Judgment : 1. The respondent/writ petitioner was appointed as a Driver in the APSRTC on 04.08.1989. While working, he was directed to undergo medical examination. He was found unfit for the post of driver, vide MC No.024487, dated 08.02.2006, due to defective distant vision. As such, he was retired from service on medical grounds with effect from 08.06.2006 under regulation 6-A(4) of the APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations 1964 (for short ‘the Service Regulations’). He submitted representation dated 30.12.2006 and opted in the prescribed proforma for payment of additional monetary benefit in lieu of employment in terms of circular No.PD-40/2005, dated 26.08.2005 and PD-30/2006, dated 20.07.2006. On his representation as referred above, additional monetary benefit of Rs.1,61,100/- was paid through cheque No.459876, dated 31.03.2007 and 35057, dated 31.12.2007 duly deducting the loan amount of CCS Rs.32,214/-. Thereafter, he filed Writ Petition No.22765 of 2008 and this Court passed the following interim order in WPMP No.29634 of 2008. “There shall be a direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for providing alternative employment, if he is found medically unfit to hold the post of Driver, as per the provision of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and pass appropriate orders within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” 2. Thereafter, the appellants/respondents passed orders dated 15.12.2008 stating that since the writ petitioner has accepted additional monetary benefit offered to him, in lieu of alternative employment, he is not entitled for the alternative employment as per the circular instructions in force. The same was questioned by the writ petitioner in W.P.No.12830 of 2009. 3. Relying on Regulation 6-A(4) of the Service Regulations as well as Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation) Act, 1995 (for short ‘the Act’), the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition by order dated 17.02.2012 directing the appellants to issue appointment orders appointing the writ petitioner to any other suitable post under Section 47 of the Act within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Since this Court has passed orders on 18th October 2008 in WPMP No.29634 of 2008 in W.P. No.22765 of 2008 and the appellants have not followed the said orders and issued the impugned proceedings on 15.12.2008, the said appointment order shall be deemed to have been issued with effect from 15.12.2008 and the writ petitioner shall be entitled to all monetary benefits from 15.12.2008 i.e., back wages from such date. It is also made clear that the writ petitioner shall be entitled to continuity of service, but no other attendant benefits or back wages except to the extent indicated above shall be given. As far as the amount already received by the writ petitioner is concerned, the same shall be adjusted towards the arrears of back wages to be paid to the writ petitioner to be calculated with effect from 15.12.2008 and if any excess amount is to be recovered from the writ petitioner the same shall be recovered in easy monthly instalments from his salary. The same is challenged in this Writ Appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that since the respondent/writ petitioner himself submitted a representation, additional monetary benefit was given which was accepted by the writ petitioner, as such, he cannot turn back and file the writ petition seeking alternative employment in terms of Section 47 of the Act, that the writ petitioner should have opted for reversion, instead, he opted for additional monetary benefit, that the writ petitioner cannot approbate and reprobate and that the learned Single Judge has not taken these facts into consideration while allowing the writ petition. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner contended that the appellants are under obligation to consider the case of the writ petitioner under Section 47 of the Act. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner contended that the appellants are under obligation to consider the case of the writ petitioner under Section 47 of the Act. It is also contended that a reading of Section 47 of the Act envisages that if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits, that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation whichever is earlier and that sub-section 2 makes it clear that no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability and, in view of the same, the appellants cannot wash away their hands by paying additional monetary benefit. He relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Kunal Singh Vs. Union of India and another (2003) 4 SCC 524 ) and also the judgments of this Court in APSRTC, Musheerabad, Hyderabad and others Vs. K. Moses ( 2012(2) ALD 772 ) and K. Moses Vs. APSRTC, Musheerabad, Hyderabad and others ( 2011 (1) ALD 823 ). 6. In the present case, no doubt, additional monetary benefit was offered and it was accepted by the writ petitioner, but the obligation of the appellants under Section 47 of the Act cannot be washed away by offering the additional monetary benefit. Even as per Regulation 6-A(4) of the Service Regulations, employees are entitled for option for reversion. 7. 6. In the present case, no doubt, additional monetary benefit was offered and it was accepted by the writ petitioner, but the obligation of the appellants under Section 47 of the Act cannot be washed away by offering the additional monetary benefit. Even as per Regulation 6-A(4) of the Service Regulations, employees are entitled for option for reversion. 7. A learned Single Judge of this Court in K. Moses case (3 supra), in similar circumstances, held that the procedure adopted by APSRTC to do away with such employees by offering monetary benefits and printing a 'prescribed format' in this regard is nothing short of doing violence to the statutory obligatory duty cast upon it, that waiver of the right vested in an employee under Section 47 of the Act of 1995, if at all, could only be in exceptional circumstances and must necessarily be demonstrated by an informed and fully conscious expression of such waiver by the said employee, that a mere printed format baldly stating to the effect that the employee was accepting monetary benefits in lieu of alternate employment under Section 47 of the Act of 1995 falls far short of the requirements to validate such waiver, that the level of literacy of the employees in the APSRTC itself being open to question, mere affixation of their signatures in such printed formats would neither demonstrate nor amount to an informed decision on their part to waive their statutory right and that the attitude of the APSRTC in resorting to such a practice therefore requires to be deprecated in the strongest terms. 8. The Supreme Court in Kunal Singh case (1 supra) held that Section 47 of the Act is mandatory and in construing the provisions of such statutes, the view advancing the object of the Act and serving its object must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses that purpose. It is also held that protection made available under Sections 47 and 72 of the Act to an employee acquiring disability during his service cannot be denied on the ground that he had been granted invalid pension under Rule 38 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 9. It is also held that protection made available under Sections 47 and 72 of the Act to an employee acquiring disability during his service cannot be denied on the ground that he had been granted invalid pension under Rule 38 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 9. A Division Bench of this Court in APSRTC case (2 supra) held that offer of monetary benefit in lieu of alternative employment to employee who suffered disability is not permissible unless employer discharged its primary obligation of providing alternative employment in the first instance and that the burden of employer gets discharged only if upon offer of alternative employment made by employer, employee finds it hard to accept such an alternative employment and declines to accept the same. 10. In the present case, the learned Single Judge, relying on Regulation 6-A(4) of the Service Regulations as well as Section 47 of the Act held that the burden casts on the appellants to offer alternative employment and, as such, the appellants are bound to provide alternative employment and since they have not provided alternative employment, the learned Single Judge directed them to provide employment and adjust the amount already paid as additional compensation which cannot be faulted. The interpretation given by the learned Single under Section 47 of the Act read with Regulation 6-A(4) of the Service Regulations also cannot be found fault, as it is in consonance with the object and spirit with which the enactment is enacted. We have gone through the judgments relied on by the respondents and the same are applicable to the facts of the instant case. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any error in the view taken by the learned Single Judge. 11. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed while confirming the impugned order. 12. As a sequel, interim order granted earlier i.e., on 05.09.2012 is vacated and miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the writ appeal shall stand disposed of.