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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 723 (MP)

Arun Prakash Yadav v. State of M. P.

2013-06-28

SHEEL NAGU, SUJOY PAUL

body2013
JUDGMENT : Sheel Nagu, J. : - The following question has been referred to this larger Bench for being answered : "Whether under Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, charge-sheet can be issued and enquiry and presenting authorities can be appointed by any other authority than the authorities empowered and mentioned in the Rules? Accordingly, in view of conflicting views between the judgments of N. K. Pandey and Dal Chand Ahirwar (supra), it may be decided as to which view is correct." 2. The undisputed facts in the present case are as follows :- 1. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6206/2011, which is being taken as a reference case, is an Inspector of Police, who, at the relevant point of time (issuance of charge-sheet), was enjoying salary in the pay-scale of Rs 6500-10500/-. 2. Pay-scale attached to the post of Inspector of Police is upgraded to Rs 6500-200-10500/- w.e.f. 1-9-2007 by executive instruction dated 8-11 -2007 (vide P-2). 3. All posts, which are filled by direct recruitment and promotion, and which carry pay scale of Rs 6500-10500/- are declared as Gazetted Class-II posts by executive instruction dated 11-4-2008 (vide P-3). 4. The post of Inspector of Police continues till date to form part of the cadre constituted under the M. P. Police Executive (Non-Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 1996 ("Non-Gazetted Rules" for brevity). 5. The post of Inspector of Police till date does not form part of the cadre constituted by the M.P. Police Executive (Gazetted) Service Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2000 ("Gazetted Rules" for brevity). 6. Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 ("1966 Rules" for brevity) in Rule 3(1)(d) excludes the applicability of the 1966 Rules to such person for whom special provision for the time being in force is made in respect of matters covered by the Rules of 1966 by or under any law. 7. Section 7 of the Police Act, 1861 bestows plenary powers to the IG, DIG and AIG to dismiss and discharge any Police Officer of Subordinate rank subject to protection provided under Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the relevant Rules. 8. M.P. Police Regulations ("Regulations" for brevity) are statutory in nature having been framed under section 43(2) and (3) of Indian Police Act, 1861. 9. 8. M.P. Police Regulations ("Regulations" for brevity) are statutory in nature having been framed under section 43(2) and (3) of Indian Police Act, 1861. 9. Regulation 213 of the Regulations, by implication excludes the applicability of the Regulations to the members of the Indian Police Service and M.P. State Police Service (Officers of the rank of Dy.S.P. and above). 10. An Inspector of Police is undoubtedly subordinate in rank to Dy. S.P. and is neither a member of M.P. State Police Service as mentioned in Regulation 213 nor a member of the services/cadres constituted under the Gazetted Rules. 11. Regulation 221 of the Regulations bestows power upon SP to inflict punishment of censure on Inspectors whereas Regulation 222 bestows powers on DIG to inflict any punishment except removal, dismissal or compulsory retirement from service upon Inspectors. 12. Regulation 228 of the Regulations provides that in all cases of removal, compulsory retirement from service, reduction in rank/grade/pay or withdrawing of increments for a period in excess of one year, the SP shall be empowered to set forth the charge, the evidence on which the charge is based, the defence of the accused, the statements of his witnesses, if any, the findings of the SP with reasons on which it is based and the enquiry report containing the findings in regard to the charges against the delinquent officer. Thus, in other words, the SP is empowered by Regulation 228 to issue a charge-sheet/institute disciplinary proceedings against an Inspector of Police. 3. In the backdrop of the undisputed factual matrix supra, this Court is persuaded to hold that the Regulation 228 categorically provides for issuance of charge-sheet to an Inspector of Police and, therefore by necessary implication arising out of conjoint reading of Regulation 213 and Rule 3(1 )(d) of 1966 Rules, the applicability of 1966 Rules gets excluded qua an Inspector of Police as regards the subject-matter of competence to issue charge-sheet. 4. As such, an Inspector of Police while questioning the competence of an authority empowered to issue charge-sheet, can seek to invoke the applicability of 1966 Rules, only when he can successfully establish that mere declaration of post of Inspector to be gazetted by an executive fiat, results in automatic inclusion of the post of Inspector in the gazetted service constituted by the Gazetted Rules. 5. 