Judgment : P.D. Rajan, J. 1. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Family Court, Kottayam at Ettumanoor in O.P.No.401 of 2002. Appellant, who filed the O.P, is the husband and the respondents are his wife and son respectively. The above O.P was filed for declaration of title over item No.1 of plaint schedule property, for permanent prohibitory injunction and other reliefs. 2. The brief facts that gave rise to this appeal are as follows. Petitioner is the owner in possession of plaint schedule item No.1 property by virtue of sale deed No.754/2008 of SRO, Ramapuram and he constructed a building therein in the year 1971. Plaint schedule property item No.2 was purchased by him by virtue of sale deed No.1825/67 dated 5.2.1967 of SRO, Ramapuram and he is in possession of both properties. Respondents 1 and 2 trespassed into item No.1 of the plaint schedule property and are residing in the building therein for the last three years. The second respondent is a drunkard, who had attempted to inflict bodily injury upon the petitioner and hence the petitioner is now residing in a rented building at Pala. The petitioner has no other property or source of income and hence, he demanded the respondents to shift their residence from item No.1 of the plaint schedule property, but they not only refused to do so, but also threatened him and also threatened that they will cause damage and commit waste in the property by cutting trees. In the circumstances, petitioner approached the court below for declaration of his title over item No.1 property and to issue a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondents from entering into the property and taking income or commit any damages thereon and also to evict them from that property. 3. Both respondents resisted the petition by filing a detailed written objection. They contended that the building in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property was constructed with the funds raised by the first respondent by selling her gold ornaments. They also argued that they are residing in the property since 1995 and denied the allegation of trespass. According to them, both properties are lying as a compact plot and it is difficult to identify it. They also argued that they are residing in the property since 1995 and denied the allegation of trespass. According to them, both properties are lying as a compact plot and it is difficult to identify it. They alleged that the petitioner is a drunkard and created huge financial debt to the family, which was discharged by the first respondent and her daughter, Sonia by pledging her property and that when he created more problems, they resisted and that it was in such circumstances, he filed the O.P. According to them, there was no threat or danger to the life of the petitioner. First respondent made all improvements in the property and petitioner left the house in the year 2000 and they are in joint possession of the property and enjoying it. They never obstructed the petitioner from taking income or had any intention to commit any waste in the property or the building and hence they prayed to dismiss the application. 4. In the lower court, O.P.No.401 of 2002 was tried jointly with O.P.No.515 of 2000, filed by the respondents and evidence was recorded in O.P.No.515 of 2000. The evidence consists of oral testimony of Pws 1 to 3 and RW1 and Exts.A1 to A21 and Ext.B1 to B10 were marked. 5. Trial court, after analysing the oral and documentary evidence, dismissed O.P.No.515 of 2000 and partly allowed O.P.No.401 of 2002 by declaring petitioner's title and possession over item No.1 schedule property and the building therein. Permanent Prohibitory injunction was granted restraining respondents 1 and 2 from committing damage to the building or cutting and removing trees and committing waste therein and interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioner. But the prayer for eviction of respondents 1 and 2 was disallowed. Aggrieved by this finding, the husband who filed O.P.No.401 of 2002, has preferred this appeal. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the Family Court having declared his title and possession over item No.1 of plaint schedule property, could not have declined the prayer for eviction of respondents 1 and 2 from the property. According to him, the appellant is now aged 68 years and his wife is no more and that though he is entitled to enjoy the property, the second respondent is in illegal occupation of the property. According to him, the appellant is now aged 68 years and his wife is no more and that though he is entitled to enjoy the property, the second respondent is in illegal occupation of the property. It was contended that he has no right to continue in the property and that on account of the threat that he will manhandle him, the appellant is residing in a lodge away from the property and that if the respondent is not evicted from the property, it would cause serious prejudice to him. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent strongly resisted the above argument and contended that the Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition seeking to evict him from the plaint schedule property. According to him, under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, only parties to marriage are entitled to institute proceedings before the Family Court. Therefore, the proceedings against him is null and void. He relied on the judgment in Devaki Antharjanam V. Narayanan Namboodiri ( 2006(2) KLT 1022 ). 8. In view of the rival contentions advanced by both counsel, we shall first consider the jurisdictional aspect. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act reads thus; Jurisdiction - (1) subject to the other provisions of the Act, a Family Court shall - (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends”. Explanation:- The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely- (a) suit or proceeding between parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage; b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; c) a suit of proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them; d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship; e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person; f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance; g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor (2) subject to the other provision of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise - (a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and (b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment”. 9. The above section incorporated in Chapter III of the Family Courts Act, 1984 deals with the jurisdiction of Family Courts. According to Section 7, subject to the other provisions of the Act, a Family Court shall have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force, in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the explanation to that section. Sub-section (b) to Section 7(1) says that for the purpose of exercising such jurisdiction, the Family Court shall be deemed to be a District Court or such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. The suits and proceedings referred to in Section 7(1)(a) are the suits and proceedings enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) to the explanation to the section. The suits and proceedings referred to in Section 7(1)(a) are the suits and proceedings enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) to the explanation to the section. From the scheme of Section 7 of the Act, it is clear that Family Court is to be deemed to be a civil court and that it shall have and exercise the jurisdiction exercisable by a District Court or subordinate courts in respect of matters specified in clauses (a) to (g) to the explanation. Family Court shall also exercise the jurisdiction in respect of all matters under Section 7(2)(a) and (b) of the Act, which empower it to exercise the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the I class under Chapter IX of Code of Criminal Procedure relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents and such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment. 10. According to Section 8, where a Family Court has been established for any area, no District Court or any subordinate civil court referred to in Section 7(1) shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any suit or proceedings of the nature referred to in the explanation to that sub-section. It also excludes the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in relation to such area in respect of matters mentioned under chapter IX of Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 8(c) provides that every suit or proceeding mentioned under Section 7(1) and (2) pending immediately before the establishment of a Family Court, before any District Court or subordinate court, or Magistrate, shall stand transferred to the Family Court on the date on which it is established. 11. If the scheme of legislation is examined in the context of the provisions conferring the jurisdiction on the Family Court, it is clear from explanation (c) to Section 7 (1) that a suit or proceedings between the parties to the marriage with respect to the property of the parties, or either of them is maintainable before the Family Court. 12. In Abdul Jaleel V. Shahida (2003(2) KLT 402) while considering the scope of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, the Apex Court clarified the legal position thus; “Section 7 of the Act provides for the jurisdiction of the Family Court in respect of suits and proceedings as referred to in the Explanation appended thereto. 12. In Abdul Jaleel V. Shahida (2003(2) KLT 402) while considering the scope of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, the Apex Court clarified the legal position thus; “Section 7 of the Act provides for the jurisdiction of the Family Court in respect of suits and proceedings as referred to in the Explanation appended thereto. Explanation (c) appended to S.7 refers to a suit or proceedings between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them”(para 10). Therefore, when a husband sues his wife, for recovery of his property, such a suit will squarely fall within the jurisdiction of the Family Court and that suit could be tried and disposed of by the Family Court. Further, in view of clause (e) to the explanation to Section 7(1), a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship is also maintainable before a Family Court. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the wife is not alive now and after her death, her son is in possession of the property. Therefore, according to him, it is not a “suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage” to come within the ambit of explanation (c) to Section 7(1) of the Act. In so far as this argument is concerned, it is true that under explanation c to section 7(1) of the Act, the suit or proceedings must be between the “parties to a marriage” alone with respect to ''property of the parties or either of them”. Therefore, if a suit is filed by the father against the son alone, that suit will be beyond the scope of explanation (c ) to Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act and civil court alone will have jurisdiction over such a dispute. This position has been clarified by this court in Suprabha V. Sivaraman ( 2006 (1) KLT 712 ), where it was held thus : “ When either the husband or the wife is not alive and the suit is filed against the parents of either of them, it cannot be said that it is a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage. In the context of S.7(c) the meaning of the words “parties to a marriage” cannot be given such a wide interpretation as to include all those who are interested in the welfare of the couple or those who take part to the marriage ceremony. Therefore, the suit or proceeding must be between the husband and wife with respect to the property of the parties or either of them. S.7 (c) of the Act is not applicable in such cases and the Family Court was justified in holding so”. 