ORDER Shrivastava, J. 1. The order passed in this appeal shall also govern disposal of connected Writ Appeal No. 689/2012 (Chandrapal Singh v.Board of Secondary Education and another), which has been filed by respondent/employee assailing that part of the impugned order by which back wages have not been directed to be paid. 2. The facts necessary for disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. Admittedly, the writ petitioner/respondent was serving on the post of Input Output Assistant in the office of appellants. The respondent was tried for the offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 472/34 of IPC. However, learned JMFC in criminal original case No. 2690/1998 decided on 12th September, 2002 acquitted the respondent. There is nothing on record that this order was ever set aside by any higher Court. After the acquittal from the criminal Court, the respondent/employee submitted necessary application before the employer on 8.10.2002 along with copy of the judgment that he is acquitted in the aforesaid criminal case and therefore he be permitted to join the duties. However, the employer/appellant took the respondent back in service on 30.1.2003. All these facts have not been disputed by the learned counsel for the parties. 3. It is also undisputed that earlier respondent filed a Writ Petition No. 528/2003(S) which was disposed of by learned writ Court on 4th September, 2008 (Annexuer P/7). That petition was allowed by directing the respondents that after hearing the petitioner, his case be decided in terms of fundamental Rule 54. Admittedly, thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and the employer/appellants rejected all the grievances of the respondent by considering the suspension period to be break in service. Hence, the Writ Petition No. 1286/2009 was filed by the petitioner, which has been partly allowed by the impugned order. Learned writ Court did not allow the back wages; however, the entire period of suspension was directed to be treated service period for the purpose of calculating the pension. Hence, this appeal has been filed by the employer/appellants against that part of the impugned order by which the suspension period has been directed to be treated service period for the purpose of calculating the pension. The connected Writ Appeal No. 689/2012 has been filed by the employee/writ petitioner praying to grant full back wages. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The connected Writ Appeal No. 689/2012 has been filed by the employee/writ petitioner praying to grant full back wages. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. By placing reliance upon a decision of Supreme Court in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharashtra and others (1997) 3 SCC 636 , it has been contended by Shri Dixit, learned counsel for the appellant/employer that where an acquittal order has been passed on the basis of insufficient evidence and the suspension period treated to be a suspension pending the trial, even after acquittal, the employee if reinstated in service, would not be entitled to the consequential benefits. However, Shri Dudawat, learned counsel for the respondent argued in support of the impugned order. 5. Having heard, learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered view that both the appeals deserve to be dismissed. 6. Undisputedly, the employer/appellants have held that the period of suspension cannot be computed for the purpose of calculating the pension. Learned writ Court has dealt with the situation and held that it is the settled law that an employee who is placed under suspension, the relationship of employer /master servant does not come to an end. During suspension period also his contract of service continues and he remains an employee under suspension and for this reason only the subsistence allowance is being paid to an employee. The only rider during the suspension period is that employee is debarred to perform his normal duties as an employee. Accordingly to us, learned writ Court rightly held that in cases of compulsory retirement, removal and dismissal of the contract of service comes to an end and the employee-employer relation ceases. In those cases, after reinstatement, the employer may be justified in holding that intervening period will be treated as ‘dies-non’ or not spend on duty. However, the present case rests upon different footings. It is also not disputed that earlier the employee was suspended on 1.8.1986 but his suspension was revoked on 7.9.1993 and again he was suspended on 23.1.1999. In those cases, after reinstatement, the employer may be justified in holding that intervening period will be treated as ‘dies-non’ or not spend on duty. However, the present case rests upon different footings. It is also not disputed that earlier the employee was suspended on 1.8.1986 but his suspension was revoked on 7.9.1993 and again he was suspended on 23.1.1999. In these facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that learned writ Court did not commit any error in directing that for the purpose of computing the pension, the period of suspension will be treated as service period and set aside the impugned order of the appellants dated 3.2.2009 and further directed to the appellants to count the period of suspension for the purpose of retiral dues and pension. Thus, in these facts and circumstances, the decision of Supreme Court in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar (supra) is not applicable for the reasons stated hereinabove. 7. We do not find any error in the impugned order and therefore, this appeal and connected appeal are hereby dismissed. 8. There is no stay order staying the operation of the impugned order, but despite there being an order of learned writ Court to grant the benefits within 90 days from 26.7.2012, the benefits have not yet been extended as argued by learned counsel for the respondent. The appellants/employer are hereby directed to extend the benefit on or before 31.7.2013 otherwise the said amount shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum, if the said benefit has not already been given. Let a copy of this order be kept in connected Writ Appeal No. 689/12.