5. On the anvil of the aforesaid factual undisputed background, the pivotal question, which arises for consideration in the instant case, at the cost of refraining the original one, in the considered opinion of this Bench, is as follows : "Whether, mere award of the scale of ? 6500-10500/- and the declaration of being a Gazetted post, the Inspector of Police can avail the advantage of being inducted, by implication, into the Gazetted cadre constituted under M.P. Police Executive (Gazetted) Service Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2000 thereby allowing the inspectors to wriggle out of the clutches of the M.P, Police Regulations and claiming applicability of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 for the purpose of deciding as to which is the competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an Inspector of Police and thus which among the conflicting judgments in the cases of N. K. Pandey and Dal ChandAhirwar lays down the correct law." 6. Learned counsel for petitioner raises the following primary contentions :- (1) The Executive Instructions dated 8-11-2007 (vide P-2) and dated 11-4-2008 (vide P-3) categorically indicate that the post of Inspector of Police of having been declared as Gazetted is inducted by implication into the Gazetted service constituted under the Gazetted Rules notwithstanding the said Rules having not been amended so far to include Inspector as a member of Gazetted service. (2) By virtue of the Schedule appended to the Rules of 1966 solely excluding the Class-III (Non-Ministerial) post in the Police Department from applicability of the Police Regulations, the post of Inspector of Police, which does not fall within the category of Class-III (Non-Ministerial), cannot be made subject to the Police Regulations and, therefore for deciding the question of competency of the authority to issue charge-sheet to an Inspector of Police, the Rules of 1966 are alone applicable. (3) Due to change in the hierarchical set up of the M.P. Police Establishment as provided in the Police Regulations, the post of DIG ought to be read as IG and the post of IG deserves to be read as DGP and, therefore even if the authorities issuing the charge-sheet to the petitioner are competent as per the Police Regulations, which are based on the old hierarchical set up, then such authorities should be treated to be incompetent. 7. 7. At the very outset, it would be appropriate to deal with the legal aspect of the pivotal question, which has been refrained above. 8. Service Jurisprudence recognizes certain means, by which a particular post can form part of a "service". The term "service" is well known as constituting posts, which are more or less of similar nature. Every service is required to be governed by certain Rules of statutory nature for the purpose of filling similar kind of posts constituting the service. In the instant case, there are two kinds of Recruitment Rules under consideration. The first being the M.P. Police Executive (Gazetted) Service Recruitment and Appeal Rules, 2000, which not only provides for constitution, classification and scales of pay, but also method of recruitment to fill up those similar kinds of posts which are classified as "Gazetted". As per Rule 4 of the Gazetted Rules, the Gazetted service comprises of the following three kinds of persons :- (i) Persons, who at the commencement of the Gazetted Rules are appointed substantively or in officiating capacity to the posts specified in Schedule-I; (ii) Persons recruited to the service (Gazetted service) before the commencement of the Gazetted Rules; (iii) Persons recruited to the service in accordance with the provisions of the Gazetted Rules. 9. Whereas Rule 5 deals with classification, the number of posts included in the service and the scales of pay attached thereto with the power to the Government to add or reduce the number of posts included in the Gazetted service on permanent or temporary basis at any time. 10. Rule 6 lays down the method of recruitment, which is restricted to three modes, i.e., direct recruitment through competitive examination, by promotion and by transfer or deputation. 11. Rules 7 to 14 deal with appointment to service by direct recruitment and thereafter Rules 15 to 20 deal with appointment by promotion, Schedule-I to the said Gazetted Rules prescribing for classification in service, pay-scale and the number of posts existing in the Gazetted service, provides for 30 different kinds of constituting the cadre of Gazetted Service. These 30 different kinds of posts can generally be classified into three types, i.e. (i) Superintendent of Police; (ii) Additional Superintendent of Police and (iii) Deputy Superintendent of Police. Schedule-I further provides the post of Inspector of Police as the feeder post for filling these posts in Gazetted service. 12. These 30 different kinds of posts can generally be classified into three types, i.e. (i) Superintendent of Police; (ii) Additional Superintendent of Police and (iii) Deputy Superintendent of Police. Schedule-I further provides the post of Inspector of Police as the feeder post for filling these posts in Gazetted service. 