JUDGMENT R.D. KOTHARI, J. 1. The petitioner – original defendant challenges granting of interim injunction by first appellate court in favour of the respondents – original plaintiffs. 2. Short question arises for consideration is consequence of alleged deviation from conditions of NA permission and deviation in plan which was submitted along with the application for NA permission. 3. Relevant facts are, thus – The respondents – original plaintiffs claim to own plots around the suit plot. The suit plot is known as ‘Devbhoomi Society Bungalows.’ It is the say of the respondents that they were constructing their building on the faith and belief that no complex or flats would be constructed in the said society and no shareholder would put up any construction in contravention of layout plan submitted before the authority at the time of applying NA permission. It is the further say of the respondents that petitioner – original defendant has illegally amalgamated four different plots into one plot. It is also the say of the respondents that easmentary rights would be seriously obstructed by the proposed construction of four storied building by the petitioner. Broadly on this pleading, the plaintiffs have instituted Regular Civil Suit No.62 of 2011 before the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Modasa. In the said suit, the plaintiffs have claimed relief in substance, it reads as under; It may be declared that in respect of the property mentioned in Para 3 i.e. suit property, defendant has no right to put up construction in violation of NA permission dated 2.4.2001 and also no right to put up construction in violation of layout plain attached with NA conditions dated 31.8.2001. That the suit property consists of Plot No.25, 26, 43 and 44 of part of Survey No.512 and its newly amalgamated plot is Plot No.25. That the defendant has no right to put up construction in violation of plan and conditions either on ground floor or of four storied flats. In this regard, the plaintiffs also pray for injunction. 4. The defendant, in his reply, has denied all the assertions made by the plaintiffs in their pleadings. 5. Considering the documentary evidence produced before it, the learned trial court, in order under Exh.5 application, has concluded that municipal authority has duly granted the permission to the defendant. That the plaintiffs have not challenged any action of the authority granting the sanction. 5. Considering the documentary evidence produced before it, the learned trial court, in order under Exh.5 application, has concluded that municipal authority has duly granted the permission to the defendant. That the plaintiffs have not challenged any action of the authority granting the sanction. Therefore, the plaintiffs have no prima facie case. The defendant being owner of the suit property is free to use the property as she likes. In absence of any complaint of any breach, balance of convenience cannot be said to be in favour of the plaintiffs. When both the ingredients for granting of the injunction are against the plaintiffs, it follows that defendant would suffer irreparable loss if the injunction is granted particularly when defendant has got sanction for construction from the authorities. 6. The order of refusal of injunction was carried in appeal and the learned Additional District Judge was pleased to allow the appeal. It would appear that following points weighed with the said appellate Court. (I) That the learned trial court has not considered the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs in the proceedings. Secondly, there are specific averments made in the pleading about threat to the enjoyment of easementary rights. (II) That there is no lawful amalgamation of four plots. No such order of amalgamation of plot is produced. (III) If we consider margin land to be left open for putting up construction, for one plot versus margin land to be left open in case of each one of the plot – by developing each plot separately it would appear that the emerging picture of construction is not in consonance with the layout plain submitted at the time of obtaining NA permission. (IV) That the Raja Chhithi issued by the municipal authority is bad and illegal for the reason – inter-alia – that it permits change of user from residential to commercial purpose. That Raja Chhithi is in violation of the NA permission. (V) It appears from the material on record that defendant was to put up the construction on each of the four plots as per the NA permission and such construction was required to be completed within three years from the date of granting of NA permission. 7. That Raja Chhithi is in violation of the NA permission. (V) It appears from the material on record that defendant was to put up the construction on each of the four plots as per the NA permission and such construction was required to be completed within three years from the date of granting of NA permission. 7. Together with the above findings, the learned Additional District Judge was of the view that conduct of the defendant in commencing the construction requires issuance of injunction and holding so, the Court had granted interim injunction. 8. Heard learned Senior Advocate Shri Shalin Mehta with learned advocate Mr. Shahil M. Shah on behalf of the petitioner and learned Senior Advocate Shri B.B. Naik with learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi on behalf of respondents. 9. