JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal. J.—Order dated 11.3.2005 having been recalled vide order of date passed on Restoration Application, writ petition is restored to its original number. 2. As requested and agreed by learned counsel for parties, I proceed to hear this case and decide it finally at this stage under the Rules of the Court. 3. Heard Sri Vishal Tandon, Advocate, for petitioner and Sri Shiv Sagar, Advocate, holding brief of Sri J.N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3. 4. The dispute relates to House No. 6/17, Bungalow No. 2, Mohalla Lal Bagh, District Farrukhabad, of which, petitioner is landlord having purchased the same from its earlier owner, namely, Smt. Prabha Nagendra Singh vide sale-deed dated 28.10.1986. 5. Respondent No. 3 filed an application on 2.4.1987 before Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Farrukhabad (hereinafter referred to as “RCEO”) for allotment of house in question to him, whereupon inspection by Rent Control Inspector by was ordered by RCEO on 9.4.1987 pursuant whereto the house in question was inspected when it was found locked. The Inspector was informed by the erstwhile owner that house has been sold to Sri Jawahar Lal Sadh. He submitted report on 15.4.1987 whereafter it appears that RCEO passed order on same day fixing 28.4.1987. The Process Server submitted report on 16.4.1987 that the House owner Jawahar Lal Sadh, son of Sri Chunna Lal Sadh refused to accept notice whereupon on 27.4.1987 the application was notified inviting objections. No objection was received and on 1.5.1987 the vacancy was declared by an order passed by RCEO. Even thereafter on behalf of landlord, none responded, despite service of notice by pasting on the house of petitioner, as a result whereof on 5.5.1987 allotment order was passed. 6. The possession of house in question was handed over to respondent No. 3, the allottee, on 5.11.1987 with the help of police whereupon Sri Akhil Kumar, son of petitioner Jawahar Lal made a complaint to Senior Superintendent of Police, Farrukhabad, and, that too after a fortnight i.e. on 23.5.1987 stating that he was illegally and forcibly alongwith other family members was evicted from house in question. In the meantime, petitioner filed Review/Revision No. 92 of 1987 which came up before Special Judge (E.C.Act), Farrukhabad. In the meantime, petitioner filed Review/Revision No. 92 of 1987 which came up before Special Judge (E.C.Act), Farrukhabad. The revision was allowed by the Special Judge (E.C.Act) by judgment dated 15.1.1988 setting aside RCEO’s order dated 5.5.1987 remanding the matter to RCEO to hear landlord and pass a fresh order in accordance with law. Respondent No. 3, thereafter, preferred a Review Application registered as Misc. Case N0. 2/74 of 1988 stating that without giving him any opportunity and without serving any notice upon him, the revisional order has been passed and it is in utter violation of principal of natural justice. This Application was allowed and Revisional Court passed impugned order dated 6.4.1988 recalling order dated 15.1.1988 and thereafter it has dismissed revision by confirming the RCEO’s order dated 5.5.1987. 7. Learned counsel for petitioner challenged the impugned orders basically on the ground that before inspection, no notice was served upon petitioner and, therefore, the impugned orders are in violation of Rule 8 (2) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1972”), and, therefore, the entire subsequent proceedings are illegal and liable to be set aside. He placed reliance on Om Shanker Sharma v. VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others, 2009 (75) ALR 834 and Raj Kishore Tandon and others v. District Judge, 2006 ARC (1) 880. 8. Here is a case where I find that landlord has been given opportunity to place his stand before RCEO before declaration of vacancy and even before allotment of accommodation in question. The Process Server submitted report on 16.4.1987 that petitioner refused to receive notice. This fact has been noticed by Revisional Court in the impugned order dated 6.4.1988 as under: ^^ofj"B fujh{kd ¼jsUV dUVªksy½ us viuh fjiksVZ fnukad 15&4&1987 dks izLrqr dh ftl ij jsUV dUVªksy ,oa fu"dklu vf/kdkjh us uksfVl tkjh djus dk vkns’k fn;kA uksfVl fnukad 15 vizSy 1987 ¼dkxt ua0 16&x½ edku ekfyd Jh tokgjyky lk/k dks Hkh nh x;h ftl ij vknsf’kdk okgd dh fjiksVZ fnukad 16&4&87 dks yxkbZ x;h ftlesa mlus fy[kk fd edku ekfyd us mDr uksfVl ysus ls bUdkj fd;kA^^ “Senior Inspector (Rent Control) filed his report on 15.4.1987 on which Rent Control and Eviction Officer gave direction to issue notice. The notice (Paper No. 16-C) dated 15.4.1987 was given to landlord Shri Jawahar Lal Sadh. The notice (Paper No. 16-C) dated 15.4.1987 was given to landlord Shri Jawahar Lal Sadh. The report of Process Server dated 16.4.1987 was endorsed thereon, in which, he has mentioned about the aforesaid notice that landlord refused to accept it...” (English Translation by the Court) 9. In the entire writ petition, there is not even a whisper that aforesaid observation and finding recorded by Revisional Court is false, perverse, incorrect or that he was never attempted to be served with notice or that he never refused to receive any notice and this endorsement of Process Server on report referred to in the impugned order is patently false and incorrect. As a matter of fact, there is no challenge to the aforesaid factum. The only way in which the denial of opportunity has been has been asserted is para 15 where it says that petitioner has no opportunity to show that he has purchased the house in question from the owner and the accommodation is not available for allotment. In the above facts and circumstances, the two judgments relied on by learned counsel for petitioner do not help him in any manner. 