Judgment: V.M. Kanade, J. 1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Respondents waive service. By consent of the parties matter is taken up for final hearing. 2. By this Petition which is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Petitioner is challenging the order dated 30/07/2012 passed by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions issuing Consent Certificate. 3. Brief facts which are necessary for the purpose of deciding this Petition are as under:- 4. Petitioner No.1 is a Trade Union registered in the year 1960 under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (hereinafter referred to as the “said Act”) Respondent Nos. 3 to 12 claim to be members of Petitioner No.1 – Union and are operating rival Union in the name and style of Mumbai Taxi Union. According to the Petitioners, in 2004, Respondent Nos. 3 to 12 formed rival Union in the name and style of “Cool Cab Taxi Union” and thereafter changed the name of Union to “Mumbai Taxi Union” without making Petitioner No.1 – Union party to the proceedings. 5. On 19/05/2012, Respondent Nos. 3 to 12 filed an application before the 2nd Respondent – Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions seeking his consent as required under section 28(1A) of the said Act. Request was made to make inquiry under Regulation 23 of the Bombay Trade Unions Regulations, 1927. In Annexure-1 to the said application, four issues were raised. Firstly, that the last election of the office bearers was held on 31/08/2008 and the next election ought to have been held in August, 2011. However, without holding election, members of the Managing Committee are illegally holding posts in the Union. Secondly, it was contended that there were several properties of the Union, details of which were mentioned in para 3 of the said Annexure. It was contended that no accounts of such properties were maintained and the details of the Bank Accounts and those of the deposits, securities, investments were not given to the members of the Union. Secondly, it was contended that there were several properties of the Union, details of which were mentioned in para 3 of the said Annexure. It was contended that no accounts of such properties were maintained and the details of the Bank Accounts and those of the deposits, securities, investments were not given to the members of the Union. Thirdly, it was contended that two life members of the Union were suspended by issuing order dated 11/05/2012 and, fourthly, it was contended that though 670 members of the Union had made representation to the General Secretary and President of the Union to call Annual General Body Meeting of the Union and to hold elections of the office bearers, the respective office bearers have failed to call for the Annual General Body Meeting of the Union and to conduct elections of office bearers. Reply was filed by Petitioners dated 14/06/2012, The Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions, Mumbai issued Consent Certificate dated 30/07/2012. Being aggrieved by the said order, Petitioners have filed the present Petition. 6. Mr. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submitted that the Deputy Registrar while exercising the powers vested in him under section 28(1A) and considering whether consent should be granted to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court, has to arrive at an objective satisfaction and has to pass a reasoned order after satisfying himself that, in fact, a dispute exists between the members of the Trade Union on the question whether any person is office bearer or in respect of any dispute relating to the property of any registered Trade Union. He submitted that, in the present case, it was contended by Respondent Nos. 3 to 12 that elections had not been held after August, 2008. He submitted that, in fact, elections were held in 2011. Secondly, it was submitted that amendment was made to the Constitution/Rules of the Union and as long as new Body was not elected, existing office bearers were entitled to continue. It was submitted that by suppressing these facts, dispute had been filed and it was the duty of the Deputy Registrar – Respondent No.2 to find out whether, in fact, a dispute exists or not. It was submitted that by suppressing these facts, dispute had been filed and it was the duty of the Deputy Registrar – Respondent No.2 to find out whether, in fact, a dispute exists or not. It was submitted that so far as suspension of members is concerned and holding of elections is concerned, it would not be a subject matter of dispute under section 28(1A) of the said Act. It was submitted that the Deputy Registrar had mechanically issued Consent Certificate without holding an inquiry. It was contended that the Deputy Registrar was not expected to be a rubber stamp who would issue Consent Certificate upon an application being made under section 28(1A). It was contended that the 2nd Respondent failed to consider the letter dated 22/06/2011 by which he was informed about the elections of new office bearers in the Annual General Meeting held on 12/06/2011. It was contended that without taking into consideration the said fact, the impugned order was passed mechanically. It was contended that Respondent Nos. 3 to 12 had not submitted any prima facie document in support of their allegations. It was contended that the 2nd Respondent had failed to make inquiries as required under Regulation 23(2) of the said Regulations, 1927 read with section 28 of the said Act. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Talsania, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 3 to 7 submitted that, in fact, the Petitioners were heard through their Advocate and they had filed their detailed reply and the Deputy Registrar had granted consent only in respect of the dispute relating to office bearers and property of the Union and not in respect of suspension of the two members and regarding elections of the office bearers of the Union. He submitted that, therefore, this clearly showed the proper application of mind by Respondent No.2. He further submitted that section 28 (1A) under which consent was to be given, Registrar was not expected to adjudicate upon the merits of the case of the rival parties but only duty cast on him was to see whether prima facie there was a dispute and once he had arrived at the said conclusion, he was under an obligation to give his consent and refer the matter to Industrial Court for adjudication. He submitted that Division Bench of this Court in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha vs. Registrar of Trade Union and Another (Special Civil Application No.4282 of 1976) had considered the powers of the Registrar under section 28(1A) and Regulation 23 read with section 28. He invited our attention to para 19 of the said judgment wherein the powers of the Registrar under section 28(1A) have been taken into consideration. He further submitted that so far as section 28(1A) is concerned, the said amendment was brought into force only in the State of Maharashtra and not in any other State. It was submitted that the order had to be passed by the Registrar in Form “L” and, accordingly the impugned order was passed in that Form. 8. Mr. Arshad Shaikh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 8 to 12 submitted that perusal of the provisions of section 28(1A) would reveal that the dispute had to be referred to the Industrial Court constituted under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 for decision. It was contended that, therefore, it was open for the Petitioners to raise a preliminary issue regarding maintainability of the dispute which was permissible under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and the Industrial Court, therefore, could decide the said preliminary issue. He further contended that the jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred under sub-section (4) of section 28(1A) and under sub-section (5), it was made clear that Industrial Tribunal may exercise the same powers as it exercise for the purpose of deciding industrial disputes under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. 9. On the other hand, in rejoinder, Mr. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, invited our attention to Regulation 23 which speaks about the manner of referring the dispute to Industrial Court under section 28(1A). It was contended that under sub-section (2) of Regulation 23, it was clearly mentioned that the Registrar shall make such inquiries as he may deem fit; and if he is satisfied that any dispute of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 28-1A exists, he may give his consent in Form “L”. It was contended that under sub-section (2) of Regulation 23, it was clearly mentioned that the Registrar shall make such inquiries as he may deem fit; and if he is satisfied that any dispute of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 28-1A exists, he may give his consent in Form “L”. He submitted that though for the convenience of the Registrar, Form “L” was prescribed, it was incumbent upon the Registrar to give his reasons on the basis of which he had arrived at a conclusion that the dispute exists and merely because the Form was prescribed, it did not mean that the order had to be passed in the same Form without assigning any reason. He submitted that unless the reasons were assigned, it would not be possible for the Court before which the order would be challenged to know what was the basis on which the consent was granted by the Deputy Registrar. In support of the said submissions, he relied upon two judgments; one of the Bombay High Court in Maharashtra Suraksha Rakshan Aghadi vs. State of Maharashtra, through Secretary, Ministry of Labour & Ors (2010 III CLR 259) and other of the Apex Court in JaswantSingh vs. State of Punjab & Ors (1991 Vol-1 CLR 1). He submitted that in both these cases, it had been held that there had to be an application of mind and if that was not spelt out from the order, the order was liable to be set aside. It was contended that so far as the judgment in Maharashtra Suraksha Rakshan Aghadi (supra) is concerned, it was observed that while issuing notification under section 23 which permitted the Government to grant exemption under the provisions of the said section, exemption could not be granted mechanically by merely reproducing the provisions of section 23 of the Act. It was held that consultation with Advisory Committee should be meaningful and there was no basis as to how the opinion was formed to grant exemption and, therefore, in the said case impugned notification granting exemption under section 23 of the Act was quashed and the matter was remitted back. It was held that consultation with Advisory Committee should be meaningful and there was no basis as to how the opinion was formed to grant exemption and, therefore, in the said case impugned notification granting exemption under section 23 of the Act was quashed and the matter was remitted back. In JaswantSingh (supra), the Apex Court had observed that while taking decision under Article 311(2), clause (b) of the second proviso, authority had to arrive at a subjective satisfaction and that had to be based on independent material to justify dispensing with the inquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. It was therefore submitted that, similarly, while exercising powers under section 28(1A) read with Regulation 23(2), an inquiry was contemplated and while passing the order of consent, some reasons had to be assigned. 10. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 3 to 7 and the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 8 to 12 at length. 11. In order to consider the rival submissions, it would be necessary to take into consideration the relevant provisions of the said Act. Section 28(1A) which has been inserted by Maharashtra Act No.III of 1969 dated 9/2/1969, reads as under:- “28(1A). Power of Industrial Court to decide certain disputes (1) Where there is a dispute as respects whether or not any person is an office bearer or member of a registered Trade Union including any dispute relating to wrongful expulsion of any such officer-bearer or member, or where there is any dispute relating to the property including the account books of any registered Trade Union, any member or such registered Trade Union for a period of not less than six months, may, with the consent of Registrar and in such manner as may be prescribed, refer the dispute to the Industrial Court constituted under the Bombay Industrial Relation Act, 1946 (Bom. XI of 1947) for decision. XI of 1947) for decision. (2) The Industrial Court shall, after having the parties to all the dispute, decide the dispute; and may require an office bearer or member of the registered Trade Union to be appointed whether by election or otherwise under the supervision of such person as the Industrial Court may appoint in his behalf or removed, in accordance with the rules of the Trade Union: Provided that, the Industrial Count may, pending the decision of the dispute, make an interim order specifying or appointing any person or appointing a Committee of Administration for any purpose under the Act including the purpose of taking possession or control of the property in dispute and managing it for the purposes of the union pending the decision. (3) The decision of the Industrial Court shall be final and binding on the parties, and shall not be called in question in any Civil Court. (4) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or other proceeding in relation to the dispute referred to the Industrial Court as aforesaid and if any suit for proceedings is pending in any such Court, the Civil Court, shall, on receipt of an intimation from the Industrial Court that it is seized of the question, cease to exercise jurisdiction in respect thereof. (5) Save as aforesaid, the Industrial Tribunal may, in deciding disputes under this section, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as it exercise or follows for the purpose of deciding industrial disputes under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bom. XI of 1947) Regulation 23 of the Bombay Trade Unions Regulation, 1927 prescribes the manner of referring the dispute to Industrial Court under section 28(1A), which reads as under:- “23. Manner of referring dispute to Industrial Court under Section 28-1A (1) Any person desiring to obtain the consent of the Registrar under sub-section (1) of Section 28-1A for the purpose of referring a dispute to the Industrial Court under that sub-section shall make an application to the Registrar in Form 'K'. (2) On receipt of the application under sub-rule (1), the Registrar shall make such inquiries as he may deem fit, and if he is satisfied that any dispute of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 28-1A exists he may give his consent in Form “L”, called the consent certificate. (2) On receipt of the application under sub-rule (1), the Registrar shall make such inquiries as he may deem fit, and if he is satisfied that any dispute of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 28-1A exists he may give his consent in Form “L”, called the consent certificate. (3) On receipt of the consent certificate under sub-rule (2), the applicant shall then refer the dispute to the Industrial Court in Form 'M' and enclose therewith the consent certificate in original.” 12. Perusal of the aforesaid provisions clearly reveal that when there is a dispute about the question whether any person is office bearer or not and, secondly, relating to wrongful expulsion of any office bearer or member and, thirdly, relating to property including books of Union, a member of such Union has to first obtain consent of the Registrar and then only the dispute is referred to the Industrial Court. In the present case, after the application was filed for consent, a detailed reply has been filed by the Petitioners and both the parties were heard through their Advocates and consent has been granted only on two aspect viz dispute regarding the office bearers and regarding property of the Union and on other two aspects consent has not been granted. 