JUDGMENT Tinlianthang Vaiphei, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 5-7-2005 passed by the Assistant Commissioner-cum-Commission under the Workmen's Compensation Act rejecting the preliminary objection of the petitioner against W.C. Case No. 86/2002 filed by the respondent No. 5 claiming compensation in a representative capacity on the ground of res judicata. Before proceeding further, the brief facts of the case may be noticed. The respondent No. 5, as a claimant, had filed an application before the Assisting Labour Commissioner-cum-Commissioner ("the Commissioner" for short) under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 ("the Act") alleging that her husband, the late Sirajuddin, was employed by the petitioner-Corporation as daily labour and had died due to electrocution while clearing the jungle on 6-11-1997 and that her husband was at that time working under the supervision of one Shri Nurul Huda Laskar, an Engineer of the petitioner-Corporation. An FIR was lodged to that effect and was registered as Lakhipur P.S. Case No. UD Case No. 16/97. According to respondent No. 5, she had two minor children and was five months pregnant at the time of the death of her husband. The application for compensation was filed before the Commissioner on 30-10-2000 and was registered as W.C. Case No. 28 of 2000. On receipt of the notice from the Commissioner, it is claimed by the petitioner-Corporation, an inquiry was into the incident and a report called for from the said N.H. Laskar, who in his report informed them that the deceased was neither an engaged labour of the petitioner-Corporation nor did he ever work under his supervision. The report further stated that on 6-11-1997 when the incident allegedly took place, no work of jungle clearing was undertaken by the Corporation at Ciclepunji area where the incident allegedly had take place. The report also stated that no linemen by the names of Liakat Laskar and Nasiruddin Laskar whop were alleged to be present on that day were engaged by the petitioner-Corporation. The report flatly denied that the deceased or any of the witnesses were ever seen or known to the enquiry officer as they never worked under him or the petitioner-Corporation. 2. The report flatly denied that the deceased or any of the witnesses were ever seen or known to the enquiry officer as they never worked under him or the petitioner-Corporation. 2. In contesting the claim application, the petitioner-Corporation, while refuting the case of the respondent 5 on merit, it also raised preliminary objection against the maintainability of the claim application on the grounds that the claim application, having been after almost three from the date of alleged incident, was barred by limitation and that it did not receive notice under Section 10 of the Act. It denied that the deceased was its engaged labour or that he had ever worked under the said Nurul Huda Laskar. The Commissioner, after hearing the parties on the preliminary objection, passed the order dated 23-8-2001 dismissing W.C. Case No. 28 of 2000 holding that the application was not maintainable as it was time-barred. No revision or appeal was preferred by the respondent No. 5, and the said order has attained finality. However, to the surprise of the petitioner-Corporation, the respondent No. 5 in May, 2002 again filed another claim application under the Act before the same Commissioner in a representative capacity i.e. on behalf of her three children on the same cause of action. The claim application was registered as W.C. Case No. 86/2002. The application was accompanied by another application filed under Section 10(1)(b) of the Act to appoint the respondent No. 5 to represent her minor children and condone the delay in presenting the application. 3. On receipt of the applications, the petitioner-Corporation filed its written statement wherein, apart from denying all the averments in the applications, it challenges the maintainability thereof on the ground of limitation as the application was filed after five years of the alleged incident. The petitioner-Corporation also contended therein that the application was also barred by the principles of res judicata. After hearing the parties, the learned Commissioner passed the impugned order and held that the application was neither time-barred nor hit by res judicata and that the same was maintainable. He, therefore, allowed the respondent No. 5 to represent the minor children and condoned the delay in filing the application. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner-Corporation is preferring this writ petition for appropriate relief. 4. To appreciate the controversy, I may refer to the relevant portions of Section 10 of the Act, which are as follows:- 10. He, therefore, allowed the respondent No. 5 to represent the minor children and condoned the delay in filing the application. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner-Corporation is preferring this writ petition for appropriate relief. 4. To appreciate the controversy, I may refer to the relevant portions of Section 10 of the Act, which are as follows:- 10. Notice and claims.-(1) No claim for compensation shall be entertained by a Commissioner unless notice of the accident has been given in the manner hereinafter provided as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and unless the claim is preferred within two years of the occurrence of the accident or, in case of death, within two years from the date of death:- Provided further that the Commissioner may entertain and decide any claim to compensation in any case notwithstanding that the notice has not been given, or the claim has not been preferred, in due time as provided in this sub-section, if he is satisfied that the failure to give the notice or prefer the claim, as the case may be, was due to sufficient cause. 