12. On the other hand, the other set of Rules, which pertain to Non-Gazetted Service known as M.P. Police Executive (Non-Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 1996 also comprise similar provisions as contained in the Gazetted Rules. The said Non-Gazetted Rules categorically provide Inspector of Police as the very first post constituting Non-Gazetted service under Schedule-I of these Rules. 13. From the abovesaid two different set of Rules governing the Gazetted service and Non-Gazetted service under the Police Establishment, one glaring aspect that is evident as day light, is that the post of Inspector of Police being part of Non-Gazetted Rules, is the feeder post for filling up the posts constituting Gazetted service under the Gazetted Rules. 14. The contention of the learned counsel for petitioner that mere declaration of the post of Inspector as Gazetted Class-II inducts the post of Inspector into the Gazetted service constituted under the Gazetted Rules, deserves outright rejection for the reason that the Gazetted Rules categorically prescribe three kinds of persons forming the Gazetted cadre under Rule 4 which does not contemplate a fourth kind (i.e. Inspector) who claims his existence in the Gazetted service merely by implication based upon declaration of Inspector as gazetted. If such a course of action of induction by implication is permitted, then the sanctity of the Recruitment Rules shall stand eroded and arbitrariness will come into play bestowing unbridled power to the executive of making recruitment by a mode foreign to the recruitment rules by merely getting an executive order passed in favour of a select few without amending the Recruitment Rules. Moreover, it is further to be seen that the post of Inspector of Police continues till date to be the feeder post for filling up the Gazetted cadre comprising of the posts of various nomenclature falling broadly under three categories of SP, Additional SP and Dy.SP comprised under the Gazetted Rules. Moreover, it is further to be seen that the post of Inspector of Police continues till date to be the feeder post for filling up the Gazetted cadre comprising of the posts of various nomenclature falling broadly under three categories of SP, Additional SP and Dy.SP comprised under the Gazetted Rules. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the first contention of the learned counsel for petitioner of seeking induction of the post of Inspector of Police by implication into the Gazetted cadre constituted under the Gazetted Rules deserves to be and is, therefore rejected. 15. Coming to the next contention of the learned counsel for petitioner about the contents of the Schedule to the Rules of 1966, it is noticed that the posts falling under Class-III (Non-Ministerial) Cadre in the Department of Police are provided by the said Schedule to be governed by the Police Regulations and not by the Rules of 1966. The said remark made in the sub-heading of "Home Department (Police)" in the Schedule appended to the Rules of 1966 is in fact against the petitioner. Once this Court has held that induction into the Gazetted Cadre of the posts of Inspector of Police cannot take place by implication, the post of Inspector of Police, which as per the Schedule-II of Rules of 1966 belongs to Class-III (Non-Ministerial) category, shall necessarily be governed by the Police Regulations and, therefore the contention of the petitioner that the competence of an authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an Inspector of Police ought to be tested on the anvil of Rules of 1966, is unsustainable. 16. The third and the last submission of the learned counsel for petitioner is regarding the change in the hierarchical set up of the Police Establishment where the post of DIG as mentioned in the Police Regulations ought to be read as IG. It is his further contention that due to hierarchical change in the Police Force, the Police Regulations have become redundant as no amendments in the said Regulations have been carried out to keep pace with the change in the hierarchical set up and, therefore he contends that the question of competency of the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings cannot be decided on the basis of the changed hierarchical set up of posts. 17. 17. The said third contention of the learned counsel for petitioner regarding the Police Regulations failing to keep pace with the change in hierarchical in the Police Establishment is untenable. The Police Regulations have been amended by Notification dated 8-9-1999 issued invoking the powers under section 46(2) and (3) of the Police Act of 1861 substituting the term "IG (Range)" in place of DIG (Range) wherever this term appears in the Police Regulations and further by another Notification dated 25-2-2004 issued by invoking the same powers under the Police Act of 1861 substituting the term "IG (Range)/DIG (Range) in place of IG (Range). 