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2013 DIGILAW 732 (RAJ)

Mohd. Usman (D) Thro’ His LR’sAnr v. Smt. Uma Khanna

2013-04-09

P.K.LOHRA

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. - Appealed by the impugned order dated 21.7.2008 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur (for short, 'the learned trial Court'), the petitioners have laid the instant revision petition under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C.'). The learned trial Court by the impugned order has rejected the application submitted on behalf of the petitioner under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. 2. The facts apposite for the purpose of this revision petition are that the petitioner (landlord) instituted a suit for eviction against the non-petitioner (defendant) on the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity and default in payment of arrears of rent. The suit filed by the petitioner was decreed by the learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 25.3.2002. While granting the decree for eviction, the learned trial Court found that the reasonable and bona fide necessity of the petitioner is genuine, and therefore, he is entitled for a decree of eviction. So far as the ground of default is concerned, the learned trial Court has extended the benefit of first default to the non-petitioner (defendant). 3. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the non-petitioner (defendant) preferred an appeal before the learned. Additional District judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur (appellate Court) and ultimately the said appeal was also dismissed by the learned appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 11.10.2004. 4. Being disgruntled with the judgment and decree of the learned appellate Court, the non-petitioner (defendant) availed yet another remedy of appeal- inasmuch as on her behalf a second appeal was laid before this Court being S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 578/2004. This Court after hearing the arguments on second appeal dismissed the same vide its judgment dated 25.1.2005 and directed the non-petitioner (defendant) to vacate the premises by end of 2006 i.e. upto 31.12.2006. 5. As per description of the premises, it is one flat having two rooms, one room facing east and another room facing west with Baramda and latrine-bath. 6. As per the averments contained in the revision petition, the non-petitioner (defendant) handed over the vacant possession within the stipulated period and at the time of handing over the possession of the premises, the same was in a very dilapidated condition. 6. As per the averments contained in the revision petition, the non-petitioner (defendant) handed over the vacant possession within the stipulated period and at the time of handing over the possession of the premises, the same was in a very dilapidated condition. As the petitioner (decree-holder) was sick, he has sifted to the ground floor and later on he passed away on 22.2.2008. 7. The petitioner has also, inter alia, averred in the revision petition that before the learned trial Court on behalf of non-petitioner an application under Section 15 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereafter referred to as 'the Act of 1950'), wherein the non-petitioner has prayed for restoration of his possession in the disputed premises on the ground that the said premises are not used by the petitioner (plaintiff) for last nine months. 8. The averments contained in the application were denied by the petitioner (landlord). During the pendency of the proceedings, the original plaintiff- Mohammad Usman expired and the present petitioners were brought on record. On behalf of the petitioners before the learned trial Court an endeavour was made for persuading the learned Court below to dismiss the application of the non- petitioner by invoking Order 7, Rule 11 read with Section 151 C.P.C. In the application, the petitioners have stated with clarity and precision that as the Act of 1950 has already been repealed and therefore, this application is not maintainable. 9. Assailing the impugned order, the learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that after repealing of the Act of 1950 and promulgation of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short, 'the Act of 2001'), the petition under Section 15 laid by the non-petitioner is not at all maintainable and is liable to the dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also invited attention of this Court towards Section 32 of the Act of 2001 and has submitted that the Act of 2001 has come into force w.e.f. 1.4.2003, and therefore, after coming into force of the Act of 2001, the petition filed on behalf of the non-petitioner under Section 15 of the old Act of 1950 is not at all tenable. 10. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also laid emphasis on Section 29 of the Act of 2001 and has urged that by virtue of Section 29, the Act of 2001 is having overriding effect on any other law for the time being in force. On the strength of Section 29 of the Act of 2001, the learned counsel has vehemently argued that the petition laid on behalf of non-petitioner (tenant) under Section 15 of the Act of 1950 is wholly preposterous. 11. Buttressing his submissions with full emphasis, the learned senior counsel has further contended that after coming into force of the Act of 2001, adequate safeguards are provided for protecting the rights of the tenant including the restoration of possession to the tenant. The rights asserted by the non- petitioner by the application under Section 15 of the Act of 1950 are not at all enforceable. To support this contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on clause (i) of Section 9 of the Act of 2001. 12. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the non-petitioner, Mr. Patodia, has argued that there is no infirmity much less legal infirmity in the impugned order and as such no interference is called for in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner has also urged that as there is no substitute of Section 15 of the Act of 1950 under the new Act of 2001, the non-petitioner (tenant) is well within his right to invoke the said provision for claiming restoration of possession of the disputed premises. 