JUDGMENT Dev Darshan Sud,J. This petition has been referred to this Court for being treated as a Criminal Contempt on the request of the learned Civil Judge(Junior Division), Rampur Bushehar, District Shimla. 2.In the communication addressed to this Court, the learned Judge writes that Civil Suit No.31- 1 of 2008, titled: Khalanga vs. Gurdass was pending (which has not been transferred) in the Court of the learned Judge in which Shri Bansi Lal, Advocate, was representing the plaintiff. The suit instituted was for permanent prohibitory injunction with respect to the suit land.The learned Judge writes that there were number of adjournments which had been granted in the case although it was a time bound and targeted case. The plaintiff filed an application under Order 26 Rule 9 and Order 18 Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’ ) being CMA No.54-6 of 2011, praying therein that inspection of the spot be carried out by a Local Commissioner to be appointed by the Court. This application was dismissed on 27.9.2011 as the Court did not feel any necessity to appoint a Commissioner. The Court also noticed that the sole defendant had died on 17.11.2009 and the suit could not continue as a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction could not have been passed against the deceased defendant. On 29.9.2011 an application under Section 151 CPC was instituted by the plaintiff which was registered as CMA No.56-6 of 2011 in which a prayer was made for allowing time to file revision petition against the order of dismissal of the first application (CMA No.54-6 of 2011) which rejected the prayer of the plaintiff for appointment of Local Commissioner. 3.On perusing the application, the Court noted that the facts pleaded were not correct and the language used was intemperate and contemptuous. Personal allegations were leveled against the Presiding Officer that the application for demarcation/appointment of Local Commissioner had been dismissed by the learned Court in an arbitrary manner, the Presiding Officer was biased and at the time of consideration of the application for appointment of the Local Commissioner no objection was raised by the opposite counsel for appointment of a revenue expert in which eventuality the appointment should have been a matter of course. It was alleged that the learned Presiding Officer had dictated some part of the order which was thereafter changed and order of dismissal was recorded. It was alleged that the learned Presiding Officer had dictated some part of the order which was thereafter changed and order of dismissal was recorded. This is obviously a serious allegation of fudging judicial record. 4. Civil Suit No.79-1 of 2008, titled: Nokhu Ram vs. State of H.P., (which also stood transferred from the Court of the learned Presiding Officer), was for recovery of Rs.4,79,000/- on account of damages which the plaintiff pleaded had been caused to him by the defendant. In this case also Shri Bansi Lal, Advocate, represented the plaintiff. This was also an old and targeted case and here also a number of adjournments had been prayed for and granted. In this case also an application under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC being CMA No.53-6 of 2011 had been instituted by the plaintiff for appointment of a Local Commissioner as an expert to assess damages caused. Since the trial of the suit had concluded, the Court recorded that there was no necessity to appoint a Commissioner and the application was dismissed. On 28.09.2011, another application under Section 151 CPC was filed by the counsel which was registered as CMA No.55-6 of 2011 praying for adjournment of the case on the ground that the applicant be given a chance to approach this Court against the order of dismissal of the application under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC. Again the Court notes that in CMA No.55-6 of 2011 personal allegations have been leveled against the Presiding Officer alleging that the suit would be dismissed. 5. The learned Presiding Officer then submits that on 1.10.2011, a reference has been made for institution of contempt proceedings which was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court with the following directions:- “Justice Kurian Joseph, C.J. (Oral) This is a contempt petition, registered suo motu by the Court, on the basis of complaint made by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) cum-JMIC, Rampur Bushahar, Distt. Shimla, which has been forwarded by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Kinnaur Civil & Sessions Division at Rampur Bushahar . 2. Shimla, which has been forwarded by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Kinnaur Civil & Sessions Division at Rampur Bushahar . 2. Going by the Contempt of Court (H.P.) Rules, 1996, to be specific Rule 8, a preliminary inquiry has to be conducted by the Subordinate Court, by issuing a show cause notice to the alleged contemnor (s) and after hearing the matter, only if required, the Subordinate Court has to pass a concise reasoned order of reference to the High Court. Therefore, this COPC is rejected, with a direction to the Subordinate Court to make reference, in terms of Rule 8 of the Contempt of Court (H.P.) Rules, 1996. Sd/- (Justice Kurian Joseph), Chief Justice. Sd/- (Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary) May 4, 2012 Judge.” 