14. This court considered the provisions of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act in the following cases also. In Shyni V. George and others (1997 KHC 289), the original petition was filed by a spouse against her husband and her father in law. The learned Family Court Judge took the view that a suit could be entertained by the Family Court in respect of the property of one of the spouses only against the other spouse and not against the father of the other spouse and that consequently it was necessary for the plaintiff wife to delete the second defendant father in law from the array of parties and that only if she does so, the Family Court can proceed with the suit. Adverting to that aspect, in paragraph 5 of the judgment, it was held that having regard to the sweep of the Family Courts Act and the objects that are sought to be achieved, merely because a stranger is also impleaded in the suit on the ground that the property of the wife or a portion of it had also been handed over to him, it cannot be held that the suit cannot be entertained by the Family Court. It was held that even if a relative of the husband or a stranger is a party to the suit, the jurisdiction of the Family Court is not ousted. 15. In Devaki Antharjanam's case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this court considered Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 in the context of a partition suit between husband, wife and son, and observed that jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted , the relevant portion of the judgment reads thus; “19. 15. In Devaki Antharjanam's case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this court considered Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 in the context of a partition suit between husband, wife and son, and observed that jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted , the relevant portion of the judgment reads thus; “19. The next question to be considered is what is the meaning of the expression “with respect to the property of the parties” occurring in Explanation © to S.7(1). Does it mean property of the parties to the proceedings or property of the parties to a marriage? The words “or of either of them “following the expression “with respect to the property of the parties” would unmistakably lead to the conclusion that the expression refers to parties to a marriage and not parties to the proceedings. In order to attract clause ©, the litigation must be with respect to the property of either the husband or wife or both of them. It excludes any other person who has independent rights in respect of the property. Could it be said that the comaownership property of the husband, wife and son is the property of “ the parties to a marriage or either of them”? Evidently not. Therefore, I am of the view that the ingredients of clause © of the Explanation are not attracted in the present case. It cannot even be contended that the present case is covered by clause (d) to the Explanation to S.7(1). Therefore, I am of the view that the civil court had jurisdiction to decide the suit and that the decree is not a nullity. I respectfully follow the decisions in Krishnan Namboodiri V Thankamani 1994(1) KLT 607 and Kamalassanan V. Valsala ( 1994(1) KLT 737 ) and Shyni V. George & Ors. 1997(1) KLJ 573. Point No.1 is accordingly held against the appellant. 16. Now we shall deal with Section 7(d) of the Act highlighted by the learned counsel for the respondent. Under Section 7(d), the words “in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship” applies to a suit or proceedings for an order or injunction. Meaning of the expression “circumstances arising out of the marital relationship” is not explained anywhere in the Act. 17. Under Section 7(d), the words “in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship” applies to a suit or proceedings for an order or injunction. Meaning of the expression “circumstances arising out of the marital relationship” is not explained anywhere in the Act. 17. The above expression occuring in clause (d) of Explanation to sub-sec (1) of Section 7 came up for consideration in Leby Issac V. Leena.M.Ninan (2005(3) KLT 665). It was held thus:- “12. The expression “circumstances” means 'the surroundings of an act', as per Law lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, reprint edition, 1992. It also means 'the particulars which accompany an act.' The word “circumstances” is explained in Salter v. State, 163 Ga.80, 135 S.E.408, 409 also as, “related or accessory facts, occurrences or things which stand around, or about which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify a principal fact or event. (vide Black's Law Dictionary Fourth edition).13. So, 'circumstances' in relation to a marital relationship will be those particulars which closely preceds, surrounds, accompanies and follows a marital relationship. That means, primarily those can be the marriage itself and the surrounding occurrences in connection with marriage. The main requirement is that such 'circumstances' must have a direct bearing on marriage, since the marriage precedes, the existence or origin of a 'marital relationship'. 