Abdul Hakim s/o. Abdul Rehman Chauhan v. State of Maharashtra
2013-03-26
M.L.TAHALIYANI
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Admitted. Heard finally by consent. Heard Mr. Firdos Mirza, learned counsel for the applicant; Mr. A.D. Sonak, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for non-applicant no.1-State and Mr. N.S. Bargat, learned counsel for non-applicants 2 and 3. Non-applicant No.1 is the State of Maharashtra. 2. This is an Application moved by father of deceased-lady, by name, Mrs. Nasreen @ Farha, who had allegedly committed suicide on 22.1.2013. 3. The deceased was married to non-applicant No.2 -Mohammed Asif Mohd. Aslam. She was staying with him in the matrimonial home situated at village Darwha. The non-applicant no.3 is the brother of non-applicant no.2 and is a College-going boy. The deceased had allegedly committed suicide due to harassment on the part of non-applicants 2 and 3 on account of dowry and other family matters. The matter was reported to the police by the applicant. The offence punishable under sections 498A and 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against non-applicants 2 and 3 and mother of non-applicants 2 and 3. The mother of non-applicants 2 and 3 has been released on anticipatory bail. The State has not filed any Application challenging the said order. As far as non-applicants 2 and 3 are concerned, they had applied for grant of bail before the learned Additional Sessions Judge vide their Application No.21/2013. The said Application came to be rejected on 14.2.2013. The learned Additional Sessions Judge had observed in his order that the investigation was in progress and that the post-mortem report had not been received by the Investigating Officer (I.O.). Briefly stated, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge was of the view that since investigation was in progress, the non-applicants 2 and 3 were not entitled for bail. Later on, a fresh bail Application was moved before the same learned Additional Sessions Judge by non-applicants 2 and 3. The said Application came to be decided on 5th March, 2013. The non-applicants 2 and 3 were granted bail in the sum of Rs. 15,000/- each and certain conditions were imposed on them. 4. The present applicant, who is the father of the deceased lady, has moved this Court for cancellation of bail. The non-applicant No.1 is the State of Maharashtra. The learned Addl. P.P. Mr. A.D. Sonak represents the non-applicant no.1. The non-applicant No.1 supports the prayer of the applicant.
15,000/- each and certain conditions were imposed on them. 4. The present applicant, who is the father of the deceased lady, has moved this Court for cancellation of bail. The non-applicant No.1 is the State of Maharashtra. The learned Addl. P.P. Mr. A.D. Sonak represents the non-applicant no.1. The non-applicant No.1 supports the prayer of the applicant. As far as the locus of the applicant is concerned, it is well-settled by now that in such a case, father of the deceased-lady can make an Application for cancellation of bail. Therefore, the objections raised on behalf of the non-applicant 2 and 3 has no substance. At the same time, it may be mentioned here that after having gone through the papers, I am of the view that the Application for cancellation of bail of non-applicant no.3 needs to be dismissed. 5. As regards the non-applicant no.2, it may stated here that there are serious allegations against him made by the applicant as well as in the notes of diary maintained by the deceased. Neither the applicant nor the deceased in her diary has made any serious allegations against the non-applicant no.3. Therefore, I am not inclined to disturb the order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge as far as the grant of bail to non-applicant no.3 is concerned. 6. In the first place, it is necessary to be stated here that the offence was originally registered u/ss. 498A and 306 of the IPC. Later on, Section 304-8 IPC has been applied. Admittedly, the deceased had died within seven years of her marriage. The applicant has made serious allegations against the non-applicant no.2. The applicant has categorically stated in his complaint that at least on two occasions he had paid some money to non-applicant no.2 on the request of his deceased daughter. As such, prima facie it appears that there was demand on the part of non-applicant no.2. Secondly, the deceased has made serious allegations against the non-applicant no.2 in her notes recorded in the diary. What is important to be noted is that though the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has stated in his earlier order that investigation was in progress and that the post-mortem report had not been received, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had not bothered to consider the postmortem report which was available at the time of second order which is impugned in the present Application. 7.