6. It is in these circumstances that the petition has now come up for adjudication. Before we proceed with the matter further, we are at pains to note that an advocate of long standing as also Presiding Officer or Judge should lock horns on unsavory happenings in Court. Learned counsel is well reminded that there is nothing personal which he has in the litigation and he has not to act as a mouthpiece of his client spouting and spitting venom at the Bench. He is well reminded that a Presiding Officer has to perform an onerous task and any genuine error in judgment does not tantamount to bias or pre­determination of the issue before it. Counsel is well reminded that the Board of the Court is full and it would not choose one or the other case to act in a prejudicial manner unless discernable and established from the record. We advert to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of W.B. and Others vs. Shivananda Pathak and Others, (1998)5 SCC 513 , the Hon’ble Court holds:- “27. Judges, unfortunately, are not infallible. As human beings, they can commit mistakes even in the best of their judgments reflective of their hard labour, impartial thinking and objective assessment of the problem put before them. In the matter of interpretation of statutory provisions or while assessing the evidence in a particular case or deciding questions of law or facts, mistakes may be committed bona fide which are corrected at the appellate stage. This explains the philosophy behind the hierarchy of courts. In the matter of interpretation of statutory provisions or while assessing the evidence in a particular case or deciding questions of law or facts, mistakes may be committed bona fide which are corrected at the appellate stage. This explains the philosophy behind the hierarchy of courts. Such a mistake can be committed even by a Judge of the High Court which are corrected in the Letters Patent Appeal, if available. 28. If a judgment is overruled by the higher court, the judicial discipline requires that the Judge whose judgment is overruled must submit to that judgment. He cannot, in the same proceedings or in collateral proceedings between the same parties, re-write the over-ruled judgment. Even if it was a decision on a pure question of law which came to be over­ruled, it cannot be reiterated in the same proceedings at the subsequent stage by reason of the fact that the judgment of the higher court which has overruled that judgment, not only binds the parties to the proceedings but also the Judge who had earlier rendered that decision. That Judge may have his occasion to reiterate his dogmatic views on a particular question of common law or constitutional law in some other case but not in the same case. If it is done, it would be exhibitive of his bias in his own favour to satisfy his egoistic judicial obstinacy. 29. As pointed out earlier, an essential requirement of judicial adjudication is that the Judge is impartial and neutral and is in a position to apply his mind objectively to the facts of the case put up before him. If he is pre-disposed or suffers from prejudices or has a biased mind, he disqualifies himself from acting as a Judge. But Frank, J. of the United States in In re Linahan, 138 F 2d 650 says:- “If, however, ‘bias’ and ‘partiality’ be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the Judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one will. The human mind, even, at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. The human mind, even, at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by taking the oath of office as a Judge, a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine.” (See also Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative Law (1973 Edn.) p.155; Judicial Review of Administrative Action by de Smith (1980 Edn.) p.272; II Administrative Law Treatise by Davis (1958 Edn.) p.130.) 30. These remarks imply a distinction between pre-judging of facts specifically relating to a party, as against pre-conceptions or pre­dispositions about general questions of law, policy or discretion. The implication is that though in the former case, a Judge would disqualify himself, in the latter case, he may not. But this question does not arise here and is left as it is.” (pp.524-525) 7. Before we proceed further, we need note that in Spencer & Company Ltd. and Another vs. Vishwadarshan Distributors Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (1995)1 SCC 259 , the Supreme Court counseled erring Hon’ ble Judges who did not obey the directions of the Court, but, nonetheless did not proceed in contempt. The Court held:- “2. We have on our board Special Leave Petition Nos.12597-600 of 1993 against the judgment and order dated 29/4/1993 of a Division Bench of the High court of Judicature at Madras passed in some CMPs in OSA Nos. 69-73 of 1993. These are at the instance of the first and the second defendant in the original suit filed by the plaintiff-first respondent, pending before a learned Single Judge of the High Court, in which in intra-court appellate jurisdiction the petitioners have been subjected to certain interim orders of significance by the Division Bench. This court on 10/9/1993 ordered issuance of notice in the special leave petitions as also on the application for stay returnable within four weeks. On response, and consideration of the counter- affidavits filed by the respondents and rejoinder affidavits by the petitioners, we had on 14-1 -1994 passed the following order: “Let the matter