Judgment : Ramachandran Nair, J. 1. The petitioner herein is the tenant of a building owned by the landlord. The landlord filed R.C.P.No.81/2009 before the Rent Control Court seeking eviction under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of Act 2 of 1965. The Rent Control Court disallowed eviction under Section 11(3) (bona fide need) and allowed the same under Section 11(2)(b), namely for arrears of rent. The Rent Control Court has made it clear that the tenant is entitled to the benefit of Section 11(2)(c), if he so opts. The Appellate Authority, in an appeal filed by the landlord set aside the finding under Section 11(3) and allowed eviction on that ground also. 2. We heard the learned counsel Shri K.Jayesh Mohankumar appearing for the petitioner and learned counsel Shri O.Ramachandran Nambiar appearing for the respondent. 3. Before going into the respective contentions, we will refer to the bare facts. The landlord in the eviction petition projected the bona fide need for conducting own business in the premises. The tenant, in the objections filed to the petition, while disputing the bona fide need, raised a contention that the landlord is having different buildings under his ownership and some of the rooms have been given on rent and some of the rooms are remaining vacant also. He is getting much income from the rental business and has got landed properties also. He is not having any genuine interest for conducting business or experience to do the same. He is mainly engaged in letting out buildings and rooms. It was pleaded that just before filing of the eviction petition, in the very same building, the landlord has given on rent two rooms and if he had any genuine bona fide need, he would not have let out the said rooms. While rejecting the contentions of the landlord under Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court found that the fact that the landlord has let out two rooms just before the filing of the eviction petition and the fact that he has not offered any explanation as to why the proposed business cannot be conducted in the rooms, really will go against the bona fides of the landlord. 4.
4. The Appellate Authority in para.11 was of the view that from the first proviso to Section 11(3), it can be seen that the landlord has to show reasons for not occupying another building only if he is having possession any other building on the date of the eviction petition and there is no evidence with regard to the fact that the landlord was having any other building in his possession as on that date and so the question of making a mention of the same in the eviction petition does not arise. This in a nut shell is the background of the contentions of the parties and the findings rendered by the authorities below. 5. While making submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner Shri K.Jayesh Mohankumar submitted that some of the relevant aspects have been lost sight of by the Appellate Authority. According to the learned counsel, the bona fide need of the landlord has just cropped up, namely, on the date of filing of the eviction petition which is clear from the background and non mentioning of the said bona fide need on any of the earlier occasions when the landlord had filed cases against the tenant herein. It is mentioned that O.S.No.618/2001 was filed seeking for a mandatory injunction contending that the petitioner herein was only a licencee which was negatived. Again he filed R.C.P.No.294/2004 under Section 11(2)(b). It is submitted that even if these two are of the years 2001 and 2004; just before the filing of the eviction petition, the landlord had sent various notices and in none of the notices, the requirement for own occupation has been made mention of. This aspect assumes importance in the light of the fact that he has let out the two rooms in the first floor of the building 20 days before the filing of the eviction petition and after the sending of the notices. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the tenent, this is a genuine circumstance which affects the bona fide need. Our attention was invited to the notices, namely, Exts.A6, A8 and A10. Ext.A6 is dated 15/06/2009, Ext.A8 13/7/2009 and A10 is dated 27/07/2009. The first floor rooms were given on rent on 19/08/2009 and the eviction petition was filed on 10/09/2009. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant, the context therefore is quite important. 6.
