JUDGMENT : 1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioner (original applicant), interalia, with a prayer to quash and set aside the judgment and order dated 17.12.2012, passed by the learned 10th Additional Sessions Judge, Rajkot, in Execution Application No.291/2012, whereby the said application has been rejected. 2. Briefly stated, the relevant facts of the case are that the petitioner entered into a Contract dated 17.08.2010, with the respondent, for purchase of fully pressed bales of Gujarat Shanker6 Cotton of 201011 Crop at Rs.32,000/- per candy. The contract stipulates an Arbitration clause whereby the byelaws and rules of the Cotton Association of India, Mumbai (“CAI Rules”, for short), would be applicable while resolving any dispute through arbitration. According to the petitioner, the parties to the contract had agreed to resolve all disputes through arbitration, in accordance with the CAI Rules, which interalia stipulate that a Secretary is appointed by the said Association for the purpose of carrying out the duties under the Rules. A dispute was raised in respect of the contract dated 17.08.2010 and Mr.Pankaj S. Kotak was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator under Rule20 of the CAI Rules, for the claim lodged by the petitioner. The Arbitrator passed an award on 1011.04.2012, directing the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.60,96,677/with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the award, till the payment or realization along with the costs of the arbitration amounting to Rs.26,636/, to the petitioner. The award has been signed by the Arbitrator and countersigned by the Secretary of the CAI. The respondent did not participate in the arbitration proceedings despite several notices by the Arbitrator. After the award was passed and signed by the Arbitrator, it was sent by R.P.A.D. by the Secretary, CAI vide a communication dated 11.04.2012, to the respondent. Upon inquiring from the CAI regarding the service of the award, the petitioner was intimated by letter dated 01.09.2012, that the award has been sent by R.P.A.D. and the respondent has received it, as per the acknowledgment card. It is the case of the petitioner that despite receipt of the award, the respondent has failed to make the payment as per the award to the petitioner. No appeal was filed by the respondent, as provided under Rule69 of the CAI Rules. It is the case of the petitioner that despite receipt of the award, the respondent has failed to make the payment as per the award to the petitioner. No appeal was filed by the respondent, as provided under Rule69 of the CAI Rules. Under the circumstances, the petitioner was constrained to institute execution proceedings before the Trial Court, interalia, praying for the enforcement of the award and seeking the issuance of a warrant of attachment, under Section36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Arbitration Act”, for short), read with Order21 Rule43 and 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the CPC”, for short). The respondent did not file a reply to the execution application, but filed a separate application at Exhibit12, praying for the dismissal of the execution application on the ground that the award was not communicated to the respondent by the Arbitrator, therefore, the time period for challenging it having not expired, the award cannot be enforced under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. The Trial Court rejected the application of the petitioner seeking enforcement of the award, vide the impugned judgment and order dated 17.12.2012. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court by preferring the present petition. 3. On 16.01.2013, this Court issued Notice for final disposal. With the consent of the learned counsel for the respective parties, the petition is being finally decided. 4. Hence, issue Rule. Mr.Mousam R. Yagnik, learned advocate waives service of notice of Rule for the respondents. 5. Mr.Mihir H. Joshi, learned Senior Advocate has appeared for the petitioner with Mr.Vimal M. Patel, learned advocate. His submissions are briefly summarized as follows:- (a) There is no requirement under the law that an arbitral award must be communicated to the respondent by the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal, itself. In the present case, the award has been signed by the Arbitrator and a signed copy thereof has been sent by R.P.A.D. by the Secretary of the CAI to the respondent, who has received it. The provisions of Section31(5) of the Arbitration Act are very clear in this regard and stipulate that a signed copy shall be delivered to each party. It is nowhere stated in the said provision that the Arbitrator is required to personally deliver a signed copy of the award to the parties. The provisions of Section31(5) of the Arbitration Act are very clear in this regard and stipulate that a signed copy shall be delivered to each party. It is nowhere stated in the said provision that the Arbitrator is required to personally deliver a signed copy of the award to the parties. While rejecting the application of the petitioner, the Trial Court has misread the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and others Vs. ARK Builders Private Limited, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 616 , on which it has purportedly relied. In the said judgment, the facts were different inasmuch as no copy of an award was given to the parties therein. In the present case, a signed copy of the award was sent to the respondent by the Secretary of the CAI. The judgment does not hold