JUDGMENT : K.S. JHAVERI, J. 1. Rule. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing. By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order dated 28.8.2000 passed by the Labour Court, Surat, in Recovery Application No. 1174 of 1998 preferred by the employee whereby the Labour Court has passed order for recovery of Rs. 4,03,488/- break of which as under:- (A) AS PER JUDGMENT OF T. APPLICATION NO. 345 OF 1990 (B) AS PER JUDGMENT OF NON-FATAL APPLICATION NO. 16A OF 1990 (C) TOTAL A+B (3,32,350.00+71,138.00) = Rs. 4,03,488.00 1.1 The petitioner has also challenged the judgment and order dated 30.4.2001 and summons dated 17.8.2002. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Clerk contended that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited vs. The Workmen and Another, (1974) 4 SCC 696 particularly at page 697, paragraph Nos. 11 to 16, the Recovery Application is without jurisdiction. It was held in the said paragraphs thus: It is well settled that proceedings u/s 33C(2) are in the nature of execution proceedings and, therefore, this does not involve a right of plaintiff to relief and the corresponding liability of the defendant i.e. whether the defendant is at all liable or not. These two functions are normally regarded as functions of a suit and not of execution proceedings. To call determination of such points as incidental to execution proceedings will be a perversion. So when a claim is made before the Labour Court u/s 33C(2) that Court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions-say of an Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make such adjudications. The workmen cannot put forward a claim in an application u/s 33C(2) in respect of a matter not based on an existing right. 2.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak and Another, (1995) 1 SCC 235 , particularly, paragraph Nos. 12 and 8, the application u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is not maintainable. 2.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak and Another, (1995) 1 SCC 235 , particularly, paragraph Nos. 12 and 8, the application u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is not maintainable. It was held in the said paragraph as under: Where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a] proceeding u/s 33C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power u/s 33C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognized by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power u/s 33C(2) like that of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. The power of the Labour Court u/s 33C(2) extends to interpretation of the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests. 2.2 Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Labour Court Jullunder and Others, (1980) 1 SCC 4 , particularly, paragraph Nos. 7 and 8 and submitted that the claim of fatal case is not maintainable. Paragraph Nos. 7 and 8 at page 1981, of the said judgment read as under: The Payment of Gratuity Act enacts a complete code containing detailed provisions covering all the essential features of a scheme for payment of gratuity. Parliament intended that proceedings for payment of gratuity due under the Payment of Gratuity Act must be taken under that Act and not under any other Act. Therefore, the applications filed by the employee under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act did not lie, and the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of them. Parliament intended that proceedings for payment of gratuity due under the Payment of Gratuity Act must be taken under that Act and not under any other Act. Therefore, the applications filed by the employee under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act did not lie, and the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of them. 2.3 Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied on the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in the case of S.A. Shaikh vs. Union of India and Others, 2000 (3) CLR 132, particularly, paragraph No. 2 which reads as under: Shri Jha has tried to argue that there is no limitation under S. 33(C)(2) of the Act to file an application to claim money due from the employer. In theory he is absolutely right that there is no prescription of any limitation under the said provision. Merely because there is no specific prescription of limitation, we cannot lose sight of the reality that there are rules for destruction of the records and the employers are not at all expected to preserve the records for decades or centuries together. It is absolutely absurd to imagine that since there is no limitation prescribed under S. 33(C)(2) of the Act, any application can be filed at any time. We cannot mortgage our sense of reasons. We have to be reasonable to interpret such provisions. It is more of an abuse of the said provision than what the legislature had intended to help the employees for recovery of their legitimate dues. To say that the application can be filed even after 50 years merely because there is no limitation, is to stretch the absurdities to absurd limits. We have to be rational and reasonable in interpretation of the provisions of law. The Supreme Court has refused to interfere in number of matters where the employees tried to raise industrial disputes after inordinate delay. Such disputes were of substantial nature of challenge to the orders of termination claiming reinstatement. Even in such cases, the Supreme Court refused to grant any relief on the ground that no state disputes can be raked up to disturb