stand by three months. In the meantime, parties’ counsel shall approach the High court for an early disposal of the OSA Nos.69-73 of 1993 pending before it and apprise to us on the next date of hearing the result of it. In the meantime, parties’ counsel shall approach the High court for an early disposal of the OSA Nos.69-73 of 1993 pending before it and apprise to us on the next date of hearing the result of it. We have no doubt that the High court when approached for the purpose would give the matter due attention as is expected by us.” 3. In order to await the outcome of the order we had kept the matter adjourned from time to time when a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Hon’ble Mr.Justice Gulab C. Gupta (now Chief Justice of Himachal Pradesh High Court) and Hon’ble Mr.Justice K.A. Thanikkachalam passed on 18/8/1994 the following order: “These applications are filed for fixing early hearing of the appeal. The order of the Supreme Court dated 14/1/1994 in Special Leave Appeal (Civil) No.12597-600/93(AN) is produced before us to support the aforesaid prayer. We have considered the matter with the seriousness it deserves; but find nothing important so as to give precedence to the appeals over large numbers of pending appeals in this court. The appellant must take his chance strictly in order in which he approached this court by filing these appeals. The applications are rejected.” 4. Patently our order dated 14/1/1994 has been flouted, which is a matter of grave concern to us. On our part what else is expected? It has obvious ramifications, far and significant. We therefore have on our own solicited the advice of the Solicitor General of India Mr.Dipankar P.Gupta, besides that of Mr.K. Parasaran, Senior Advocate, the ex- Attorney General of India representing one of the parties instantly, and Shri G.L. Sanghi, Senior Advocate appearing for the other parties, as to what step need we take in respect of the Hon’ble but erring Judges of the High Court. Conceivably our action has parameters ranging between total apathy and punishment for contempt after initiating contempt proceeding. Conceivably our action has parameters ranging between total apathy and punishment for contempt after initiating contempt proceeding. They have, in all seriousness, in one voice, advised us to show at this juncture judicial statesmanship, and let the present order go on record, more as a reminder and a message, travelling far and wide, less as a warning, solely to uphold and preserve the independence and majesty of the Supreme Court, as the highest court of justice in the Sovereign Republic of India; a pillar of the body politic, established under the Constitution, conferred with plenary powers under Articles 141, 142 and 144 of the Constitution. We appreciate and value their advice. We would rather remain advised on a matter like this, for then we are on sure ground.” (pp.261-262) 8. We reproduce this judgment in order to remind all concerned that despite the fact that prima facie contempt was made out from the record, yet the Court in its sagacity withheld taking action not as a matter of meekness, but as a matter of wise caution. Once proceedings have been initiated, they are carried to their logical conclusion. In this case before us wiser counsel should have prevailed. We write this as a matter of reminder to the learned counsel who with his vast experience was not expected to make wild allegations against the Presiding Officer at the whim of his client. If the order was to be challenged before the revisional Court, where was the need to ask permission from the Court? If the order(s) passed were against law, where was the need to be belligerent and what stopped the litigant to challenge it in a higher Court in appeal or revision? 9.We are conscious of the fact that the position of a Presiding Officer is vulnerable and it is our Constitutional obligation to place a cloak of protection around him and to insulate him from the vicious onslaught of imagined bias of disgruntled litigants. After all temperance and tolerance have their own limitations. 10.We need to remind the learned counsel that a member of the Bar owes a duty to his client but not to the extent of scandalizing the Bench whose dignity and majesty he is to protect and which obligation is higher than the duty he owes to the Court. After all temperance and tolerance have their own limitations. 10.We need to remind the learned counsel that a member of the Bar owes a duty to his client but not to the extent of scandalizing the Bench whose dignity and majesty he is to protect and which obligation is higher than the duty he owes to the Court. In M.Y. Shareef v. Judges of the Nagpur High Court, AIR 1955 SC 19 , the Supreme Court holds:- “11. The fact however remains, as found by the High Court, that there was at the time these events happened considerable misconception amongst a section of the Nagpur Bar about advocates’ responsibilities in matters of signing transfer applications containing allegations of this character. It cannot be denied that a section of the Bar is under an erroneous impression that when a counsel is acting in the interests of his client, or in accordance with his instructions he is discharging his legitimate duty to his client even when he signs an application or a pleading which contains matter scandalizing the Court. They think that when there is conflict between their obligations to the Court and their