Sessions Judge has stated in his earlier order that investigation was in progress and that the post-mortem report had not been received, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had not bothered to consider the postmortem report which was available at the time of second order which is impugned in the present Application. 7. Learned Advocate Mr. Firdos Mirza for the applicant, has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported at AIR 2001 SC 2023 : (2001 ALL MR (Cri) 1210 (S.C.)] in the matter of Puran vs. Rambilas; and has submitted that the applicant has moved this Court for cancellation of bail not because the non-applicant nos. 2 and 3 had flouted some conditions of bail. It is further submitted that this Court is moved because the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge itself is perverse in nature and cannot be sustained. 8. Learned Advocate Mr. N.B. Bargat for non-applicant nos.2 and 3 has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Mirza Ilyas vs. State of Maharashtra reported at {2006 (1) Mh.L.J. (Cri) 702} : (2006 ALL MR (Cri) 1315) and, Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Subramani reported at (2011) 5 SCC 296 : (2011 ALL SCR 2961). It is submitted by Mr. Bargat that liberty once granted shall not be taken away unless there are pressing reasons. It is submitted by Mr. Bargat that the considerations for grant of bail and for cancellation of bail already granted, are different. 9. I agree with the learned Advocate Mr. Bargat in this regard. My attention was invited to paragraph 23 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CBI vs. Subramani, [2011 ALL SCR 2961] which runs as under : "23. It is also relevant to note that there is difference between yardsticks for cancellation of bail and appeal against the order granting bail. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of bail already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail are, interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concessions granted to the accused in any manner. These are all only few illustrative materials.
Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail are, interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concessions granted to the accused in any manner. These are all only few illustrative materials. The satisfaction of the court on the basis of the materials placed on record of the possibility of the accused absconding is another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. In other words, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial." Mr. Bargat has submitted that there no supervening circumstances are brought on record which may render the bail be no longer conducive for a fair trial. It is further submitted that no circumstances are brought on record to show that the liberty granted to non-applicant no.2 needs to be taken away by by cancelling the bail. It is submitted by Mr. Bargat that non-applicant no.2 has two children to be looked after by him. It is submitted that cancellation of bail at this stage, will be detrimental to the interest of children also. 10. Mr. Mirza, learned counsel for the applicant, has submitted that the applicant is ready to take care of both the children. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with similar case, has made following observations at paragraph nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Puran's case:- "9. Mr. Lalit next submitted that once bail has been granted it should not be cancelled unless there is evidence that the conditions of bail are being infringed. In support of this submission he relies upon the authority in the case of Ram vs. State of Haryana reported in (1995) 1 SCC 349 . In this case it has been held that rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail already granted have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. It has been held that very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail already granted.
In this case it has been held that rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail already granted have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. It has been held that very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail already granted. It has been held that generally speaking the grounds for cancellation of bail broadly are interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. It is however, to be noted that this court has clarified that these instances are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. One such ground for cancellation of bail would be where ignoring material and evidence on record a perverse order granting bail is passed in a heinous crime of this nature and that too without giving any reasons. Such an order would be against principles of law. Interest of justice would also require that such a perverse order be set aside and bail be cancelled. It must be remembered that such offences are on the rise and have a very serious impact on the society. Therefore, an arbitrary and wrong exercise of discretion by the trial Court has to be corrected. 10. Further, it is to be kept in mind that the concept of setting aside the unjustified, illegal or perverse order is totally different from the concept of cancelling the bail on the ground that accused has mis-conducted himself or because of some new facts requiring such cancellation. This position is made clear by this Court in Gurucharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn) reported in AIR 1978 SC 179 : (1978 Cri.LJ 129). In that case the Court observed as under (Para 16): "If, however, a Court of Sessions had admitted an accused person to bail, the State has two options. It may move the Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have arise which were not earlier known to the State and necessarily, therefore, to that Court. The State may as well approach the High Court being the superior Court under S. 439 (2) to commit the accused to custody.