'Circumstances' arising out of a marital relationship are therefore, 'occurrences or things which stand around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify the principal event' of a marriage or marital relationship. 14. The expression 'in circumstances arising out of marital relationship' thus means not only those occurrences which transpired during marital life, but those also include such circumstances which led to the marriage, which developed thereafter, which took place during marital life, which resulted in breaking down of marriage and also those which 'closely' followed as a consequence of all these. If the intention of legislature was to take in only those occurrences which take place during a 'martial relationship', there was no necessity to use the word 'circumstances' in explanation (d) to S.7 (1) of the Act. The same purpose could have been achieved if explanation (d) is worded without the term 'circumstances' also. If the intention of legislature was to take in only those occurrences which take place during a 'martial relationship', there was no necessity to use the word 'circumstances' in explanation (d) to S.7 (1) of the Act. The same purpose could have been achieved if explanation (d) is worded without the term 'circumstances' also. So, the inclusion of word 'circumstances' in the relevant provision is quite significant and it must have been done to include all such circumstances surrounding, preceding and closely following a marital relationship ie., the principal event of marriage and the eventualities surrounding the same.” 18. In so far as this case is concerned, appellant had a common cause of action against his wife and son and the son had no right over the property in question, except in his capacity as the son of his parents, who are the parties to the marriage. In spite of it, if the wife is sued in the family court and son is to be sued in the ordinary civil court, that results in splitting up of the cause of action. In this context, we should also clarify that jurisdiction to entertain the lis should be reckoned with reference to the date of its institution, unless such jurisdiction is taken away by a subsequent enactment. The legal principles in this behalf have been laid down in the Apex Court judgment in Grikapati Veeraya V. N.Subbaiah Choundhary( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) and the same are extracted below for easy reference. “(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the Superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise”. These principles have been followed in various judgments including Clara and others V. Augustine and others (1984 KLT 261). Therefore, if on the date of its institution the OP was maintainable before the Family Court, subsequent developments, such as death of one of the parties, will not render either the proceedings or an appeal before a superior forum incompetent for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the petition filed by one of the spouse (husband) against the other (wife), would be maintainable in the family court even if their son is also impleaded as a party and it is not possible to accept the argument that in such circumstances, the husband should sue his son in an ordinary civil court. 19. According to the appellant, he is the owner of plaint schedule item No.1 property by virtue of sale deed No.754/68 of SRO, Ramapuram, in which he constructed a building utilizing his own funds. Plaint schedule item No.2 property was also purchased by him by virtue of sale deed No.1825/67 of SRO, Ramapuram. According to him, his wife and son trespassed into the property and are residing therein. The Family Court declared the appellant's title and possession over plaint schedule item No.1 property and the building therein and granted permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondents. According to him, his wife and son trespassed into the property and are residing therein. The Family Court declared the appellant's title and possession over plaint schedule item No.1 property and the building therein and granted permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondents. After judgment, the 1st respondent wife died and the 2nd respondent son is residing in the property as the legal representative of the 1st respondent and is enjoying the plaint schedule properties. Appeal is a continuation of the petition and there is no bar in granting further reliefs also. 20. The trial court granted declaration of title and possession over plaint item No.1 property and building therein and an order of prohibitory injunction was passed against respondents. But it declined to order their eviction from the property. Since the son has no independent or recognizable legal right over the scheduled property, appellant is entitled to succeed and the judgment of the lower court to the extent it has rejected the prayer for eviction calls for interference. 21. In the result, the judgment of the Family Court, Kottayam in O.P.No.401/2002 to the extend prayer for eviction is declined, is set aside and we direct the second respondent to vacate the plaint schedule item 1 and 2 property within 30 days from today, failing which appellant will be at liberty to evict him from the property in accordance with law and realize the cost from him. Appeal is disposed of as above. No costs.