Our attention was invited to the notices, namely, Exts.A6, A8 and A10. Ext.A6 is dated 15/06/2009, Ext.A8 13/7/2009 and A10 is dated 27/07/2009. The first floor rooms were given on rent on 19/08/2009 and the eviction petition was filed on 10/09/2009. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant, the context therefore is quite important. 6. It is further submitted that there is no explanation from the side of the landlord for not occupying the said rooms, or about any unsuitability of the said rooms either in the eviction petition or in the chief affidavit given as P.W.1. Even though the landlord had a case that the lease agreement in respect of the two rooms let out to Rajesh was executed later and the room was given to the tenant much earlier by one year that case was not accepted by the authorities below. In fact, the document entered into between him and one Rajesh on 17/06/2009 was produced before the Appellate Authority along with I.A.No.750/2012 for receiving that document in evidence, but the Appellate Authority did not mark the same and disallowed his prayer as it was a document which was available with the landlord and was not produced at the trial stage. 7. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the landlord has failed to adduce evidence with regard to the said aspect. Thus, it is submitted that the cogent reasons found by the Rent Control Court have been upset by the Appellate Authority by taking a perverse view, that is, what matters is only the state of affairs as on the date of the petition. 8. Shri O.Ramachandran Nambiar, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord submitted that it is not the law that all the material particulars are to be detailed in the eviction petition. The learned counsel made reference to Order VI Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that para.7 of the eviction petition gives basic particulars as regards the bona fide need, required for filing the eviction petition. Rule 7 of the Rules under the Kerala Buildings (Rent and Lease Control) Rules was also referred to by the learned counsel in this context. It is submitted that necessary particulars alone need be pleaded. Learned counsel in support of his contentions relied upon Subbiah Reddiar v. Chinnamma [1991 KHC 437] and M.Fathima Beevi v. Stella John [2006 KHC 365] .
It is submitted that necessary particulars alone need be pleaded. Learned counsel in support of his contentions relied upon Subbiah Reddiar v. Chinnamma [1991 KHC 437] and M.Fathima Beevi v. Stella John [2006 KHC 365] . He also relied upon Jerry Joseph v. Selvaraj [2002 KHC 398] and submitted that it is open to the landlord to place materials before the court in evidence. By relying upon the Judgment in Abdul Rub v. Jobby Tharian [ 2003 (3) KLT 733 ] it is submitted that a meticulous survey pleadings are not required in rent control proceedings and learned counsel also relied upon the Judgment in Krishna Pillai v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation [ 2003 (2) KLT 697 (F.B.)] in that context. Learned counsel explained that as PW1 in the cross-examination, he has stated that vacant rooms were in the first floor, which is an acceptable reason going by the decision in Udaya Shankar Upadhyay & Others v. Naveen Maheswari [(2010) 1 SCC 503 = 2010 SAR (Civil) 69 SC] and Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai and others [ (2002) 6 SCC 16 ]. With regard to the first proviso to Section 11(3) where the landlord will have to explain special reasons, the learned counsel relied upon Raghavan v. Govindan Nambiar [ 1995 (1) KLT 596 ]. It is submitted that only if vacant rooms are in possession as on the date of filing of the writ petition, any special reason need be stated which is not the case herein. 9. The learned counsel further submitted that the fact that the landlord had occasion to transfer one of the rooms earlier is not a ground to dispute the genuine bona fide need, and merely, because he had occasion to file two cases earlier also is not a ground to doubt the genuine bona fide need. The same will only imply that he has not sought the tenant to be evicted at that point of time for these reasons, which is not at all a handicap. It is submitted by referring to the detailed evidence in the matter that even the tenant did not state while being examined that the room in the first floor is suitable.
