JUDGMENT N.V. Anjaria, J. 1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Deepak Sanchela for the petitioner-Petlad Municipality. The petitioner has in this petition, put under challenge order dated 4th July, 2013 passed by the appellate authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, in Appeal No. 12 of 2013. The said appeal was directed against order dated 1st November, 2011 passed by the Controlling Authority which directed that the respondent was entitled to me gratuity of Rs. 2,50,108/- with 10% interest thereon. It is further prayed in the petition to remand the case to the appellate authority with a direction to decide me case de novo. 2. The facts stated in nutshell were that me respondent-employee had joined as Safai Kamdar from 11-4-1969 with the Municipality and he retired on reaching me age of superannuation on 31-5-2011. His last pay drawn was Rs. 14,107/-. It was me case of the employee before the Controlling Authority that he was entitled to get Rs. 2,82,144/- towards gratuity. The Controlling Authority, on the basis of material available on record, found that the last pay received by me employee was Rs. 13,137/- p.m. and me employee had put in 33 years of service. On that basis, the order for paying me gratuity, as aforesaid, was passed. 3. The ground on which the appellate authority did not entertain me appeal and dismissed it, was that me same was filed beyond total period of 120 days prescribed for preferring me appeal under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, (Hereinafter mentioned as "me Gratuity Act" for sake of brevity). Therefore, whether the delay beyond 120 days occasioned in preferring the appeal before the appellate authority was condonable by the authority is the neat question of law, which falls for consideration. 4. Section 7 of the Gratuity Act deals with determination of the amount of gratuity. Sub-section (4)(a) provides for deposit of the amount of gratuity with the controlling authority by the employer, if there is a dispute as to the payability or admissibility of the gratuity payable. Clause (b) of sub-sec. (4) provides for an application to be made before the controlling authority by either side for deciding the dispute. Against the order of the controlling authority who decides the application which may be made as above after inquiry, an appeal is provided before the appellate authority under sub-sec. Clause (b) of sub-sec. (4) provides for an application to be made before the controlling authority by either side for deciding the dispute. Against the order of the controlling authority who decides the application which may be made as above after inquiry, an appeal is provided before the appellate authority under sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 7 of the Gratuity Act which reads as under: "(7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-sec. (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days: Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-sec. (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount." 4.1. From the reading of above provision, it is clear that the period provided to prefer appeal before the appropriate Government or such other appellate authority which may be specified, against the order of the controlling authority, is 60 days from the date of receipt of the order of controlling authority. The First Proviso permits preferring of appeal within further 60 days provided sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within first 60 days is shown. The Second Proviso imposes a pre-condition of depositing the gratuity amount for admission of appeal by an employer. In other words, maximum period made available by the Legislature is total 120 days for preferring the appeal against controlling authority's order. It would not be gainsaid that this is in nature of special period of limitation. 4.2. Thus, as provided in Sec. 7(7) of the Gratuity Act, in respect of preferring appeal before the appellate authority, the outer limit of limitation is 120 days. The statute does not confer powers to entertain the appeal after 120 days. It would not be gainsaid that this is in nature of special period of limitation. 4.2. Thus, as provided in Sec. 7(7) of the Gratuity Act, in respect of preferring appeal before the appellate authority, the outer limit of limitation is 120 days. The statute does not confer powers to entertain the appeal after 120 days. The power to condone the delay is available within the sixty days contemplated in the First Proviso for which sufficient cause has to be shown so as to explain delay beyond sixty days. 4.3. The authorities appointed under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 are not judicial officers. Nor these authorities have the trappings of the Court. They cannot be treated as Courts. The provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to the proceedings before these authorities. In Van and Co. Sole Proprietary Concern, through its Sole Proprietor Mrs. Ketty Hosang Vandrawala v. Babubhai Lallubhai, 1981 GLH 5 , it was observed: "In Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, : AIR 1969 SC 1335 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that the Limitation Act applies to 'Courts' and not to bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or Executive authorities. It has also been observed in that, decision that an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications or references under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not a Court for the purpose of Limitation Act because it is not governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. For these two reasons, we are of the opinion that the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, do not apply to the instant case. (Para. 5)" 4.4. The Court held that the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal after expiry of 120 days from the date of order of the controlling authority. For these two reasons, we are of the opinion that the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, do not apply to the instant case. (Para. 5)" 4.4. The Court held that the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal after expiry of 120 days from the date of order of the controlling authority. Taking note of Sec. 14 of the Gratuity Act, which expressly excludes application of any other law which is inconsistent with the Act, the Division Bench held that Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application, it was observed and held: "The provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument or contract having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act. (Para. 4)" "We find that there is inconsistency between Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Whereas Sec. 5 enables a Court to entertain an appeal at any time after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for it, if mere is a sufficient cause, sub-sec. (7) of Sec- 7 enables the appellate Authority to entertain appeal only within sixty days after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for it under me said sub-section. In view of the fact that the proviso to sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is inconsistent with the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and since Sec. 14 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, gives overriding effect to the provisions of that Act over all other Acts, within the meaning