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Shalin Mehta has drawn attention to order of the learned trial court and the order of the Additional District Judge and has submitted that the Additional District Judge has seriously erred in interfering in the order passed by the learned trial court. It was submitted that scope and power of the Collector in considering NA application is distinct and different than the powers of the municipal authority considering the application / plan for construction. Learned Senior Advocate has also drawn attention to unreported judgment of this Court in SCA No.5057 of 1998 (Nathubhai Dulabhai Patel v. Collector) decided on 18.8.1998. 10. On the other hand, learned Senior Advocate Shri B.B. Naik has supported the judgment of the Additional District Judge. The principal submission of learned Senior Advocate Shri Naik is limited scope of interference in exercise of powers under Article 227. Strong reliance was placed on the NA permission issued by the Collector particularly condition attached to the said permission. It was pointed out that suit plot was originally agricultural land. The Collector office was moved for NA permission on 28.6.2001. The Collector office had issued NA permission on 31.8.2001. Attention was also drawn to Condition Nos.3, 5, 15, 16, 18 and 27. It was submitted that order of the learned trial court in refusing the interim relief was erroneous. That the learned trial court has erroneously considered Mark 22/2. It is a letter addressed by Junior town planning officer to the Collector while the learned trial court has considered as permission for construction. 11. It was submitted that order of the learned trial court in refusing the interim relief was erroneous. That the learned trial court has erroneously considered Mark 22/2. It is a letter addressed by Junior town planning officer to the Collector while the learned trial court has considered as permission for construction. 11. Learned Senior Advocate Shri B.B. Naik has drawn attention to Ouseph Mathai and Others v. M. Abdul Khadir, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 319 . It was submitted that law is settled as far back in Waryam Singh’s case [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] referred in this case and it was held in Para.4 (in Ouseph Mathai’s case) as under:- “4. It is not denied that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are extraordinary and discretionary powers as distinguished from ordinary statutory powers. No doubt Article 227 confers a right of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction but no corresponding right is conferred upon a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction under the said Article as a matter of right. In fact power under this Article cast a duty upon the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority and that they do not cross the limits, ensuring the performance of duties by such courts and tribunals in accordance with law conferring powers within the ambit of the enactments creating such courts and tribunals. Only wrong decisions may not be a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under this Article unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate courts and tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party.” 12. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Naik also drawn attention to Shalini Shyam Shetty’s case [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] wherein it was held that jurisdiction under Article 227 is neither original nor appellate jurisdiction. It is a jurisdiction of superintendence for both administrative and judicial superintendence. That being so, power conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. After analyzing its earlier decisions, the Court has formulated various principles – AtoO– for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227. 13. It is a jurisdiction of superintendence for both administrative and judicial superintendence. That being so, power conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. After analyzing its earlier decisions, the Court has formulated various principles – AtoO– for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227. 13. In Waryam Singh’s case (supra), it was held that power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised only in appropriate cases in order to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. If we apply this test to the case on hand, it can be said that much depends on sustainability of the order passed by first appellate court in CAFO No.69 of 2011. If the order under challenge is erroneous then obviously this Court in exercise of power under Article 227 would not interfere. If the order has not transgressed the area or circle of error -by applying principles applicable for granting and refusing the injunction, then, certainly this Court would not intervene with the said order. 