the industrial peace. The same logic can be applied even in the cases of applications under S. 33(C)(2) of the Act. In the result, I do not find any merit and substance in the contention of Shri Jha. The same logic can be applied even in the cases of applications under S. 33(C)(2) of the Act. In the result, I do not find any merit and substance in the contention of Shri Jha. He contended that in view of above, the order of the Labour Court is without jurisdiction and the same is required to be interfered with. 2.4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that in view of the order of this Court, Rs. 25,000/- was deposited by the Company and in view of the averment in paragraph No. 18 of the petition, the respondent has not reported for duty and therefore the matter either may be remanded to the Labour Court or an appropriate order may be passed. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the petition deserves to be dismissed in view of the decision of this Court in the matter of Shri Dhirajlal Madhavlal Bharati vs. Shri R.S. Shukla, the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Ahmedabad and Others, 1981 GLH 89 . The employer has challenged the order of ex-parte award in a recovery application before this Court after a delay of 2 years and therefore the respondent workman is deprived of his legitimate dues. The case which was made out that the workman has not resumed his duties is denied in paragraph No. 5.10 of the affidavit in reply (at page 34) which reads as under: With regard to para 13, I deny that I have never reported for resumption of duty after the judgment and order of the Labour Court dated 30.7.1992 in T. Application No. 345/90. I state that after the order passed on 30.7.1992, I have reported for duty for many times and as stated in earlier paragraphs, I have also complained to various authorities for execution of the order. I state that even on 1998, I have given a registered notice for complying the judgment and order but the petitioner company has never allowed the respondent workman to resume the duty. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent workman is still ready and willing to work and therefore, he may be allowed to continue the work. His date of birth is 11.10.1961 and he has not attained the age of superannuation. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent workman is still ready and willing to work and therefore, he may be allowed to continue the work. His date of birth is 11.10.1961 and he has not attained the age of superannuation. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Before proceeding with the matter, reference is invited to Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which reads as under: 33C. Recovery of money due from an employer:- (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months. 5.1 So far as the first contention regarding the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in regard to payment of fatal case is concerned, the contention raised by the petitioner that the claim of fatal case is not maintainable u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be accepted. However, regarding adjudication of the back wages which are claimed by the respondent workman in his recovery application which were not opposed, are as under: 5.2 The above claims are pursuant to the order of the Labour Court. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Labour Court has wrongly adjudicated the claim of back wages for the period 1.4.1990 to 31.8.1998 amounting to Rs. 2,49,975/-. He has further submitted that other claims regarding bonus, earned leave and festival leave etc. are not in accordance with the award of the Labour Court. In that view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court has wrongly adjudicated the claims regarding back wages for the period 1.4.1990 to 31.8.1998, bonus, earned leave and festival leave is accepted and the respondent is not entitled to such claims. In that view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court has wrongly adjudicated the claims regarding back wages for the period 1.4.1990 to 31.8.1998, bonus, earned leave and festival leave is accepted and the respondent is not entitled to such claims. 5.3 In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the claim of the respondent workman in the Recovery Application for the wages for the period for which he had worked, as per the directions of the Labour Court, is required to be paid. The other claims like back wages for the period 1.4.1990 to 31.8.1998, bonus, earned leave and festival leave etc. wrongly adjudicated by the Labour Court, are not required to be paid. 5.4 Considering the fact that the workman filed Recovery Application in the year 1998, in my view, in view of provisions of Section 33C of the Act, only last one year salary is required to be given. The last one year salary which comes to Rs. 30,000/- will be the claim for the last 12 months. In the premises, recovery ought to have been allowed only for the last one year's salary i.e. Rs. 30,000/-. In the premises, the petition is partly allowed. The order of the Recovery Court is modified to the aforesaid extent. The original claimant will be entitled to Rs. 30,000/- only. The amount of Rs. 25,000/- which was deposited by the Company, if not withdrawn by the respondent workman, is allowed to be withdrawn by the workman and the said amount will be adjusted against the amount of Rs. 30,000/-. The summons issued by the Mamlatdar for recovery dated 17.8.2002 is set aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.