It is submitted by referring to the detailed evidence in the matter that even the tenant did not state while being examined that the room in the first floor is suitable. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that it is not a case where there is lack of pleadings or lack of production of any materials in evidence and as the landlord wants to conduct own business, it can only be termed as a genuine bona fide need. 10. We will now go to the pleadings and evidence in the case. The landlord's case, going by the eviction petition, with regard to the bona fide need, as stated in para.7, is that he wants to conduct the business in groceries as he has no other avocation now and no other vacant rooms are in his possession to do the business. In the objections filed by tenant, in para.4, it is averred that the averments by the landlord that he wants to get the room vacated for own purposes to conduct grocery business, that he has no avocation in life and, that he has no other suitable building in his possession are not correct. It is averred that the landlord has buildings having different rooms and he has in his possession rooms similar to that of the petition schedule room and, some of which have been rented recently and some are remaining unoccupied. He is getting good income from the rooms let out for other people and has got landed properties and is getting huge income from them also. By constructing buildings and giving the rooms on rent, he is getting substantial income and; he has no real interest or experience to conduct his own business. He is mainly engaged in the business of giving rooms on rent. Just before the filing of the eviction petition, in the very same building, the landlord has given on rent two rooms and if he actually had any requirement for bona fide own purposes, he would not have given these rooms on rent. 11. Thus, the tenant has raised the specific objection that the bona fide need pleaded is not genuine for many reasons including the main one that the landlord has given on rent two rooms just before the filing of the eviction petition. 12. Next, we will go through the chief affidavit filed by the landlord.
11. Thus, the tenant has raised the specific objection that the bona fide need pleaded is not genuine for many reasons including the main one that the landlord has given on rent two rooms just before the filing of the eviction petition. 12. Next, we will go through the chief affidavit filed by the landlord. Therein, what he has stated is that the petition schedule room is required for doing own business and he is not having any other avocation. With regard to availability of any vacant rooms, what he has stated is that no vacant rooms to do business in grocery are in his possession. 13. In the cross-examination, he has stated that he was `C' class Contractor and government contracts were also being availed of and he had licence for two years and there is no document to show that he has surrendered the same. It is also submitted that he was an income tax payer during the above period and, after the year 2002 he has no other business. The marriage of his daughters have been conducted before the year 2002. 14. With regard to the petition schedule building, it is explained that it is a three storied building and in the ground floor, there are six rooms apart from the stair case room. In the ground floor, second room from the southern side was sold by him to one Vimala and two adjoining rooms were sold to one Rukhia. Three rooms in the second floor have been sold to Vyapara Bhavan. He has given on rent to one Rajesh, room Nos.3 and 4 on the southern side of the first floor, as per agreement dated 19/08/2009. According to him, he had entrusted the rooms one year back but, there is no document to show that he has received rent from then. According to him, the receipt for payment of rent was given after execution of the agreement. In the re-examination, he has given the answer that in the first floor, it will not be possible for him to conduct the business proposed by him. In the further cross-examination, he has stated that there is no particular reason for not stating in the eviction petition that in the first floor he will not be able to conduct the proposed business. 15. The tenant was examined as RW1.
In the further cross-examination, he has stated that there is no particular reason for not stating in the eviction petition that in the first floor he will not be able to conduct the proposed business. 15. The tenant was examined as RW1. In the chief examination, he has stated that just before the filing of the eviction petition, in the very same building the landlord has given on rent two rooms and if he had any bona fide purpose, it would not have been done also, and he would have occupied those rooms. 16. In the cross examination, he was asked whether the business that is being obtained in the ground floor will be there in the first floor and he answered that it will depend upon the nature of the business. 17. Ext.A6 is the lawyer notice issued by the landlord which is dated 15/06/2009 and Ext.A7 is its reply. In Ext.A6, what is claimed is the arrears of rent to the tune of `18,400/-. After receipt of Ext.A7 dated 27/06/2009, Ext.A8 notice was sent on 13/07/2009 informing that the rent is payable at the rate of `800/- per month. Ext.A10 is another lawyer notice dated 27/07/2009. The eviction petition is filed on 10/09/2009. Going by the deposition of PW1, the rental agreement executed for giving on rent two rooms in the first floor to Mr.Rajesh is dated 19/08/2009, namely, 20 days prior to the date of filing of the eviction petition. 18. When we come to the finding of the Rent Control Court, the court was of the view that the landlord has not explained why the proposed business cannot be conducted in the first floor and also he did not explain any inconvenience or his difficulty in conducting such business in the first floor and it is not brought out from the evidence that the first floor is not suitable for the business proposed by the landlord. Finally, it was held that the need put forth by the landlord is not bona fide. It was also stated that no special reasons have been stated as provided under first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.