duty to the client, the latter prevails. This misconception has to be rooted out by a clear and emphatic pronouncement, and we think it should be widely made known that counsel who sign applications or pleadings containing matter scandalizing the Court without reasonably satisfying themselves about the prima facie existence of adequate grounds therefore, with a view to prevent or delay the course of justice, are themselves guilty of contempt of Court, and that it is no duty of counsel to his client to take any interest in such applications; on the other hand, his duty is to advise his client for refraining from making allegations of this nature in such applications. Once the fact is recognized as was done by the High Court here, that the members of the Bar have not fully realized the implications of their signing such applications and are firmly under the belief that their conduct in doing so is in accordance with professional ethics, it has to be held that the act of the two appellants in this case was done under a mistaken view of their rights and duties, and in such cases even a qualified apology may well be considered by a Court. In border line cases where a question of principle about the rights of counsel and their duties has to be settled, an alternative plea of apology merits consideration; for it is possible for a judge who hears the case to hold that there is no contempt in which case a defence of unqualified apology is meaningless, because that would amount to the admission of the commission of an offence. In this case the learned judges themselves had to wade through a large volume of English and Indian case-law before they could hold that the act of the appellants constituted contempt and thus it could not be said that the matter was so patent that on the face of it, their act amounted to contempt. In these circumstances it cannot be said that what they did was willful and their conduct in getting the law settled in this matter by raising the defence that they did, was contumacious. The authorities relied upon by the High Court have no application to cases of this character. How else is the validity of a defence of this kind to be settled, except by an argument that the counsel was entitled in the interests of his client to advise a transfer and give grounds for that transfer which were ‘bona fide’ believed by the client. Every form of defence in a contempt case cannot be regarded as an act of contumacy. It depends on the circumstances of each case and on the general impression about a particular rule of ethics amongst the members of the profession. The learned Judges, as already said, have themselves said that such an impression was prevalent since a long time amongst a section of the Bar in Nagpur. It was thus necessary to have that question settled and any effort on the part of these two learned counsel to have that point settled cannot be regarded as contumacy or a circumstance which aggravates the contempt. We think that the expression of regret in the alternative in this case should not have been ignored but should have been given due consideration. It was made in the earliest written statement submitted by the counsel and cited above. Once however the High Court found that they were guilty of contempt, they would have been well advised to tender an unqualified apology to that court forthwith. It was made in the earliest written statement submitted by the counsel and cited above. Once however the High Court found that they were guilty of contempt, they would have been well advised to tender an unqualified apology to that court forthwith. But perhaps they were still under the delusion that they were right and the court was in error, and that by coming to this Court they might be able to have the question of principle settled as they’ contended. As soon as we indicated to the learned counsel that they were in error, they, and their counsel immediately tendered an unqualified apology which as already indicated was repeated again in absolute terms at the second hearing. We have not been able to appreciate why the learned Judges of the High Court should have doubted the genuineness of this apology. It certainly was not the object and could not be the object of the learned Judges of the High Court to humiliate senior counsel and to expect something more from them than what they had already done inthis Court. It has also to be kept in view that condemnation for contempt by a High Court of senior members of the Bar is itself a heavy punishment to them, as it affects them in their professional career and is a great blot on them. .. ... ... ... ... ....”(pp. 23-25) 11. We find that this principle is reiterated inLalit Mohan Dass vs. Advocate General, AIR 1957 SC 250 , 254, holding:- “1. The appellant is Shri Lalit Mohan Das, a pleader of about 25 years standing, who ordinarily practised in the Courts at Anandapur in the district of Mayurbhanj in Orissa. The Munsif of Anandapur, one Shri L.B.N.S. Deo, drew up a proceeding under Ss. 13 and 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 against the pleader for grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty and submitted a report to the High Court through the District Judge of Mayurbhanj on December 12, 1953. The District Judge forwarded the report, accompanied by his opinion, to the High Court of Orissa on March 9, 1954. The recommendation of the Munsif was that the pleader should be suspended from practice for one year. The District Judge forwarded the report, accompanied by his opinion, to the High Court of Orissa on March 9, 1954. The recommendation of the Munsif was that the pleader should be suspended from practice for one year. The reference was heard by the High Court of Orissa, and by its order dated March 15, 1955 the High Court came to the conclusion that the pleader was guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for a period of five years with effect from, March 15, 1955. 