Per Kotwal, J. 1. This appeal is by one Mohd. Yousuf Lone, who has been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge, Kupwara under sections 449, 392, 302 & 201 RPC vide Judgment dated 27.07.2010 and sentenced in proof of these offences vide order dated 29.07.2010. 2. It may be noteworthy here that co-accused of the appellant, Bashir Ahmed Koshi s/o Khairo Koshi r/o Manigah, Kupwara, was convicted by the trial court under sections 365/109 RPC and sentenced to imprisonment for seven years and fine of Rs. 3000/. However, the period of sentence imposed upon him has been set off in terms of Section 397-A Cr.P.C. as he remained in custody from 31.01.1997 to 19.01.2005. Sentence of fine has also been implemented by realization of fine from him. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 4. Facts, briefly, may be stated thus: On 20.01.1997 at about 4.30 p.m. Mst. Rubeena Kounser (PW-1) w/o Farooq Ahmed Taki r/o Watal Kadal, Srinagar lodged written information at Police Post, Klaroos. She alleged that she and her husband had stayed in the house of Mohd. Yousuf Lone (appellant) at Khanpora, Klaroos for three days. On fourth day, appellant took them to the residence of his friend. They stayed there for one day. On the next day, in the evening at about 7 p.m. four persons came to the said house. One of them was masked. The masked person entered the room and enquired saying `yeh Kon hai'. She identified said masked person by his voice, the ring which he was wearing on a finger of his right hand and the clothes worn by him. He was Mohd. Yousuf Lone. Mohd. Yousuf Lone brought her husband out of the house and took him away along with his associates, whom she could not identify due to darkness. She, therefore, prayed for action in the matter and also stated that she suspects that her husband has been killed by Mohd. Yousuf Lone and the persons accompanying him. 5. The report lodged by PW-1 was entered as report No. 18 dated 20.01.1997 in the `Roznamcha' (daily diary) of Police Post, Klaroos and transmitted to Police Station, Kupwara on the same day upon which FIR No. 17/97 under Sections 364 & 452 RPC was registered at 9 p.m. Copy of the FIR was transmitted to the area Magistrate on 22.01.1997. 6. 6. On registration of the FIR, police took up the investigation, which was entrusted to Abdul Gani Sub Inspector, Officer In charge Police Post, Klaroos (PW-15). Supplementary statement of PW-1 was recorded. In her statement, she stated that she was working as a teacher in Education Department and in the winter vacation she had come from Srinagar to stay in the house of the accused-appellant, who was known to her. She and her husband reached the house of the appellant on 12.01.1997. On 15.01.1997, appellant, who was a surrendered militant, shifted them to the house of his friend at Village, Thiyen saying that staying in his house was risky because militants keep on searching for him. The name of the friend of the appellant was Ali Malik s/o Khaliq Malik (PW 5). They stayed in that house for one day. On 16.1.1997 in the evening her husband was sleeping in the kitchen of that house and she was sitting along with the wife and daughter-in-law of Ali Mohammad Malik. A group of persons, consisting of appellant and his accomplice, barged into the residence of said Ali Mohammad Malik having a torch with them. Remaining part of the said statement contains what was stated in the written information (supra). 7. Appellant-accused was arrested on 21.1.1997. On the same day appellant made disclosure statement about the dead body of the deceased, which was recovered from the place identified by him. Co-accused Bashir Ahmad Koshi(A-2) and Abdul Majeed Koshi (PW-18) were arrested on 31.1.1997. Investigating Agency secured pardon for co-accused, Abdul Majid Koshi, in terms of section 337 Cr.P.C. from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kupwara, on the condition of his making full and true disclosure of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the occurrence and cited him as a prosecution witness. After completion of the investigation charge sheet under sections 302, 325, 364, 392, 449, 201/34 RPC was preferred against the appellant (A-1) and co-accused, Bashir Ahmad Koshi (A-2). Case was committed for trial to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Kupwara. 8. Learned trial court, after taking into consideration the material collected by the Investigating Officer, found prima facie case under sections 302, 449, 392, 201/34 RPC against the appellant and under sections 302, 364, 392, 201/34 RPC against A-2 and framed charges against them on 02.05.1997. Both of them pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 8. Learned trial court, after taking into consideration the material collected by the Investigating Officer, found prima facie case under sections 302, 449, 392, 201/34 RPC against the appellant and under sections 302, 364, 392, 201/34 RPC against A-2 and framed charges against them on 02.05.1997. Both of them pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Both of them were put to trial. 