JUDGMENT : Vilas V. Afzulpurkar, J. 1. Fourth respondent in WP.No.3250 of 2013 is the appellant and the fourth respondent, in this appeal, is the writ petitioner in the above writ petition. 2. For the sake of convenience, the appellant is described as tenant and the fourth respondent is described as landlady. 3. Landlady filed WP.No.3250 of 2013 questioning the proceedings of the third respondent – Prohibition and Excise Superintendent, Nellore, renewing 2B license for running bar and restaurant in favour of the appellant for the excise year 2012-2013. The said order was questioned by the landlady, inter alia, on the ground that neither there is a subsisting lease in favour of the tenant nor the landlady has authorized the tenant to remain in possession for the period for which renewal is granted. By the impugned order dated 25.06.2013, the writ petition was allowed by the learned single Judge and questioning the said order, the tenant is in appeal before us. 4. We have heard elaborate submissions of Mr. C. V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the tenant and Mr. B. Adinarayana Rao, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the landlady as well as the learned Government Pleader for Prohibition and Excise for the official respondents 1 to 3. 5.In order to appreciate the respective contentions, it would be appropriate to note the chronological events, as under, which preceded the impugned renewal of license: (a) The landlady is, admittedly, owner of premises bearing No.70-2-147 (old D.No.17/294), Aachari Street, Nellore. A portion of that premises was given on lease for one year from 01.07.2006 to 30.06.2007 to the appellant/tenant for running Saritha Bar and Restaurant. Accordingly, the tenant was granted a license under Form – 2B under the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Grant of License of Selling by Bar and Conditions of License) Rules, 2005 (for short ‘the Rules’). (b) After expiry of the initial period of license, the tenant continued in the leasehold premises with the consent of the landlady for one year from 01.07.2007 to 30.06.2008. For the following excise year 2008-2009, even in the absence of lease, the second respondent by proceedings dated 02.07.2008 directed the third respondent to grant license subject to tenant producing a lease deed within a month. The aforesaid order was questioned by the landlady in WP.No.14797 of 2008 and by order dated 10.07.2008, this Court suspended the said proceedings. For the following excise year 2008-2009, even in the absence of lease, the second respondent by proceedings dated 02.07.2008 directed the third respondent to grant license subject to tenant producing a lease deed within a month. The aforesaid order was questioned by the landlady in WP.No.14797 of 2008 and by order dated 10.07.2008, this Court suspended the said proceedings. The tenant filed an application, being WVMP.No.2210 of 2008, seeking vacation of the said order. However, by order 27.08.2008, learned single Judge declined to vacate the interim order and by dismissing the vacate petition, interim order dated 10.07.2008 was made absolute. Questioning the same, the tenant preferred WA.No.1359 of 2008, which was dismissed by order of the Division Bench dated 07.11.2008, directing hearing of the writ petition along with WA.No.567 of 2008 involving similar question. (c) In the meanwhile, the landlady filed O.S.No.614 of 2008 before the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Nellore seeking eviction of the tenant. The tenant filed WP.No.25076 of 2008 questioning the refusal by the third respondent – Prohibition and Excise Superintendent, in granting renewal of license. (d) After dismissal of WA.No.1359 of 2008, the landlady and the tenant entered into a settlement by which the challenge of the landlady in WP.No.14797 of 2008 and of the tenant in WP.No.25076 of 2008 was settled permitting the tenant to remain in the premises till 01.07.2010. Consequently, by order dated 22.12.2008, the landlady’s WP.No.14797 of 2008 and tenant’s WP.No.25076 of 2008 were disposed of duly recording the undertaking of the tenant that he would vacate the premises by 01.07.2010. Consequent upon the aforesaid settlement, the eviction suit, O.S.No.614 of 2008, filed by the landlady was also withdrawn and Form – 2B license was renewed in favour of the tenant till 01.07.2010. (e) The aforesaid agreed period for vacating was, however, extended by mutual consent of the parties by one more year and for that purpose, the tenant filed Pre-Litigation Case No.31 of 2010 before the Lok Adalat, Nellore, which was disposed of by Award No.300 of 2010 of the Lok Adalat Bench, Nellore dated 30.06.2010 duly recording the memo of compromise filed by both parties and extending fresh lease period from 01.07.2010 to 30.06.2011 apart from other mutually agreed terms. Pursuant to the said award, the third respondent renewed Form – 2B license in favour of the tenant from 01.07.2010 to 30.06.2011. Pursuant to the said award, the third respondent renewed Form – 2B license in favour of the tenant from 01.07.2010 to 30.06.2011. (f) Before expiry of the said period, the tenant sought further extension by one more year and by mutual consent a fresh Pre-Litigation Case No.198 of 2011 was filed by the tenant before the District Legal Services Authority, Nellore and the same was referred to Lok Adalat, Nellore, which passed Award No.349 of 2011 dated 30.06.2011 extending the lease period from 01.07.2011 to 30.06.2012 apart from other mutually agreed terms and conditions recorded in the award. Consequently, the third respondent further renewed Form – 2B license of the tenant from 01.07.2011 to 30.06.2012. (g) Up to this stage, there was no dispute between the tenant and the landlady. However, thereafter, the tenant claimed that the landlady executed an agreement of sale dated 02.04.2012 agreeing to sell the premises in question to the tenant for a consideration of Rs.65 lakhs and further agreeing that Rs.25 lakhs is already deposited as security deposit, while renewing the lease, it shall be treated as part payment and on receiving the further balance consideration of Rs.40 lakhs, the agreement recites that the said property is handed over to the tenant with absolute rights over the property. The landlady is also alleged to have executed a letter dated 02.04.2012 addressed to the Prohibition and Excise Superintendent, Nellore confirming the said agreement of sale and recording no objection for renewal of license. The landlady, however, disputes the agreement as well as the letter. A legal notice dated 25.06.2012 was addressed on her behalf to the tenant with a copy marked to the Prohibition and Excise Superintendent, Nellore. Under proceedings dated 26.07.2012, however, the Prohibition and Excise Superintendent, Nellore renewed the license in favour of the tenant for the excise year 2012-2013 on the ground that the dispute relating to execution of agreement of sale and no objection letter cannot be adjudicated by the Excise authorities and since the tenant is in possession and is supported by agreement of sale and no objection letter of the landlady, the renewal of license was granted. The tenant also filed O.S.No.217 of 2012 seeking specific performance of the said agreement of sale, which is pending before the V Additional District Judge, Nellore. The tenant also filed O.S.No.217 of 2012 seeking specific performance of the said agreement of sale, which is pending before the V Additional District Judge, Nellore. (h) The landlady, on the other hand, filed EP.No.41 of 2012 before the Principal District Judge, Nellore seeking execution of the Lok Adalat Award No.349 of 2011 dated 30.06.2011. The landlady also requested other three tenants in the building to vacate the premises whereupon each of the said tenants filed O.S.Nos.271, 268 and 270 of 2012 before the III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Nellore for injunction against the landlady and the said suits are said to be pending. In the meanwhile, the landlady filed the present WP.No.3250 of 2013 questioning the renewal of license for the excise year 2012-2013 granted to the tenant by the Prohibition and Excise Superintendent, Nellore under his proceedings dated 26.07.2012. By interim order dated 07.06.2013, the learned single Judge directed the third respondent not to renew the license in favour of the tenant for the excise year 2013-2014. Seeking vacation of the said order, the tenant filed WVMP.No.1685 of 2013. Learned single Judge heard and disposed of the main writ petition at that stage and on finding that the renewal of the license for the excise year under the impugned proceedings was illegal, set aside the same by giving liberty to the tenant to approach the civil Court for appropriate relief. Since the learned single Judge allowed the writ petition, the tenant preferred this appeal. 