Judgment Bhaskar Bhattacharya, CJ.—These two Letters Patent Appeals were heard together as those were directed against a common judgment of a learned Single Judge dated 5th February, 2013 thereby disposing of two Special Civil Applications, one being Special Civil Application No. 16229 of 2012 and the other being Special Civil Application No. 17029 of 2012, by which the learned Single Judge directed the appellant – Oil & Natural Gas Corporation to permit the petitioners to apply for the job in question relaxing the age criterion and also to consider their case for appointment on merit. 2. Being dissatisfied, the Oil & Natural Gas Corporation [‘the Corporation’ hereafter], has come up with these two Letters Patent Appeals. 3. The writ-petitioners were working as employees of Contractors who were allegedly engaged by the appellant-Corporation for the specific works. The writ-petitioners, however, claim that they were employed really as employees of the Corporation but in order to get rid of the liability of the writ-petitioners as direct employees, the Contractors were engaged as a camouflage. Whether the writ-petitioners along with such employees who are engaged by the Contractors are direct employees under the appellant-Corporation is subject matter of another pending litigation before the Labour Court. 3.1 The Corporation published an advertisement for regular recruitment on the regular posts in Western Sector, vide advertisement dated 24th November 2012. The said advertisement is open for all eligible individuals who are covered within the criteria mentioned therein. The main criteria pertain to age, qualification, physical standards, percentage of marks etc. There is no dispute that the writ-petitioners have crossed the maximum age-limit provided for in the said advertisement, but according to them, they should be given age-relaxation because such age-relaxation is given to the candidates who worked with the Corporation as ex-apprentices under the Apprentices Act. In other words, according to the writ-petitioners, if the former apprentices who worked as apprentices under the Apprentices Act can be given age-relaxation, there is no reason why the writ-petitioners who are actually working for a long time with the appellant-Corporation by virtue of the alleged contracts between the Contractors and the appellant, should not be given such benefit. The petitioners, therefore, prayed for a direction upon the appellant to give similar relaxation. The petitioners, therefore, prayed for a direction upon the appellant to give similar relaxation. 3.2 As pointed out earlier, the learned Single Judge, by the order impugned herein, has allowed the Special Civil Applications with a direction upon the appellant to give age-relaxation to the petitioners who were working under the alleged Contractors on the ground that the petitioners have legitimate expectation of being treated fairly, and if they want to come and compete in the open market for offering their candidature, their legitimate expectation of age-relaxation cannot be said to be illegal. 4. Therefore, the only question that falls for determination in these appeals is whether the learned Single Judge was justified in passing the direction impugned in these appeals notwithstanding the fact that the concerned regulations framed by the appellant do not permit relaxation of age in case of a person who has worked under the Contractor. 5. At this stage, it will be profitable to refer to rule 5 of the Modified Recruitment & Promotion Regulations, 1980, [the Regulations, hereafter] which provides for age limit for direct recruitment: SCALE OF PAY AGE LIMIT — Earlier provision Enhanced provision a) EXECUTIVE LEVEL E-4 17500-22300 42 yrs. 44 yrs. E-1 17500-22300 28 yrs. 30 yrs. b) CLASS-III Top of Class-III 7000 (open ended) 30 yrs. 32 yrs. A-II (Asst. Rigman only) 5100 (open ended) 30 yrs. 30 yrs. Bottom of Class III 4700 (open ended) 28 yrs. 30 yrs. c) CLASS-IV Bottom of Class IV 4300 (open ended) 25 yrs. 27 yrs. The age criteria provided in the advertisement reads thus: (ii). Age Criteria Category Age limit as on 18.12.2012 General Max 30 years Minimum 18 years OBC Max 33 years “ SC/ST Max 35 years “ Age limit for Person with Disability (PwD) (OH/HH can also apply for Post Code No. 10, 26, 27 & 28) Category Age limit as on 18.12.2012 General Max 40 years Minimum 18 years OBC Max 43 years “ SC/ST Max 45 years “ Note: * Age will be reckoned as on 18.12.2012. * Candidate competing for General post should fulfill age criteria for General category. * Departmental candidates will be given age relaxation as per company rules except for post code No. 07 and 18. * Ex-Apprentice of ONGCV will be given age relaxation for the period of Apprenticeship training in ONGC. * Candidate competing for General post should fulfill age criteria for General category. * Departmental candidates will be given age relaxation as per company rules except for post code No. 07 and 18. * Ex-Apprentice of ONGCV will be given age relaxation for the period of Apprenticeship training in ONGC. * Ex-Serviceman will be given age relaxation for length of service in Armed Forces plus 3 years as per Govt. Rules, subject to maximum age of 45 years and 50 years in case of disabled defense service personnel belonging to SC/ST. * In respect of Post Code No. 7 &18, no age relaxation will be admissible. 6. Thus, there is no dispute that the clause of age-relaxation is applicable only in the case of Other Backward Caste [OBC], Scheduled Caste [SC], Scheduled Tribe [ST], Persons with Disability [PWD] and ex-serviceman. The advertisement also provided that departmental candidates will be given age-relaxation as per Company rules and ex-apprentice of Corporation will be given age-relaxation for the period of apprenticeship training in the Corporation. 