9. Prosecution, thus, entered its evidence and besides examining the approver, Abdul Majid Koshi as PW 18, produced 18 witnesses namely; Rubeena Kounser complainant (PW 1), Gulzar Ahmed Wani HC (PW 2), Mst. Zeba (PW 3), Mst. Fahma (PW 4), Ali Mohammad Malik (PW 5), Ghulam Mohammed SGC (PW 6), Mushtaq Ahmad Shah Const. (PW 7), Ghulam Hassan Constable (PW 8), Mumtaz Ahmad Ganaie (PW 9), Nazir Ahmad Constable (PW 10) Abdul Rashid SGC (PW 11) Nasir Ahmed Bhat (PW 12), Ghulam Mohammd Dar (PW 13) Zulfiqar Ali Constable (PW 14), Ab. Gani S. I. (PW 15), Showkat Ali (PW 16), Ghulam Nabi Payar (PW 17) & Dr. Abdul Rashid Bhat (PW 19). 10. Accused also examined six witnesses namely, Noor Alam Jatal, Shabir Ahmad Lone, Ghulam Hassan Lone, Mohd Sultan Khatana, Nazir Ahmad Qureshi and Nazir Ahmad Lone. 11. The learned trial court after scrutiny of record and evaluation of the prosecution evidence led at the trial, vide judgment dated 27.07.2010, held appellant-accused, guilty of having committed house trespass for abduction and consequent murder of deceased, Farooq Ahmed Taki. Learned trial court further held him guilty of robbery for having taken away forcibly golden chain/locket and cash in possession of the deceased and further held him guilty of murder of the deceased. Learned court also held him guilty under section 201 RPC for having caused disappearance of robbed amount. The court, thus, convicted the appellant-accused under Sections 449, 398, 302 and 201 RPC. 12. Vide order dated 29.07.2010, learned trial court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 15,000/ in proof of offence under section 302 RPC, life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/ in proof of offence under section 449 RPC and to imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/ in proof of under Section 201 RPC. Learned court further sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for 10 years and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/ in proof of under Section 398 RPC. 10,000/ in proof of offence under section 449 RPC and to imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/ in proof of under Section 201 RPC. Learned court further sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for 10 years and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/ in proof of under Section 398 RPC. Learned trial court ordered that the period of sentence under gone by the appellant during trial be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed under section 398 RPC and 201 RPC and further that in case of default of any payment of fine, he shall undergo further simple imprisonment for six months and that fine after realization shall be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased. The learned trial court also observed that `there is good and strong base, to treat the life imprisonment in the instant case, to mean, the imprisonment till the rest of the life of the convict and be treated so'. 13. Appellant-accused is in appeal against his sentence and conviction. Alongside, the ld. trial court has made a reference in terms of section 374 Cr. P.C. for confirmation of the sentence. 14. Before, we take up the grounds on which the conviction and sentence have been assailed by the appellant, we may give a brief account of the case as it, as per the impugned judgment, has been proved before the learned trial court. 15. Learned trial court has found that the accused-appellant had intruded into the house of Ali Malik, PW-5 on 16.1.1997 and was recognized by PWs-1, 3 and 4. He forcibly took/carried away the deceased and was associated by the approver and A-2. The deceased was seen alive in unauthorized custody of appellant. The dead body of the deceased was recovered on the basis of the discloser statement made by the appellant. The golden chain/locket of particular description, which the deceased had been wearing at the time when he was forcibly taken from the residence of PW-5, was recovered at the instance of the appellant from his residence and he had failed to account for their recovery. 16. The golden chain/locket of particular description, which the deceased had been wearing at the time when he was forcibly taken from the residence of PW-5, was recovered at the instance of the appellant from his residence and he had failed to account for their recovery. 16. Learned trial court also found that the appellant and the deceased were having good acquaintance with each other prior to the occurrence and that the deceased and his wife, PW-1, had stayed in the house of the appellant before they were accommodated in the house of PW-5 as guests by the appellant. 