18. The amendment in the Police Regulations as mentioned above, are of no avail to the petitioner in the face of Regulation 228 categorically empowering the SP to issue a charge-sheet to Officer of any rank subordinate to the SP which would include an Inspector of Police. 19. It would be appropriate at this stage to decipher the real intent and purport of the Regulation 228 for finding out as to whether any other authority superior or inferior in rank to SP can also exercise the power of issuance of charge-sheet against an Officer subordinate in rank to SP. For convenience, the relevant extract of the Regulation 228 is reproduced below :- "228. D.E. - When and how held. - In every case of removal, compulsory retirement from service, reduction in rank, grade or pay or withholding of increment for a period in excess of one year a formal proceedings must be recorded by the Superintendent in the prescribed form, - setting forth]. (a) the charge ; (b) the evidence on which the charge is based ; (c) the defence of the accused ; (d) the statements of his witness (if any); (e) the finding of the Superintendent, with the reasons on which it is based; (f) the Superintendent's final order or recommendation, as the case may be; 20. A bare reading of Regulation 228 indicates that Superintendent alone has been mentioned as the authority to frame and issue a charge-sheet in respect of major penalty or penalties which have the effect of major penalties. The term "Superintendent" means the Superintendent of Police, which is evident from Regulation 32 which describes the SP as the head of the Police Force of his District. The term "Superintendent" means the Superintendent of Police, which is evident from Regulation 32 which describes the SP as the head of the Police Force of his District. The Police Regulations do not prescribe the competence of any authority to issue a charge-sheet in any other provisions except Regulation 228, which solely empowers the SP. This power of issuance of charge-sheet is bestowed upon the SP in regard to all persons holding the ranks subordinate to that of the SP. By necessary implication, the provisions of Regulation 228 exclude all authorities, superior or inferior to the SP to issue a charge-sheet to any Police personnel holding the rank subordinate to that of SP. It can, thus, be safely held that for an Inspector of Police, which in rank is subordinate to SP, the sole competent authority to issue charge-sheet is the SP under the Police Regulations, which exclusively govern the field as held supra. 21. From the above discussion, it is crystal clear that no other authority except SP is empowered under the Police Regulations to institute disciplinary proceedings/issue charge-sheet to an Inspector of Police. 22. It is now to be seen that in the background of the abovesaid findings of the SP alone being competent to issue charge-sheet to an Inspector, can the DIG/IG or for that matter any Officer superior in rank to the SP, institute disciplinary proceedings/issue charge-sheet to an Inspector of Police. 23. The right of a civil post holder to question the competence of an authority to institute disciplinary proceedings/issue charge-sheet is neither a fundamental nor a constitutional right. Such a right can be provided by a Statute in shape of an Act or Rule/Regulations. 24. The Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and another vs. Chandrapal Singh and another, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 670 has held thus : "8. Thus, looking to the terms and content of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution, it does not follow that even initiation or conduct of inquiry proceedings should be by that authority itself, which is empowered to dismiss or remove an official under the said article, unless there is an express rule governing the official requiring it to be so." 25. The Apex Court in the case of P. V. Srinivasa Sastry and others vs. Comptroller and Auditor General and others, (1993) 1 SCC 419 has further held thus : "4. The Apex Court in the case of P. V. Srinivasa Sastry and others vs. Comptroller and Auditor General and others, (1993) 1 SCC 419 has further held thus : "4. Article 311 (1) says that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an All India Service or a Civil Service of a State or holds civil post under the Union or a State "shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed". Whether this guarantee includes within itself the guarantee that even the disciplinary proceeding should be initiated only by the appointing authority? It is well known that departmental proceeding consists of several stages: the initiation of the proceeding, the inquiry in respect of the charges levelled against that delinquent officer and the final order which is passed after the conclusion of the inquiry. Article 311 (1) guarantees that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. But Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, it is open to Union of India or a State Government to make any rule prescribing that even the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority. Any such rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holder