Finally, it was held that the need put forth by the landlord is not bona fide. It was also stated that no special reasons have been stated as provided under first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. The above finding was rendered after considering the fact that landlord has let out two rooms which were in his possession just 20 days prior to the filing of the eviction petition and then came to the court with bona fide need for the petition schedule room. It will certainly tell upon his bona fides. The Rent Control Court in para.12 also observed that as far as the nature of the business is concerned, there are inconsistencies both in the petition as well as in the evidence of PW1. In the petition as well as in the chief affidavit, he says that he want the petition schedule room for starting grocery business and in another place, he has stated that he wants to start a business in condiments and he has no case that both are one and the same. It is found by the court that by the nature of the business, it cannot be said that both are one and the same and so there is no definite evidence to show which business the landlord is going to conduct. Accordingly, it was found that the plea of bona fide need put forth by the landlord is vague, uncertain and not capable of treating it as bona fide. 19. The Appellate Authority while reversing the above findings, in para.10 held that the finding of the court below that the landlord has no definite case as to which type of business he is going to conduct and so the bona fide need put is vague and uncertain, cannot be supported in any manner. The argument of the learned counsel for the landlord that grocery business or business in condiments are almost synonymous was accepted and; it was held that just because he had referred to both it cannot be concluded that he has no idea as to the business he is intending to do.
The argument of the learned counsel for the landlord that grocery business or business in condiments are almost synonymous was accepted and; it was held that just because he had referred to both it cannot be concluded that he has no idea as to the business he is intending to do. With regard to the availability of vacant rooms and about any special reasons to be stated by the landlord, in para.11, it was held that even the Rent Control Court could not find that as on the date of the filing of the eviction petition, there was any other building in the possession of the landlord and what the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act insists is to show reasons for not occupying another building only if he is having possession of any other building on the date of the eviction petition. The Appellate Authority therefore found that the need developed by the landlord is bona fide. The decision of the Apex Court in Udaya Shankar Upadhyay & Others v. Naveen Maheswari [2010 SAR (Civil) 69 SC] was relied upon to reject the argument of the tenant that the landlord should have made use of the vacant rooms in the first floor which were rented out just before the filing of the eviction petition. 20. What we find from the approach made by both the authorities is that, the Rent Control Court laid emphasis on the fact that the action of the landlord in leasing out two rooms just 20 days prior to the filing of the eviction petition will tell upon the genuineness of his bona fide need coupled with the unsure manner in which he has stated the proposed business also and the approach made by the Appellate Authority is to find out whether as on the date of the eviction petition, he was in possession of any vacant room.
As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the real question is not that any vacant room is in the possession of the landlord as on the date of the eviction petition but what has to be considered is whether the act of the landlord in letting out two rooms just 20 days prior to the filing of the eviction petition in the same building, even though in the first floor, affects the bona fides of the claim and whether he could have utilised the same. We are also of the view that the question will have to be examined whether the bona fide need pleaded is genuine in the light of the above conduct of the landlord for which, according to the learned counsel for the tenant, there is no proper explanation also. 21. When we examine the principles relied upon by the learned counsel for the landlord Shri O.Ramachandran Nambiar, in various decisions cited, what we find is that they laid down general principles after considering various circumstances. In Subbiah Reddiar v. Chinnamma [1991 KHC 437] it has been held in para.10 that there should be a liberal construction of the pleadings and meticulous analysis of the pleadings would lead to failure of justice. Para.10 of the said Judgment is extracted below: "10. One other aspect stressed by counsel for the respondents and mentioned by the Appellate Authority is, that the pleadings of the tenant denying the bona fide need of the landlords is vague. We have adverted to clause 5 of the objections filed by the tenant. He had denied the allegations in paragraph 8 of the petition and has further stated that the petition for eviction is filed without any bona fides. The tenant has also highlighted the fact that the petitioners or their son are not capable of starting a business. We perused through the petition filed for eviction (R.C.P. No. 27 of 1985) and also the objections filed by the tenant. We are of the view that there are sufficient pleadings in the case. Moreover, looking at the entire proceedings, we are satisfied that no prejudice has been caused to the landlords due to lack of precision or details in the pleadings.