6. Mr. C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the tenant, submitted that Rule 6 of the Rules read with Rule 9-A of the Rules is completely misconstrued by the learned single Judge. Learned senior counsel also points out that the status of the tenant is changed after the agreement of sale and the said status of the tenant is merged into a higher right, as an agreement holder in possession and as such, Rule 6 (vi) itself would not apply. Learned senior counsel also submits that Rule 9-A of the Rules deals with renewal of license, which does not stipulate fulfilling of conditions, as required under Rule 6 of the Rules, in the first instance. Learned senior counsel also submits that Rule 9-A of the Rules deals with renewal of license, which does not stipulate fulfilling of conditions, as required under Rule 6 of the Rules, in the first instance. Learned senior counsel submits that when a tenant seeks license and fulfills the conditions of Rule 6 of the Rules, while seeking renewal of license, Rule 9-A alone is applicable and it is not necessary for the tenant to fulfill all the conditions under Rule 6 all over again. Learned senior counsel also submits that the agreement of sale, which is being enforced through the specific performance suit, was rightly taken into consideration for granting renewal in favour of the tenant and as such, the impugned proceedings of the Prohibition and Excise Superintendent granting renewal for the excise year 2102-2013 was not required to be set aside, as it has been done by the learned single Judge. 7. Learned senior counsel would submit that the agreement of sale creates an interest in property and has distinguished the cases relied upon by the learned single Judge on the ground that the Rules under different enactments such as Cinema Regulations Act cannot be made applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case, which is governed by specific Rules, as above. Learned senior counsel placed reliance upon various decisions, reference to which would be made appropriately hereunder. Learned senior counsel, therefore, submits that irrespective of the dispute raised by the landlady with regard to the agreement of sale and no objection letter, the issue is under adjudication before the competent civil court and as such, the excise authorities were well within their right in renewing the excise license, awaiting and subject to the decision of the civil Court. It is also contended that the learned single Judge relied upon his earlier judgment in Mandakini Bar and Restaurant case, but the said judgment has not attained finality and is subject matter of WA.No.567 of 2008 and on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the tenant, who is supported by an agreement of sale where he has paid full consideration, the renewal of license under the Excise Act cannot be denied to him. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. B. Adinaryana Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the landlady, on the contrary, submits that the agreement of sale relied upon by the tenant, apparently, shows that it is an agreement coupled with possession, which is a compulsorily registerable document under Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act, 1908 and in the absence of registration, it is totally inadmissible and cannot be looked into. Learned senior counsel points out that the award of the Lok Adalat in Award No.349 of 2011 permitted the tenant to remain in possession up to 30.06.2012 and clause 6 of the award further states that the tenant shall vacate the building at the time of expiry of lease period without any claim for good will and in terms of the award, the tenant was bound to vacate the premises. The landlady has, therefore, rightly filed the execution petition, which is pending. Learned senior counsel, therefore, submits that the tenant has no legal right to remain in possession much less seek renewal of his license beyond 30.06.2012. Learned senior counsel would, however, submit that the liquor trade, being a privilege, a conjoint reading of Rules 6 and 9-A of the Rules would point out that where it is the license, in the first instance, or renewal thereafter, Rule 6 has to be complied with, otherwise any subsequent event occurring within the initial period of license will have to be ignored while granting renewal. It is further contended that renewal in effect is a grant of fresh license and thereby, Rule 6 of the Rules in entirety is attracted even for the case of renewal. Learned senior counsel, therefore, supports the impugned order of the learned single Judge and places reliance upon various decisions to support his contention that renewal is a fresh grant. 9. In the light of these rival contentions, the following questions arise for consideration in this appeal: 1. Whether an applicant seeking renewal of license is required to fulfill the conditions under Rule 6 of the Rules even though Rule 9-A provides for renewal whereas Rule 6 provides for conditions to be fulfilled for grant of license, in the first instance? 2. What is the effect of the Lok Adalat Award No.349 of 2011 dated 30.06.2011 and whether the excise authorities could consider the case of the tenant on the basis of subsequent agreement of sale, which is disputed by the landlady? 2. What is the effect of the Lok Adalat Award No.349 of 2011 dated 30.06.2011 and whether the excise authorities could consider the case of the tenant on the basis of subsequent agreement of sale, which is disputed by the landlady? QUESTION No.1: 10. Before considering the question framed, it is appropriate to notice Section 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, which provides that ‘no person shall sell or buy any intoxicant except under the authority and in accordance with the terms and conditions of license granted in this behalf’. Section 29 of the Excise Act provides that subject to, as rules may prescribe, the authority granting license may require the licensee to give security for due observance of terms and conditions of license and to execute a counter part agreement in terms of license. Rule 6 and Rule 9-A of the Rules framed under Section 72 of the Excise Act are as follows: “6. Restrictions on the grant of Licence: (1) A licence in Form-2B shall not be granted. (i) Unless the premises has: - (a) a minimum plinth area of 150 sq. meters, out of which a minimum of 100 Sq. Mts. Shall be RCC Roof structure. (b) … (c)Sanitary equipment like wash basin, water closet separately for ladies and gents. (d)Facility for cooking and serving complete means of good quality to the consumers as licensed by local authority. (e) Air conditioning or Air cooling facility in rooms and halls of licensed premises. (f) Adequate vehicle parking arrangements. (ii) Within 100 meters from educational institution recognized by the Government, places for public worship such as Temples registered by the Endowments Department, Mosques registered with the Wakf Board, Churches and Hospitals. (iii) Within 500 meters of predominantly residential area but licences may however be sanctioned if the proposed premises is located on a main road used for shopping purposes. Provided that the restrictions in clause (i) to (iii) shall not be applicable to Star Hotels (3 Star and above) certified by the Tourism Department of the State or Central Government. (iv) Within 50 meters of a Highway. (v) Unless the applicant produces Trade licence from the local authority concerned for grant of 2-B licence. (vi) Unless the applicant produced the lease deed on a Stamp paper for the proposed licensed premises from the owner of the premises. (iv) Within 50 meters of a Highway. (v) Unless the applicant produces Trade licence from the local authority concerned for grant of 2-B licence. (vi) Unless the applicant produced the lease deed on a Stamp paper for the proposed licensed premises from the owner of the premises. Explanation:- For the purpose of this rule: (a)“Place of public worship” means a temple registered with the Endowments Department, Mosque registered with the Wakf Board and Church and includes such other religious institutions, as the State Government may by order specify in this behalf; (b)“Educational Institutions” means any Primary School, Middle School and High School recognized by the State Government or Central Government, Junior College or any College affiliated to any University established by law; (c)“Highway” means National Highway or State Highway and shall not include the part of the National Highway or State Highway which passes within the limits of Municipal Corporation, Municipality or the Gouthan in any village or Panchayat area. (d)“Hospital” means any hospital which is managed or owned by a local authority, State Government or Central Government or any private hospital having a provision of at least (30) beds.” “9-A. Renewal of 2-B