14. The first appellate court has held that respondents – original plaintiffs have made specific averements about violation of easementary right. Learned Senior Advocate Shri B.B. Naik, at the time of hearing, has also seriously prays for issuance of injunction on the ground of violation of easementary right. It is the say of the respondents – original plaintiffs that if the petitioner – original defendant is allowed to put up the construction of four flats then their rights to have access to light and air would be seriously affected. It was submitted that considerable inconvenience would be caused to respondents in absence of satisfactory drainage facility. The respondents have also urged that it would cause traffic problem also. 15. The traffic problem cannot be advanced as a ground of disturbance or violation in enjoyment of easementary right. As to the violation of enjoyment of light and air, it can be said that bare pleading cannot help the respondents. Section 35 of the Easement Act provides for issuance of injunction to restrain the disturbance. It may be stated that not every interference with full enjoyment of the easement that amounts in law as a disturbance. As to the violation of enjoyment of light and air, it can be said that bare pleading cannot help the respondents. Section 35 of the Easement Act provides for issuance of injunction to restrain the disturbance. It may be stated that not every interference with full enjoyment of the easement that amounts in law as a disturbance. Though it is not necessary that there should be total obstruction to enjoyment of easementary right but, at the same time, complaint must be of violation of substantial right. How the easementary right of light and air would be violated is required to be shown by the plaintiffs and further the plaintiffs have to show that the deprivation or disturbance to the enjoyment of their easementary right is of such a nature that it makes a prima facie case for granting interim injunction. Here, it appears that beside bare pleading, there is nothing to substantiate the say of the plaintiffs. In pleading also, there is only passing reference to violation of easementary right in the plaint, if the degree of violation or seriousness of respondents’ claim about it is to be appreciated on the basis of this, it can be said that alleged violation or disturbance to the easementary right is of negligible or formal nature. Hence, the plea of obstruction to enjoyment of easementary right cannot be accepted. Further, the photographs produced by the defendant vide Mark 22/14 show that in the very society in which the parties are residing, there are multistory buildings. Therefore, this submission is not possible to accept. 16. The finding of the first appellate court that change of user is sanctioned in the Raja Chhithiis also erroneous. The said court has held that change of user from residential to commercial use is sanctioned in the Raja Chhithi. In fact, the Raja Chhithi is issued for construction of residential flats. This finding, therefore, has no factual basis. It is bad. 17. The finding that there is no lawful amalgamation of four plots in the one plot and elaborate reference to margin land to be left out if each of the four plots is to be separately developed and margin of land to be left out stands reduced if four plots is amalgamated into one plot, does not appear to be legal and proper. The plaintiffs in order to succeed in their claim for interim relief, have to show and establish that there is a prima-facie case. It is for the plaintiffs to show that amalgamation of four plots into one plot is bad and illegal. The plaintiffs cannot succeed by merely urging that there is amalgamation of four plots into one plot. Amalgamation per-se is not illegal. How it is illegal, it is for the plaintiffs to show. The respondents pressed into service NA permission in support of their submission in this regard. Reference to NA permission and breach of its condition may make in a moment. The authority, who is empowered to sanction the plan, has considered the plan submitted by the defendant and has duly sanctioned the same. It is material to note that before the municipal authority, the respondents – original plaintiffs have made representation against sanctioning of the plan. Despite the representation, the authority has sanctioned the plan. How much margin of land is to be left and is it advisable to sanction the plan of amalgamated plot whereby margin of land to be kept open stands reduced, is for the concerned authority to consider and decide. The Court has no expertise for the same. It would appear that there is also lack of material on record to conclude that authority has committed an error in sanctioning the defendant’s plan of amalgamated plot. In fact, there is no material for such conclusion and the said Court has proceeded to consider that if each of the four plots without amalgamation is to be developed, then what area would be left open on west-north etc. vis-a-vis the area that now would be left open on those sides on account of amalgamation – is the exercise which is apparently erroneous. It is serious error. It is domain of authority prescribed under the Act to consider whether such plan is permissible or not. If consequence of sanctioning such plan is not legal, then flowing of such consequence that attracts illegality has to be urged and made out by the respondents in order to succeed in their claim for issuance of injunctive relief. This finding of first appellate court, therefore, is clearly erroneous. 18. If consequence of sanctioning such plan is not legal, then flowing of such consequence that attracts illegality has to be urged and made out by the respondents in order to succeed in their claim for issuance of injunctive relief. This finding of first appellate court, therefore, is clearly erroneous. 