13. The short question which falls for consideration before this Court is what are the contours of the power which can be exercised by the Registrar under section 28(1A) read with Regulation 23. In our view, perusal of the said provisions reveals that the said section 28(1A) does not contemplate two tier system of adjudication and it merely stipulates that dispute has to be adjudicated by the Industrial Court and before that consent of the Registrar has to be obtained. The inquiry which is to be held by the Registrar does not contemplate preliminary adjudication of dispute but holding of summary scrutiny. The summary scrutiny obviously has to be made to find out whether preliminary requisites for filing the application are made out viz that such an application is made by any member or registered Trade Union which is in existence for a period of not less than six months. The summary scrutiny obviously has to be made to find out whether preliminary requisites for filing the application are made out viz that such an application is made by any member or registered Trade Union which is in existence for a period of not less than six months. Secondly, to find out whether the dispute falls within the parameters laid down under section 28(1A) viz (i) whether any person is an office bearer or not, (ii) whether the dispute is relating to wrongful expulsion and (iii) whether the dispute is relating to property of Trade Union. Any other dispute, obviously, cannot be referred to and it is for that purpose the said inquiry appears to have been contemplated and that appears to be the intention of the legislature in incorporating the need to obtain consent. Perusal of Regulation 23 also discloses that the Registrar is supposed to make such inquiries as he may deem fit and upon his satisfaction, he may refer the dispute. Upon conjoint reading of section 28(1A) and Regulation 23, it would be abundantly clear that the legislature never intended to put burden upon a member of the registered Trade Union who wishes to raise a dispute on the three aspects mentioned in the said section of proving the dispute twice, first before the Registrar and then before the Industrial Court. There does not appear to be any reason to believe that the legislature had in its mind two tier system of adjudication, firstly at the stage of Registrar and secondly at the stage of Industrial Court. If such an interpretation is made, it would defeat the purpose for which the provision has been incorporated by the Maharashtra Amendment Act viz to permit any member of a registered Trade Union to agitate against the three disputes referred to in the said section. If such an exercise is undertaken, it would be unending affair and office bearer of the registered Trade Union would continue to perpetuate illegalities which are alleged against them. Mr. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Maharashtra Suraksha Rakshan (2010 III CLR 259) (supra). If such an exercise is undertaken, it would be unending affair and office bearer of the registered Trade Union would continue to perpetuate illegalities which are alleged against them. Mr. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Maharashtra Suraksha Rakshan (2010 III CLR 259) (supra). In the said case, the question which fell for consideration before the Division Bench was whether section 23 of the Maharashtra Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 2002 which provides for exemption is only one time exemption. Petitioner in the said case had challenged the Notification issued by the State of Maharashtra under section 23 of the said Act exempting the Security Guards employed by the employer agencies from the operations of all or any of the provisions of the Act or the Scheme. Division Bench did not accept the contention of the Petitioner that the exemption under section 23 is not only one time exemption but such exemption was permissible at any point of time till the Security Guard is registered with the Board under the said Act in order to ensure that the service conditions of the Security Guard who is employed should not be less favourable than the one under the Act and if the Government is satisfied that the terms and conditions of the Security Guards with the Company are not less favourable than the one under the Act then in such circumstances exemption could be granted by the Government. While deciding the said question, this Court set aside the impugned Notification issued by the State Government on the ground that there was total non-application of mind and in this context the Division Bench held that the Notification did not disclose material on which the subjective satisfaction had been recorded by the State Government. In our view, ratio of the said judgment would not apply to the facts of the present case since under section 23 of the said Act, the State Government was under obligation to make inquiry and find out whether the terms and conditions of the service of the Security Guards with the Companies are equivalent to the one under the Act and only upon reaching the said satisfaction, the State Government could issue Notification under section 23 of the said Act. The Division Bench under these circumstances held that such Notification could not be issued mechanically and it was necessary for the State Government to disclose the material on which subjective satisfaction had been recorded by the State Government. The second judgment on which reliance was placed by Mr. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners was in JaswantSingh (1991 Vol-1 CLR 1) (supra). In the said case, the services of the Petitioner were terminated by invoking clause (b) of the Second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and Rule 16.2(2) of the Punjab Police Rules. The reasons assigned for dispensing with the departmental inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution were set out in para 3 of the impugned order which reads as under:- “And whereas it has been reported that he has thrown threats that he with the help of other police employees will not allow holding of any department enquiry against him and he and his associates will not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer.” The order of dismissal was confirmed by the High Court. The Apex Court held that clause (3) of that Article made decision of the Disciplinary Authority final but such finality could certainly be tested in the court of law and interfered with if the action was found to be arbitrary or malafide or motivated by extraneous considerations or merely a ruse to dispense with inquiry. The Apex Court held that it was incumbent on the Respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence on the date of passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by Respondent No.3 in the impugned order. The Apex Court in this context observed in para 5 as under:- “5.............. This is clear from the following observation at p.270 of TulsiRam's case. “A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary authority lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the government servant is weak and must fail.” The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In the counter filed by the third respondent it is contended that the appellant, instead of replying to the show cause notices, instigated his fellow police officials to disobey the superiors. It is also said that he threw threats to beat up the witnesses and the Inquiry Officer if any departmental inquiry was held against him. No particulars are given. Besides it is difficult to understand how he could have given threats etc., when he was in hospital. It is not shown on what material the third respondent came to the conclusion that the appellant had thrown threats as alleged in paragraph 3 of the impugned order. On a close scrutiny of the impugned order it seems the satisfaction was based on the ground that he was instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings with other police officials with a view to spreading hatred and dissatisfaction towards his superiors. This allegation is based on his alleged activities of Jullunder on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not forthcoming. It is no one's contention that the said SHO was threatened. The third respondent's counter also does not reveal if he had verified the correctness of the information. To put it tersely the subjective satisfaction recorded in paragraph 3 of the impugned order is not fortified by any independent material to justify the dispensing with of the inquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. We are, therefore, of the opinion that on this short ground alone the impugned order cannot be sustained.” In our view, again, the facts and circumstances under which the observation has been made by the Apex Court are entirely different and cannot be equated with the power which is exercised by the Registrar when he grants consent under section 28(1A). The ratio of the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, in our view, will not apply to the facts of the present case. The ratio of the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, in our view, will not apply to the facts of the present case. In this context, therefore, it would be relevant to take into consideration the statement of objects and reasons for incorporating section 28(1-A), which read as follows:- “The Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 provides for the registration of trade unions and in certain respects defines the law relating to registered trade unions. The Act, however, does not contain any provision for deciding internal disputes in a registered trade union. These disputes, which are at present decided by civil courts take a long time to decide with the result, that pending the decision of the dispute, the work of the registered trade union, which cannot function, is paralysed. To tide over this difficulty, it is proposed to give power to members of trade unions with the consent of the Registrar of Trade Unions to refer such disputes to the Industrial Court constituted under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and to bar the jurisdiction of civil courts from entertaining such disputes. It is also proposed to empower the Industrial Court to pass interim orders, and its decisions are to be made final and binding on parties.” 14. Division Bench of this Court in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha (supra) had an occasion to consider the provisions of section 28(1A). In para 19 of the said judgment, it is observed as under:- “19. It is precisely here that this Court must point out the difference between the provisions of section 28 of the Trade Unions Act read with Regulation 12 and the provisions of the added section 28-1A read with Regulation 23. The field of operation of these two provisions is distinct and different. It may be that Registrar has to issue a consent certificate without which a dispute contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 28-1A of the Trade Unions Act could not be raised at all. However, the examination required to be made is only for the purpose of finding whether the dispute exists. The Registrar has not to go deep and decide whether that dispute has really such substance that it may ultimately succeed. However, the examination required to be made is only for the purpose of finding whether the dispute exists. The Registrar has not to go deep and decide whether that dispute has really such substance that it may ultimately succeed. The only idea of the legislature seems to be that the Industrial Court should not be flooded with frivolous disputes and there should be some kind of pre-checking by experienced officer of Government before a dispute is allowed to be raised. It may be noted