2. The charges against the appellant were the following. On July 15, 1953 the appellant was appearing on behalf of the defendant in Suit No.81 of 1952 pending before the Munsif of Anandapur. On that date, there were two other suits pending before the same Munsif. There were petitions for time in all the three suits. The Munsif wanted to take up the oldest suit for hearing, and the oldest suit being Suit No.54 of 1952, it was taken up first and five witnesses for the plaintiff were examined. Suit No.81 of 1952 was postponed to August 18, 1953. The appellant, who appeared for the defendant in that suit, was informed of the postponement. When so informed, the appellant made a remark in open Court and within the hearing of the Munsif to this effect: “If the Peshkar is gained over, he can do everything”. He then left the Court. The Munsif was surprised at the remark made and asked the appellant to explain his conduct, by means of a letter sent the same day. As the appellant sent no reply, the Munsif wrote again to the appellant on, July 18, 1953. To this letter the appellant sent the following reply; “Dear Sir, I am painfully constrained to receive memo after memo for some imaginary act of mine not in any way connected with my affairs for which if any explanation is at all warranted officially. For your second memo I felt it desirable as gentleman to reply. Further I may request you, to be more polite while addressing letters to lawyers. Yours faithfully, Sd. L. M. Das, Pleader”. It is obvious that the letter of the appellant was couched in very improper terms and considerably strained the relation between the Munsif and the appellant... ... ... ...” 11 . ... ... ... ... Further I may request you, to be more polite while addressing letters to lawyers. Yours faithfully, Sd. L. M. Das, Pleader”. It is obvious that the letter of the appellant was couched in very improper terms and considerably strained the relation between the Munsif and the appellant... ... ... ...” 11 . ... ... ... ... A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client and must place before the court all that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on behalf of his client. He may even submit that a particular order is not correct and may ask for a review of that order. At the same time, a member of the Bar is an officer of the court and owes a duty to the court in which he is appearing. He must uphold the dignity and decorum of the court and must not do anything to bring the court itself into disrepute. The appellant before us grossly overstepped the limits of propriety when he made imputations of partiality and unfairness against the Munsif in open court. In suggesting that the Munsif followed no principle in his orders, the appellant was adding insult to injury, because the Munsif had merely upheld the order of his predecessor on the preliminary point of jurisdiction and court-fees which order had been upheld by the High Court in revision. Scandalising the court in such manner is really polluting the very fount of justice. Such conduct as the appellant indulged in was not a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial service. It brought into disrepute the whole administration of justice. ... ... ... ...”(pp.251, 254) 12.We find that on the baseless allegations of bias against Judges, the Supreme Court holds that reckless and motivated allegations against the Court should be dealt with severely. In W.B. Electricity Regulatory Commission vs. CESC Ltd., (2002)8 SCC 715 , the Supreme Court holds:- “100. The High Court by its order dated 7.5.2002 has declined to hear the arguments of the appellants in CA no. 4048 of 2002, on the ground that they had alleged bias against the judges. In W.B. Electricity Regulatory Commission vs. CESC Ltd., (2002)8 SCC 715 , the Supreme Court holds:- “100. The High Court by its order dated 7.5.2002 has declined to hear the arguments of the appellants in CA no. 4048 of 2002, on the ground that they had alleged bias against the judges. In a case where an allegation of bias made against the judges is found to be not proved, it is open to the court to initiate such action against the person who made the allegation of bias, as is permissible in law. That in our opinion would not empower the court to deny a right of hearing, if the person alleging the said bias is otherwise entitled to. We think denial of hearing which is reasonably due to a party cannot be made on the ground of the conduct of the party attributing bias. 101. The right of audi alteram partem is a valuable right recognised even under the Indian Constitution. (See Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978)1 SCC 248 ), wherein it is held, the principle of the maxim which mandates that no one should be condemned unheard, is a part of the rule of natural justice. We have already held that such right of hearing conferred by a statute cannot be taken away even by courts. While reckless and motivated allegations against the court should be severely dealt with by appropriate proceedings, in our opinion, imposition of the punishment of denying a right of hearing would amount to a violation of the principles of natural justice and, hence, should not be resorted to. However, in the instant case since we have heard these appellants on the merits of the case, the said prejudice, if any, caused to them stands obliterated and requires no further consideration.”