of a civil post. But in absence of any such rule, this right or guarantee does not flow from Article 3.11 of the Constitution. It need not be pointed out that initiation of a departmental proceeding per se does not visit the officer concerned with any evil consequences, and the framers of the Constitution did not consider it necessary to guarantee even that to holders of civil posts under the Union of India or under the State Government. At the same time, this will not give right to authorities having the same rank as that of the officer against whom proceeding is to be initiated to take a decision whether any such proceeding should be initiated. At the same time, this will not give right to authorities having the same rank as that of the officer against whom proceeding is to be initiated to take a decision whether any such proceeding should be initiated. In absence of a rule, any superior authority who can be held to be the controlling authority, can initiate such proceeding." 26. The Apex Court in the case of Inspector General of Police and another vs. Thavasiappan, reported in (1996) 2 SCC145 has held thus : "8. The learned counsel also drew our attention to P. V. Srinivasa Sastry vs. Comptroller and Auditor General : (1993) 1 SCC 419 wherein this Court in the context of Article 311 (1) has held that in absence of a rule any superior authority who can be held to be the controlling authority can initiate a departmental proceeding and that initiation of a departmental proceeding per se does not visit the officer concerned with any evil consequences. Transport Commr. vs. A. Radha Krishan Moorthy : (1995) 1 SCC 332 was next relied upon. Therein also this Court has held that initiation of disciplinary enquiry can be by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority. These decisions fully support the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that initiation of a departmental proceeding and conducting an enquiry can be by an authority other than the authority competent to impose the proposed penalty." 27. From the abovesaid decisions of the Apex Court, it is clear that unless Rules provide and empower any particular authority to institute disciplinary proceedings/issue charge-sheet, the delinquent officer cannot insist that such a power can be exercised only by the appointing/disciplinary authority. 28. In the cases at the hand charge-sheet impugned in the writ petitions have either been issued by the DIG. DIG is an authority superior in rank to SP. This Court, thus, has no hesitation to hold that initiation of the disciplinary proceedings/issuance of charge-sheet by the DIG or any other authority except SP runs counter to the provisions of Regulation 228. 29. DIG is an authority superior in rank to SP. This Court, thus, has no hesitation to hold that initiation of the disciplinary proceedings/issuance of charge-sheet by the DIG or any other authority except SP runs counter to the provisions of Regulation 228. 29. Learned counsel for petitioner has pressed into service the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Shardul Singh, reported in 7977 MPLJ (S.C.) 363 = 1970 (1) SCC 108 , which is of no avail since the said decision does not deal with the issue involved herein as the Apex Court in the said case held that the constitutional protection afforded to a civil post holder under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India is available at the time of imposition of penalties mentioned therein and cannot be stretched to be available even at the stage of issuance of charge-sheet. 30. Per contra, the learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on various decisions of the Apex Court P. V. Srinivasa Sastry vs. Comptroller and Auditor General, (1993) 1 SCC 419 (Paras 4 and 5), Transport Commissioner vs. A. Radha K. Moorthy, (1995) 1 SCC 332 (Para 8), Inspector General of Police vs. Thavasiappan, (1996) 2 SCC 145 (Para 9), Shyamkant Tiwari vs. State ofM.P., 1986 MPLJ 37 (Paras 12 and 13), Krishna Narayan vs. State of M.P., 1985 MPLJ 343 (Paras 15 and 16), and Indian Medical Association vs. Union of India, AIR 2011 SCW 3469 (Para 40) to contend that Section 7 of the Police Act bestows sufficient powers upon the IG, DIG and AIG to dismiss and discharge any Police Officer of subordinate rank subject to the provisions of Article 311 and Rules framed in that regard. It is his further contention that since specific rule, i.e. Regulation 228 of the Police Regulations is framed bestowing power upon the SP to institute disciplinary proceedings by framing and issuance of a charge-sheet, the petitioner, who is an Inspector of Police and against whom charge-sheet has been issued by the DIG, cannot seek applicability of the Rules of 1966 at the cost of exclusion of the Police Regulations. 31. 31. In the backdrop of the abovesaid factual and legal position, this Court now embarks upon the scrutiny of the two conflicting decisions delivered in the cases of N. K. Pandey vs. State ofMP, 2012(1) MPLJ 479 = ILR (2011) MP 2168 and Dalchand Ahirwar vs. State of M.P., ILR (2012) MP 902 which are the genesis of this bench. 