17. Appellant has assailed the impugned judgment and sought its setting aside on the grounds that the four days' delay in lodging report to the police has not been explained and the trial Court has not made proper evaluation of the evidence. It is urged that the judgment rendered by the trial Court deserves to be set aside for the reason that story of approver has been believed without having any additional support. It is contended that the trial Court has recorded the guilt by picking up sentences from the evidence. It is contended also that the learned trial Court has given benefit to the prosecution of the weakness of the defence and falsehood of the explanation of the appellant, notwithstanding that the prosecution was required to stand on its own legs. Appellant has assailed the discloser statement allegedly made by him and has contended in this regard that no local persons of the area have been kept as witness to the disclosure statement. Blood stains and the stone alleged to be the weapons of offence have not been sent to the expert for examination. The appellant has questioned his identification by PW-1 on the basis of the ring worn by him and his voice, contending that, had it been so, she could have immediately reported the matter with the assistance of the family members of the house in which she was residing and disclosed his name to the Police. It is also urged that the trial court could not arrive at definite conclusion as to whether the cause of death was strangulation by the scarf or by hitting the stone and in such a case conviction cannot sustain. Without naming, it is contended that the material witnesses have been withheld by the prosecution. It is also urged that the trial court could not arrive at definite conclusion as to whether the cause of death was strangulation by the scarf or by hitting the stone and in such a case conviction cannot sustain. Without naming, it is contended that the material witnesses have been withheld by the prosecution. The evidence of the witnesses who had stated no knowledge about the occurrence has been ignored. It is contended also that the evidence led by the prosecution reveal two stories, one pointing towards innocence and the other towards guilt of the appellant and the learned trial court has fallen into error by not accepting the one, which favours the appellant. It is also contended that the learned trial court has failed to appreciate conduct of the appellant in not having absconded after the offence showing that he was not having a guilty mind. 18. One of the grounds taken in this appeal in paragraph-23, given its nature, is reproduced verbatim: "That even if the trial Court has accepted the story of Prosecution for the purpose of just for argument the trial Court should have taken into account EXPRESSION OF ANGER disclosed by the appellant whose brother has been killed by the deceased therefore there could have been the possibility, that appellant has given expression to his anger by loosing his brother who was killed by the deceased therefore while passing the order of sentence the trial court should have maintain proper guard and should have convict the appellant for 10 years who lost his family member at the hands of the deceased, therefore with the due regard the trial Court has not maintained proper guard while announcing the quantum of sentence and this appellate court is also competent to reduce the sentence passed by the trial Court." 19. When the case was heard by us, Mr. A. M. Watali, learned counsel for the appellant, however, primarily remained focused on, what he called, inadequacy of reliable and trustworthy evidence to establish the identity of the masked man, who, allegedly had entered the house of Ali Mohammad Malik, PW-5 in the evening on 16.01.1997 and abducted the deceased from there. We may point out here that Mr. Wattali did not assail the prosecution story insofar as it relates to the happenings prior to the time of abduction of the deceased from the house of PW-5 on 16.01.1997. We may point out here that Mr. Wattali did not assail the prosecution story insofar as it relates to the happenings prior to the time of abduction of the deceased from the house of PW-5 on 16.01.1997. The part of the prosecution story involving prior/acquaintance between the deceased and PW-1 with the appellant, the stay of the deceased and his wife, PW-1, in the house of the appellant at village, Khanpora, Klaroos for some days and thereafter the appellant accommodating both of them in the house of Ali Mohammad Malik, PW-5 on 15.1.1997 have not been assailed on behalf of the appellant. Even the abduction of the deceased from the house of PW-5 has not been assailed by the appellant. 20. To reiterate in brief, prosecution case is and the learned trial court has found that the appellant and the deceased were having good acquaintance with each other and that the deceased and his wife, PW-1, stayed in the house of appellant before the appellant accommodated them in the house of PW-5. This part of prosecution case, having been proved before the learned trial court, is not assailed by the appellant so we are not confronted with any doubt as regards the proof and truth of prosecution story to that extent. 21. Coming to the identification of the appellant as the person who had entered the house of PW-5 on 16.01.1997 in the evening and abducted the deceased, he, even though wearing a mask on his face, was identified by the wife of the deceased, Rubeena Kounser-PW-l, Zeba, PW-3 and Fehma PW-4. PW-3 is the wife the owner of the house, PW-5, and PW-4 is their daughter-in-law. All of them have authoritatively and unanimously said that the person, who had brought the deceased and his wife to their house a day earlier, was the person who had entered the house wearing mask on his face and taken the deceased with him. All of them have, therefore, explicitly stated that they had identified the appellant when he entered the house. 