(p. 763) (emphasis supplied) 13.In Baradakanta Mishra vs. The Registrar of Orissa High Court and Another, (1974)1 SCC 374 , Supreme Court by its majority decision held that the right to appeal does not give right to commit contempt of Courts nor can it be used as a shield to bring the authority of the High Court into disrespect and disregard. The Court per majority holds:- “40. ... ... ... ... The Court per majority holds:- “40. ... ... ... ... The right of appeal does not give the right to commit contempt of Court, nor can it be used as a cover to bring the authority of the High Court into disrespect and disregard. ... ... ... ... ... . 49. Scandalization of the court is a species of contempt and may take several forms. A common form is the vilification of the Judge. When proceedings in contempt are taken for such vilification the question which the court has to ask is whether the vilification is of the Judge as a Judge. (See Queen v. Gray, (1900)2 QB 36, 40) or it is the vilification of the Judge as an individual. If the latter the Judge is left to his private remedies and the court has no power to commit for contempt. If the former, the court will proceed to exercise the jurisdiction with scrupulous care and in cases which are clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, the court will have also to consider the degree of harm caused as affecting administration of justice and, if it is slight and beneath notice, courts will not punish for contempt. This salutary practice is adopted by Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The jurisdiction is not intended to uphold the personal dignity of the Judges. That must rest on surer foundations. Judges rely on their conduct itself to be its own vindication.” (pp.392 -393) 14.The minority of Hon’ble Mr.Justice Krishna Iyer and Bhagwati, JJ, holds:- “87. At this stage it must be noticed that in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Reva Shanker, 1959 SCR 1367 this Court ruled that aspersions of a serious nature made against a Magistrate in a transfer petition could be punishable as a contempt if made without good faith. However, in Govind Ram v. State of Maharashtra, (1972)1 SCC 740 , this Court reviewed the decisions on the point and ruled that if in the garb of a transfer application scurrilous attacks were made on a Court imputing improper motives to the Judge there may still be contempt of Court, although the Court referred with approval to the ruling in Swarnamayi Panigrahi v. B. Nayak, AIR 1959 Orissa 89 that a latitudinarian approach was permissible in transfer applications. The core of the pronouncement is that a remedial process like a transfer application cannot be a mask to malign a judge, a certain generosity or indulgence is justified in evaluating the allegations against the judge. Eventually, Grover J., held that the allegations made in the proceeding in question were not sufficiently serious to constitute contempt. A liberal margin a permissible in such cases but batting within the crease and observing the rules of the game are still necessary. Irrelevant or unvarnished imputations under the pretext of grounds of appeal amount to foul play and perversion of legal process. Here, the author, a senior judicial officer who professionally weighs his thoughts and words, has no justification for the immoderate abuse he has resorted to. In this sector even truth is no defence, as in the case of Criminal insult - in the latter because it may produce violent breaches and if forbidden in the name of public peace, and in the former because it may demoralise the community about courts and is forbidden in the interests of public justice as contempt of Court. 88. Even so, if judges have frailties - after all they are human - they need to be corrected by independent criticism. If the judicature has serious shortcomings which demand systemic correction through socially oriented reform initiated through constructive criticism, the contempt power should not be an interdict. All this, far from undermining the confidence of the public in Courts, enhances it and, in the last analysis, cannot be repressed by indiscriminate resort to contempt power. Even bodies like the Law Commission or the Law Institute and researches, legal and sociological may run ‘contempt’ risks because their professional work sometimes involves unpleasant criticism of judges, judicial processes and the system itself and thus hover perilously around the periphery of the law if widely construed. Creative legal journalism and activist statesmanship for judicial reform cannot be jeopardised by an undefined apprehension of contempt action. 91. The Court being the guardian of people’s rights, it has been held repeatedly that the contempt jurisdiction should be exercised “with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt.” (vide R. v. Gray supra) 92. Creative legal journalism and activist statesmanship for judicial reform cannot be jeopardised by an undefined apprehension of contempt action. 