ORDER Ram Mohan Reddy, J: Petitioner, a registered partnership firm, carrying on business of wholesale supply of food grains to various departments in the State of Karnataka and other private parties, responded to a tender through E-auction for supply of Tool Dal for the academic year 2011-12, floated by N.C.D.E.X, which is a recommending agency of the State of Karnataka to procure food grains to be supplied to Schools for preparation of Mid day meals to students. Petitioners rate was found to be lowest, in the matter of supply of Toor Dal from I Phase to VI Phase for the period from June 2011 to December 2011. Supply of Tool Dal from I to IV phase was without complaint while during the V phase, supply of Tool Dal was delayed by more than 100 days, though the agreement stipulated it should be made within 30 working days. Karnataka Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, having noticed the delay tantamounting to breach of terms of the contract, is said to have issued a show-cause notice dated 13.12.2011 of the District Manager (South) Annexure 'R3' to the statement of objections informing the petitioner as to why penalty should not be imposed as per penalty clause of the agreement and why it should not recommend to the Head office to keep the Firm under the blacklist and there after wards, by order dated 11.04.2012 Annexure 'B', forfeited the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) and security deposit as also blacklisted the petitioner for a period of five years. The request of the petitioner to withdraw the said order when not responded to, has resulted in this petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the order Annexure 'B'. 2. In the statement of objections, apart from pointing out to the show cause notice Annexure 'R3' and the notice Annexure 'R4', it is stated that the representation of the petitioner post the order Annexure 'B' was considered and rejected by endorsement dated 05.06.2012 Annexure 'R5'. 3. The only contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the authority, without issuing a show-cause notice and following the principles of natural justice, directed forfeiture of EMD and blacklisted the petitioner, which is illegal by placing reliance upon the following reported opinions: 1. AIR 1975 Supreme Court 266 (M/s. Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd., Vs. State of West Bengal) 2. AIR 1975 Supreme Court 266 (M/s. Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd., Vs. State of West Bengal) 2. (2009) 2 SCC 652 , (State of Orissa Vs. Bairam Sahu) 3. AIR 2009 Supreme Court 2699, (Gurumej Singh Vs. State of Punjab) 4. 2010 AIR SCW 7105, (ORXY Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India) 5. 2011 AIR SCW 4031, (Kesar Enterprises Ltd. Vs. The State of U.P.) 4. Facts, not in dispute are: there was a delay in supplying Toor Dal constituting breach of the terms of the agreement and therefore, petitioner was visited with a notice as to why action should not be taken. It is no doubt true that Annexure 'R3' does not take partake the character of a show-cause notice over why the petitioner should not be blacklisted, since its contents disclose that the Manager recommend to the Head office for blacklisting the petitioner. The Senior Chief Manager issued a notice dated 27.12.2011 Annexure "R4' informing the petitioner that action would be taken to forfeit the E.M.D. and blacklist the petitioner. That notice apparently is an order passed stating that action would be taken to blacklist the petitioner and also forfeit the EMD. Therefore, that notice is not a show-cause notice to the petitioner. 5. In M/s. Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and another, AIR 1975 SC 266 , the Apex Court at paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 observed thus: "12. Under Article 298 of the Constitution the Executive power of the Union and the State shall extend to the carrying on of any trade and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose. The State can carryon executive function by making a law or without making a law. The exercise of such powers and functions in trade by the State is subject to Part III of the Constitution. Article 14 speaks of equality before the law and equal, protection of the laws. Equality of opportunity should apply to matters of public contracts. The State has the right to trade. The State has there the duty to observe equality. An ordinary individual can choose not to deal with any person. The Government cannot choose to exclude persons by discrimination. The order of black-listing, has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. The State has the right to trade. The State has there the duty to observe equality. An ordinary individual can choose not to deal with any person. The Government cannot choose to exclude persons by discrimination. The order of black-listing, has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. A person who is on the approved list is unable to enter into advantageous relations with the Government because of the order of black-listing. A person who has been dealing with the Government in the matter of sale and purchase of materials has a legitimate interest or expectation. When the State acts to the prejudice of a person it has to be supported by legality. 13. But for the order of blacklisting, the petitioner would have been entitled to participate in the purchase of cinchona. Similarly the respondent in the appeal would also have been entitled but for the order of blacklisting to tender competitive rates. 