Licence:-- (1) Before 15 days of expiry of the license, the licensee may apply for renewal of 2B license to the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise concerned or any other officer authorized by the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, A.P. Hyderabad. (2) An application for renewal for license shall bear a court fee stamp of the requisite value as per the provisions of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and shall be submitted to the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise or any other Officer authorized by the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, A.P. Hyderabad together with a Challan in original for Rs.10,000/- towards renewal fee and a Challan in original in support of having paid the requisite licence fee as prescribed in Rule 10. Along with proof of payment of trade licence fee for the current year. (3) In case the application for renewal of licence is made as prescribed in sub-rule (2) and the licence is not duly renewed and returned before the licence expired, the licencee shall have the right to carry on business till the renewal is refused and the fact intimated. (3) In case the application for renewal of licence is made as prescribed in sub-rule (2) and the licence is not duly renewed and returned before the licence expired, the licencee shall have the right to carry on business till the renewal is refused and the fact intimated. If the application is not made within the time it shall not however be open to the licencee to continue the business on the expiry of the licence. (4) Before the issue of licence, the licensee shall execute a counterpart agreement in Form 4-B on the stamp paper of requisite value as per provisions of Indian Stamp Act, 1899.” Form – 2B license may also be noticed as under: FORM-2B (See Rule 4) License fro the Sale of Indian Liquor/Foreign Liquor by Bar to be Consumed on the Premises I, … Prohibition and Excise Superintendent … in consideration of the payment of a fee of Rs. … (Rs. … only), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged and hereby licence you … to sell all kinds of Indian Liquor and Foreign Liquor on the premises … bearing No … the details of which are as follows: - BOUNDARIES 1. East: 2. Wet: 3. North: 4. South: Locality Village/Town within the marginally noted boundaries during the period commencing from 1st July 20… and ending with 30th June 20… subject to the following conditions and stipulations to be observed by you the said Viz., 1. No liquor shall be sold for removal from the licensed premises. 2.The Licensee other than a five star hotel and above shall not purchase or stock Indian Made Foreign Liquor and Foreign Liquor in bottles of sizes less than 750 ml except beer, Wine and Ready to Drink varieties. 3.The licensee is prohibited from purifying colouring and flavouring the liquor or making any material therewith and from blending another kind of liquor with it or to keep in his possession other than authorized under the licence. 4. The Licensee is prohibited from bottling liquors. 5. The possession or sale of diluted beer by the licensee is prohibited. 6. All Indian Made Foreign Liquor and Foreign Liquor sold under this licence shall be duty paid and obtained from the Andhra Pradesh Beverages Corporation Limited. 7.The Licensee shall maintain and furnish to the Prohibition and Excise Superintendent statistics showing the consumption of all kinds of liquors separately. 8. 6. All Indian Made Foreign Liquor and Foreign Liquor sold under this licence shall be duty paid and obtained from the Andhra Pradesh Beverages Corporation Limited. 7.The Licensee shall maintain and furnish to the Prohibition and Excise Superintendent statistics showing the consumption of all kinds of liquors separately. 8. The Licence is not transferable. 9.The Licence shall be subject to cancellation or suspension at will by the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise. 10. The Licensee shall not act in any manner prejudicial to the interest of the revenues of the Government. Date: Day of ______ 20____ Prohibition and Excise Superintendent” Counter part agreement contemplated is required to be under Form – 4B as under: FORM-4B (See Rule 4) Counterpart Agreement to Sell Indian Made Foreign Liquor, Foreign Liquor by Bar (As required under Section 29 of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968) I/We, … S/o. … age … years have severally/jointly obtained the Licence in Form II … under the name and style of M/s. … at premises No. … for the period from … to … on payment of Licence Fee/Proportionate licence fee of Rs. … I/We do hereby affirm, agree and covenant with the licensing authority: (i)That, I/We shall be severally/jointly responsible to abide by the terms and conditions of the License as laid down in the license in Form iL-2B dated … and The Andhra Pradesh Excise (Grant of License of Selling by Bar and Conditions of Licence) rules, 2005. (ii)That, I/We shall abide by the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 and the Rules and Order there under existing and also those that would be issued from to time. (iii)That, I/We shall abide by all general conditions applicable to the sale of intoxicants and also the instructions issued by the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, in this regard from time to time. (iv)That, I/We shall be bound to pay the license fee, excise duty and security deposit or any enhanced license fee, excide duty and security deposit, and the like levied from time to time. (v) That, I/We shall be bound to pay the penalties or privilege fee levied from time to time. (iv)That, I/We shall be bound to pay the license fee, excise duty and security deposit or any enhanced license fee, excide duty and security deposit, and the like levied from time to time. (v) That, I/We shall be bound to pay the penalties or privilege fee levied from time to time. (vi)That, I/We hereby agree that the license is liable to be cancelled on the basis of any adverse report of investigation for any lapse which amounts to contravention of any Rule or any conditions of license or any other provisions of Law and also for any conviction in any criminal case at any time either in the past or in future. (vii) If the license is surrendered in the middle of the lease period, I/We shall not be eligible for refund of License Fee. (viii) That, If I/We fail to pay the gallonage fee, Excise Duty, Penalties or Privilege fee etc., if any due to the Government on time, the license is liable to be cancelled and the entire amount so due, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, may be recovered by way of distraining my/our movable and immovable property whatsoever I/We possess and selling the said properties under the Andhra Pradesh Revenue Recovery Act. This agreement is executed in favour of the licensing authority and the said authority may enforce the above terms and conditions agreed to by me/us. Place: Signature of the Licensee/Licensees. Date: Witness: 1. 2. I certify that Sri/Sarvasri … S/o … R/o. H.No. … Name of the locality, village or town … is known to me/identified by Sri Sarvasri … known to me, executed the agreement and signed before me. Signature of the Licensing Authority Official Designation and Seal” 11. It would be evident from the above that Rule 9-A of the Rules, which deals with renewal of license under Form – 2B by itself does not prescribe any pre-conditions except that the licensee may apply for renewal 15 days before expiry of license and that it should bear Court fee stamp of requisite value together with a challan for Rs.10,000/-along with proof of payment of trade license fee for the current year. Rule 6 whereunder a license is granted, in the first instance, under Form – 2B stipulates several preconditions regarding minimum plinth area, sanitary equipments, facility for cooking, air-conditioning or air-cooling facility, adequate parking space, minimum distance required to be maintained from educational institutions or place of public worship, location of the licensed premises away from the residential area and highway, premises must have a valid trade license and if the applicant is a lessee, appropriate no objection of the owner etc. 12. A reading of Rule 9-A of the Rules exclusively, no doubt, supports the contention of the learned senior counsel for the tenant. However, when we test the said proposition it is not possible to sustain the contention that while seeking renewal, pre-conditions under Rule 6 of the Rules need not be followed. For instance, after license is granted initially in terms of Rule 6 of the Rules, it cannot be ruled out that an educational institution or a place of worship may come up within the prohibited distance of such bar and restaurant or it cannot be ruled out that a trade license at a particular locality would not be granted by the licensing