91. The Court being the guardian of people’s rights, it has been held repeatedly that the contempt jurisdiction should be exercised “with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt.” (vide R. v. Gray supra) 92. The policy directive can be gleaned from the ruling in Special Reference No 1 of 1964, (1965) 1 SCR 413, where Gajendragadkar, C.J. speaking for the Court, observed: “We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously, wisely, and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the Court, but may sometimes affect it adversely. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectively of their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct.” If judges decay the contempt power will not save them and so the other side of the coin is that judges, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion.(pp.411-413) 15.Lastly, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Arundhati Roy In Re, (2002)3 SCC 343 , holding:- 3. The law of contempt has been enacted to secure public respect and confidence in the judicial process. If such confidence is shaken or broken, the confidence of the common man in the institution of judiciary and democratic set up is likely to be eroded which, if not checked, is sure to be disastrous for the society itself. 15. After referring to various judgments of this Court and courts of other countries, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has asserted that no proceedings for contempt can be initiated against any person on the ground of his/her allegedly scandalising the court. Much reliance is placed upon the judgment in Brahma Prakash Sharma. v. The State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 10 . Much reliance is placed upon the judgment in Brahma Prakash Sharma. v. The State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 10 . In that case contempt proceedings were initiated against the members of the Executive Committee of the District Bar Association at Muzaffarnagar in the State of Uttar Pradesh because of certain resolutions passed by the Committee in which it was alleged that the two Judicial Officers were thoroughly incompetent in law, did not inspire confidence in their judicial work, were given to stating wrong facts when passing orders and were over-bearing and discourteous to the litigant public and the lawyers alike. A number of other defects were also catalogued in the resolution passed by the Association. The High Court directed the issue of notice to the members of the Committee of the Bar Association to show cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court in respect of certain portion of the resolution which was set out in the notice. In answer to those notices, the alleged contemners appeared and filed affidavits. The Bench, hearing the case, came to the conclusion that with the exception of the two alleged contemners, who were not the members of the Executive Committee at the relevant date, the remaining six were guilty of contempt of court. It was, however, held that the aforesaid six members of the Bar were not actuated by any personal or improper motive and the statement made on their behalf was that their object not intended to interfere with but to improve the administration of justice. Nevertheless it was observed that the terms used in the resolution were little removed from personal abuse and whatever might have been the motive, they were guilty of contempt. In concluding portion of the judgment it was stated: (AIR p.12, para 5) “We think that the opposite parties acted undera misapprehension as to the position, but they have expressed their regrets and tendered an unqualified apology. In the circumstances, we accept their apology, but we direct that they pay the costs of the Government Advocate which we assess at Rs. 300.” The High Court in its judgment had concluded that the allegations made against the judicial officers come within the category of contempt which is committed by “scandalising the court”. The learned judges observed on the authority of the pronouncement of Lord Russel in Reg. 300.” The High Court in its judgment had concluded that the allegations made against the judicial officers come within the category of contempt which is committed by “scandalising the court”. The learned judges observed on the authority of the pronouncement of Lord Russel in Reg. v. Gray [(1900) 2 Q.B.36) that this class of contempt is subject to one important qualification. In the opinion of the judges of the High Court, the complaint lodged by the contemners exceeded the bounds of fair and legitimate criticism. This Court referred to various judgments of English Courts and concluded: (AIR p.14, para 12) “The position therefore is that a defamatory attack on a judge may be a libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action if he so chooses. If however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court’s administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law. ... ...” (Emphasis supplied) We cannot agree with the submission made on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent that in the light of Brahma Prakash Sharma ‘s case no contempt proceedings can be initiated against the respondent for scandalising the court. No wrong appears to have been done to any judge personally by filing the offending affidavit but the contemptuous part of the affidavit demonstrates the wrong done to the public. No wrong appears to have been done to any judge personally by filing the offending affidavit but the contemptuous part of the affidavit demonstrates the wrong done to the public. The respondent has tried to cast an injury to the public by creating an impression in the mind of the people of this backward country regarding the integrity, ability and fairness of the institution of judiciary. 