We are of the view that there are sufficient pleadings in the case. Moreover, looking at the entire proceedings, we are satisfied that no prejudice has been caused to the landlords due to lack of precision or details in the pleadings. This Court has held, on more than one occasion, that the pleadings should be liberally construed and meticulous analysis of the pleadings should not be adopted, which will lead to failure of justice. - (See -Narayani v. District Judge ( 1991 (1) K.L.T. 646 ); Madhavan v. Leelamma ( 1991 (2) K.L.T. 32 ). On a perusal of the orders of the authorities below and the nature of the examination of the parties and the evidence tendered in the case, we are of the view that no surprise has been caused to the landlords due to any vagueness in the pleadings. The argument to the contrary is devoid of force." 22. In Narayani v. District Judge [1991 KHC 173] , a Division Bench of this Court held that in the pleading, the precise nature of the business proposed to be conducted is not required and that is a matter of evidence. 23. In Jerry Joseph v. Selvaraj [2002 KHC 398], one of the aspects considered is whether non mentioning of other premises belonging to the landlord in the pleadings will be crucial if materials have been placed in the evidence and no prejudice has been caused to the tenant. It has been held in para.18 that "even if the landlord failed to mention in the petition for eviction about the other premises belonging to him, if materials about those alternate accommodation have been placed before the court and the matter has been adequately considered by the court without causing any prejudice to the tenant, the non disclosure of the availability of the buildings in the petition is immaterial". A reading of para.20 will show that the Division Bench was of the view that even though the landlord had not disclosed about the availability of rooms belonging to his parents and their non suitability for the purpose of the trade that he intends to start in the petition schedule premises, both sides have properly understood the applicability and impact of the first proviso to S.11(3) of the Act and both of them have adduced evidence on this aspect of the case.
Thus, it was held that non disclosure has not caused any prejudice to the tenant. It was also held by the Division Bench in para.21 that the bona fide requirement of the landlord should be objectively tested and the landlord need not establish that it is a dire need. Further, the Division Bench in para.25 was of the view that no prior experience to conduct business is necessary for claiming eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. In the case before us, the objection is not one of lack of pleadings by the landlord, but want of proper evidence. 24. Abdul Rub's case [ 2003 (3) KLT 733 = 2003 KHC 1185] is a case where the Division Bench held that the bona fides of the request of the landlord is as on the date of his application for eviction. Para.6 of the Judgment shows that till the year 1989-90, the first floor of the building was remaining vacant but no business was started by the landlord. It was held by the Bench that it cannot be a good ground to resist the need put forward by the landlord on 01/04/1992 and subsequently in June, 1992 when the rent control petition was filed. It was submitted that there was evidently a gap of three years. Therefore, the Division Bench did not accept the contention of the tenant. The situation herein is totally different. 25. M.Fathima Beevi v. Stella John [2006 KHC 365] is another decision relied upon, wherein the Division Bench held that parties are to state the essential factual situations, which may be foundation for the Court to grant or deny eviction. We find from a reading of para.9 of the Judgment that the Bench clearly held that details which prompted the landlord to occupy own building are "expected to be supplied at the time of placing evidence alone". The contention by the tenant that all the aspects should be detailed in the pleadings itself was rightly rejected. Rule 7(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules was relied upon therein. The said decision will go to show that the landlord will have to furnish the details at the time of placing evidence after stating the essential factual situation in the eviction petition. 26. Maganlal Kishanlal Godha v. Nanasaheb Uddhaorao Gadewar [2009 KHC 4317] is a decision of the Apex Court.