22. Learned trial court has accepted the evidence rendered by PW-1 that she had identified the masked intruder as the appellant by his voice as on entering the house he, while pointing towards her husband, who was sleeping, had said `yeh khon hai' meaning thereby that he had enquired who the person sleeping was. 22. Learned trial court has accepted the evidence rendered by PW-1 that she had identified the masked intruder as the appellant by his voice as on entering the house he, while pointing towards her husband, who was sleeping, had said `yeh khon hai' meaning thereby that he had enquired who the person sleeping was. Learned trial court has further accepted her evidence that she had identified the appellant also by his cloths and the ring worn by him. Learned trial court also accepted the evidence of PWs 3 & 4 that they had identified the masked man as the person who had brought the deceased and his wife to their house a day earlier. 23. Mr. Watali, however, questioned the reliability and value of the evidence rendered by these three witnesses to establish the identity of the masked intruder as the appellant. Mr. Watali would say that identification of a person on the basis of cloths or ring worn by him cannot be relied upon. Likewise, he submitted that identification on the basis of voice of a person is not reliable evidence, particularly when no voice sample is taken by the Investigating Officer. In support Mr. Wattali relief upon (2011) 4 SCC 143 24. While not finding sufficient ground for being in agreement with Mr. Watali that learned trial court has fallen into an error in evaluating and relying upon the evidence as regards identification of the appellant, we, however, have anxiously and carefully read the evidence of PWs. 1, 3 and 4 and evaluated it with the purpose to ascertain as to whether it is reliable and sufficient to establish the identity of intruder as the appellant. 25. We may in this regard at the outset point out that the judgment in Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 4 SCC 143 (supra) relied upon by learned appellant's counsel, firstly, would not apply to this case given the fact situation of that case and this case and secondly, does not rule out admissibility of evidence of identification of an accused on the basis of identification of his voice by a witness who has seen the occurrence. In that case question involved was not the identification of the voice of the accused directly heard by an eye witness of the occurrence. In that case question involved was not the identification of the voice of the accused directly heard by an eye witness of the occurrence. The question rather pertained to identification of tape recorded voice of the person (accused) allegedly involved in the occurrence. This is discernable from para 31 of the judgment that reads: "31. In our opinion, the evidence of voice identification is at best suspect, if not, wholly unreliable. Accurate voice identification is much more difficult than visual identification. It is prone to such extensive and sophisticated tampering, doctoring and editing that the reality can be completely replaced by fiction. Therefore, the Courts have to be extremely cautious in basing a conviction purely on the evidence of voice identification. This Court, in a number of judgments emphasised the importance of the precautions, which are necessary to be taken in placing any reliance on the evidence of voice identification." 26. Identification of an accused based upon identification of his voice is well recognized under law. We may in this behalf refer to Kishnia v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 11 Supreme Court Cases 567. In that case, appellants therein were found guilty and convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and also for the offence under Section 201 IPC by the Sessions Court. Their appeal was dismissed by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, counsel for the appellant had contended as regards the evidence rendered by PW 2 and PW 5 therein that they had no opportunity to see the appellants as they were standing near the boundary of their field and it was much later, after darkness had set in. It was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that: "5. These witnesses also had no case that they had seen the appellants but they identified them by their voice. PW 2 and PW 5 had previous acquaintance with these appellants as their properties were situate close to the field of the deceased Rawata. There no inherent improbability in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 5 that they identified these appellants by voice as they were standing at a distance." 27. PW 2 and PW 5 had previous acquaintance with these appellants as their properties were situate close to the field of the deceased Rawata. There no inherent improbability in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 5 that they identified these appellants by voice as they were standing at a distance." 27. What is, however, required is that, for relying upon the evidence of identification of an accused at the time of the occurrence by an eye witness by his voice, it needs to be proved, firstly, that the witness, who alleges to have identified the accused by his voice, was having prior acquainted with the accused and was familiar with his voice and secondly, that the witness had had the occasion of hearing or was in a position to hear his voice at the time of the commission of offence. Cogent evidence as regards the words heard by the witness would be required. 