19. Relying upon some judgments of foreign courts and the cherished wishes expressed or observations made by the Judges of this country it cannot be held as law that in view of the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and expression no one can be proceeded with for the contempt of court on the allegation of scandalising or intending to scandalise the authority of any Court. The Act is for more comprehensive legislation which lays down the law in respect of several matters which hitherto had been the subject of judicial exposition. The legislature appears to have kept in mind to bring the law on the subject into line with modern trends of thinking in other countries without ignoring the ground realities and prevalent socio-economic system in India, the vast majority of whose people are poor, ignorant, uneducated, easily liable to be misled, but who avowedly have the tremendous faith in the Dispensers of Justice. The Act, which was enacted in the year 1971, much after the adoption of the Constitution by the People of India, defined criminal contempt ... ... ... ... .... 28. As already held, fair criticism of the conduct of a judge, the institution of the judiciary and its functioning may not amount to contempt if it is made in good faith and in public interest. To ascertain the good faith and the public interest, the courts have to see all the surrounding circumstances including the person responsible for comments, his knowledge in the field regarding which the comments are made and the intended purpose sought to be achieved. All citizens cannot be permitted to comment upon the conduct of the courts in the name of fair criticism which, if not checked, would destroy the institution itself. Litigant losing in the Court would be the first to impute motives to the judges and the institution in the name of fair criticism which cannot be allowed for preserving the public faith in an important pillar of democratic set up, i.e., judiciary. Litigant losing in the Court would be the first to impute motives to the judges and the institution in the name of fair criticism which cannot be allowed for preserving the public faith in an important pillar of democratic set up, i.e., judiciary. ... ... ... ... ... 32. In the offending portion of her affidavit, the respondent has accused the court of proceeding with absurd, despicable and entirely unsubstantiated petition which, according to her, amounted to the court displaying a disturbing willingness to issue notice. She has further attributed motives to the court of silencing criticism and muzzling dissent by harassing and intimidating those who disagree with it. Her contempt for the court is evident from the assertion “by entertaining a petition based on an FIR that even a local police station does not see fit to act upon, the Supreme Court is doing its own reputation and credibility considerable harm”. In the affidavit filed in these proceedings, the respondent has reiterated what she has stated in her earlier affidavit and has not shown any repentance. She wanted to become a champion to the cause of the writers by asserting that persons like her can allege anything they desire and accuse any person or institution without any circumspection, limitation or restraint. Such an attitude shows her persistent and consistent attempt to malign the institution of the judiciary found to be most important pillar in the Indian democratic set up. This is no defence to say that as no actual damage has been done to the judiciary, the proceedings be dropped. The well-known proposition of law is that it punishes the archer as soon as the arrow is shot no matter if it misses to hit the target. The respondent is proved to have shot the arrow, intended to damage the institution of the judiciary and thereby weaken the faith of the public in general and if such an attempt is not prevented, disastrous consequences are likely to follow resulting in the destruction of rule of law, the expected norm of any civilised society.” (pp.352, 359-360, 364-365, 372 & 374) 16. We may also point out that the duty of the counsel does not extend for provoking the Court at the asking of the client. Surely, a counsel being a seasoned trained in pleading and arguing should and ought to know better. We may also point out that the duty of the counsel does not extend for provoking the Court at the asking of the client. Surely, a counsel being a seasoned trained in pleading and arguing should and ought to know better. Bias is not something which is imagined, but tangible and can be expressed in a dignified manner in the pleadings, if it exists. We at first instance were inclined to initiate proceedings for contempt but then taking into consideration the observations of the Supreme Court in Spencer & Company’s case supra we deem it proper to close the entire proceedings and expect that the learned counsel would conduct proceedings with this sagacious monition that the Bar should set an example of courtesy which could equally be responded to by Presiding Officer. Petition disposed of.