that the Arbitrator is expected to personally deliver a copy of the award to the parties. The conclusion of the Trial Court, based upon a wrong interpretation of the above judgment is, therefore, not in accordance with law. (b) To interpose a requirement to the effect that the Arbitrator is personally required to deliver a copy of the award to the parties would amount to legislating, which is not legally permissible. Section31(5) of the Arbitration Act does not lay down that a signed copy of the award must be delivered by the Arbitrator to the parties, as has been wrongly concluded by the Trial Court. This would amount to adding words to the Statute. The Legislature has used clear, unambiguous and specific language while enacting Section31(5), stating that a signed copy of the award shall be delivered to each party, in contradistinction to the provisions of Section31(1), wherein it is clearly stated that the award shall be made in writing and signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. Had it been the intention of the Legislature to enact that the arbitral award should be delivered by the Arbitrator himself after signing it, nothing had prevented the Legislature from stating so. The Legislature has consciously used the words “signed copy shall be delivered to each party”, but has not stated that the delivery should be made by the Arbitral Tribunal itself. The Legislature has consciously used the words “signed copy shall be delivered to each party”, but has not stated that the delivery should be made by the Arbitral Tribunal itself. (c) If the interpretation of the judgment of the Supreme Court, as done by the Trial Court is accepted, it would result in absurdity. It would then become mandatory for the Arbitral Tribunal to personally deliver the award to the parties and would exclude any other mode of delivery. (d) After signing the award, the Arbitral Tribunal becomes functus officio. The delivery of the signed copy of the award to the parties is a ministerial job, which can be performed by the office of the Arbitrator or, in the present case, by the Secretary of the CAI, which has framed Rules in this regard. The said rules are binding on the parties, as has been observed by the Trial Court in the impugned order. In this view of the matter, the delivery of the award to the respondent by the Secretary of the CAI is perfectly legal and valid. (e) In support of the above submissions, the learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jamal Uddin Ahmad Vs. Abu Saleh Najmuddin and another, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 257 , wherein it has been held that while judicial functions are required to be discharged by the judges themselves, the administrative and ministerial functions can be delegated or entrusted by authorization to subordinates unless there is any rule restricting the same. (f) That, Rule11(a) framed by the CAI clearly contemplates that the Secretary of the said Association shall receive all communications made to the Arbitral Tribunal by the parties and communicate to them the orders and directions of the Arbitral Tribunal. (g) Rule43 lays down the procedure to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal. (h) Rule57 provides that after the Arbitral Tribunal has signed the award, the Secretary will countersign the award and give notice in writing. In case where there is more than one Arbitrator, after the majority of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal have signed the award, the Secretary shall countersign the same. (i) Rule 58 provides that when the award has been made, the Secretary shall furnish a true copy of the award to the parties by RPAD/UCP/Courier Service etc. In case where there is more than one Arbitrator, after the majority of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal have signed the award, the Secretary shall countersign the same. (i) Rule 58 provides that when the award has been made, the Secretary shall furnish a true copy of the award to the parties by RPAD/UCP/Courier Service etc. only when the arbitration costs have been fully paid to the Association by the parties concerned. The above Rules are binding on the petitioner and the respondents who have accepted this position in the Arbitration Clause in the contract between them. On the basis of the above submissions, it is prayed that the impugned order, being illegal and unsustainable in law, be quashed and set aside and the petition allowed. 6. Mr.Mousam R. Yagnik and Mr.S.K.Vora, learned advocates have appeared for the respondent. The petition is strongly resisted by Mr.S.K.Vora, learned advocate for the respondent, by making the following submissions:- (a) The Rules of the CAI are not applicable to the Arbitral proceedings. The Arbitrator himself has never been formally appointed, as there is no appointment letter on record. (b) The CAI has not informed the petitioner regarding the arbitration proceedings and the appointment of the Arbitrator. By the letter dated 19.05.2011 of the Secretary of the CAI, the respondent was informed that Mr.Vinay N. Kotak was nominated as an Arbitrator. However, instead of him, Mr.Pankaj S. Kotak has been nominated, without information to the petitioner. (c) The respondent has filed an application for dismissal of the execution petition filed by the petitioner, on the ground that the Arbitrator has not communicated the award to the respondent; therefore, the right of the respondent to file an application for setting aside the arbitral award is not exhausted as the award is not capable of being enforced/executed. The execution petition