7. Therefore, the question that arises for determination in these Letters Patent Appeals is whether the writ Court, in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can ignore the age-bar created for a particular post by the concerned rules framed by the “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and grant direction upon such “State” to ignore such bar even though the selecting authority is not vested with any right of relaxation of such age-bar by exercise of discretion. 8. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record, we find that in these cases, under the Regulations fixing age limit for selection, no power or authority has been given to the selecting authority to consider the question of relaxation of the age-limit of the applicants except for Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe etc. as quoted in the advertisement referred to hereinabove, and that too, to a limited extent. It is not the case of the writ-petitioners before us that any of them fall within those categories but their case is that since they were working in the Corporation although not on regular basis, they should be given the benefit of age-relaxation. 9. as quoted in the advertisement referred to hereinabove, and that too, to a limited extent. It is not the case of the writ-petitioners before us that any of them fall within those categories but their case is that since they were working in the Corporation although not on regular basis, they should be given the benefit of age-relaxation. 9. At this stage, we may make it clear that we have not gone into the question whether the appointment of the writ-petitioners through Contractors was really a camouflage to overcome their liability and that question is at large before the appropriate forum and will be decided in accordance with law by that authority. 10. It is now a settled law that a person can approach a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if any of his legal or fundamental rights has been infringed by the action or inaction of a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. So far as the writ of Habeas Corpus or of the nature of Public Interest Litigation are concerned, a writ-petitioner can, however, espouse even the cause of others if their legal or fundamental rights are violated. 11. But Article 226 of the Constitution does not vest the High Court with the power to interfere when there exists no legal or fundamental right of a person over the subject-matter of the dispute alleged. In the case before us, it is not the case of the writ-petitioners that although they have the legal right to be considered conferred under the existing Rules for appointment to the posts concerned, the respondent Corporation is denying such right. On their own admission, they have crossed the age-limit prescribed for such appointment on the cutoff date fixed. Thus, there was no scope of accepting their application even at the instance of the selecting authority. Such being the position, the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot confer a right to the writ-petitioners to appear at the process of selection. Thus, by passing the direction upon the selecting authority, the learned Single Judge directed the said authority to violate its own Regulations. In other words, the learned Single Judge directed the selecting authority to consider the candidature of ineligible candidates. 12. We are also not impressed by the submission of Mr. Thus, by passing the direction upon the selecting authority, the learned Single Judge directed the said authority to violate its own Regulations. In other words, the learned Single Judge directed the selecting authority to consider the candidature of ineligible candidates. 12. We are also not impressed by the submission of Mr. Clerk, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents-writ petitioners, that his clients having joined the organization, although not as direct employees but through Contractor, and at that point of time of entry, had the requisite qualification as regards age, therefore, they should be deemed to have possessed the requisite qualification. We cannot lose sight of the fact that their appointment was not a regular appointment by following the rules of selection, and thus, such employment through a Contractor cannot confer any legal right on them to condone the age-bar, which is not provided in the Regulations. 13. In this connection, we may profitably refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Manjul vs. Chairman, UPSC and Another reported in (2006) 8 SCC 42 : “25. The statutory authority is entitled to frame the statutory rules laying down the terms and conditions of service as also the qualifications essential for holding a particular post. It is only the authority concerned which can take ultimate decision therefore. 26. The jurisdiction of the superior courts, it is a trite law, would be to interpret the rule and not to supplant or supplement the same.” (Emphasis supplied). 14. Therefore, when the employer who is a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution fixes the age-bar, which does not provide for any relaxation for the petitioners, there is no scope of passing such a direction while disposing of the writ-applications. 