It may move the Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have arise which were not earlier known to the State and necessarily, therefore, to that Court. The State may as well approach the High Court being the superior Court under S. 439 (2) to commit the accused to custody. When, however, the State is aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail and there are no new circumstances that have cropped up except those already existed, it is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge again and it is competent in law to move the High Court for cancellation of bail. This position follows from the subordinate position of the Court of Sessions vis-a-vis the High Court. 11. It must be mentioned that in support of the above submission, Mr. Lalit had also relied upon the authorities in the cases of Subhendu Mishra v. Subrat Kumar Mishra, reported in 1999 Cr.LJ 4063 : (1999 AIR SCW 2955 : AIR 1999 SC 3026 ), State (Delhi Administration) vs. Sanjay Gandhi reported in (1978) 2 SCC 411 : ( AIR 1978 SC 961 : 1978 Cri.LJ 952) and Bhagirathsinh Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 284 : ( AIR 1984 SC 372 : 1984 Cri.LJ 160). These need not be dealt with separately as they are of no assistance in a case of this nature where bail has been cancelled for very cogent and correct reasons. 12. Our view is supported by the principles laid down in the case of Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration ), reported in (1978) 1 SCC 118 : ( AIR 1978 SC 179 : 1978 Cri LJ 129). In this case it has been held, by this Court that under Section 439(2) the approach should be whether the order granting bail was vitiated by any serious infirmity for which it was right and proper for the High Court, in the interest of justice, to interfere." 11. The present Application for cancellation of bail is to be considered in the light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment cited by Mr. Mirza and the judgment cited by Mr.
The present Application for cancellation of bail is to be considered in the light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment cited by Mr. Mirza and the judgment cited by Mr. Bargat in the matter of CBI vs. Subramani., [2011 ALL SCR 2961] As already stated, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, while rejecting the first Bail Application had recorded in his order that the investigation was in progress and that the P.M. report had not been received. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, therefore, was not inclined to grant bail. Another Bail Application was made within a period of three weeks. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge does not appear to have taken his earlier observations into consideration while passing the order below the fresh Bail Application. If the earlier prayer for grant of bail was rejected for want of availability of the P.M. examination report, it was obligatory on the part of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge to take into consideration opinion of the Medical Officer when the second application was considered after receipt of M.P. notes. It was also obligatory on the part of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge to see the injuries recorded in the P.M. notes. Had the learned Addl. Sessions Judge taken the P.M. Notes into consideration, probably he would not have granted bail to the non-applicant no. 2. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge has stated in the impugned order that the investigation was completed. If one goes to the P.M. Report, it would appear that the case needs a thorough investigation and the investigation done by the I.O. so far appears to be superficial. The possibility of application of section 302 IPC also cannot be ruled out in view of the fact that the seven incise wounds including one underscalp contusion were found on the dead body. It was not a simple case of death by poisoning. The Medical Officer had opined that "post-mortem findings are consistent with the death due to poisoning with under scalp contusion". There was one under scalp contusion over right temporal region of size 7 cm x 4 cm., reddish in colour. It is, therefore, possible that the deceased was assaulted before poison was either administered to her or was consumed by her. This aspect, in my considered opinion, has not been examined by the I.O. so far.
There was one under scalp contusion over right temporal region of size 7 cm x 4 cm., reddish in colour. It is, therefore, possible that the deceased was assaulted before poison was either administered to her or was consumed by her. This aspect, in my considered opinion, has not been examined by the I.O. so far. The I.O. should realise that there is a vast difference between the ingredients of the offence punishable u/ss. 304-B and 302 of the IPC. He should take a serious note of the injuries found on the person of the dead body and shall try to investigate as to how the injuries were sustained by the deceased if the cause of death is stated to be "poisoning". 12. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge failed to take note of all these injuries. He did not even bother to touch the postmortem notes while passing the impugned order. His comment in the order that the investigation was completed was absolutely a superficial comment. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge should have realised that he is dealing with a case involving death of a lady under suspicious circumstances and should have taken all the relevant factors into consideration. 13. As such, I have come to the conclusion that such an order cannot be sustained and needs to be set aside. As already stated, I am not inclined to disturb the order passed in favour of non applicant No.3. The bail granted to the non-applicant no.2 needs to be cancelled with immediate effect. Hence I pass the following order:- ORDER The Application is partly allowed. Bail granted to the non-applicant / respondent no.2 by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge by his order dated 5th March, 2013 in Misc. Criminal Application No.36/2013 is cancelled. The respondent No.2 shall surrender before the Darwha Police immediately. If respondent No.2 does not surrender before the police within twenty four hours, he shall be arrested. It is made clear that in the event of respondent no.2 filing fresh Application for bail after filing of charge-sheet, the observations made by this Court in the present order shall not influence the learned Sessions Judge/ Addl. Sessions Judge hearing the Bail Application of the Respondent No.2. Application partly allowed.