authority for various reasons. If any of such events occur within the initial one year period of license, the renewal for subsequent year would directly violate the pre-conditions under Rule 6 of the Rules. Moreover, just because Form – 2B license is granted for running a bar and restaurant, it would not put a restraint on any education institution or a place of worship or the conversion of area into predominantly residential area during the currency of that license. The situation with regard to the location of the licensed premises, as it exists on the date of initial grant, may or may not exist when the license comes up for renewal for the subsequent year or thereafter. If the situation remains unchanged, the license may be renewed but in order to enable the authorities to examine whether the renewal can be permitted or not, the licensee has to satisfy that the renewal of license is permissible in terms of Rule 6 of the Rules. Rule 9-A of the Rules, therefore, need not provide all the pre-conditions under Rule 6 of the Rules all over again; as even a renewal, for all purposes, is a fresh grant. Rule 9-A of the Rules, therefore, need not provide all the pre-conditions under Rule 6 of the Rules all over again; as even a renewal, for all purposes, is a fresh grant. Hence, in our view, renewal merely amounts to grant of license for a fresh term and as such, all other requirements, which the applicant has to fulfill before grant of license must be fulfilled. Rule 9-A of the Rules read with Rule 6 of the Rules, therefore, provide for a complete mechanism while dealing with applications for license or their renewal and both the said rules will have to read conjointly rather than disjointly. 13. A few decisions of the Supreme Court may be noticed, at this stage, which throw light on the aforesaid aspects. N.S. SHETHNA v. VINUBHAI HARILAL PANCHAL ( AIR 1967 SC 1036 ) was a case dealing with renewal of license under the Cinematography Act and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder: “5. … The Rules relating to the licence for sale of tickets provide as aforesaid that the maximum period for which such a licence can be issued is one year. Renewal of a licence is provided for but only indirectly and in a sort of an off-hand manner by cl. 4 of Form F. It appears therefrom that a licencee has to produce his licence, pay the renewal fee and get entries made on it reverse as to the date of renewal, the period upto which it would be valid on such renewal and the fees having been paid therefore. Since the Rules do not provide as to how much are the fees for renewal it must be presumed that the fees are the same as for the licence itself it is clear from the Rules that they do not contain anything to show that the renewed licence is a continuation of the licence previously issued except the fact that the Authority has to make the said entries on the reverse of the licence. The fact that the Rules do not make any provision for the power to renew, the procedure for renewal and for its fees .as is done in Chapter VI in the case of a cinema licence is all indication that the draftsman equated renewal of a licence with the issuance of a licence. The fact that the Rules do not make any provision for the power to renew, the procedure for renewal and for its fees .as is done in Chapter VI in the case of a cinema licence is all indication that the draftsman equated renewal of a licence with the issuance of a licence. It may also be observed that it is not as if renewal is automatic nor is to be granted as a matter of Course. If the Licensing Authority desires to impose any fresh conditions there is nothing in the Rules to prevent him from doing so. That being so, a renewal cannot, unless the context requires otherwise, be regarded as a continuation of the licence previously issued. There is also nothing in Chapter VIII or in Form indicating that the renewal is such a continuation.” “8. In our view the fact that renewal is not a matter of course, the fact that the licensing authority can in proper circumstances refuse an application for renewal and is not precluded from imposing different conditions and can grant it for a different period coupled with the absence of any Rules for renewal are all indications leading to the result that renewal is a fresh grant and is not merely continuation of the licence previously issued. The High Court was therefore correct in allowing the writ petition on a conclusion that the show cause notice relating to the licence for the year 1960 could not be regarded as a show cause notice in respect of the renewal for the next year and if the renewed licence was sought to be affected in the inquiry a fresh show cause notice relating to the renewed licence was necessary.” DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. DURGA CHAND KAUSHISH (1973) 2 SCC 825 ) and para 7 thereof is extracted hereunder: “7. If the plaintiff was not entitled initially to a lease of 90 years for the rent agreed upon but the rent was liable to be increased within that period, as appeared to be the real case of the defendants in the High Court, there was no question of grant of a fresh lease. A renewal of a lease is really the grant of a fresh lease. It is called a "renewal" simply because it postulates the existence of a prior lease which generally provides for renewals as of right. A renewal of a lease is really the grant of a fresh lease. It is called a "renewal" simply because it postulates the existence of a prior lease which generally provides for renewals as of right. In all other respects, it is really a fresh lease. Thus, the initial term of a lease of ninety years could not co-exist with the renewals of that very lease within ninety years. Hence, the appellant’s counsel was compelled to argue that the initial period of the lease must be deemed to be 20 years. If the argument advanced by the appellant is correct, the Plaintiff-respondent would be merely a tenant "holding over" after expiry of twenty years. But, that is not the defendants’ case in their written statement. If, as the words used in covenant No. 9 clearly signify, enhancement of rent is made conditional upon grant of a fresh lease, it could only take place, on the expiry of the, initial lease and not before that time. That could be either ninety years or twenty years but not both simultaneously.” M.C. MEHTA v. UNION OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS. (2004) 12 SCC 118 ) and para 76 thereof is extracted hereunder: “76. In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp.(1) SCC 504] agreeing with views expressed in Ambica Quarry Works, it was held that the FC Act applies to renewals as well and even if there was a provision for renewal in the lease agreement on exercise of lessee's option, the requirement of the Act had to be satisfied before such renewal could be granted. In State of M.P. & Ors. v. Krishnadas Tikaram [1995 Supp.(1) SCC 587], these two decisions were relied upon and it was held that even the renewal of lease cannot be granted without the prior concurrence of the Central Government. It is settled law that the grant of renewal is a fresh grant and must be consistent with law.” The first question is accordingly answered against the tenant. Question No.2: 14. In order to appreciate the question posed, let us now examine the legal authorities cited by the learned senior counsel for the tenant. Learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in KRISHNA KISHORE FIRM v. GOVT. Question No.2: 14. In order to appreciate the question posed, let us now examine the legal authorities cited by the learned senior counsel for the tenant. Learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in KRISHNA KISHORE FIRM v. GOVT. OF A.P. ( AIR 1990 SC 2292 ) where the nature of possession of a lessee, who acquired interest of one of the co-lessors, before the expiry of period of lease, was discussed and considered. Learned senior counsel heavily relies upon the following passages from the aforesaid decision: “4. True the appellant was neither owner nor lessee. Yet was his possession forbidden in law? Was there no excuse for his possession? The error committed by High Court was to equate lawful with legal. Legal and lawful, normally, convey same sense and are usually interchangeable. What is legal is lawful. But what is lawful may be so without being formally legal. "The principle distinction between the terms 'lawful' and 'legal' is that former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law. To say of an act that it is lawful implies that it is authorised, sanctioned or at any rate not forbidden by law". Black's Law Dictionary. Same thought about lawful has been brought out by Pollock and Wright by explaining that "Lawful Possession" means a legal possession which is also rightful or at least excusable. Pollock and Wright Possession in the Common Law. Thus