13. Stoutly defending the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner has strenuously argued that the learned trial Court has exercised its jurisdiction by placing reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in his favour and therefore, no interference with the impugned order is warranted. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the impugned order. 15. Before I proceed to deal with the arguments advanced by the respective counsels, I feel it desirable to have a glance at the relevant provisions of the Act of 2001. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the impugned order. 15. Before I proceed to deal with the arguments advanced by the respective counsels, I feel it desirable to have a glance at the relevant provisions of the Act of 2001. For appreciating the [is involved in the matter and for understanding the rigor of Sections 29 and 32 of the Act of 2001, the complete texts of Sections 9(i), 29 and Section 32 are reproduced as infra: 9(i) the premises are required reasonably and bona fide by the landlord for- the use or occupation of himself or his family or for the use or occupation, of any person for whose benefit the premises are held: Provided that where decree of eviction from any premises is sought by the landlord under clause (i), he shall be prohibited from letting out the same to any other person within a period of three years and in case the premises are let-out, the tenant shall be entitled for restoration of possession on a petition moved by him before the Rent Tribunal and the Rent Tribunal shall dispose of such petition expeditiously and the procedure as laid down in Section 16 shall mutatis mutandis apply; or 29. Act to have overriding effect.-The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other Law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any Law other than this Act. 32. Repeal and savings.-(1) The Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No. 17 of 1950) shall stand repealed with effect from the date notified under sub-section (3) of Section 1 of this Act. (2) The repeal under sub-section (1) shall not affect, (a) anything duly done or suffered under the enactment so repealed; or (b) any right, title, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or incurred under the enactment so repealed; or (c) any fine, penalty or punishment incurred or suffered under the provisions of the enactment so repealed. (2) The repeal under sub-section (1) shall not affect, (a) anything duly done or suffered under the enactment so repealed; or (b) any right, title, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or incurred under the enactment so repealed; or (c) any fine, penalty or punishment incurred or suffered under the provisions of the enactment so repealed. (3) Notwithstanding the repeal under sub-section (I) (a) all applications, suits or other proceedings under the repealed Act pending on the date of commencement of this Act before any Court shall be continued and disposed of, in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act, as if the repealed Act had continued in force and this Act had not been enacted. However, the plaintiff within a period of one hundred and eighty days of coming into force of this Act shall be entitled to withdraw any suit or appeal or any other proceeding pending under the repealed Act with liberty to file fresh petition in respect of the subject matter of such suit or appeal or any other proceeding under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and for the purpose limitation such petition shall, if it is filed within a period of two hundred and seventy days from the commencement of this Act, be deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the suit which was so withdrawn and in case of withdrawal of appeal or other proceeding, on the date on which the suit, out of which such appeal or proceeding originated, was filed; (b) the provision for appeal under the repealed Act shall continue in 'force in respect of applications, suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder; (c) all suits and proceedings instituted under the provisions of the repealed Act shall be effective and disposed of in accordance with such repealed law; (d) any rule or notification made or issued under the repealed Act and in force on the date of commencement of this Act shall continue to govern the pending cases. 16. Mr. 16. Mr. M.M. Ranjan, the learned Senior Counsel, has invited my attention towards a Full Bench judgment of this Court in case of Bhag Chand v. Additional District Judge No. 5, Kota & Ors., 2009(2) WLC (Raj.) 775 and has contended that in the said judgment, the larger Bench of this Court has held that the Division Bench judgment in the case of Kamal Kishore & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 2008 (1) WLC (Raj.) 29 , is per incurium and yet while non-suiting the present petitioners, the learned Court below has placed heavy reliance on the verdict of Kamal Kishore's case (supra). 17. While answering the question referred to the Larger Bench, the Larger Bench in the case of Bhag Chand (supra) has concluded in para Nos. 27 and 28 of the said judgment as infra: 27. This leads just to the next question which is "whether the suits, applications and other proceedings relating to fixation of standard or provisional rent under Sections 6 and 7 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, which have been saved by Section 32(3)(a) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, will be governed by the provisions of the Old Act of 1950, after coming into force of the New Act of 2001 or will be governed by the provisions of the New Act of 2001 as Sections 6 and 7 of the Act of 1950, having been impliedly repealed, by virtue of Section 29 of the New Act of 2001 as held by the Division Bench in Kamal Kishgre's.case (supra). 