is, therefore, premature. This aspect has rightly been considered by the Trial Court in the impugned order. (d) The Rules of the CAI were not brought on the record of the Trial Court by the petitioner, in spite of an application being filed by the respondent for production of the Rules. (e) The Trial Court has correctly applied the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and others Vs. (d) The Rules of the CAI were not brought on the record of the Trial Court by the petitioner, in spite of an application being filed by the respondent for production of the Rules. (e) The Trial Court has correctly applied the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and others Vs. ARK Builders Private Limited (Supra.), as the facts and circumstances of the present case are similar to the facts obtaining in the case before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has stated in paragraph12 of the judgment that a signed copy of the award would normally be delivered to the party by the Arbitrator himself. This, therefore, means that the Arbitrator is required to deliver a copy of the award to the respondent, which has not been done in the present case. The Trial Court has correctly appreciated the ratio of the judgment and rightly rejected the application of the petitioner on the ground that the Arbitrator has not delivered the signed copy of the award to the respondents and the execution petition is premature. There is no illegality in the judgment of the Trial Court, warranting interference. 7. This Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length, perused the averments made in the petition, contents of the impugned order and the documents on record. 8. The undisputed position is that the petitioner entered into a Contract dated 17.08.2010, with the respondent, for the purchase of fully pressed bales of Gujarat Shanker6 Cotton of 201011 Crop at Rs.32,000/- per candy. The contract contains an Arbitration Clause, which reads as under:- “This contract incorporate the byelaws and rules of the Cotton Association of India, Mumbai, as they were when this contract were entered. All disputes relating to this contract will be resolved through arbitration in accordance with the byelaws of the Cotton Association of India, Mumbai. No party shall take legal action against the other over any dispute unless it has first obtained an Arbitration award in the arbitration proceedings from Cotton Association of India, and exhausted all remedies by way of appeal allowed by the Association's bylaws.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Undisputedly, this contract has been signed by the representatives of both the parties. No party shall take legal action against the other over any dispute unless it has first obtained an Arbitration award in the arbitration proceedings from Cotton Association of India, and exhausted all remedies by way of appeal allowed by the Association's bylaws.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Undisputedly, this contract has been signed by the representatives of both the parties. It is clear from the record that the parties have agreed that all disputes relating to the contract shall be resolved through arbitration, in accordance with the rules and byelaws of the Cotton Association of India, Mumbai. The Trial Court has categorically noted in its impugned order that the parties are bound by the rules of the arbitration and byelaws of the CAI. 10. Rule11 (a) of the CAI Rules defines the duties of the Secretary in the following terms :- “Rule11(a) The Secretary shall receive applications for arbitration by the Association, receive payment of fees and deposits, communicate decision of the Chairman/Vice-Chairman, regarding appointment of arbitrator(s) as hereinafter provided. The Secretary shall also receive all communications made to the arbitral tribunal by the parties and communicate to them the orders and directions of the arbitral tribunal, keep a register of application to the Association and of awards made by the arbitral tribunal, keep such other books or memoranda and make such other records or returns as the Board shall from time to time require and generally carry out the directions of an arbitral tribunal so constituted under these rules and take such other steps as may be necessary to assist such arbitral tribunal in the carrying out of its functions.” (emphasis supplied) 11. Rule43 delineates the functions and procedure to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal. 12. Rule57 provides that the arbitral award shall be in English and signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. Where there is an arbitral proceeding with more than one Arbitrator, the signature of the majority of all the members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be sufficient, so long as the reasons for any omitted signature is stated. This rule further provides that the Secretary will countersign the award and shall give notice in writing to the parties, regarding the making and signing thereof, and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and the award. 13. This rule further provides that the Secretary will countersign the award and shall give notice in writing to the parties, regarding the making and signing thereof, and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and the award. 