28. As stated above, it has been proved before the learned trial court and is not disputed before us that appellant and the deceased were having good acquaintance with each other and that the deceased and his wife, PW 1, had stayed in the house of appellant at Khanpora, Klaroos for some days prior to the day of occurrence. Besides, it is obvious from the evidence of PW 1 that she was well acquaintance with the appellant and used to treat him as her brother. It has also come in her evidence that her marriage with the deceased had taken place on 08.1.1997. Prior to her marriage, she was in a love affair with the deceased and the appellant had assured her that if she and the deceased get married, he would provide them protection in village, Klaroos as her marriage was going to be solemnized without consent of her parents. No doubt as regards acquaintance of PW 1 with the appellant, therefore, arises and it is irresistible that prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove that PW 1 was familiar with the voice of the deceased. 29. It is further proved from the evidence of PW 1 that she had sufficient occasion to hear and identify the voice of the appellant at the time he entered the house and also to identify him on the basis of cloths and ring worn by him. 29. It is further proved from the evidence of PW 1 that she had sufficient occasion to hear and identify the voice of the appellant at the time he entered the house and also to identify him on the basis of cloths and ring worn by him. It is pertinent to quote relevant portion of her evidence in vernacular: "Doosre din sham ko mulzam Yousuf apney chehray par nakaab odhey aur bandooq se laes ho kar us ghar main aaya jahan usne hamey theraya tha. Raat ka Waqat tha bigli na thee. Muzra ne ghar ki malkin sa kha ke kaoi aaya hey. Us ney jawaban kaha job hi hey woh ander aye ga. Joon hi ghar ki malkin ne darwaza khola to mulzam yousuf ne torch roshan ki. Farooq leta huwa tha. Mulzam Yousuf ne uski taraf eshra karke (sic) aur kaha ke yeh khun hai Choonki mulzam Yousuf din ko us makan ma aya tha aur jo kapde usna din ko pahene they woh hi sham ke waqat us ki poshish mein they. Neez us ki ungli mein ek angoothi pehani huie the gisay muzra ne pahelay be uski ungli mein dekha tha. Es wajha sey muzra ne mulzam Yousuf ko sanakhat keya........ Muzra ne Farooq ko kaha ke Yousuf usey bulaa raha hai lihaza uthey aur usay se melay. 30. Her statement in its plain reading would inspire confidence that she had confidently and unmistakably identified the appellant. So strong was her confidence that she asked her husband, who was sleeping, that Yousuf (appellant) is calling him, he should get up and meet him. She has in simple and persuasive manner explained that appellant had come to that house in the day time also and cloths which were worn by him at that time were worn by him at the time of occurrence too. She had also identified the ring supporting the finger of the appellant, which was fitted with a blue stone. This part of the evidence rendered by PW 1 has remained totally unshaken in the cross-examination. We, having examined her testimony anxiously, see no reason to be persuaded to entertain any doubt as regards the identification of appellant by PW-1, even though he was wearing a veil. 31. Evidence rendered by PW 1 gets sufficient and valuable support from the evidence of PW 3 & 4. We, having examined her testimony anxiously, see no reason to be persuaded to entertain any doubt as regards the identification of appellant by PW-1, even though he was wearing a veil. 31. Evidence rendered by PW 1 gets sufficient and valuable support from the evidence of PW 3 & 4. It has come in the evidence rendered PWs 3 & 4 that the appellant had come to their house on 15.1.1997 when he had brought the deceased and PW 1 there and also in the day time on 16.1.1997 and that the abduction took place in the evening on 16.1.1997. PW-3 in her chief examination confidently and firmly says that it was the appellant who had entered her house in the evening and taken along with him the male guest. In this context, she in cross-examination says that she had identified the appellant in the light of a table lamp. The face of the appellant was veiled with a mask but she had guessed that masked person was Yousuf. Evidence of PW 4 Fehma in this regard is also in the similar line. While stating that accused had entered their house and also that his face was fully covered with a mask, she has stated that she has identified him from his jacket and cloths. 