14. The State can enter into contract with any person it chooses. No person has a fundamental right to insist that the Government must enter into a contract with him. A citizen has a right to earn livelihood and to pursue any trade. A citizen has a right, to claim equal treatment to enter into a contract which may be proper, necessary and essential to his lawful calling." 6. In Raghunath Thakur Vs. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1989 SC 620 , the Apex Court observed thus: "4. Indisputably, no notice had been given to the appellant of the proposal of black-listing the appellant. It was contended on behalf of the State Government that there was no requirement in the rule of giving any prior notice before blacklisting any person. In so far as the contention that there is no requirement specifically of giving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right. But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequence should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice. It has to be realised that blacklisting any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequence for the future business of the person concerned in any event. But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequence should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice. It has to be realised that blacklisting any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequence for the future business of the person concerned in any event. Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order. In that view of the matter, the last portion of the order in so far as it directs black-listing of the appellant in respect of future contracts, cannot be sustained in law. In the premises, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the black-list in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside. So far as the cancellation of the bid of the appellant is concerned, that is not affected. This order will, however, not prevent the State Government or the appropriate authorities from taking any future steps for blacklisting the appellant if the Government is so entitled to do so in accordance with law, i.e. giving the appellant due notice and an opportunity of making representation. After hearing the appellant, the State Government will be at liberty to pass any order in accordance with law indicating the reasons therefor. We, however, make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made against the appellant. The appeal is thus disposed of." 7. In State of Orissa and Others Vs. Balram Sahu, 2009(2) SCC 652 , the Apex Court observed that before cancellation and forfeiture of security deposit, notice has to be given. 8. In ORXY Fisheries Put. Ltd., Vs. Union of India and Others, 2010 AIR SCW 7105 the Apex Court observes that: "Justice is rooted in confidence and justice is the goal of a quasi-judicial proceedings also. If the functioning of a quasi-judicial authority has to inspire confidence in the minds of those subjected to its jurisdiction, such authority must act with utmost fairness. Its fairness is obviously to be manifested by the language in which charges are couched and conveyed to the person proceeded against.' 9. In Kesar Enterprises Limited Vs. If the functioning of a quasi-judicial authority has to inspire confidence in the minds of those subjected to its jurisdiction, such authority must act with utmost fairness. Its fairness is obviously to be manifested by the language in which charges are couched and conveyed to the person proceeded against.' 9. In Kesar Enterprises Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2011 AIR SCW 4031 (Supra), the Apex Court while following the decision in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India, (1981)1 SCC 664 extracted the relevant portion, which reads thus: "xxx. Conversely if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, Courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The Court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise." 10. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles in the matte; of forfeiture and blacklisting, it is needless to state that the petitioner was entitled to a pre-decisional hearing. The show-cause notice, Annexure 'R3', falls short of informing the petitioner or extending it an opportunity of hearing before forfeiture of the EMD and blacklisting. The notice Annexure 'R4', though termed as a notice dated 27.12.2011, nevertheless, the operative portion reads that action would be taken to forfeit the EMD and blacklist the petitioner. This too does not constitute a show-cause notice to the petitioner so as to extend it an opportunity of having its say. 11. In the circumstances, the petition deserves to be allowed and is accordingly, allowed. The order dated 11.04.2012 Annexure 'B' is quashed and proceeding remitted for consideration afresh. This too does not constitute a show-cause notice to the petitioner so as to extend it an opportunity of having its say. 11. In the circumstances, the petition deserves to be allowed and is accordingly, allowed. The order dated 11.04.2012 Annexure 'B' is quashed and proceeding remitted for consideration afresh. The order Annexure ‘B’ is directed to be treated as a Show-Cause Notice the petitioner, who may submit its explanation within a fortnight from today, which the respondent is directed to consider and pass order in accordance with law. The order dated 05.06.2012, Annexure 'R5', passed during the pendency of this petition is treated as inconsequential. I.A.I/2012 for modification of the interim order and I.A.I/2013 for early hearing are unnecessary and are dismissed as such.