13. Rule58(a) has some bearing on the issue on hand, therefore, it is reproduced as below :- “Rule58(a) When an award has been made, the Secretary shall furnish a true copy of the award to the parties by registered post/U.C.P./courier service etc. only when the arbitration costs have been fully paid to the Association by the parties concerned.” (emphasis supplied) 14. From the above, it is clear that after the making of an award, the Secretary is required to furnish a true copy thereof to the parties by RPAD/UCP/Courier Service etc. when the arbitration costs have been fully paid to the Association by the parties concerned. This is exactly what has been done in the present case. 15. Certain relevant factual aspects of the matter may now be referred to. Both the petitioner and the respondent are members of the Cotton Association of India and, as per the Contract entered into between them, the parties had agreed to resolve any dispute arising between them through arbitration, in accordance with the rules and byelaws of the CAI. Accordingly, the Secretary of the CAI has addressed a letter dated 19.05.2011, to the respondents, referring to the proposed Arbitrator by the petitioner Company against them, as per Byelaw No.38 of the CAI. As per the said letter, the respondent was informed that the petitioner has nominated one Shri Vinay N. Kotak, M/s.Kotak & Company Limited, as the Sole Arbitrator. Respondent No.1 was specifically informed that if it agrees for arbitration proceedings by Shri Vinay N. Kotak, it is requested to give its consent within seven days from the receipt of the letter to the CAI. A copy of the Panel of Arbitrators was also enclosed therewith. It is specifically stipulated in the said letter that if no reply is received from the respondent within a stipulated period of time, the matter would be referred to the Chairman of the CAI for appointment of an Arbitrator, in accordance with the Rules of CAI. A copy of the Panel of Arbitrators was also enclosed therewith. It is specifically stipulated in the said letter that if no reply is received from the respondent within a stipulated period of time, the matter would be referred to the Chairman of the CAI for appointment of an Arbitrator, in accordance with the Rules of CAI. Admittedly, respondent No.1 did not respond to the letter dated 19.05.2011, neither did it give its consent to the proposed Arbitrator Shri Vinay N. Kotak, nominated by the petitioner. In this view of the matter, the matter was referred to the Chairman of the CAI for the appointment of an Arbitrator, in accordance with the Rules of the CAI. Mr.Pankaj S. Kotak was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator, as per Rule20 (iii) of the Rules, which provides that in a case where no objection has been raised to the appointment of a particular Arbitrator, the Chairman/Vice-Chairman of the CAI shall appoint an Arbitrator who is ready and willing to act as such from amongst the Panel of Arbitrators to be the Sole Arbitrator. 16. In this view of the matter, the submission advanced by the learned advocate for the respondents, to the effect that Mr.Pankaj S. Kotak has been appointed as an Arbitrator though, in the letter dated 19.05.2011, Mr.Vinay N. Kotak was nominated, is without any substance. Further, the submission that no formal notice of the appointment of an Arbitrator was received by the respondent is also baseless, in view of the provisions of Rule20(iii), as the respondents did not object to, or disapprove of, the person nominated as an Arbitrator. The Chairman/ViceChairman of the CAI thus proceeded to appoint Shri Pankaj S. Kotak as an Arbitrator from among the Panel of Arbitrators. It may be noted that the name of Shri Pankaj S. Kotak was not proposed by the petitioner and he is an independent person, appointed from amongst the Panel of Arbitrators. This action is in accordance with the Rules of the CAI. 17. The submission made on behalf of the respondent that the Arbitrator has never been appointed, as no letter of appointment has been given to him, is without merit, in view of the rules and byelaws of the CAI as discussed hereinabove. The respondents chose not to respond to the letters of the CAI, therefore, they cannot derive any benefit from their own acts of omission. 18. The respondents chose not to respond to the letters of the CAI, therefore, they cannot derive any benefit from their own acts of omission. 18. The Secretary of the CAI issued a communication dated 11.04.2012, to respondent No.1, stipulating that he is giving notice on behalf of the Sole Arbitrator, that the Arbitrator has made the award and signed it. A copy of the award, duly signed by the Arbitrator, was enclosed with this communication. It is not the case of the respondents that they have not received a copy of the award, duly signed by the Arbitral Tribunal, from the Secretary of the CAI. Their only grievance is that the signed copy of the award was not sent by the Arbitral Tribunal itself. When there was no move on the part of the respondent in satisfying the award, the petitioner was constrained to file an application for execution of the award, before the Trial Court. 19. This brings us to the legal aspect of the matter, to highlight which, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of law. 20. Section31 of the Arbitration Act provides for the form and contents of an arbitral award. The relevant provision for the purpose of this petition is Sub section (5) of Section31, which reads as below :- “31. Form and contents of arbitral award – (1) An arbitral award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal. (2) ***** (3) ***** (4) ***** (5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party.” (emphasis supplied) 21. A plain reading of this provision indicates that after the arbitral award is made, a signed copy thereof shall be delivered to each party. The award would obviously have to be signed by the Arbitrator. There is no stipulation in this provision that the Arbitrator is personally required to deliver the award to the parties. 