15. At this stage, we may also refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Another vs. Sajal Kumar Roy and Others reported in (2006) 8 SCC 671 where the Supreme Court specifically held that where there is no scope of relaxation of the age limit for a particular category of the candidates, the High Court erred in law in directing the authority to consider the case of relaxation of the writ-petitioner. The following observation of the Bench is relevant and quoted below: “11. The following observation of the Bench is relevant and quoted below: “11. The respondents are not members of the Scheduled Caste or Schedules Tribe. Age-limit is prescribed for appointment to the general category of employees. The upper age-limit for appointment to the post of LDC is 25 years. The advertisement also says so. The Rules, as noticed hereinabove, are in two parts. The first part talks about the age-limit. The second part provides for relaxation. Such relaxation can be granted for the purpose specified, i.e. in favour of those who answered the descriptions stated therein. Relaxation of age-limit even in relation to the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribe candidates or the retrenched Central Government employees, including the defence personnel is, however, not automatic. The appointing authorities are required to apply their mind while exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to relax the age-limits. Discretion of the authorities is required to be exercised only for deserving candidates and upon recommendations of the Appointing Committee/Selection Committee. The requirements to comply with the rules, it is trite, were required to be complied with fairly and reasonably. They were bound by the rules. The discretionary jurisdiction could be exercised for relaxation of age provided for in the rules and within the four corners thereof. As the respondents do not come within the purview of the exception contained in Article 45 of the Education Code, in our opinion, the Tribunal and consequently, the High Court committed a manifest error in issuing the aforementioned directions”. [Emphasis supplied by us] 16. We now propose to deal with the following nine decisions cited by Mr. Clerk, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents-writ petitioners: [1]. Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. National Union Waterfront Workers reported in (2001) 7 SCC 1 . [2]. Sandeep Kumar vs. State of U.P. reported in 1993 SUPP (1) SCC 525. [3]. J&K Public Service Commission vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan reported in (1994) 2 SCC 630 . [4]. Bihar State Board of Homeopathic Medicine vs. State of Bihar reported in (1995) 6 SCC 503 . [5]. State of Haryana vs. Surinder Kumar reported in (1997) 3 SCC 633 . [6]. Union of India vs. Vinod Shankar Tripathi reported in (1998) 8 SCC 583 . [7]. State of Orissa vs. Mamtarani Sahoo reported in (1998) 8 SCC 753 . [8]. Harminder Kaur vs. Union of India reported in (2009) 13 SCC 90 . [5]. State of Haryana vs. Surinder Kumar reported in (1997) 3 SCC 633 . [6]. Union of India vs. Vinod Shankar Tripathi reported in (1998) 8 SCC 583 . [7]. State of Orissa vs. Mamtarani Sahoo reported in (1998) 8 SCC 753 . [8]. Harminder Kaur vs. Union of India reported in (2009) 13 SCC 90 . [9]. Satya Prakash vs. State of Bihar reported in (2010) 4 SCC 179 . 17. In the case of Steel Authority of India [Supra], in Paragraph 125 of the judgment, the Supreme Court set out the upshot of the discussions, and Mr. Clerk specifically relied upon Sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 at Page 63, which are quoted below: “(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularize the services of the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of Para 6 hereunder. (6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical qualifications.” 17.1 On going through those sub-paragraphs, it appears that the Supreme Court observed in Paragraph 5 that if the contract between the employer and the contractor is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, and in that event, according to the Supreme Court, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularize the services of the contract labour in the concerned establishment subject to conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of Para 6 mentioned there. In Paragraph 6, the Supreme Court pointed out that in the event the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act in respect of the concerned establishment has been issued by the appropriate Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workmen he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical qualifications. 17.2 In the case before us, whether the contract between the employer and the Contractor is genuine or is a camouflage is yet to be decided in the Reference. 17.2 In the case before us, whether the contract between the employer and the Contractor is genuine or is a camouflage is yet to be decided in the Reference. It is also not a case where after the contract is found to be genuine a prohibition notification has been imposed. Thus, the said decision of the Supreme Court would have no application to the facts of the present case. 18. In the case of Sandeep Kumar [Supra] the Supreme Court, after taking into consideration the facts of the said case, came to the conclusion that having regard to the purpose of the Corporation - the Respondent No. 3, and the nature of work available under it, it was difficult to say that the petitioners could be regularized. The Supreme Court further observed that the only direction which could be given was as and when any vacancy of permanent nature would occur preference for regularization might be offered to the work-charged employees including the petitioners on the basis of their seniority and entitlement according to rules and it would be open to the employer to consider the feasibility of giving weight-age of past service and condonation of age-bar as they are already in service. 