18. Lastly, the first appellate court has placed much emphasis on NA permission and has held that as per the said NA permission, defendant was to put up construction on each of the four plots and the said construction was to be completed within three years from the date of granting of NA permission. That breach of NA permission call for interference. This finding also has no substance. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Shalin Mehta has rightly drawn attention to unreported judgment of this Court Nathubhai Dulabhai Patel’s case (supra) – wherein identical question arose for consideration before this Court. Facts are stated in Para.3 as under:- “3. The petitioner has land bearing RS No.725/1 to 725/6 in the sim of Ankleshwar, District Bharuch. The land was originally agricultural land. On 1.7.1995, permission was granted to the petitioners for non-agricultural use of the land in question under Sec. 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. At the time of obtaining sanction for conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural purposes, the petitioners have filed the development plan duly sanctioned by Deputy Town Planner, Vadodara dated 26.5.1994. The conversion was accorded on the condition that applicant, it shall be entitled to construct on the land in accordance with the plan approved by the Deputy Town Planner, Vadodara on 26.5.1994. The land was converted for residential purposes and there was prohibition against use for any other purposes. In Condition No. 17 it was also envisaged that if any plan is approved without the permission of the Collector it shall be deemed to be the utilisation of land for other purposes in terms of Sec.48(4) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and shall be prohibited.” 18.1 After the grant of permission, the petitioner in that case, wanted to make alteration in already approved plan. Therefore, the petitioner applied before the Collector for use of the land for NA purpose as per the revised layout plan. It may be stated that said revised layout plan was duly approved by the Deputy Town Planner. The office of the Collector raised one or the other objection. Therefore, the petitioner applied before the Collector for use of the land for NA purpose as per the revised layout plan. It may be stated that said revised layout plan was duly approved by the Deputy Town Planner. The office of the Collector raised one or the other objection. Ultimately, the petitioner has had to file a petition before this Court. In Para.10, it had held, thus:- “10. It is true that an occupant of land assessed to or held for the purpose of agriculture can be used only for agricultural purposes unless otherwise permitting in accordance of the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Unless, the land is converted to be used for nonagricultural purposes by competent authority, the nature of land continue to be the agriculture, not available for being used for other purposes. For the purpose of such conversion and use the Land Revenue Code provides procedure. Whether such procedure is affected due to the provision of the Town Planning Act, is not the question arising in this case. However, the question that arise is that once the land has been permitted to be used for nonagricultural purposes of one kind does the permission of the Collector for varied use in the same category is again required under the code. Section 65 in terms make it clear that an occupant of the land assessed or held for the purpose of agriculture is entitled by himself, his servants, tenants, agents, or other legal representatives, to erect farm-buildings, construct wells or tanks, or make any other improvements thereon for the better cultivation of the land, or its more convenient use for the agricultural purpose. Thus, broadly it provides in detail what use of the land is considered as use for agriculture purpose. That is to say, the land used for ancillary purpose to cultivation to the extent permitted under Sec. 65 is considered to be used for agricultural purposes and within the dominion of the accupant’s right to use uninhibited. However, it is further envisaged that if occupant wishes to use the land any other purpose, the permission of the Collector is required for that. The Collector has been given necessary authority to accept or refuse such prayer. However, it is further envisaged that if occupant wishes to use the land any other purpose, the permission of the Collector is required for that. The Collector has been given necessary authority to accept or refuse such prayer. It also envisages that if the Collector fails to inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. Once land is permitted to be used for non-agriculture purpose, for further user in different class of non-agriculture purpose was not subject to provision of Bombay Land Revenue Code until insertion of Section 65A. By Act 26 1976 Section 65A was inserted which envisages that where the occupant of any land assessed or held for any non-agricultural purpose wishes to use such land or part thereof for any other non-agricultural purpose, the Collector’s permission shall be required and the provisions of Section 65 shall apply sofar as may be. Non-agricultural purpose for the purpose of Section 65A are defined to mean as purpose defined in clause (b) to (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 48. Section 48 in turns enumerates the classification of land in various classes on the basis of purpose for which the