that which is not stricto legal may yet be lawful. It should not be forbidden by law. In fact legal is associated with provisions in the Act, rules etc. whereas lawful visualises all that is not illegal against law or even permissible. Lawful is wider in connotation than legal. Although provision in specific Relief Act empowering a person or tenant to recover possession if he has been evicted forcibly by the Landlord, may be juridical and not lawful or a tenant holding over is not in lawful possession unless landlord agrees or acquiesces expressly or impliedly but that does not alter the legal position about possession of a person not legal yet not without interest. The provision in specific Relief Act is founded more on public policy than on jurisprudence. But concept of lawful as opposed or in contradistinction to litigious assumes different dimension. The provision in specific Relief Act is founded more on public policy than on jurisprudence. But concept of lawful as opposed or in contradistinction to litigious assumes different dimension. M.C. Chockalingam v. M. Manichavasagam [1974] 2 SCR 143 is of no help as it was concerned with possession which could not be said to be warranted or authorised by law. Distinction between nature of possession of a lessee after expiry of period of lease can better be explained by resorting to few illustrations. For instance a lessee may before expiry of lease acquire entire lessor's interest resulting in "drowning" or "sinking" of inferior right into superior right. That is right of one merges into another. It has been statutorily recognised by Section 111(d) of Transfer of Property Act. Similarly a tenant after expiry of period of lease may be holding over and the lessor may acquiesce in his continuance expressly or impliedly. That is from conduct of lessor the tenant's possession may stand converted into lawful. The other may be where lessor may not agree to renew the lease nor he may acquiesce in his continuance. Such a lessee cannot claim any right or interest. His possession is neither legal nor lawful. Such was the Chockalingam's case (supra). The Court held that continuance of lessee's possession after expiry of period of lease was not lawful for purposes of renewal of licence under Madras Cinema Regulation Act 1955 obviously because lessee was left with no interest which could furnish any excuse or give it even colour of being legal.” “5. ... Whether such joint owner could transfer his share even when he was not in exclusive possession and what would be effect of such transfer need not be gone into as title suit is pending between parties but when a person having physical control acquires an interest to hold or continue by virtue of an agreement of sale it cannot be said that he had no interest and his possession was forbidden by law. The High Court lost sight of the fact that by virtue of the transaction entered between V.V. and appellant which was not challenged by him nor any cloud was cast over it by creating any subsequent interest the appellant may not have become owner but he could certainly claim that he was in lawful possession. The High Court lost sight of the fact that by virtue of the transaction entered between V.V. and appellant which was not challenged by him nor any cloud was cast over it by creating any subsequent interest the appellant may not have become owner but he could certainly claim that he was in lawful possession. In law he was entitled to file suit for specific performance if there was any threat to his right or interest by V.V. Such right or interest could not be termed as litigious. It was at least not without any excuse or forbidden by law. In words and Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 25A, 2nd reprint 1976 a somewhat similar situation was described as not litigious:” 15. It would be noticed from the above decision that on account of the interest of a co-lessor having been transferred to the lessee, the possession of the lessee was held to be lawful. It is, however, significant to notice in the extracted portion of para 5, above, that the said transfer of interest was not disputed or challenged nor a cloud was cast over it. In other words, therefore, on the facts of that case, the document under which the tenant acquired interest of the co-lessor was not disputed by the said co-lessor unlike the case on hand whether the landlady disputes the very agreement and the letter of no objection as forged and fabricated. In view of that, therefore, we are of the view that the aforesaid decision does not support the contention of the learned senior counsel. 16. Learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in JOSEPH KANTHARAJ v. ATTHARUNNISA BEGUM S (2010) 2 SCC 619 ) where the Supreme Court considered similar defence of a tenant to eviction proceedings under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. Section 43 of that Act fell for consideration wherein it was held that the Court must be, prima facie, satisfied that the agreement is genuine and defence is bonafide for giving benefit of Section 43 of the Act. 17. Another decision of the Supreme Court in SHRIMANT SHAMRAO URYAVANSHI. v. PRALHAD BHAIROBA SURYAVANSHI BY LRS. Section 43 of that Act fell for consideration wherein it was held that the Court must be, prima facie, satisfied that the agreement is genuine and defence is bonafide for giving benefit of Section 43 of the Act. 17. Another decision of the Supreme Court in SHRIMANT SHAMRAO URYAVANSHI. v. PRALHAD BHAIROBA SURYAVANSHI BY LRS. ( AIR 2002 SC 960 ) is also pressed into service by the learned senior counsel by contenting that in view of the fact that possession is delivered to the tenant under the aforesaid agreement of sale, even under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act the tenant is entitled to defend his possession so long as tenant is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and various requirements thereunder, on the facts of that case, held that the agreement holder in possession was entitled to protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. In addition to above, a decision of the learned single Judge of the Madras High court in K. PORUTHAMMAL v. THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DRUGS CONTROL, ZONE IV (2008) 4 MLJ 1151 ) is also relied upon where the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and the Rules framed thereunder fell for consideration. The requirement of grant of license under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, for grant or renewal of license, was mainly with reference to the suitability of the premises for such trade, as Druggist and Pharmacist, which has to satisfy Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules unlike the position under the Cinematograph Act or under the Petroleum Rules. 18. Another decision in M/S. RAGHAVENDRA ENTERPRISES v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (ILR 2011 (KAR) 5703) is also relied upon, which deals with license under the Cinematograph Act and para 32, thereof, is relied upon, which is self-explanatory as under: “32. Therefore, in the instant case Cause 16 of the agreement of lease dated 26.04.1974 is the foundation for renewal to be entered into between the parties and so long as the parties do not enter into any registered agreement for a further renewal period of 10 years the continuation of for a further renewal period of 10 years the continuation of the possession of the property in question by the Petitioner cannot be held to be unlawful. Infact Clause 16 is the foundation on the basis of which fresh rights enure to the lesser as well as to the lessee and particularly to the lessee in the instant case, since the lessee only has an option to seek renewal of lease for a further period of 10 years. Therefore, so long as there is no determination of rights between the parties arising under Clause 16 of the agreement despite initial expiry of the lease period, the continuation in possession of the property in question by the Petitioner has to be held to be lawful. The fact that rents have been paid by the lessee in the instant case would mean that the tenancy is a month to month tenancy and the Petitioner's right to seek specific performance of the contract is subject to terms of Clause 16. As already observed the same is a subject matter of O.S. No. 5135/2008 and it is not for this Court to make any observations on the rights of the respective parties in that regard.” 