18.1. By relying upon the aforesaid observations made in paragraph 10 of the judgment, Mr. Clerk tried to convince us that a writ-Court is also competent to pass directions upon the employer to relax the age-bar in a given case. We are afraid, we are not impressed by such submissions of Mr. Clerk, as in our view, the above direction was given in exercise of powers vested in the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, which is not available to a writ-Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are afraid, we are not impressed by such submissions of Mr. Clerk, as in our view, the above direction was given in exercise of powers vested in the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, which is not available to a writ-Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18.2 At this juncture, we may also point out a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Jharkhand and others vs. Bijay Kumar and others reported in (2008) 17 SCC 617 where, while dealing with the question whether the High Court had any jurisdiction to issue directions similar to the ones issued by the Supreme Court in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution and confined only to the appellants of those cases, held in Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the judgment, that the Constitution of India conferred a special jurisdiction on the Supreme Court only, and although power of judicial review has been conferred on the High Courts, it had not been given any special jurisdiction as has been done on the Supreme Court in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, the High Court could not issue the impugned directions which, in effect and substance, would be violative thereof. 18.3 We, thus, find that the decision in the case of Sandeep Kumar [Supra] cited by Mr. Clerk is of no assistance to his clients. 19. In the case of J & K Public Service Commission [Supra], it was held by the Supreme Court that regularization of ad hoc appointees without being subjected to open competitive examination to be held by Public Service Commission, purportedly done in relaxation of recruitment rules is not permissible but such appointees could be granted age-relaxation for appearing in the examination. In Paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Supreme Court gave directions to the State Government that in case any of the respondents is barred by age, such case should be considered for relaxation under rule 9(3) of the age qualification. Apparently, such directions were given by the Supreme Court in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. That the directions were under Article 142 of the Constitution is apparent from the fact that the Supreme Court passed those directions after dismissing the appeals filed by both the petitioners and the State Government. 20. Apparently, such directions were given by the Supreme Court in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. That the directions were under Article 142 of the Constitution is apparent from the fact that the Supreme Court passed those directions after dismissing the appeals filed by both the petitioners and the State Government. 20. In the case of Bihar State Board of Homeopathic Medicine [Supra], it appears that due to financial strain, certain posts were abolished. Writ petitions were filed challenging the abolition. The Supreme Court, in Paragraph 19 of the judgment, ultimately held that the original writ-petition should be dismissed, and further observed that nevertheless, in the event of the said posts being revived or similar posts being created in future, the Board may consider appointing the six original petitioners or any one or more of them to such posts in view of their past service by giving a suitable waiver of age-bar, if required. 20.1 The above observation of the Supreme Court is apparently in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution because the writ-petitions were dismissed and the observation was that “in the event of the said posts being revived or similar posts being created in future”. Thus, the above principle cannot be exercised by a High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 21. In the case of State of Haryana [Supra], the Supreme Court specifically held that any appointment made to the services should be in accordance with the statutory rules and also the guidelines laid down there under and the State of Haryana was directed to consider the cases of the respondents in accordance with the law and guidelines laid down for appointment of the respondents to the services as per law provided they are otherwise eligible. After holding as such, the Supreme Court observed that if they had become age-barred, age may be relaxed for the period they have worked. Mr. Clerk relied upon the above observations. We find that the Supreme Court, in the said decision, never laid down as a proposition of law that the age is of no consequence when it is specifically provided for in the rules. The above observations must be held to be a direction in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 22. We find that the Supreme Court, in the said decision, never laid down as a proposition of law that the age is of no consequence when it is specifically provided for in the rules. The above observations must be held to be a direction in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 22. In the case of Union of India vs. Vinod Shankar Tripathi [Supra], the respondents were employed as Laboratory Attenders on ad hoc basis for seasonal work in Government Opium and Alkaloid Works. Interview was held in October 1987 for filing up of three vacancies on regular basis and the respondents were not considered on the ground that they did not fulfill requirements laid down in draft recruitment rules. Central Administrative Tribunal, in its judgment dated 27th August 1993 directed the respondents’ absorption on regular basis by giving weight-age to long service rendered by them and if necessary, rules also to be framed in this regard. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in directing that all the applicants be absorbed and the rules be framed to enable such absorption. After saying so, the Supreme Court further observed that all that could be said was that the respondents were entitled to be considered for appointment against the three posts of Laboratory Attenders for which recruitment was being made. The Supreme Court further observed that the appellants would take steps to consider the case of the respondents for appointment on the three posts of Laboratory Attenders and if any other vacancy had occurred or occurs in future on the post of Laboratory Attender, the respondents might be considered for the same provided they fulfilled the requirement of the rules, if made, for appointment on the said post and they might be given age-relaxation for the purpose of such consideration. 22.1 Thus, the above direction was also passed for doing complete justice between the parties in exercise of power conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and cannot be applied by this Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 23. In the case of State of Orissa vs. Mamtarani Sahoo [Supra] relied upon by Mr. Clerk, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court also dismissed the writ-application and thereafter made the following observation in Paragraph 13 of the judgment: “13. 23. In the case of State of Orissa vs. Mamtarani Sahoo [Supra] relied upon by Mr. Clerk, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court also dismissed the writ-application and thereafter made the following observation in Paragraph 13 of the judgment: “13. In the premises the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Writ Petitions are dismissed. However, all those headmasters/headmistresses who are functioning on an ad hoc basis with the prior approval of the Inspector of Schools, will be entitled to continue until regular appointments are made. They will also be eligible for consideration for regular appointment by the District Selection Board concerned along with other applicants. They will be entitled for such consideration by the District Selection Board which shall waive the age bar, provided at the time of their initial appointment, they were within the prescribed age limit. The District Selection Board any take into account their record of service while functioning as such ad hoc headmasters or headmistresses. We also make it clear that if any scheme for regularisation of such ad hoc headmasters/headmistresses is framed, all those who were functioning as such ad hoc headmasters/headmistresses with the approval of the Inspector of Schools on the date of the High Court’s judgment which is impugned before us, will be entitled to be considered for regularisation if they are qualified under that scheme for such consideration. The appeals are allowed accordingly.” 23.1 It is, thus, apparent that after the dismissal of the writ-application, the above direction is definitely a direction for doing complete justice between the parties and not a general law laid down by the Supreme Court. We, thus, find that this decision also is of no avail to the respondents. 24. In the case of Harminder Kaur vs. Union of India [Supra], the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the High Court and dismissed the appeal and at that stage, the Supreme Court was informed that 800 posts of Teachers were lying vacant and that the administration was ready and willing to fill up the said posts on regular basis. At that stage, the Supreme Court observed that while doing so, the Supreme Court had no doubt in its mind that the case of the appellants shall also be taken into consideration and the Administrator may consider the desirability of relaxing the age-limit provided for in the Rules. At that stage, the Supreme Court observed that while doing so, the Supreme Court had no doubt in its mind that the case of the appellants shall also be taken into consideration and the Administrator may consider the desirability of relaxing the age-limit provided for in the Rules. We, thus, find that it was a mere desire of the Supreme Court and that cannot help Mr. Clerk in any way. 24.1 Moreover, in our opinion, within the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no scope of expressing any “hope” or “expectation” after holding that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief claimed. The aforesaid “hope” and “expectation” observed by the Supreme Court cannot be said to be the ratio of the decision so as to bind as a precedent. 25. In the case of Satya Prakash vs. State of Bihar [Supra], the Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal, in Paragraph 14 of the judgment, relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others vs. Umadevi [3] and Others reported in (1996) 4 SCC 1 wherein a direction was given for waiving age restriction for their having been engaged for work in the Department for a significant period of time. In our opinion, the aforesaid observations in the facts of the said case cannot be applicable to the case where the petitioners have got no requisite qualification nor does the regulations permit relaxation. 