JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—The Rent Control and Eviction Officer/Additional City Magistrate 5th Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as the “RCEO”) vide order dated 24.7.1991 declared vacancy in accommodation in question and by another order dated 6.8.1991 released the same in favour of Sri Rajeev Prakash, who claimed himself to be the owner and landlord of disputed accommodation, by exercising powers under Section 16(1) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1972”). Thereagainst, the petitioner, claiming himself to be a tenant and a person validly possessing the disputed property, filed an application dated 21.8.1991 seeking recall of orders dated 24.7.1991 and 6.8.1991. Simultaneously, he also filed a revision under Section 18 of Act, 1972 against both the aforesaid orders. The revision was dismissed on 24.8.1991 on the ground that it does not lie against an order declaring vacancy. The petitioner then filed an application under Section 16(5) of Act, 1972 on 17.1.1992 which was rejected on 19.2.1992. Thereagainst, he filed a revision which was dismissed on 25.2.1992. These two orders dated 19.2.1992 and 25.2.1992 led the petitioner to file Writ Petition No. 7980 of 1992. This writ petition was disposed of on 16.3.2000. 2. Besides above, the order dated 24.7.1991 was challenged by petitioner in Writ Petition No. 26394 of 1991, allowed on 16.3.2000 vide judgment in Sheel Kumar Mishra v. Smt. Usha Rani Mishra and others, 2000(1) ARC 551. This Court in paras 15 and 16 of the judgment directed as under: “15. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 24.7.1991 declaring the vacancy is hereby quashed. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer shall consider the matter afresh keeping in view the observations made above and in accordance with law. 16. The Rent Control and Eviction officer had passed the order of release after the accommodation was treated as vacant. In case it is finally held that there was no vacancy, the order of release passed on 6.8.1991 shall be treated as quashed, but if it is held that there was vacancy, the release order passed in favour of respondent No. 2 shall remain operative.” 3. Since the order declaring vacancy passed on 24.7.1991 was quashed by this Court, the RCEO accordingly was required to reconsider this question. Since the order declaring vacancy passed on 24.7.1991 was quashed by this Court, the RCEO accordingly was required to reconsider this question. Pursuant thereto the RCEO has passed a fresh order on 11.1.2005 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) reiterating his stand that there is a vacancy in the accommodation in question and accordingly declaring the same and it is this order which has given cause of action to the present writ petition. 4. The RCEO has found possession of petitioner in accommodation in question, wholly unauthorised and illegal, therefore, has held a “deemed vacancy” therein by virtue of Sections 12(1)(a) and (b) and 12(3) read with Section 13 of Act, 1972. 5. Now before coming to adjudication of dispute and to see, whether there is any glaring and manifest error in the impugned orders passed by RCEO warranting interference, I may refer to certain facts which are not disputed between the parties. 6. The disputed property consists of House No. 3-A/274 Azad Nagar, Kanpur Nagar. It was initially owned by one Sri Krishna Kumar Srivastava and his five brothers wherefrom Sri Rajeev Prakash son of Sri Mathura Prasad purchased it vide sale-deed dated 10.8.1990. One Sri Ram Chandra Mishra was occupying disputed accommodation as a tenant since the time it was owned by Sri Krishan Kumar Srivastava and his brothers. He died on 25.4.1991. The petitioner is the son of Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra who was brother of erstwhile tenant Sri Ram Chandra Mishra. It is also not in dispute that Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra died in 1965. 7. The case set up by petitioner is that the erstwhile tenant, Sri Ram Chandra Mishra shifted to Karnal (Haryana) sometimes in 1964 and his brother Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra (i.e. petitioner’s father) alongwith his family came to reside in the disputed accommodation and since then has been paying rent regularly to erstwhile landlord. Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra died in 1965, whereafter the petitioner made payment of rent to erstwhile landlords. 8. Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra died in 1965, whereafter the petitioner made payment of rent to erstwhile landlords. 8. The RECO has found that tenancy continued in the name of Sri Ram Chandra Mishra till his death, i.e., 1991 and since the petitioner, who resided in the disputed accommodation as the son of erstwhile tenant’s brother, continued to reside thereat but since he did not qualify the definition of “family” of Sri Ram Chandra Mishra, his possession is wholly unauthorised and there is a deemed vacancy in the premises in question. 