19. Per contra, Mr. B. Adinarayana Rao, learned senior counsel for the landlady, relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in M.C. CHOCKALINGAM v. V. MANICKAVASAGAM (1974) 1 SCC 48 ) where the Supreme Court while dealing with Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1957 and the Rules framed thereunder considered the meaning of lawful and juridical position of a tenant whose lease expired by efflux of time, but who continued in possession. The following passages from the said decision would be illuminating and appropriate. “12. The principal question, therefore, that comes for decision in this appeal is whether a tenant, who is not a statutory tenant, is entitled to claim to be in lawful possession of the premises on determination of the tenancy, on expiry of the lease. We may quote what the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held in its own words: "Such possession is quite good against the entire world except the landlord himself. The landlord will be entitled to evict him by the appropriate proceedings. Until then we are of the view that the erstwhile tenant cannot be regarded as being in unlawful possession. We are inclined to think that his possession is wrongful but not unlawful. It is wrongful, because the erstwhile tenant continues in possession beyond expiry of the period fixed in the lease. Until then we are of the view that the erstwhile tenant cannot be regarded as being in unlawful possession. We are inclined to think that his possession is wrongful but not unlawful. It is wrongful, because the erstwhile tenant continues in possession beyond expiry of the period fixed in the lease. It is not unlawful, because the landlord cannot take the law into his own hands and evict him. He can evict him only by proper procedure and, that being the case, it cannot be said that the erstwhile tenant is in unlawful possession” “13. We are concerned in this case with the concept of 'lawful possession' in the context of the Act with which we are concerned. As stated earlier, Rule 13 has got two parts and we are concerned in this case with the second part. A great stress has been given by Mr. Setalvad upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Lalu Yeshwant Singh's case (supra) where this Court considered the possession of a tenant after expiry of the lease, as in this case, as a juridical possession in the context of a provision similar to Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. He emphasises that such a juridical possession would be a lawful possession, as it is protected by law, namely, under Section 6 (new) of the Specific Relief Act. Mr. Setalvad submits that since even with the best of title to the property the landlord cannot forcibly dispossess a tenant after expiry of the lease, his possession is not only protected by law but also recognised by law and, therefore, his possession is lawful possession and the licensing authority was right in renewing the licence which the Board of Revenue had wrongly interfered with. After giving anxious consideration, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Setalvad. All that Section 6(new) of the Specific Relief Act provides is that a person, even if he is a landlord, cannot take the law into his own hands and forcibly evict a tenant after expiry of the lease. This section has relevance only to the wrongful act of a person, if it be by the landlord, in forcibly recovering possession of the property without recourse to law. Section 6 frowns upon forcible dispossession without recourse to law but docs not at the same time declare that the possession of the evicted person is a lawful possession. This section has relevance only to the wrongful act of a person, if it be by the landlord, in forcibly recovering possession of the property without recourse to law. Section 6 frowns upon forcible dispossession without recourse to law but docs not at the same time declare that the possession of the evicted person is a lawful possession. The question of lawful possession does not enter the issue at that stage. All that the court is then required to consider is whether an evicted person has been wrongfully dispossessed and he has come to the court within six months of the dispossession. The various civil rights between the landlord and the tenant will have to be adjudicated upon finally in a regular civil suit if filed. Mr. Setalvad has drawn our attention to the definition of the word 'juridical' in Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth edition, at page 990. There the definition is given as follows: - Juridical : "Relating to administration of justice, or office of a judge. "Regular; done in conformity to the laws of the country and the practice which is there observed". Mr. Setalvad submits that possession of the licencee in this case is in conformity with the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and what is juridical is also lawful. In the same Dictionary at page 1032 the word 'lawful' is also defined as follows: - Lawful : "Legal; warranted or authorised by the law; having the qualifications prescribed by law; not contrary to nor forbidden by the law". It is difficult to appreciate how possession in the instant case can be said to be "warranted or authorised by the law" as per the above definition. On the other hand, what is 'contrary to or forbidden by the law' is only the forcible dispossession of a tenant which may even engender breach of the peace …” “16. Law in general prescribes and insists upon a specified conduct in human, relationship or even otherwise. Within the limits of the law, courts strive to take note of the moral fabric of the law. In the instant case, under the terms of the lease, file property had to be handed over to the lessor. Besides under section 108(q) of the Transfer of Property Act, on the determination of the lease, the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property. In the instant case, under the terms of the lease, file property had to be handed over to the lessor. Besides under section 108(q) of the Transfer of Property Act, on the determination of the lease, the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property. Since the landlord has not assented to the lessee’s continuance in possession of the property, the lessee will be liable, to mesne profits which can again be recovered only in terms of his wrongful possession. Under section 5 (1) of the Act, the licensing authority in deciding whether to grant or refuse a licence has regard, amongst others, to the interest of the public generally. Public interest is, therefore also involved in granting or refusing a licence. That being the position, the expression, ‘lawful possession’ in rule 13 assumes a peculiar significance of its own in the context of the provisions of the Act. Here in any view of the matter possession of the respondents on the expiry of the lease is not lawful possession within the meaning of rule 13. The High Court, is, therefore, not correct in its interpretation of rule 13. The Board of Revenue in appeal was, on the other hand, right in interfering with the order of the licensing authority and the learned single Judge of the High Court rightly refused to interfere with the order of the Board under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 20. Reliance is also placed upon a Full Bench judgment of this Court in SMT. Y. ANASUYA v. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ( 1993 (1) ALT 661 (FB) arising under the A.P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955 and which has considered the scope of the words lawful possession, which the licensing authority is required to go into while granting or renewing license. The following passage therefrom is relevant and is extracted, as under: “13. …The question is whether ‘lawful possession’ is not one such relevant consideration. In our view, lawful possession is a very relevant facts that could be legitimately taken into account by the licensing authority in the matter of renewal of licence. In this context, we will revert back to Rule 13. …The question is whether ‘lawful possession’ is not one such relevant consideration. In our view, lawful possession is a very relevant facts that could be legitimately taken into account by the licensing authority in the matter of renewal of licence. In this context, we will revert back to Rule 13. Sub-Rule (6-A) of Rule which was inserted in the year 1976 mandates that “a renewed licence shall be deemed to be a continuation of original licence.” This rule, in express terms embodies the general principle that renewal is virtually a fresh grant. While dealing with the renewal of a mining lease, the Supreme Court in State of T.N. vs. M/s. Hind Stone [ AIR 1981 SC 711 ] observed that an application for the renewal of lease is in essence, an application for the grant of lease for a fresh period. When such is the case, there is no reason why the requirement of lawful possession which is relevant for the purpose of initial grant of licence should cease to be so in the case of renewal. At both stages, the consideration whether the applicant is in lawful possession could legitimately weight with the licensing authority; otherwise the idea of continuity of licence will make little sense. Incidentally it