of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29, application of the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is excluded by Sec. 14. (Para. 4)" 4.5. The question whether the appeal can be maintained after 120 days, is no longer res integra in view of decision of this Court in Van and Co. (supra). (2) of Sec. 29, application of the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is excluded by Sec. 14. (Para. 4)" 4.5. The question whether the appeal can be maintained after 120 days, is no longer res integra in view of decision of this Court in Van and Co. (supra). Again in Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, Jabalpur,: 2000 Lab.IC 3458 (MP), the Madhya Pradesh High Court has taken similar view: "On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it becomes luminously clear that the appellate authority has jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the period of sixty days if sufficient cause is shown, by extending the said period by a further period of sixty days. It is to be borne in mind that the Payment of Gratuity Act is a special statute and there is provision for condonation of delay. Once the limitation period has been provided and there is further provision conferring the power on authority to condone the delay of 60 days beyond the specified period if sufficient cause is shown, the authority cannot travel beyond it. It is well settled in law that in absence of conferment of jurisdiction to condone delay the statutory authority which is a quasi-judicial authority cannot condone delay or extend the period of limitation. (Para. 5)" 4.6. The Madhya Pradesh High Court relied on Supreme Court decision in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal, : 1996 AIR SCW 941 wherein the Apex Court while considering whether the Land Acquisition Officer under the Land Acquisition Act is Court or not and can condone the delay under Sec. 18 of said Act, has held as under: "It is to remember that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984) was enacted prescribing the limitation to exercise the power under Secs. 4, 6 and 11 and also excluded the time occupied due to stay granted by the Courts. Taking cognizance of the limitation prescribed in proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18 the provisions of the Limitation Act were not expressly extended. Though Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act is available, and the limitation in proviso to sub-sec. 4, 6 and 11 and also excluded the time occupied due to stay granted by the Courts. Taking cognizance of the limitation prescribed in proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18 the provisions of the Limitation Act were not expressly extended. Though Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act is available, and the limitation in proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18 may be treated to be special law, in the absence of such an application by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984), the Act specifically maintains distinction between the Collector and the Court and the Collector/L.A.O. performs only statutory duties under the Act, including one while making reference under Sec. 18. It is difficult to construe that the Collector/L.A.O. while making reference under Sec. 18, as statutory authority still acts as a Court for the purpose of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. (Para. 17)" "Though hard it may be, in view of the specific limitation provided under proviso to Sec. 18(2) of the Act, we are of the considered view that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 cannot be applied to the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18. The Collector/L.A.O., therefore, is not a Court when he acts as a statutory authority under Sec. 18(1). Therefore, Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18...... (Para. 18)" 4.7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Chhattisgarh S.E.B. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, : 2010 (5) SCC 23 , considered similar provision under Sec. 125, proviso under Electricity Act, 2003, providing period of limitation for appeal to the Supreme Court against order of Appellate Tribunal for Electricity. Sec. 125 provided for normal period of 60 days which under the proviso to Sec. 125, was extendable for further 60 days, as is the provision under Sec. 7(7) of Gratuity Act also. It was held that delay in filing appeal beyond 120 days cannot be condoned by the Supreme Court. The Apex Court stated: "The use of the expression "within a further period of not exceeding 60 days" in the proviso to Sec. 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. (Para. 25)" 4.7.1. The object underlying was highlighted thus: "The object underlying establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i.e. the Tribunal to deal with the grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate Commission with a provision for further appeal to this Court and prescription of special limitation for filing appeals under Secs. 111 and 125 is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and implementation of different provisions of the Electricity Act are expeditiously decided by an expert body and no Court, except this Court, may entertain challenge to the decision or order of the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts (Sec. 145) qua an order made by an adjudicating officer is also a pointer in that direction. (Para. 26)" "It is thus evident that the Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which lays down that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the one prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Sec. 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and provisions contained in Secs. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application unless they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law. (Para. 27)" 4.7.2. What is finally held in Chhattisgarh S.E.B. (supra) is equally and fully applicable to interpretation of Sec. 7(7) of the Gratuity Act: "In view of the above discussion, we hold that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Sec. 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Sec. 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act read with Sec. 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Sec. 125 will become nugatory. (Para. 32)" 5. It leaves the certain part of the relief whereby the petitioner has prayed that matter may be remanded to the appellate Authority. This part of the prayer cannot be granted for the obvious reason that once the appeal preferred before the appellate Authority is beyond the maximum permissible period of 120 days and delay beyond which is not condonable, as held hereinabove, remanding the case to the appellate Authority would amount to a circumvention of legal position. It would mean condoning the delay indirectly. It is trite principle that what is not permissible to be done directly, cannot be done indirectly in law. Moreover, no order or direction could be passed in exercise of powers under Arts. 226 or 227 of the Constitution and no relief in any manner can be granted to the petitioner in breach of express statutory provision, or when it has the effect of ignoring the statutory provision. For all aforesaid reasons and discussion, the petition does not qualify for any relief whatsoever. Therefore, same is dismissed. Petition dismissed