32. Contextually, we may say that looking at the face of a person has not been recognized as a sine quo non for identifying that person. It cannot be ruled that no person can be identified unless he is seen by his face nor the possibility of identifying a person without looking at his face can be ruled out. It is quite possible to identify a person Whom one is acquainted with without seeing his face. It is possible also to identify a person without looking at his face if that person had been seen not much later before the relevant time. 33. PW-1 was having a long acquaintance with the appellant. Immediately before the day of occurrence she had stayed in her house for few days. Evidence would show that PWs 3 & 4 too were knowing the appellant even prior to the day when he had brought the deceased and his wife in their house. This is evident from the say of Zeba (PW 3) that the appellant was a surrendered militant. Evidence would show that PWs 3 & 4 too were knowing the appellant even prior to the day when he had brought the deceased and his wife in their house. This is evident from the say of Zeba (PW 3) that the appellant was a surrendered militant. With this level of acquaintance with the appellant, it could not have been difficult for these three witnesses to identify the appellant as soon as he entered the house and wearing of mask would not have come in their way. For that reason too their evidence as regards the identification of the appellant can be safely relied upon. 34. Mr. Watali also assailed the evidence as regards the disclosure statement of the appellant leading to discovery of the dead body of the deceased from a jungle on 21.1.1997. Mr. Wattali would say that neither the disclosure statement nor the recovery of the dead body pursuant thereto has been proved by reliable and trustworthy evidence inasmuch as no local civilian was associated therewith. 35. We have in this context examined the record on the trial court file and the impugned judgment carefully. It has come in the evidence of Rubeena Kounser, PW-1 and the Investigating Officer, Abdul Ganai, Sub Inspector, PW-15, who at the time of occurrence/lodging of the report was posted as Officer In charge, Police Post, Klaroos within the jurisdiction of Police Station, Kupwara, that the first written information (Ex PW 1/1) about the occurrence was lodged by PW-1 at the said Police post on 20.01.1997. P-1 has proved its contents. This came to be recorded in the daily diary (Roznamacha) of the Police Post at 4.30 pm as Report No. 18. PW 15 has proved a copy of this report (Ex PW 23/1) in the file of the trial court. PW-15 has further stated that on the basis of this report FIR under Section 364, 452 RPC was registered and investigation was entrusted to him, he arrested the accused (appellant) on 21.1.1997 and brought him to Police Station, Kupwara for investigation. There is no challenge to this aspect of the prosecution case in this appeal. 36. Evidence of Investigating Officer, PW 15 and Rubeena Kounser, PW 1, would show that on 21.1.1997, appellant had made a `Fard-i-lnkishaf'/disclosure statement (Ex PW-1/2) about the dead body of the deceased. There is no challenge to this aspect of the prosecution case in this appeal. 36. Evidence of Investigating Officer, PW 15 and Rubeena Kounser, PW 1, would show that on 21.1.1997, appellant had made a `Fard-i-lnkishaf'/disclosure statement (Ex PW-1/2) about the dead body of the deceased. It was stated by him that he, Majid Koshi s/o Ghulam Rasool Koshi and Bashir Koshi S/o Khiaroo Koshi have after abducting Farooq Ahmed, concealed his dead body in the Jungle at a place called Theyen, which he can get recovered. Their evidence would further show that on the same day the Investigating Officer recovered the dead body of the deceased from the place in Theyen Jungle as identified by the appellant vide `Fard-i-Bramdigi'/recovery memo (Ex PW 12/1). PW 15 has further stated in this regard that he had prepared sketch map of the place from where the dead body was recovered, which he has proved as Ex PW 23/3. 37. We have taken note and we are in agreement with the learned appellant's counsel that the prosecution had been unable to produce any civilian, other than PW 1, as a witness in support of the disclosure statement as regards the dead body of the deceased made by the appellant. Two civilians, other than PW-1, namely, Abdul Rehman Chiloo and Ghulam Hassan Chiloo cited as witnesses in the disclosure memo, have not been produced before the court. However, in this regard, we have seen in the prosecution evidence, the testimony of Nazir Ahmad Bhat, PW-12, who is a witness to the recovery of the dead body, which we have found most reliable applying all criteria of appreciation of evidence of a witness. His testimony provides most valuable, trustworthy and reliable evidence as regards the recovery of dead body of the deceased on the basis of identification of the spot by the appellant and in turn lends credence to the evidence as regards disclosure statement of the appellant rendered by PW 1 and the Investigating Officer, PW-15. 