The said decision will go to show that the landlord will have to furnish the details at the time of placing evidence after stating the essential factual situation in the eviction petition. 26. Maganlal Kishanlal Godha v. Nanasaheb Uddhaorao Gadewar [2009 KHC 4317] is a decision of the Apex Court. The learned counsel for the landlord relied upon paras.16 and 17. In para.16, it was held that "it is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of the business". The finding was rendered in the context of requirements of the landlord including one to shift his business to the scheduled building which was tried to be objected to by the tenant by stating that he is already having business in Chennai and Hyderabad. In para.17, by relying upon the decision in Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand [ 2004 (8) SCC 490 ] it was held that the crucial date is the date of petition. The said aspect was clarified the context of considering subsequent events which is evident from the following sentence: "....the normal rule is that the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined on the date of petition and that subsequent events can be taken into consideration for moulding the reliefs provided such events had a material impact on those rights and obligations." The above dictum cannot, obviously apply to the situation herein as thegenuineness of the bona fide need itself is raised. 27. Kamleswar Prasad v. P.Agarwal [1997 KHC 502] is another decision of the Apex Court wherein also it was held that crucial date for existence of the landlord's requirement is the date of filing of the eviction petition. That was a case where the landlord died subsequently and the tenant contended that the bona fide need no longer survives. It was held that even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court, the bona fide need cannot be said to have been lapsed as the business has to be carried on by his widow or any other elder son. The situation herein is totally different. 28.
It was held that even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court, the bona fide need cannot be said to have been lapsed as the business has to be carried on by his widow or any other elder son. The situation herein is totally different. 28. Two of decisions rendered by us, Sreeraj S.R. v. Baburajan and others [2013 KHC 2748] and George v. T.K.Saidu Muhammed [2013 (2) KHC 326 (DB)] have also been cited. In the first one, we have held that crucial event should be taken as on the date of filing of eviction petition, while examining the contention that subsequent events in that case had an impact. In the latter one, it was held that in respect of an application for fixing fair rent, the relief will have to be granted as on the date of petition and not from the date of the order of the court. These principles cannot help the contentions of the landlord in this case. 29. Shri O.Ramachandran Nambiar relied upon two decisions of the Apex Court, viz. Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai and others [ (2002) 6 SCC 16 ] and Uday Shankar Upadhyay and others v. Naveen Maheswari [2010 SAR (Civil) 69] to support his case that vacant room in the first floor cannot be held as sufficient. 30. In the first decision in Dhannalal's case (supra), the landlord required the room for shifting and for continuing his ready-made garments business which he was running in a rented accommodation in another locality. In para.27, the Apex Court considered the effect of availability of alternative accommodation of the landlord. It has come out in evidence of the said case that landlord has secured possession of some premises in another locality which again is a tenanted accommodation. It was also observed that another alternative accommodation pointed out by the tenant is on the first floor of the building where the second floor is used by the landlord for residence and the first floor is used partly as godown and partly for stitching clothes. While examining the said contention, the Apex Court has held in para.27 as follows: "..........................To amount to an alternative non-residential accommodation so as to defeat the requirement of the landlord for the suit premises, it should be a reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation.
While examining the said contention, the Apex Court has held in para.27 as follows: "..........................To amount to an alternative non-residential accommodation so as to defeat the requirement of the landlord for the suit premises, it should be a reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation. It should be suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [ (1999) 6 SCC 222 ] this Court has held that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. The availability of another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to bona fides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. The bona fides of the need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises have to be determined by the court by applying objective standards and once the court is satisfied of such bona fides then in the matter of choosing out of more accommodations than one available to the landlord, his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. For the business, which Respondents 2 and 3 propose to start or continue respectively, an accommodation situated on the first floor cannot be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation in comparison with the shops situated on the ground floor. A shop on the first floor cannot attract the same number of customers and earn the same business as a shop situated on the ground floor would do. Moreover, there is no evidence adduced by the appellants to show that in M.T. Cloth Market, shops are also situated on first floor of buildings and attract the same business as the shops on ground floor do. The High Court and the RCA have held that none of the premises pointed out by the appellant-tenants was such alternate accommodation as may defeat the respondents' claim. We find no reason to take a different view.