that because a dispute is raised, as many disputes are raised in various litigations under various Acts they do not have ipso facto effect of affecting the proceedings of the various bodies whose existence is challenged. If an election is in dispute, as in the present case, and the disputants wanted that the persons wrongfully elected to certain office, should not function, they have a right to apply to the Industrial Court for interim relief. The proviso to sub-section (2) of section 28-1A provides that the Industrial Court may pending the decision of the dispute make an interim order specifying or appointing any person or appointing a Committee of Administration for any purpose under the Act including the purpose of taking possession or control of the property in dispute and managing it for any purpose under the Act including the purpose of taking possession or control of the property in dispute and managing it for the purpose of the Union pending the decision. In other words, the existence of the Union and its officers as also carrying out the activities of the Union is not to be hampered but instead of regularly elected persons, an Administrator may conduct the affairs of the Union. Implicit, therefore, is the intention of he legislature that where no interim relief has been granted as provided by proviso to sub-section (2) of section 28-1A, the activities of the Union must be deemed to continue the normal course. It is this aspect of the matter which has been lost sight of by the Registrar. He is not made an officer for the purpose of deciding a dispute under section 28-1A. It is this aspect of the matter which has been lost sight of by the Registrar. He is not made an officer for the purpose of deciding a dispute under section 28-1A. The fact that the election is under challenge and the Registrar has issued a certificate makes him think that he was treating the elected body as if an unlawful body and every action taken by that body later on is non est in law. This is going too far and the Registrar has not been vested with any such power and advisedly so by the legislature.” The ratio of the said judgment in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha (supra) therefore clearly applies to the facts of the present case. The inquiry which is contemplated to be made under the said provision is only for the purpose of finding out whether dispute exists and the Registrar is not expected to dwell deep and decide whether dispute has really any substance that it may ultimately succeed. The legislature appears to have put a filter in the form of obtaining consent of the Registrar in order to ensure that the Industrial Court is not flooded with frivolous disputes and that there should be some kind of prior scrutiny by experienced Officer of the Government before the dispute is allowed to be raised. If the election is in dispute and the disputants wanted that the persons wrongfully elected to certain Office should not be permitted to function, they have a right to apply to Industrial Court for interim order and under sub-section (2) of section 28(1A), Industrial Court is empowered to make interim order specifying or appointing any person or appointing a Committee of Administration for any purpose under the Act including the purpose of taking possession or control of the property in dispute and managing it for the purposes of the Union, pending the decision. Apart from that, the Petitioners may raise a preliminary issue regarding maintainability of the complaint before the Industrial Court which may decide it if permissible under law as contended by Mr. Arshad Shaikh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 8 to 12. The Apex Court in Borosil Glass Works Ltd. Employees' Union vs. D.D. Bambode and Others (2001) 1 SCC 350 ) had an occasion to consider the provisions of section 28(1A). Arshad Shaikh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 8 to 12. The Apex Court in Borosil Glass Works Ltd. Employees' Union vs. D.D. Bambode and Others (2001) 1 SCC 350 ) had an occasion to consider the provisions of section 28(1A). In the said case 4th Respondent and certain other persons made joint application for membership of the Appellant-Union. No action was taken on the said application by the Union since it was not according to the procedure laid down under the bye-laws of the Union. The 4th Respondent filed an application under section 28(1A) before the Registrar. Registrar refused to grant Consent Certificate on the ground that he was not a member of the Appellant-Union for six months prior to the date of the application. The said applicant, therefore, filed Writ Petition in the Bombay High Court which allowed the Writ Petition and gave a direction to the Registrar of Trade Unions to issue Consent Certificate. The said order was challenged in the Apex Court. The Apex Court in the said judgment has observed as under:- “4....... The High Court has given a wide interpretation to Section 28(1-A) of the Trade Unions Act. It has been held that even a person who has applied to become a member can apply under section 28(1-A) of the Trade Unions Act. This interpretation of Section 28(1-A) has been assailed before us in this appeal.” In paras 7 & 8 of the said judgment, the Apex Court has observed as under: “7. In our view, on a plain reading of Section 28(1-A), the interpretation given by the High Court cannot be sustained. Section 28(1-A) has been incorporated to ensure that internal disputes in a trade union get decided. The section specifically provides that it can be only invoked by a person who has been a member of such registered trade union for a period of not less than 6 months. The words “whether there is a dispute as respects whether or not any person is an office-bearer or member of a registered trade union” have to be read along with the words “any member of such registered union for a period of not less than six months”. A person whose application for membership has not been considered or allowed would not have been a member for six months. A person whose application for membership has not been considered or allowed would not have been a member for six months. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that if two interpretations are possible, one of which lead to a harmonious reading of the entire provision has to be accepted. The interpretation given by the High Court leads to the requirement of a person being a member of six months being rendered nugatory. However, it is held that the dispute “as to whether a person is a member or not” is necessarily a dispute in respect of a person who was already a member for a period of not less than six months, but whose membership is being disputed, then no portion of the section gets rendered nugatory. Thus it will have to be held that dispute between persons who are not members and the union would not be covered by Section 28(1-A). Further a dispute between a person who is not yet a member and a union would not be an internal dispute of the union.” “8. Under Section 28(1-A) the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred only in respect of matters which have been referred to an Industrial Court under Section 28(1-A). If a dispute does not fall under Section 28(1-A) then that dispute can always be taken to a civil court. As a dispute whether a person should or should not be admitted as a member is not a dispute falling within Section 28(1-A), it would always be open to such person to approach a civil court for resolution of their dispute. Needless to say that if the law permits they may also raise an industrial dispute before the Industrial Court in that behalf.” 15. It is obvious that section 28(1A) which has been inserted by way of Maharashtra Amendment Act seeks to achieve a twofold purpose; firstly to ensure that there is a remedy available to a member of the registered Trade Union to voice his grievances in respect of three categories of cases mentioned in section 28(1A) before the Industrial Court and the Industrial Court, if it is satisfied is armed with the powers to give suitable interim directions and final orders. This purpose, therefore, seeks to provide a quick and efficacious remedy to the workman for redressal of his grievance against the office bearers of the registered Trade Union. This purpose, therefore, seeks to provide a quick and efficacious remedy to the workman for redressal of his grievance against the office bearers of the registered Trade Union. At the same time, by incorporating the provisions of obtaining consent from the Registrar, the State of Maharashtra has sought to introduce a filter to ensure that frivolous cases and complaints are not filed before the Industrial Court and, therefore, summary scrutiny by the Registrar is envisaged by the said provision. If the said satisfaction which is to be arrived at by the Registrar is construed to mean that he has to dwell deep into the matter and see whether the complaint is likely to be successful if it is filed, it would defeat the very purpose of the said provision. If such an interpretation is given then the office bearers may continue till the proceedings continue and are concluded at the stage of Registrar and during their term the matter may not reach before the Industrial Court. So the question is what exactly the Registrar is expected to do when an application is filed under section 28 (1A). For example, (1) When an application is filed before the Registrar seeking consent, what is he supposed to examine? (i) Whether the applicant is a member of the registered Union? (ii) Whether the complaint pertains to matters which are referred to in section 28(1A)? (iii) Whether the opponent – Union is a registered Trade Union? (2) What are the questions which the Registrar is not expected to go into? (ii) Whether the allegations made by the complainant are prima facie true or not? (ii) Whether the complainant would finally succeed or his complaint would be dismissed. There cannot be any strait jacket formula which can be laid down regarding the manner in which the power has to be exercised by the Registrar. The above examples are given as and by way of illustration only. The submissions made by Mr. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, therefore, cannot be accepted. 16. We have perused the impugned order passed by the Deputy Registrar. The above examples are given as and by way of illustration only. The submissions made by Mr. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, therefore, cannot be accepted. 16. We have perused the impugned order passed by the Deputy Registrar. In our view, Deputy Registrar has granted consent in respect of two aspects viz (i) dispute as to whether a person is office bearer of the Union and (ii) dispute relating to the property and has not granted consent regarding suspension and holding of elections which prima facie show that there is an application of mind and the order is not passed mechanically. 17. We, therefore, do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned order which has been passed by the Deputy Registrar while exercising our writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Writ Petition is dismissed. Rules is discharged.