38. Nazir Ahmad Bhat, PW 12 is a labourer by profession and an independent witness in true sense. He in no manner is concerned in or linked with the informant PW 1, or the appellant. Defence, however, has put him to prolonged and incisive cross-examination. We on perusal of his testimony in entirety have found it inspiring full confidence and fully reliable. He in no manner is concerned in or linked with the informant PW 1, or the appellant. Defence, however, has put him to prolonged and incisive cross-examination. We on perusal of his testimony in entirety have found it inspiring full confidence and fully reliable. We have found him an independent and truthful witness whose testimony is reliable without slightest pinch of doubt. He says that he knows the accused who resides comparatively away from his village. He was sitting in his house. Police personnel came there and asked him to bring `genti' (pick) and `belcha' (spade) and accompany them. Police had also asked him to take a ladder. They went towards a jungle called as `Gass Padi. In that jungle Yousuf removed snow from a place and said that here is the dead body. Throat of the dead body was wrapped in a muffler. Witness, while making his statement was shown the photographs of the dead body lying on the file and said that they are the photographs were of the said dead body. He says further that the police had taken the dead body to its possession. He also admitted as true the contents of the recovery memo dated 21.1.1997 Ex PW 12/1 saying that after lifting the dead body the police had prepared some documents about the same. The contents of recovery memo would show that the dead body of the deceased was recovered on the basis of the identification of the spot made by the appellant at a place called as `Gass Padi' in Theyen jungle. We are thus inclined to agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial court and hold that the disclosure statement made by the appellant in police custody on 21.1.1997 had lead to the discovery and recovery of the dead body of the deceased on the same day. 39. Contextually, it is in place to refer to the medical evidence comprising of testimony of Dr. Abdul Rashid Bhat, the initial postmortem report (Ex PW 22 CH/1) and detailed postmortem report (Ex PW 22 CH/2), which establishes that deceased had died homicidal death due to "cardio respiratory arrest caused by 1) strangulation 2) grievous injuries on head (left side) obstructing and damaging vitals around". 40. Abdul Rashid Bhat, the initial postmortem report (Ex PW 22 CH/1) and detailed postmortem report (Ex PW 22 CH/2), which establishes that deceased had died homicidal death due to "cardio respiratory arrest caused by 1) strangulation 2) grievous injuries on head (left side) obstructing and damaging vitals around". 40. Having evaluated the evidence, we are not inclined to entertain any doubt about and we accept the prosecution case as we arrive at a conclusion that on 15.01.1997 appellant-accused Mohd. Yousuf Lone, had accommodated deceased Farooq Ahmad Taki and his wife Rubeena Kounser (PW-1) in the house of Ali Mohammad Malik (PW-5) at village, Thein. On 16.01.1997 in the evening appellant armed with a gun entered the said house and took away the deceased holding his arm from that house. Deceased did not return and was not found alive after that. Wife of the deceased had lodged report about the occurrence at Police Post, Karaloos on 20.1.1997. FIR was registered with Police Station, Kupwara on the same day. Investigating Officer arrested the appellant on 21.1.1997 and on the same day discovered and recovered the dead body of the deceased on the basis of the disclosure statement made by the appellant from a place called as `Ghas Padi' located in a jungle, namely, Thein. The deceased had died homicidal death caused by smashing of a side of his face/skull and strangulation. 41. Proof of above facts is sufficient to uphold the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial court. We, however, will take up the two other important points urged on behalf of the appellant to determine as to whether they would cause dent to the prosecution case and make conviction and sentence unsustainable in spite of proof of above facts. 42. Mr. Wattali submitted that inordinate delay in lodging information of the occurrence with the police makes entire case doubtful and gives rise to a reasonable doubt that the informant PW-1, after her husband went missing, might have falsely implicated the appellant in his abduction and killing. We have examined and accorded our consideration to this aspect. 43. Matter was first reported by PW-1 to the Police on 20.1.1997, that is, on forth day after the occurrence. This delay can well be called as inordinate. We have examined and accorded our consideration to this aspect. 43. Matter was first reported by PW-1 to the Police on 20.1.1997, that is, on forth day after the occurrence. This delay can well be called as inordinate. It would go without saying that inordinate delay in lodging FIR casts a cloud of suspicion on the creditability of entire gamut of the prosecution story. There may be sufficient and reasonable cause for delay in reporting commission of an offence to the police but such delay may be deliberate too aimed at giving a particular shape to the story including false implication. Therefore, whenever there is inordinate delay in lodging FIR, court has to look for the cause or explanation for the said delay and it rather becomes duty of the prosecution to disclose the cause and explain the delay. The delay if explained will not make FIR doubtful but, if not, entire prosecution case and evidence will have to be appreciated and evaluated in the backdrop of the delay. 