may be noticed that the Act itself does not spell out any distinction between a grant and renewal of a licence. The word ‘renewal’ is not used anywhere in the Act evidently because the legislature thought that renewal is only a facet of grant and it partakes of the same character as the grant. The rule in express terms reaffirms the same idea by saying that the renewed licence is a continuation of the original licence. That lawful possession is very much in the forefront of the mind of the rule-making authority at all crucial stages is evident from the fact that proof of lawful possession is insisted upon at the stage of grant of no-objection certificate for construction as well as at the stage of grant of licence for exhibition of films. That lawful possession is very much in the forefront of the mind of the rule-making authority at all crucial stages is evident from the fact that proof of lawful possession is insisted upon at the stage of grant of no-objection certificate for construction as well as at the stage of grant of licence for exhibition of films. As there is no qualitative difference between grant and renewal, as the Rule (Rule 13(6-A) itself indicates, it would be consistent with the intention of the rule-maker to infer that lawful possession should also be regarded as a relevant consideration for the purpose of renewal.” The Full Bench, thereafter, followed the ratio of the decision M.C. CHOCKALINGAM’s case (9 supra) and answered the reference holding that the licensing authority can legitimately enquire, while renewing the license, as to the question of lawful possession. 21.Another decision of the Supreme Court in STATE OF M.P. v. KRISHNADAS TIKARAM (1995 SUPP (1) SCC 587) is also relied upon where the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider and interpret whether renewal is a fresh grant while considering a mining lease and it was held that grant of renewal is a fresh grant and must be made consistent with law. Similar view is also expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in APSRTC, MUSHIRABAD v. STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, ANDHRA PRADESH ( 2001 (6) ALD 795 ) while considering renewal of permit under Section 81 of the Motor Vehicles Act where it is held that the grant of renewal is not automatic and it can be granted only after complying the pre-conditions set out by the Act, as it is a privilege and not a right accrued. 22. Learned senior counsel relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in STATE OF TAMIL NADU V. HIND STONE ( AIR 1981 SC 711 ) wherein while dealing with the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, it was held in para 12 as follows: “12. The next question for consideration is whether Rule 8-C is attracted when applications for renewal of leases are dealt with. The argument was that Rule 9 itself laid down the criteria for grant of renewal of leases and therefore Rule 8-C should be confined, in its application, to grant of leases in the first instance. We are unable to see the force of the submission. The argument was that Rule 9 itself laid down the criteria for grant of renewal of leases and therefore Rule 8-C should be confined, in its application, to grant of leases in the first instance. We are unable to see the force of the submission. Rule 9 makes it clear that a renewal is not to be obtained automatically, for the mere asking. The applicant for the renewal has, particularly, to satisfy the Government that the renewal is in the interests of mineral development and that the lease amount is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. These conditions have to be fulfilled in addition to whatever criteria is applicable at the time of the grant of lease in the first instance, suitably adapted, of course, to grant of renewal. Not to apply the criteria applicable in the first instance may lead to absurd results. If as a result of experience gained after watching the performance of private entrepreneurs in the mining of minor minerals it is decided to stop grant of leases in the private sector in the interest of conservation of the particular mineral resource, attainment of the object sought will be frustrated if renewal is to be granted to private entrepreneurs without regard to the changed outlook. In fact, some of the applicants for renewal of leases may themselves be the persons who are responsible for the changed outlook. To renew leases in favour of such persons would make the making of Rule 8C a mere exercise in futility. It must be remembered that an application for the renewal of a lease is, in essence an application for the grant of a lease for a fresh period. We are, therefore, of the view that Rule 8C is attracted in considering applications for renewal of leases also.” 23. Learned single Judge of this Court in MANDAKINI RESTAURANT AND BAR V. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF PROHIBITION AND EXCISE ( 2008 (4) ALD 188 ), in identical circumstances, held that the licensee must comply with all requirements of Rule 6 of the rules even at the time of renewal of license. The said judgment is, however, subject matter of WA.No.567 of 2008. Hence, we have independently considered all the questions in this appeal. 24. The said judgment is, however, subject matter of WA.No.567 of 2008. Hence, we have independently considered all the questions in this appeal. 24. From an analysis of the legal position, as above, it is evident that the agreement of sale and delivery of possession thereunder, as claimed by the tenant, is seriously disputed by the landlady. The said agreement is, admittedly, an unregistered document, though it is coupled with delivery of possession. Learned senior counsel for the landlady placed reliance upon Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act, 1908, which provides as follows: “17. Documents of which registration is compulsory:- (1)…… (1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purpose of the said Section 53-A.” Learned senior counsel points out that, as the said document is not registered, the same has no effect for the purpose of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. We may also notice the explanation to Section 47-A of the Stamp Act. The said main article deals with document of sale as defined under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, explanation I provides as follows: “Explanation I:-An agreement to sell followed by or evidencing delivery of possession of the property agreed to be sold shall be chargeable as a “sale” under this article: Provided that, where subsequently a sale deed is executed in pursuance of an agreement of sale as aforesaid or in pursuance of an agreement referred to in clause (B) of article 6, the stamp duty, if any, already paid or recovered on the agreement of sale shall be adjusted towards the total duty leviable on the sale deed.” It is, thus, contended on behalf of the landlady that apart from the dispute as to the genuineness of the said agreement of sale and the receipt, the document is inadmissible on account of the defect and deficiency under the Indian Stamp Act as well as the Registration Act. 25. 25. We, however, do not propose to record any finding on that issue, as the suit filed by the tenant for specific performance is pending before the competent civil Court and any observation by us on that aspect would prejudice the parties. We, therefore, proceed to examine the contentions of the learned senior counsel for the tenant as to whether the said agreement of sale creates a higher right in the tenant. 26.The Supreme Court in SURAJ LAMD & INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. v. STATE OF HARYANA (2012) 1 SCC 656 ) had an occasion to consider the legal incident relating to an agreement of sale. Following paragraphs from the said decision may be noticed as under: “Scope of an Agreement of sale 16. Section 54 of TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam [ (1977) 3 SCC 247 ], observed: “32. A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prosad v. Ram Mohit Hazra [1967]1 SCR 293. The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein.” 33. In India, the word ‘transfer’ is defined with reference to the word ‘convey’. The word ‘conveys’ in section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership. 37. that only on execution of conveyance ownership passes from one party to another….” 17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [ (2004) 8 SCC 614 ] this Court held: “10. Protection provided under Section 53A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [ (2004) 8 SCC 614 ] this Court held: “10. Protection provided under Section 53A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party.” 18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immoveable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immoveable property can be transferred. 