28. Having answered the question No. I in the negative, the answer to the question No. 2 is that by virtue of Section 32(3)(a) of the New Act of 2001 all the suits, applications, and other proceedings relating to the fixation of the standard rent and provisional rent under Sections 6 and 7 of the Old Act of 1950 would be governed by the provisions of the old Act of 1950 despite coming into force of the New Act of 2001 and not by the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the New Act of 2001, as held by the learned Division Bench in Kamal Kishore's case (supra). 18. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his application has also placed reliance on a verdict of this Court dated 6.4.2009 in case of Mangi Lal Saini v. Civil Judge (fD), Chomu & Anr., which was rendered by this Court in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 12972/2008 . In this verdict, considering the rigor of Section 32 of the Act of 2001, the Court has made following observations: Thus the plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 32 does not leave any room for doubt that the Act of 1950 stood repealed in its entirety w.e.f. 1.4.2003 on coming into force of the Act of 2001 by virtue of sub- section (1) of Section 32, as sub-section (1) of Section 32 of the Act of 2001 does not restrict the application of repeal only to the areas to which the Act of 2001 has been made applicable. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in case of Ram Naryan v. Smt. Asha Devi, 2010(1) DNJ (Raj.) 251 . In this verdict, this Court has again reiterated the same principle and observed in para 20 as infra: 20. It was further held that the language of Section 32(1) of the New Act 2001 clearly speaks about the date notified under sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act and does not talk of extension of the Act to any particular area under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) thereof. Thus, it is with coming into force of the New Act being 1.4.2003, the Old Act stands repealed in its entirety. It is under the New Act that notwithstanding this repeal, that certain rights have been saved expressly. The provisions of Section 32 do not at all contemplate that the tenancies prevailing, whether contractual or statutory, as on the commencement of the New Act shall continue to be governed by the provisions of the old Act, in whatever geographical area of Rajasthan and on these premises, this Court held that on the face of express repeal of the Old Act by Section 32(1), it would be wholly preposterous a proposition to hold, that despite express repeal, the Old Act continues to remain in force, with respect to certain areas of the State, while the New Act applies to certain other specified areas of the State. While deciding the question of jurisdiction of civil Court under Section 18 of the New Act, it was held that where the petition etc. are not filed under the provisions of the New Act, jurisdiction of civil Court is obviously not barred. The last contention raised therein was that there has to be some law to provide protection to the tenant and for that purpose, the Old Act was there and, therefore, until and unless similar law prevails or is enacted, protection under the Old Act has to continue and this Court observed as under: "Suffice it to say that the submission has no legal basis, in as much as, tenancy, or lease is a matter of contract, and is governed by the terms of contract and the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, which makes elaborate provisions for creation of tenancy, its termination and the rights and liabilities of the respective parties to the contract of tenancy. The Rent Control Legislation only provided certain protection to the landlord or to the tenants, wherever, it was thought fit to be provided by the legislature and simply because for some time there happened to prevail certain Rent Law, it does not entitle the tenants to inherently claim protection of some rent control legislation, notwithstanding no one being in force or enacted by the Legislature." 21. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced at the Bar and thoroughly examined the legal precedents which are brought to my notice. After examining the legal precedents on which the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance and construing Sections 29 and 32 harmoniously, I feel persuaded to hold that after repealing of the Act of 1950 a new enactment has came into force i.e. Act of 2001 and the rights of the parties which are in relationship of landlord and tenant are to be governed by the new Act of 2001. The learned Court below while deciding the application of the petitioners under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C., has not thrashed out the matter in its entirety and has further placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kamal Kishore's case which is per incurium, therefore, it has obviously committed material irregularity and illegality in exercise of its jurisdiction. 22. In this view of the matter, I am inclined to interfere in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 22. In this view of the matter, I am inclined to interfere in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover, placing reliance on a per incurium decision and not relying on biding precedent in case of Bhagchand (supra), the learned Court below has committed such a grave and serious error of law which has occasioned failure of justice. Therefore, it is a fit case wherein revisional jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised. 23. The upshot of the above discussion is that viewed from any angle, the impugned order passed by the learned Court below is not sustainable and the same is accordingly quashed and set aside and the learned trial Court is directed to decide the application of the petitioners under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C., read with Section 151 C.P.C., afresh after considering the observations made by this Court herein above and the legal precedents referred to supra. It is expected from the Court below to decide the matter as expeditiously as possible. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed as indicated above. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition Allowed. *******