22. While dismissing the application of the petitioner, the Trial Court has placed reliance on State of Maharashtra and others Vs. ARK Builders Private Limited (Supra.), wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under : “12. The appellants are now before this Court by grant of special leave. 22. While dismissing the application of the petitioner, the Trial Court has placed reliance on State of Maharashtra and others Vs. ARK Builders Private Limited (Supra.), wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under : “12. The appellants are now before this Court by grant of special leave. The two provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, relevant to answer the question raised in the case are Section 31 and 34, Section 31 deals with form and contents of arbitral award; and insofar as relevant for the present provides as follows :- ****** Section 31(1) obliges the members of the Arbitral Tribunal/arbitrator to make the award in writing and to sign it and subsection (5) then mandates that a signed copy of the award would be delivered to each party. A signed copy of the award would normally be delivered to the party by the arbitrator himself. The High Court clearly overlooked that what was required by law was the delivery of a copy of the award signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal/arbitrator and not any copy of the award.” (emphasis supplied) 23. The emphasis of the Trial Court is upon the sentence a signed copy of the award would normally be delivered to the party by the Arbitrator himself. In stating so, the Supreme Court has used the word “normally” which cannot be taken to mean “only” so that in each and every case it would be a mandatory requirement that the signed copy of the award is to be delivered personally, by the Arbitrator. By using the word “normally”, the Supreme Court has not excluded any other mode of delivery. In this connection, it would be relevant to refer to Rule11(a) of the CAI Rules, which has been reproduced hereinabove. As per Rule11(a), the Secretary is authorized to receive all communications made to the arbitral tribunal by the parties and communicate to them the orders and directions of the arbitral tribunal. 24. Section58 clearly and specifically provides that when an award has been made, the Secretary shall furnish a true copy of the award to the parties by RPAD/UCP/Courier Service etc. In the contract entered into between the parties, they have agreed to be bound by the rules of the arbitration and the byelaws of the CAI. The abovementioned rules would, therefore, be applicable to the parties. In the contract entered into between the parties, they have agreed to be bound by the rules of the arbitration and the byelaws of the CAI. The abovementioned rules would, therefore, be applicable to the parties. When there are specific rules, binding upon the parties, providing for the delivery of the award by the Secretary of the CAI and when the Secretary of the CAI has sent a copy of the award to the respondent by RPAD, it cannot be said that any illegality has been committed so as to vitiate the arbitration proceedings. 25. In the view of this Court, the Trial Court has misread the judgment of the Supreme Court and misinterpreted its ratio decidendi. It is a settled position of law that a judgment is a precedent on the point that it decides. In the case before the Supreme Court, the facts were that no copy of the award was given to the parties therein. It is in this context that the Supreme Court has observed that a signed copy of the award would normally be delivered to the parties by the Arbitrator himself. In the next sentence, the Supreme Court has stated that the High Court has fully overlooked that what was required by law was the delivery of the copy of the award signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal/Arbitrator and not any copy of the award. In the present case, a signed copy of the award has been delivered. The ratio in the above case is that a copy of the award signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal/Arbitrator is required by law to be delivered to the parties and not, as the Trial Court has misconstrued, that the Arbitrator has to himself deliver a signed copy of the arbitral award to the parties. 26. The entire reasoning of the Trial Court is based upon a misreading of the above judgment of the Supreme Court. In the considered view of this Court, the impugned order, being based upon an incorrect legal premise and misapplication of the correct principles of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and others Vs. ARK Builders Private Limited (Supra.), cannot be sustained. 27. It may be noted that the respondents did not file a reply to the Execution Application filed by the petitioner. ARK Builders Private Limited (Supra.), cannot be sustained. 