The High Court and the RCA have held that none of the premises pointed out by the appellant-tenants was such alternate accommodation as may defeat the respondents' claim. We find no reason to take a different view. Between the years 1987 and 1989 late Krishna Das, the then sole owner of the building, had sold three shops but that was an event which had taken place in the lifetime of late Krishnadas and cannot have relevance for denying the claim of the respondent- landlords filed in the year 1995." 31. It is important to notice that while relying upon the Judgment in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta [ 1999 (6) SCC 222 ] it was held that the bona fides of the need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises will have to be determined by the court by applying objective standards and once the court is satisfied of such bona fides, then in the matter of choosing out of more accommodations than one available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. This is also significant to notice that the Apex Court was of the view that "the availability of another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to the bona fides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need". Therefore, this aspect will require examination by the court wherever it is pointed out that an alternative accommodation was available with the landlord and it was not used. Therein, on the materials placed by the landlord, the Apex Court was of the view that a shop on the first floor cannot attract all the customers. 32. In the Judgment in Uday Shankar Upadhyay's case [2010 SAR (Civil) 69] also the facts show that the tenant was sought to be evicted from the shop in question for the landlord's son for doing business. It was contended by the tenant that there is alternate accommodation in the first floor. On that plea, the trial court held that the hall in the first floor is a residential accommodation and the plaintiff has no suitable accommodation for doing business.
It was contended by the tenant that there is alternate accommodation in the first floor. On that plea, the trial court held that the hall in the first floor is a residential accommodation and the plaintiff has no suitable accommodation for doing business. This was reversed by the first appellate authority by finding that the hall above the suit shop is a suitable alternative accommodation and it can be used for non-residential purpose. It was held in that context by the Apex Court, that the court cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he should use for his business; that is for the landlord to decide. 33. We find from the above two decisions that the same cannot be mechanically applied to the facts of this case as sought for by the learned counsel for the landlord. 34. The plea by the tenant importantly is one relating to the bona fides of the claim, in that, just before 20 days, the landlord has given on rent two rooms in the same building to another tenant. Of course, it is true that for an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, it is not required that a statutory notice has to be issued but herein, the question is not whether the absence of any such idea, in the notices issued Ext.A6 onwards, is fatal but it can be considered with other evidence to see whether the bona fide need is a definite one. The trial court also found that the notice is not statutory. But while appreciating the contention of the landlord whether he has a genuine bona fide need as on the date of the petition, it will have some impact, according to the said court. 35. We will go to the main question raised whether the letting of the two rooms 20 days prior to the filing of the petition affects the bona fide need.
35. We will go to the main question raised whether the letting of the two rooms 20 days prior to the filing of the petition affects the bona fide need. Even though it is true that in the pleadings the entire materials are not required to be stated, and that as held by the Division Bench in M.Fathima Beevi's case [2006 KHC 365], the matter can be placed by the landlord in evidence, herein, no attempt was made by the landlord in the evidence, to explain as to why he did not occupy the vacant rooms and has given them to another tenant just before filing the eviction petition and whether there is any unsuitability for the rooms for the purpose of his business. This aspect gains consideration in the light of the specific objection raised by the tenant. In the chief affidavit, the landlord did not come forward with any explanation. In the cross-examination also he did not attempt any proper explanation. As we have already noticed, the only answer is a lone sentence that in the first floor, his business cannot be conducted. But he did not supplement it with any cogent reasons. 36. This will have to be considered along with certain other crucial factors tried to be introduced by the landlord. The landlord has let in evidence and that too by way of an explanation in his cross-examination that even though the agreement for giving two rooms to one Mr.Rajesh in the first floor is dated 19/08/2009, the rooms were actually given to him one year back. But, he did not produce any evidence to show receipt of rent prior to 19/08/2009 and admitted that there are no documents and only after the agreement was executed, receipt for payment of rent was given. This is significant and the same was rightly rejected by the Rent Control Court. In the appeal before the Appellate Authority, he filed an I.A. No.750/2012 for receiving the licence agreement said to have been executed between him and Mr.Rajesh on 17/06/2009. The application was not allowed on the ground that the said document was available with the landlord and as it was not produced at the trial stage.