9. It is thus evident that in respect to disputed premises initial tenancy of Sri Ram Chandra Mishra is not disputed. It appears that the house in question was sold by erstwhile landlords, Sri Krishan Kumar Srivastava and his brothers by executing three sale deeds on 10.8.1990. These documents were executed in respect to separate portion of building in dispute to Smt. Usha Rani wife of petitioner’s younger brother Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra, second to Sri Rajeev Prakash and third in favour of Smt. Neeta Awasthi. The dispute relates to portion of accommodation sold to Sri Rajeev Prakash and Smt. Usha Rani Mishra wife of petitioner’s younger brother. 10. The RCEO came into action not on an application filed by subsequent purchaser-landlords but on an application filed by one Sri P.S. Chauhan seeking allotment of disputed accommodation vide application dated 26.9.1990. Thereupon the RCEO sought report of Rent Control Inspector who submitted it on 7.1.1991 stating that petitioner and his brother, Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra were found in possession of disputed property. They claim to be in possession for the last 25 years. The petitioner also informed that Sri Ram Chandra Mishra, erstwhile tenant, shifted to Karnal (Haryana) alongwith his entire bag and baggage and thereafter his brother Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra and his family continued to stay in disputed accommodation and pay rent to the erstwhile landlord. 11. It is true that on the one hand there is no overt or apparent action on the part of erstwhile tenant, Sri Ram Chandra Mishra about surrendering his tenancy to erstwhile landlord but this is also true that the statement of fact pleaded and supported by his own evidence (oral) by petitioner that Sri Ram Chandra Mishra shifted to Karnal (Haryana) has not been found false or incorrect by RCEO in the impugned order. In fact this aspect has been held proved by RCEO as an undisputed fact by observing that Sri Ram Chandra Mishra was transferred to Karnal (Haryana) and left disputed accommodation in 1964 and thereafter his elder brother Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra and his family as also the family of Sri Ram Chandra Mishra continued to stay in disputed accommodation. This fact situation having been found proved, it cannot be disputed that erstwhile landlord did not contest or dispute shifting of erstwhile tenant to elsewhere and continued possession of brother of erstwhile tenant and his family in the disputed accommodation since 1964. No legal consequence has been recognised by RCEO from this fact observing that there was no consent obtained from erstwhile landlord and there was no licence or permission granted as contemplated in Section 2-A of Act, 1972, therefore, continued possession of Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra and others would be of no legal consequence. This assumption on the part of RCEO is patently illegal inasmuch as in 1964, Act, 1972 was neither in existence nor applicable. It was not the case of RCEO that landlord’s recognition of persons continued in possession of rented accommodation was in any manner illegal or contrary to law as available on that day, i.e. in 1964, i.e., in violation of the provisions of the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. 12. The RCEO has also drawn support from the fact that Sri Ram Chandra Mishra was impleaded as respondent in the proceedings before him and his counsel has been seeking time to file objection but could not do so since in the meantime Sri Ram Chandra Mishra suddenly expired on 25.4.1991 which according to RCEO shows that Sri Ram Chandra Mishra wanted to retain his status as tenant in accommodation in question. This assumption is also wholly imaginary, based on conjectures and surmises, having no foundation of even an iota of evidence and, therefore, cannot sustain. Once the RCEO has come to the conclusion that Sri Ram Chandra Mishra’s elder brother and his family came to reside in disputed accommodation in 1964 and had continued in possession after shifting of Sri Ram Chandra Mishra at Karnal (Haryana), it clearly represents that they were residing in disputed accommodation with the knowledge of erstwhile landlord. It can be said that by conduct the landlord(s) accept their tenancy rights. It can be said that by conduct the landlord(s) accept their tenancy rights. The fact that this situation has continued for more than 25 years, inasmuch as Sri Ram Chandra Mishra shifted in 1964 and the property in dispute was sold in 1990, 26 years continued possession particularly when initial residence and possession of Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra and his family members in 1964 is not found against any statutory provisions, it cannot be said that his/their status would become adverse or illegal after enactment of Act, 1972. They cannot be required to justify validity of their possession based on a subsequent enactment. It is not in dispute that Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra also died in 1965 and petitioner being his son, acquired tenancy rights, which may be alongwith other legal heirs, namely, petitioner’s brother Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra who was also residing thereat and all of them resided in their own rights. 