JUDGMENT 1. - By the impugned order dated 10.11.2010, the learned trial Court of Additional Civil judge'(Jr. Division) and judicial Magistrate, First Class No. 2, Udaipur City (South), Udaipur in Civil Suit No. 258/2010, Omkar Lal v. Liquidator, Bhupal Co-operative Society Ltd. , for injunction against the Bhupal Co-operative Society Ltd., by the original plaintiff, Omkar Lal, impleaded the Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur (for short hereinafter referred to as 'UIT, Udaipur') as party-defendant by allowing its application under Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. 2. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners (legal representatives of deceased Omkar Lal, original plaintiff) have approached to this Court by way of present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. Mr. R.K. Thanvi, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Narendra Thanvi, learned counsel for the petitioners relying upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. reported in (1992) 2 SCC 524 , submitted that the plaintiffs have not claimed any relief against the UIT, Udaipur and more over, this application was filed in the suit filed in the year 1995 at the fag end of the trial in the year 2010; and therefore, the impugned order would only delay the trial further and merely on the basis of an alleged MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) executed by and between the defendant-Bhupal Co-operative Society Ltd. and the UIT, Udaipur, in which only right to contest the pending litigation on behalf of Bhupal Co-operative Society Ltd. was given to UIT, the UIT, Udaipur cannot be impleaded as a party-defendant, as it is neither necessary nor a proper party in the said suit for injunction filed by the plaintiffs. In which no relief was claimed by the plaintiffs against the UIT, Udaipur and the principles of dominus litis, the learned trial Court has erred in impleading the UIT, Udaipur as the defendant in the said suit. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned order deserves to be set aside by this Court in the present writ petition. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Deelip Kawadia, learned counsel, for the UIT, Udaipur, relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai & Ors. v. Paras Finance Co. Rg. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.) Thro Mankanwar & Ors. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Deelip Kawadia, learned counsel, for the UIT, Udaipur, relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai & Ors. v. Paras Finance Co. Rg. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.) Thro Mankanwar & Ors. reported in 2007 DNJ (SC) 1019 and submitted that the land in question belonging to Bhupal Co-operative Society Ltd., which had been transferred to the UIT, Udaipur under a MoU executed between these parties, the right to contest the pending litigation was given to UIT, Udaipur; and in view of this semblance of interest in the suit property, the whole land including the land for which plaintiff sought injunction, the UIT, Udaipur is very much entitled to contest the injunction suit filed by the plaintiffs and therefore, impleadment of UIT, Udaipur in the present writ petition cannot be faulted and in view of narrow jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the impugned interlocutory order does not require any interference by this Court. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and perused the impugned order and the judgments cited by the parties. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai (supra) in para 9 has held as under: "9. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on a three-judge Bench decision of this Court in Kasturi v. yamperumal & Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 733 . He has submitted that in this case it has been held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of property a stranger or a third party to the contract cannot be added as defendant in the suit. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision can only be understood to mean that a third party cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance if he has no semblance of title in the property in dispute. Obviously, a busybody or interloper with no semblance of title cannot be impleaded in such a suit. That would unnecessarily protract or obstruct the proceedings in the suit. However, the aforesaid decision will have no application where a third party shows some semblance of title or interest in the property in dispute. Obviously, a busybody or interloper with no semblance of title cannot be impleaded in such a suit. That would unnecessarily protract or obstruct the proceedings in the suit. However, the aforesaid decision will have no application where a third party shows some semblance of title or interest in the property in dispute. In the present case, the registered sale deed dated 12.8.1960 by which the property was purchased shows that the shop in dispute was sold in favour of not only Kapoor Chand, but also his sons. Thus primafacie it appears that the purchaser of the property in dispute was not only Kapoor Chand but also his sons. Hence, it cannot be said' that the sons of Kapoor Chand have no semblance of title and are mere busybodies or interlopers." 7. As against this in the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra) wherein, in a suit filed by a dealer challenging the validity of notice issued by the Municipal Corporation for demolition of certain structures raised by it on the premises as being unauthorized, held that lessee of the premises seeking to be impleaded as additional defendant on the ground of being necessary party having material to show that structures were unauthorized was neither a necessary nor proper party and the addition of lessee would only enlarge the issue of the suit and the Courts below were not justified in impleading the lessee as defendant in that suit. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length, this Court is of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impleadment of the UIT, Udaipur does not seem to be out of place. It is true that vesting of land in question with the UIT, Udaipur, has not been proved by any primafacie evidence produced by it and the only document relied upon for impleading the UIT, Udaipur was the MoU executed between the Bhupal Co-operative Society Ltd. and the UIT, Udaipur. It is true that vesting of land in question with the UIT, Udaipur, has not been proved by any primafacie evidence produced by it and the only document relied upon for impleading the UIT, Udaipur was the MoU executed between the Bhupal Co-operative Society Ltd. and the UIT, Udaipur. Both are public bodies and the MoU between them conferring the right to contest the pending litigation on the UIT, Udaipur, primafacie, could be taken as sufficient to allow the UIT, Udaipur to contest the various suits filed against the Bhupal Co-operative Society Ltd., including the present suit for injunction filed by the original petitioner-plaintiff, namely, Omkar Lal Sharma, who does not apparently have a title over the land in question, but on the basis of alleged long possession appears have claimed the injunction against the defendant-Bhupal Co-operative Society Ltd. Even in the absence of a document of title in favour of UIT, Udaipur, the UIT could not be said to be a complete stranger to the present lis and in view of the MoU produced by it, alongwith his application under Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C., for impleadment, it cannot be said that the UIT, Udaipur does not have any semblance of right or interest in the suit property or land, and therefore, its impleadment was improper. Moreover, the impleadment of party in the suit has been done as specified in the impugned order, to avoid the multiplicity of litigation and in these circumstances, the same cannot be interfered with in the narrow jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387 , has held as under: "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 the Constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or Tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in. Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such Tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) it may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (1) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 10. In the case of Jai Singh & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr. reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 , in para 15 thereof, the Hon'ble Apex Court uses the words "the exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a Court or Tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. 11. Accordingly, the present writ petition filed by the petitioners (legal representatives of plaintiff, Omkar Lal Sharma) is hereby dismissed. No costs. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned parties and the learned trial Court below forthwith.Petition Dismissed. *******