26. In this connection, we may profitably refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Arulmozhi Iniarasu and Ors. reported in AIR 2011 SC 2731 wherein the following observations were made by the Supreme Court:— “12. Before examining the first limb of the question, formulated above, it would be instructive to note, as a preface, the well settled principle of law in the matter of applying precedents that the Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the fact-situation of the case before it fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s Theorems nor as provisions of Statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s Theorems nor as provisions of Statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper because one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. (Ref.: Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and Anr. vs. N.R. Vairamani and Anr., (2004) 8 SCC 579 : ( AIR 2004 SC 4778 = 2004 AIR SCW 5457); Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2008) 1 SCC 494 = ( AIR 2008 SC 946 = 2008 AIR SCW 438); and Bhuwalka Steel Industries Limited vs. Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board and Anr., (2010) 2 SCC 273 = (AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 122 = 2010 AIR SCW 57). 13. Bearing in mind the aforenoted principle of law, we may now refer to the decision in Nagendra Chandra, (2007 AIR SCW 7666) (Supra). It is plain from a bare reading of the said decision that the question which fell for consideration before a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court was as to whether the appointments of the appellants in that case were illegal or irregular. This Court opined that since the appointments made were not only in infraction of the Recruitment Rules but also violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, these were illegal. It was thus, held that the appellants would not be entitled to get the benefit of the directions contained in Umadevi(3) case ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 = 2006 AIR SCW 1991) (Supra), which are applicable only to those qualified employees who were appointed irregularly in a sanctioned post. Having come to the conclusion that the subject appointments being illegal, the competent authority was justified in terminating the services of the employees concerned and the High Court was also justified in upholding the same, in our view, the relied upon observation in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment in Nagendra Chandra (Supra) does not appear to be consistent with the ratio of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi(3) case (Supra). In the said decision it has clearly been held that the courts are not expected to issue any direction for absorption/regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wagers or ad hoc employees merely because such an employee is continued for a long time beyond the term of his appointment. It has also been held that such an employee would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. Therefore, in our opinion, the said observation cannot be said to be an exposition of general principle of law on the point that a long length of service, de hors the relevant Recruitment Rules for the post, is a relevant factor for waiver or relaxation of any eligibility criterion, including age limit, for future regular selections for the post. Obviously, the observation, general in nature, was made by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, cannot be treated as a binding precedent. It has to be confined to the peculiar facts of that case.” (Emphasis supplied by us). 27. In this connection, we may profitably refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Paragraph 24 in the case of Indian Bank vs. Abs Marine Products Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 2006 SC 1899 while distinguishing a precedent from mere directions: “24. One word before parting. Many a time, after declaring the law, this Court in the operative part of the judgment, gives some directions which may either relax the application of law or exempt the case on hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts or in view of the uncertainty of law till then, to do complete justice. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article 142. It is not uncommon to find that courts have followed not the law declared, but the exemption/relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article 142. It is not uncommon to find that courts have followed not the law declared, but the exemption/relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. When the High Courts repeatedly follow a direction issued under Article 142, by treating it as the law declared by this Court, incongruously the exemption/relaxation granted under Article 142 becomes the law, though at variance with the law declared by this Court. The courts should, therefore, be careful to ascertain and follow the ratio decidendi, and not the relief given on the special facts, exercising power under Article 142. One solution to avoid such a situation is for this Court to clarify that a particular direction or portion of the order is in exercise of power under Article 142. Be that as it may.” 28. By relying upon the aforesaid principles, we hold that the decisions cited by Mr. Clerk are of no avail to his clients as those were all made by the Supreme Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 29. On consideration of the entire materials on record, we hold that the learned Single Judge erred in law in passing the direction upon the appellant to relax the age-limit of the petitioners which is not permitted under the Regulations. We, thus, set aside the common judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 5th February, 2013 in Special Civil Applications filed by the petitioners being Special Civil Application No. 16229 of 2012 and 17029 of 2012 and dismiss those Special Civil Applications. 29.1 In the facts and circumstances, there shall be, however, no order as to costs.