13. This by itself would not give any quietus to the matter for the reason that in case possession and continued tenancy rights of petitioner and respondent No. 4 are held to be valid since 1964/1965, after the death of Sri Ram Ashrey Mishra, this Court still has to examine consequences of purchase of residential accommodation by wife of respondent No. 4 in 1990. 14. On this aspect, Sri A.N. Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents drew attention of this Court to Sections 12(1)(c) and 12(3) of Act, 1972 which read as under: “12. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases.—(1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if— . . . . . (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere.” “(3). Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases.—(1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if— . . . . . (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere.” “(3). In the case of a residential building, if the tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building under tenancy is situate, he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy: Provided that if the tenant or any member of his family had built any such residential building before the date of commencement of this Act, then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy upon the expiration of a period of one year from the said date. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section- (a) a person shall be deemed to have otherwise acquired a building if he is occupying a public building for residential purposes as a tenant, allottee or licensee ; (b) the expression “any member of family”, in relation to a tenant, shall not include a person who has neither been normally residing with nor is wholly dependent on such tenant.” (emphasis added) 15. Section 12(1)(c) clearly talks of acquiring of a residence by a tenant or his member of family elsewhere, meaning thereby it does not talk of the same residential accommodation which is already under his tenancy. It thus would not apply to the disputed accommodation. 16. Next comes Section 12(3). It also talks of acquisition of a residential building by the tenant or any member of his family or otherwise in a vacant state or if he gets vacated residential building in the same city, municipality etc. Here also even if this Court assumes that acquisition of a property or residential building by wife of one of joint-tenant is construed as if the tenant or his family member has acquired a residential building, it cannot be said that the said building is in a vacant state for the reason that petitioner and his family members are already residing therein. The acquisition of a building would have to relate to any other building and not the same building in which the tenant is already residing. It would be wholly improbable to argue that a building is available in vacant state to be occupied by the tenant and his family members and simultaneously they have to vacate the same also treating therein a deemed vacancy. Both are mutually destructive and cannot co-exist. Sections 12(1)(c) and 12(3) contemplates a situation where the tenant and his family members are capable to shift themselves in a vacant residential building after having acquired the same and yet have not done so and only such a situation would result in a deemed vacancy in the tenanted building, but where the building is the same which is tenanted as well as it has been claimed to have been acquired, none of the aforesaid two provisions would apply for the reason that the very purpose for which legislature has enacted the said provision would stand frustrated and cannot be given effect to. An interpretation which defeats the very purpose of legislative intent cannot be conceived. A statute has to be read so as to give effect to it. A simple reading which otherwise does not create any ambiguity, cannot be misread in such a manner so as to create disastrous and inequitable results. Thus in my view Section 12, in the present case, will have no application. That being so, the purchase of part of tenanted accommodation by petitioner’s brother’s wife will make no impact on the petitioner’s status and his right to hold possession of disputed accommodation and enjoying his tenancy rights. 17. Considering the above facts and circumstances, in my view, the orders impugned in this writ petition cannot sustain. 18. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 6.8.1991 and 11.1.2005 are hereby quashed. 19. No costs. ——————