10. In Raj Kishore Tandon (supra), this Court found that no notice to the landlord was given after declaration of vacancy as required under Rule 9 (3) of Rules, 1972 and, therefore, declaration of vacancy and allotment having been made by the same order and on the same day is illegal since Rule 9 (3) is mandatory. However, that is not the case there. Therefore, the aforesaid decision lends no support to petitioner. 11. Similarly in Om Shankar Sharma (supra) also, relying on Apex Court’s decision in Yogendra Tewari v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, 1984 (2) ARC 7, the Court observed that after considering Rule 8 (2) and 9 (3) of Rules, 1972, whether this vacancy, actual, expected or deemed, is a jurisdictional fact and for making an order of allotment under Section 16(1)(a) or for an order of release under clause (b) thereof, the District Magistrate must follow the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The District Magistrate exercises a quasi-judicial power in the aforesaid provisions and, hence, there must be an impartial objective assessment of all the pros and cons of the case after due hearing of the parties concerned. 12. The District Magistrate exercises a quasi-judicial power in the aforesaid provisions and, hence, there must be an impartial objective assessment of all the pros and cons of the case after due hearing of the parties concerned. 12. The Court also relied on an earlier decision in Ganpat Roy and others v. Additional District Magistrate and others, 1985(2) ARC 73, observing that vacancy cannot be declared by a Court without hearing the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be. In view of above, this Court in Om Shankar Sharma (supra) observed: “The aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court leave no room of doubt that providing opportunity of hearing to the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, before passing of allotment order is mandatory.” 13. From the aforesaid judgment, it is evident that as far as practicable, there must be an attempt on the part of Inspector to make inspection of premises in dispute. 14. In the present case, the Inspector met the erstwhile owner of the house in question who informed about transfer by sale of the house in question to Sri Jawahar Lal Sadh but Jawahar Lal Sadh could not be contacted since house was locked. It, thus, cannot be said that as far as practicable, the attempt was not made by Inspector to make inspection in the notice of owner of house but since the house was locked, the house owner’s presence could not be ensured. Thereafter, before declaring vacancy, notice was issued and the Process Server’s report dated 16.4.1987, stating that petitioner refused to accept the notice, has not been challenged before this Court, though it has been so mentioned and relied by Revisional Court. Even before making an allotment order, the notice was attempted to be served upon petitioner by pasting on the house in question. Still, at no stage petitioner made any attempt to put in appearance before RCEO to place his stand or objection before him. 15. Moreover, I permitted counsel for petitioner to inform as to what possible objection could have been raised by petitioner and whether the accommodation in question, in law, can be said to be vacant, liable for allotment or not. 16. 15. Moreover, I permitted counsel for petitioner to inform as to what possible objection could have been raised by petitioner and whether the accommodation in question, in law, can be said to be vacant, liable for allotment or not. 16. Though in the memo of revision, it has been stated by petitioner that house in question was got released by erstwhile owner, but, he admitted before this Court that no such order of release is available, and, this fact, stated in the memo of revision, therefore, does not appear to be correct. It also could not be disputed that the house in question was within tvv xhe ambit of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1972”) and in past it has been under the tenancy of a department of Government which had vacated it. The house having not been released, was liable for allotment to any other tenant. 17. In effect, Sri Vishal Tandon, learned counsel appearing for petitioner, before this Court, except of technical objection about service of notice, in substance, could not address this Court, despite opportunity, that the house in question was not available for allotment being not in the tenancy of any other one. In the entirety of above facts and circumstances, I, therefore, find no manifest error in the impugned orders warranting interference. 18. Writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed. ——————