In the appeal before the Appellate Authority, he filed an I.A. No.750/2012 for receiving the licence agreement said to have been executed between him and Mr.Rajesh on 17/06/2009. The application was not allowed on the ground that the said document was available with the landlord and as it was not produced at the trial stage. But the Appellate Authority after referring to the same, has taken the view that what is important to consider is whether he was having any vacant suitable room at the time of filing of the eviction petition. According to us, what is important was to consider, the effect of the action of the landlord in giving two rooms on rent 20 days prior to the filing of the eviction petition on his alleged bona fide need. 37. Therefore, as far as the said aspect is concerned, there is no explanation by the landlord and the only explanation sought to be attempted is that it was given on rent one year back, but he miserably failed in proving the same. Thus the attempted explanation was not accepted by both the authorities. The tenant Rajesh was also not examined. Since the alleged agreement is only on 19/08/2009, as admitted by the landlord and as the eviction petition was filed on 10/09/2009, clearly it is a case where the bona fide need cannot be said to be held as genuine. Coupled with the fact of the same, he did not attempt any explanation with regard to the unsuitability of the rooms for doing his proposed business. The rooms are situated in the very same building and it was pleaded by the tenant that they are similar to the petition schedule rooms. No contra evidence was also adduced. As we have already noticed, the tenant had well laid the crucial and specific objections, in the counter statement itself and even after it, the landlord did not attempt anything even while letting evidence. Therefore, none of the principles stated in the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the landlord will come to his aid. 38. We are not on the question whether all materials should have been pleaded in the eviction petition itself and whether the tenant can dictate that landlord should occupy the first floor. These aspects are not germane for the purposes of this case .
38. We are not on the question whether all materials should have been pleaded in the eviction petition itself and whether the tenant can dictate that landlord should occupy the first floor. These aspects are not germane for the purposes of this case . It is not a case where, it is due to absence of particulars in the eviction petition, that the bona fide need is sought to be attacked as not genuine but the very act of the landlord giving on rent two rooms just before the filing of the eviction petition is highlighted. It is not a case where the tenant is trying to dictate the landlord that he should occupy the first floor. The landlord could have explained or come up with further materials or could have adduced evidence in the matter. But he did not attempt anything and the only plea was that he gave the rooms to Mr.Rajesh one year back and in that attempt, he miserably failed also. Therefore, it is not a case as the Appellate Authority found that the matter is one where the state of affairs are as on the date of petition will have to be considered. That will not have relevance here since it is not a case where any subsequent event is sought to be projected or any situations similar to the same. The Appellate Authority clearly missed the said point,in that, the crucial question raised by the tenant is whether there is any genuine bona fide need for the landlord. The objection raised by the tenant was relevant for consideration of the genuineness of the need itself and the claim for eviction. 39. Therefore, the view taken by the Appellate Authority that the landlord has established bona fide need which is genuine is totally perverse and is not one established in evidence by the landlord. Such a view could not have been taken on the pleas and evidence in this case. Therefore, we reverse the same and the revision petition is allowed accordingly and the order of the Rent Control Court is restored. No costs.