5. Mr. S.K. Mehdi, the learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation submits that the impugned order is the outcome of the mischief played by the private respondent, who, by doing so, has abused the process of court. Referring to paragraph 5 of the earlier application filed by the private respondent, she had clearly mentioned the names of her minor children, which goes to show that her minor children were already represented by her when she filed the earlier application, which was dismissed as barred by the law of limitation. It is his contention that as the earlier application, which was filed by the private respondent under whom these minor children had already made claim for compensation, was dismissed as time-barred, the instant application between the same parties is, therefore, barred by the principles of res judicata. Moreover, submits the learned counsel, when the instant application was filed 5 years after the death of the deceased and when fifth proviso to Section 10(1) of the Act prescribes two years as the period of limitation from the death of the deceased, in the absence of demonstrable satisfactory explanation of the delay, the claim is hopelessly time-barred. The learned counsel, therefore, contends that the impugned order is unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal and capricious and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. The learned counsel, therefore, contends that the impugned order is unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal and capricious and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. He strongly relies on the decisions of the Apex Court in Fida Hussain & other v. Moradabad Development Authority and another, (2011) 12 SCC 615 and Om Parkash Batish v. Ranjit alias Ranbir Kaur and others, (2008) 12 SCC 212 . Ms. P. Chakraborty, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 5, however, supports the impugned order and submits that when the earlier application was filed by the respondent No. 5 in her individual capacity as evident from a plain reading of the said application, there is no question of the application being barred by the principle of res judicata: the minor children have an independent right to file such application on attaining majority and cannot. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submission advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the rival parties. I have also carefully examined the impugned order and other materials on record. In holding that the claim application was neither barred by the law of limitation nor by res judicata, the learned Commissioner observed as follows: The application for compensation was rejected as incompetent in absence of a petition for condonation of delay and the case was not decided on merit. The instant petition under sec. 10(1)(b) with Rule 46 of the Rules, praying for appointment of the petitioner to represent the minors as aforesaid and condonation of delay, it is observed the minors were not made party in W.C. Case No. 28/2000 and W.C. being a piece of beneficial legislation enacted for the protection of the weaker section viz. workmen and in the instant case the applicants are minor daughters of the deceased workman; who are otherwise also entitled to file claim afterwards on attaining majority and that way the limitation shall remain dormant till attaining majority by the individual minors, so it may not be proper to disallow the petition on the ground that the case is barred by limitation and the earlier application for compensation filed by the widow of the deceased Mrs. Moni Bibi was dismissed on the ground of limitation as no petition for condonation was filed along with the petition/application for compensation, but the present petition under Section 10(1)(b) with Rule 46 is a lowed on the grounds stated above and as the parties/applicants are different the objection of res judicata is also not maintainable in this case. Therefore, for the ends of justice and equity the petition to represent the minors by the natural guardian mother in this case is allowed and the delay in filing the petition from the date of accident till date of filing is condoned. 7. In my judgment, the learned Commissioner commits no wrong in holding that the present application is not barred by the principles of res judicata. Examination of the first application filed by the private respondent i.e. in WC Case No. 28/2000, which is annexed at Annexure-1 to the writ petition, convinces me without much difficulty that such application had been filed by the respondent No. 5 in her individual capacity and not in a representative capacity. Nowhere in the said application was any whisper of statement made by her that she did so in that capacity. All that she said was that "...and he died leaving behind his wife, the claimant petitioner having 5 months pregnancy and two minor children who are now helpless and deserted and passing their days with extreme hardship starvation having no other source of livelihood due to sudden demise of the deceased who was the sole earner supporting the existence of the family". The fact that she was filing that application for herself only is demonstrated not only by the tone and tenor of her pleadings but also by the absence of any indication to that effect in the cause title as well in the relief claimed. Therefore, it cannot be said that the earlier application was between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title. It cannot be overlooked that the latest application is filed not by the respondent No. 5 for herself but is filed by her for and on behalf of the minor children, who indisputably are her wards. It cannot be overlooked that the latest application is filed not by the respondent No. 5 for herself but is filed by her for and on behalf of the minor children, who indisputably are her wards. The learned Commissioner is also correct in holding that limitation has not started running against the minor-children inasmuch they can always file such an application after attaining majority, either individually or collective, as they are saved by Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, neither the principles of res judicata nor the law of limitation can bar the private respondent from filing the instant application in her capacity as the next friend of the minor children. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in this writ petition, which is, accordingly, dismissed. As there is inordinate delay in disposal of this writ petition, the learned Commissioner shall now make an endeavour to dispose of the claim application in accordance with law within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this judgment. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. Transmit the L.C. record forthwith. Petition dismissed.