32. In the case of N. K. Pandey vs. State of M.P., ILR (2011) MP 2168, the Single Bench of this Court was faced with the factual matrix of an Inspector of Police who had been declared as Gazetted being issued a charge-sheet by the IGP thereby impelling the said Inspector of Police to assail the competence of IGP to issue the charge-sheet on the ground of the post of Inspector having been declared as Gazetted, against whom the State Government alone was competent to do so under the provisions of Rule 13 of Rules of 1966. As such, in the case of N. K. Pandey, the Single Bench moved on the assumption that for resolving the controversy, the Rules of 1966 are applicable. The Single Bench of this Court in the said case did not go into the aspect of applicability/non-applicability of the Rules of 1966 while holding IGP to be competent to issue charge-sheet an Inspector of Police who had been declared as Gazetted Officer while holding so the Single Bench drew inspiration from three decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of Inspector General of Police vs. Thavasiappan, (1996) 2 SCC 145 (Para 9), Director General, ESI vs. T. Abdul Razak, (1996) 4 SCC 708 ; and Commissioner of Police vs. Jayasurian, (1997) 6 SCC 75 . The Single Bench in the case of N. K. Pandey (supra), thus, primarily based its decision on the concept of IGP being the Controlling Authority of an Inspector and, therefore being competent to issue charge-sheet to him after placing further reliance on the general concept that it is not necessary for the authority competent to impose penalty alone to issue the charge-sheet. 33. 33. On the other hand, in the case of Dalchand Ahirwar (supra), the Single Bench of this Court held the SP to be incompetent to issue charge-sheet against a Sub-Inspector of Police since the DIG was the disciplinary authority after referring to the provisions of the Rules of 1966 and after holding that in term of Rule 13(1) of the Rules of 1966, the SP had not been empowered by general or special order to initiate disciplinary proceedings. From reading of the judgment in the case of Dalchand Ahirwar (supra), it is clear that the aspect of applicability/non-applicability of the Rules of 1966 was neither raised and, therefore not considered. The Single Bench in the said case thus moved on the assumption that the Rules of 1966 would apply for deciding the question of competence of the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a Sub-Inspector. 34. From the above conspectus of facts and law, it is evident that neither in the case of N. K. Pandey (supra) nor in the case of Dalchand Ahirwar (supra) the question of applicability or non-applicability of the Rules of 1966 was raised or considered by this Court for deciding the question of competence of the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an Inspector of Police. Moreso, this Court in both these contrary decisions was not posed with, and, therefore did not consider, the question as to whether mere declaration of the post of Inspector as Gazetted can induct by implication the post of Inspector into the Gazetted service constituted under the Gazetted Rules, without the said Rules being amended. 35. This Bench in view of the above discussion is, thus, compelled to hold with utmost humility at it's command that as regards competence of an authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an Inspector of Police, neither the case of N. K. Pandey (supra) nor the case of Dalchand Ahirwar (supra) lay down the correct law. 36. This Bench, thus, answers the reframed question in the following manner :- (i) An Inspector of Police while assailing the competence of authority to issue major penalty/charge-sheet against him cannot avail induction into the gazetted cadre constituted under the Gazetted Rules of 2000 merely because of being declared as Gazetted and being upgraded in the scale of pay of Rs 6500-10,500/-, unless the Gazetted Rules of 2000 are amended suitably. (ii) For the purpose of deciding the competence of an authority to institute disciplinary proceedings/issuance of charge-sheet against an Inspector of Police, the M.P. Police Regulations alone would apply to the exclusion of M.P. Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. (iii) As per Regulation 228 of Police Regulations, the Superintendent of Police alone is the competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings/issue charge-sheet for major penalties, against an Inspector of Police; and (iv) Neither the decision rendered in the case of N. K. Pandey vs. State of M.P., ILR (2011) MP 2168 nor the decision in the case of Dalchand Ahirwar vs. State of M.P., ILR (2012) M.P. 902 lay down the correct law for deciding the question of competency of authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings/issue charge-sheet to an Inspector of Police. 37. The case be sent back to the appropriate Single Bench for deciding the writ petition. Order accordingly.