same is used. It enumerates different classes of land for the purpose of assessment on the basis of its use, viz. (a) agriculture, (b) residence, (c) industry, (d) commerce or (e) any other purpose. Thus Section 65A envisages if the land has already been permitted to be used for any purpose other than agriculture in any classification on the basis of use, further change in use from one category to another category shall also require permission of the Collector before it can be put to such other use. However, no such permission or condition is envisaged for different mode and manner of use within the same category. Section 67 says nothing in Section 65, 65A and 66 shall prevent the granting of the permission aforesaid on such conditions as may be prescribed by the Collector subject to any rules made in this behalf by the State Government.” (Emphasis supplied) 18.2 In Para.12 and 14, it was held, thus:- “12. Further conversion of use from one category to another required fresh permission from the Collector. That is clear purport of Section 65A. Further conversion of use from one category to another required fresh permission from the Collector. That is clear purport of Section 65A. Neither Section 65 nor Section 65A envisages permission of Collector within the same class for which the land is assessed. Laying down condition requiring such permission is to be viewed as ultra vires the Act. 14. The scheme of Code about conversion in use of land held for one purpose to another purpose is directly related to the object of its assessment. Non-agricultural purpose in Section 65 is directly related to use of land otherwise than for cultivation and ancillary use specified in main provision which are deemed to be use for agricultural purpose. Primarily, it refers to conversion of land for use of one category to for use in another category, so that its assessment can be made in accordance with the user. Once such permission is granted, and field of use of land for any other purpose is governed by specific statutes. The provision of Code generally conferring the power on authorities under it cannot be extended to entrench on such field occupied by special Legislations. For example, if land is permitted to be used for residential purposes, how and in what manner residential use of such land can be made is governed by other laws regulating type of construction and development of residential areas. Condition imposed under Section 67 can relate to exercise of power relatable to conversion of land from one use to another but not to manner of use in the converted category which is subject of special statute, in the present case the Town Planning Act. In other words, once a parcel of land is permitted to be used as residential, the conditions or rules governing constructions of residential nature can be governed by law relating to building regulations and not under the Code. The Collector exercising jurisdiction under the Code cannot be in the guise of exercise of power under Section 67 of the Code, truncate the jurisdiction of authorities under said Act or arrogate to himself such authority to himself which is not vested in him under that law or where exercise of such authority under general law is excluded by operation of special law.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. The petitioner has also drawn attention to recent decision of Division Bench of this Court in Sachin Udhyognagar Sahakari Mandali Ltd.’s case – 2013 (2) GLH 83. The appellant in that case was industrial co-operative society formed for setting up industrial township for the purpose of allotting plots to its members. It had around 1600 members and 350 industries has already started functioning. This township was at Surat. The Surat Urban Development Authority (SUDA) cancelled the development permission mainly on the ground that NA permission under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code was not obtained by the appellant. The Division Bench had held in Para.30 and 31 as under:- “30. The Bombay Land Revenue Code is the Act which deals with collection of revenue and the purpose to Page 38 of 60 which the land may be used. The Bombay Land Revenue Code has no other social purpose except the regulation of the user of the lands. In cases arising out of the provisions of Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, they essentially purport to restrict an individual right, namely, right of an individual to put his land to a particular use. The question involved in such cases does not have wider social implications unlike other land laws which have been enacted with a view to achieve certain social purposes. The Bombay Land Revenue Code essentially deals with entries in the revenue records which are for fiscal purposes and which do not confer any right title or interest over the property. Thus, if the land is an agricultural land and is sought to be put to non-agricultural use then in such circumstances, prior permission of the Competent Authority under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code is required. However, it is apposite to state that Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code will apply provided the land is an agricultural land capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture and which is actually being used for the purpose of agricultural operation. In our view, land could not be termed as an agricultural land only for the reason that