27. It may be noted that the respondents did not file a reply to the Execution Application filed by the petitioner. Instead they moved an application, praying for the dismissal of the Execution Application. A perusal of the said application reveals that the dismissal of the Execution Application was sought only on one ground, that is, that the Arbitrator, Mr.Pankaj S. Kotak, has not communicated his award to the respondent. There is no denial of the fact that a signed copy of the award, as forwarded by the Secretary of the CAI, has been received by the respondent. As a copy of the award signed by the Arbitral Tribunal has been delivered to the respondent, as per the CAI Rules, the requirement of law, as highlighted in the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and others Vs. ARK Builders Private Limited (Supra.), has clearly been met. 28. A reference may be made to another relevant portion of the abovequoted judgment, which is reproduced herein-below :- “14. We are supported in our view by the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors, in SCC para 8 of the decision it was held and observed as follows :- “8. The delivery of an arbitral award under subsection (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter of substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to be 'received' by the party. The delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal and receipt by the party of the award sets in motion several periods of limitation such as an application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application for making an additional award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which would be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy of award by the Tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings.” (emphasis added) 15. The highlighted portion of the judgment extracted above, leaves no room for doubt that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act would start running only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to/ received by the party making the application for setting it aside under Section 34(1) of the Act. The legal position on the issue may be stated thus. If the law prescribes that a copy of the order/award is to be communicated, delivered, dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties concerned in a particular way and in case the law also sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from the date on which the order/award was received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law. (emphasis supplied)” 29. It is clearly held by the Supreme Court that if the law prescribes that a copy of the award is to be communicated, delivered, dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties concerned in a particular way, and in case the law also sets a period of limitation for challenging the award/order by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from the date on which the award/order was received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law. In the present case, a signed copy of the award has been communicated, delivered, dispatched and forwarded to the respondent by the Secretary of the CAI, as per the rules of the said Association and has been received by the respondent. From the above factual and legal position, it is amply clear to this Court that there exists no legal deficiency in the manner in which the award has been communicated to the respondent. 30. From the above factual and legal position, it is amply clear to this Court that there exists no legal deficiency in the manner in which the award has been communicated to the respondent. 30. It is rightly submitted by the learned Senior Advocate that after the signing of the award, it is not obligatory on the part of the Arbitrator to deliver the signed copy of the award to the parties. As held by the Supreme Court in Jamal Uddin Ahmad Vs. Abu Saleh Najmuddin and another (Supra.), while administrative functions are required to be discharged the administrative and ministerial functions can be delegated or entrusted by authorization to subordinates. In the present case, from the plain reading of the Rules, it transpires that the Secretary of the CAI is empowered to communicate, forward, dispatch and deliver a signed copy of the award to the parties, which has been done. 31. The legal requirement of Section31(5) is that a signed copy of the arbitral award must be delivered to the parties. The mode of delivery has not been specified. It may transpire that in some cases the Arbitral Tribunal may deliver a signed copy of the award to the parties. However, the Supreme Court has held in the judgment of State of Maharashtra and others Vs. ARK Builders Private Limited (Supra.), that if the law provides that a signed copy is to be delivered in a particular manner and that is done, then limitation begins to run. From the above legal position, it cannot be said that the delivery of the signed copy of the arbitral award by the Secretary of the CAI to the respondents, is not as per the provisions of Section31(5) of the Arbitration Act. 32. As a cumulative result of the above factual and legal aspects discussed hereinabove, it is evident that the impugned order of the Trial Court is a result of a misreading and misapplication of the correct legal position and has been passed by ignoring the factual position regarding the application of the rules and byelaws of the CAI to the parties. As such, it cannot be permitted to stand. 33. For the aforestated reasons, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 17.12.2012, passed by the learned 10th Additional Sessions Judge, Rajkot, in Execution Application No.291/2012, is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the Execution proceedings initiated by the petitioner stand revived. As such, it cannot be permitted to stand. 33. For the aforestated reasons, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 17.12.2012, passed by the learned 10th Additional Sessions Judge, Rajkot, in Execution Application No.291/2012, is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the Execution proceedings initiated by the petitioner stand revived. 34. Rule is made absolute, accordingly. Rule absolute.