19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of sections 54 and 55 of TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under section 53A of TP Act). According to TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of TP Act enacts that sale of immoveable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject matter.” 27. The Supreme Court in CHANDRAKANT SHANKARRAO MACHALE v. PARUBAI BHAIRU MOHITE (2008) 6 SCC 745 ) also considered as to how the claim for merger of interest has to be considered, as is evident from the following paragraphs: “16. Our attention has been drawn to a decision of this Court in Gopalan Krishnakutty v.Kunjamma Pillai Sarojini Amma [ (1996) 3 SCC 424 ] wherein upon taking into consideration some of its earlier decisions, this Court held : "The High Court, in the present case, proceeded on the erroneous assumption in law that surrender of the lease by the lessee (defendant) must be implied from the fact of execution of the usufrucuary mortgage in his favour by the lessor (plaintiff). As indicated, this is an erroneous assumption in law. This question has to be decided on the contents of the deed since there is no other evidence of surrender of the lease by the defendant on execution of the mortgage. We find nothing in the mortgage deed (Annexure A-1) dated 18.7.1974 read with the release deed of the same date to prove either an express or an implied surrender of the lease by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff on execution of the mortgage deed. Since there is no automatic merger of the interest of a lessee with that of a mortgagee when the same person is the lessee as well as the mortgagee, in absence of proof of surrender of the lease by the defendant, on redemption of the mortgage, the plaintiff is not entitled automatically to recover possession of the leased premises. The defendant’s right to continue in possession as a lessee, therefore, continues to subsist." 17. We are concerned here with a converse case. The case as to whether the interest of a lessee merged with the interest of a mortgagee would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case, as indicated in Gopalan Krishnankutty. There cannot be any hard and fast rule for arriving at only one decision as the decision thereupon will depend upon the terms of the document.” In view of the above, therefore, we are unable to accept the contention that merely by an agreement of sale, any substantive right is created in favour of the tenant. 28. In our view, the question really is required to be considered from the standpoint of the award of the Lok Adalat, being Award No.349 of 2011 dated 30.06.2011. The said award records the terms and conditions of the compromise between the landlady and the tenant wherein the term of the lease was granted up to 30.06.2012 and where the tenant also undertook to vacate on expiry of the term. The tenant, therefore, has suffered a decree for eviction in terms of the said award and the landlady has already filed EP to execute the said award. 29. What, in law, is the position of a tenant, who has suffered an eviction decree and is continuing in possession thereafter? The tenant, therefore, has suffered a decree for eviction in terms of the said award and the landlady has already filed EP to execute the said award. 29. What, in law, is the position of a tenant, who has suffered an eviction decree and is continuing in possession thereafter? In our view, the position of such tenant is certainly not that of a tenant holding-over but as that of a tenant at sufferance, who continues in possession till evicted. The said possession is, therefore, neither a possession as a tenant nor the same can be said to be lawful as it is contrary to the award and contrary to the undertaking given by the tenant under clause 6 of the award. The said award equally binds the tenant as well as the landlady. Following passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in BHAWANJI LAKHAMSHI v. HIMATLAL JAMNADAS DANI (1972) 1 SCC 388 ) may be noticed in this context: “9. The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy of any kind. If a tenant remains in possession after the determination of the lease, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without his consent. The former is a tenant at sufferance in English Law and the latter a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. In view of the concluding words of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lessee holding over is in a better position than a tenant at will. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of possession after the determination of the tenancy will create a new tenancy. What the section contemplates is that on one side there should be an offer of taking a new lease evidenced by the lessee or sub-lessee remaining in possession of the property after his term was over and on the other side there must be a definite consent to the continuance of possession by the landlord expressed by acceptance of rent or otherwise. In Kai Khushroo Bezonjee Capadia v. Bai Jerbai Hirjibhoy Warden and Anr.[1949-50] F.C.R. 262 the Federal Court had occasion to consider the question of the nature of the tenancy created under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and Mukherjea J. speaking for the majority said, that the tenancy which is created by the "holding over" of a lessee or under-lessee is a new tenancy in law even though many of the terms of the old lease might be continued in it, by implication; and that to bring a new tenancy into existence, there must be a bilateral act. It was further held that the assent of the landlord which is founded on acceptance of rent must be acceptance of rent as such and in clear recognition of the tenancy right asserted by the person who pays it. Patanjali Sastri J., in his dissenting judgment, has substantially agreed with the majority as regards the nature of the tenancy created by Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that is evident from the following observations :- “Turning now to the main point, it will be seen that the section postulates the lessee remaining in possession after the determination of the lease which is conduct indicative, in ordinary circumstances of his desire to continue as a tenant under the lessor and implies a tacit offer to take a new tenancy from the expiration of the old on the same terms so far as they are applicable to the new situation, and when the lessor assents to the lessee so continuing in possession, he tacitly accepts the latter's offer and a fresh tenancy results by the implied agreement of the parties. When, further, the lessee in that situation tenders rent and the lessor accepts it, their conduct raises more readily and clearly the implication of an agreement between the parties to create a fresh tenancy.” 30. As contended by the learned senior counsel the tenant himself is not claiming his status as a tenant but claiming higher status as that of an agreement holder. As per the award of Lok Adalat, the tenant has suffered eviction decree and pending execution of the said decree, he is continuing in possession beyond the permitted period. As contended by the learned senior counsel the tenant himself is not claiming his status as a tenant but claiming higher status as that of an agreement holder. As per the award of Lok Adalat, the tenant has suffered eviction decree and pending execution of the said decree, he is continuing in possession beyond the permitted period. He is, therefore, a judgment debtor in an execution proceeding of an eviction decree and his status cannot be equated to that of a tenant holding over or a licensee. So far as the proclaimed status as an agreement holder is concerned, the same is subjudice and yet to be adjudicated by the civil Court. Under Rule 6(vi) of the Rules, therefore, it cannot be said that the tenant has any valid authorization to occupy the premises and use it for the purpose of running a bar and restaurant. It goes without saying that if the tenant succeeds in the suit for specific performance and if, ultimately, a sale deed is executed in his favour, he may become the owner of the property but till such time, we cannot proceed on the footing that he has a higher status as that of an agreement holder when the agreement itself is in serious dispute and in law, does not create any legal title. The second question is accordingly answered against the appellant. 31. The renewal of license granted to the tenant under the impugned proceedings dated 26.07.2012 by the Prohibition and Excise Superintendent, Nellore, was, therefore, rightly set aside by the learned single Judge and no case for interference is made out. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed. The miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand disposed of as infructuous. There shall be no order as to costs.