44. In this case, however, we on perusal of statement of PW 1 have come across sufficient and satisfactory explanation to the delay in lodging report to the Police and are of the view that delay was not deliberate and in no case with the intention of falsely implicating the appellant. The delay rather seems a normal outcome of the circumstances as they were. We have noticed that to the knowledge of PW 1 her husband was taken along by the appellant with whom she and her husband were well acquainted to and friendly too. No ulterior motive, therefore, can be attributed to PW 1 in opting not to or being unable to lodge the report immediately or shortly after the occurrence. According to her on the next day she contacted Yousuf (appellant) and without making him known that she had indentified him while taking away her husband, informed him that some persons have taken away her husband and she was assured by the appellant that he will make an attempt to search for her husband by the evening and inform her about entire situation. However, she could not know anything about her husband or the appellant on that day. Failure in not informing the Police on next day, that is, 17.1.1997 is also well explained thus. However, she could not know anything about her husband or the appellant on that day. Failure in not informing the Police on next day, that is, 17.1.1997 is also well explained thus. Her further say is that on 3rd day she made up her mind to meet Deputy Commissioner, Kupwara and boarded a bus for Kupwara. Appellant also boarded that bus and seeing her weeping, told her that why she is saying to others that he has lifted her husband and that if she continued saying so, she will incur risk to her life too. She says further that prior to lodging report, she met Ghulam Nabi Payar, who was a Commander of Task Force, who told her that Yousuf might have lifted the deceased for money. Ghulam Nabi gave her a letter in the name of a Commander as appellant was working with Army. As it was snowing heavily so she could not take the letter to that Commander and ultimately she reached Police Post, Klaroos on 20.1.1997. Statement of PW 1 as regards delay in lodging the FIR needs to be adjudged in backdrop of sufficient evidence suggesting that area in question during those days was in thick of militancy, appellant was a surrendered militant and was working for Army and also that heavy snow fall was going on in the area. Delay in lodging report to the Police, therefore, cannot be said to be deliberate and is rather sufficiently explained. 45. Yet another argument of Mr. Watali relates to reliance on the evidence rendered by the approver, Abdul Majid Koshi, PW 18. PW 18 says that he along with the other co-accused, Bashir Ahmad Koshi, accompanied the appellant to the house of PW 5 and under the orders of appellant, he and the co-accused had cordoned off the house. Besides saying that the appellant had entered the house and brought out the deceased from there, he has stated that appellant had directed him and the co-accused to tie the hands of the deceased and that both of them were armed with Kalashan Kouf guns. He has stated further that the appellant had smashed head of the deceased with a stone and strangulated his neck with the muffler. This witness has, thus, provided direct evidence to the killing of the deceased by the appellant. 46. He has stated further that the appellant had smashed head of the deceased with a stone and strangulated his neck with the muffler. This witness has, thus, provided direct evidence to the killing of the deceased by the appellant. 46. We may before dealing with the evidence provided by approver, state, as we have indicated above too, that prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove the charges against the appellant, short of the evidence of the approver and in that we could have ignored this leg of appellant's challenge to the impugned judgment. However, we have carefully scrutinized the impugned judgment and have found that learned trial Court has evaluated the evidence of the approver with reference to and in the backdrop of law governing the field and relied upon the same. We are not persuaded to disagree with the view taken by the learned trial Court. Mr. Watali could not point out as to how the evidence rendered by the approver should not have been relied upon and is not trustworthy. Approver has given complete narration of the events inasmuch as he has stated about those aspects, which implicate him in the offence as abettor on the same footing as the other co-accused, who has been sentenced and convicted under Section 365/109 RPC. His evidence gets valuable corroboration from the disclosure statement of the appellant that led to the discovery of the dead body of the deceased with its face/skull smashed from one side and a muffler around the neck. 47. For all what has been said and discussed above, we find that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charges against the appellant-accused. We, thus, uphold the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial court and dismiss this appeal as without any merit. 48. Reference in terms of section 374 CR. P.C. made by the learned trial court is answered accordingly and learned court is directed to take up the follow up action. 49. Record of the learned trial court be remitted back along with a copy of this order.