in the record of rights, the same has been shown as agricultural land. 31. In our view, land could not be termed as an agricultural land only for the reason that in the record of rights, the same has been shown as agricultural land. 31. Thus, the plain reading of Section 65 of the Code makes it very clear that if any occupant of land assessed or held for the purpose of agriculture wishes to use his holding or any part thereof for any other purpose, the Collector’s permission shall, in the first place, be applied for by such occupant. The State Government vide Notification dated 14.11.1991 already specified the lands designated for nonagricultural & industrial use. Apart from the above, before putting the land to non-agricultural use, if Section 65 permission is a must then could it be said that when development permission under Section 29 of the Act was granted for layout and sub-division of the plot, the land was already put for non-agricultural use because layout and subdivision plot is included in the definition of the term “development”. The answer unquestionably has to be in the affirmative. If there was already a development in the year 1997 for non-agricultural use without permission under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code then in our view, the SUDA is not justified in insisting for N.A. Permission, now at this stage, when construction is to be made on the plot.” 20. Relying on Malankara Rubber and Produce Co.’s case – (1972) 2 SCC 492 and Ramji Sharma Alias Ramji Babu’s case – (1996) 10 SCC 671 , -former case under Kerala Land Reforms Act and later one is Bihar Land Reforms Act, this Court in that case has concluded, thus:- “36. Thus, it is very difficult for us to accept that the lands could still be considered as agricultural lands so that before making nonagricultural use, permission under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code is required. We may again say at the cost of repetition that Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code will come into play provided the land is an agricultural land and for determining as to whether the land is agricultural or not, the entries in the revenue records and the assessment of the revenue by itself would not be conclusive. We may again say at the cost of repetition that Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code will come into play provided the land is an agricultural land and for determining as to whether the land is agricultural or not, the entries in the revenue records and the assessment of the revenue by itself would not be conclusive. The true test to be applied for the purpose of determining whether a particular land is agricultural land or not, is not whether the land is capable of being used for agricultural purpose but whether having regard to the various factors to which we have referred earlier, the general nature or character of the land is such that it can be regarded as agricultural land. If we consider the matter from this point of view, the plots in question cannot be termed as agricultural land.” 21. Nathubhai Dulabhai Patel’s case (supra) clearly covers the point. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the coordinate bench of this Court. The main submission of learned Senior Advocate Shri B.B. Naik that unless the permission obtained from the Collector, act and action of the petitioner – original defendant would illegal, is not possible to accept. In a sense, the petitioner herein stands on a higher footings than Nathubhai Dulabhai’s case (supra) because in that case the petitioner was required to move the High Court as the Collector was not granting the permission to the petitioner. In the present case, objection is not raised by the State but, the respondents have come forward complaining breach of NA permission. The respondents have opted not to join the State or Municipal authority as a party. Further, in Sachin Udhyognagar Sahakari Mandali’s case (Supra), the Division Bench has taken the view on same line. 22. Learned Senior Advocate Shri B.B.Naik has placed reliance also on Skyline Education Institute (I) Pvt. Ltd.’s case – (2010) 2 SCC 142 . In this recent decision, the Court has placed reliance on oft-quoted Wander Ltd.’s case – 1990 (Suppl.) SCC 727. Apart from the fact that dispute in these cases relate to infringement of trademark, in Wander Ltd.’s case (supra), it may be noted that interference with the view taken by the Court of first instance was disapproved. In this recent decision, the Court has placed reliance on oft-quoted Wander Ltd.’s case – 1990 (Suppl.) SCC 727. Apart from the fact that dispute in these cases relate to infringement of trademark, in Wander Ltd.’s case (supra), it may be noted that interference with the view taken by the Court of first instance was disapproved. It was held that if the view taken by the Court of first instance is reasonable and if there is judicious exercise of discretion, then appellate court should not interfere. In the circumstances of the present case, it is not possible to say that learned trial court herein has taken unreasonable view. 23. Lastly, a reference may be made to one important submission advanced on behalf of petitioner. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Shalin Mehta for the petitioner has rightly drawn attention to the fact that present case stands on different footing than other cases inasmuch as in other cases, parties approach the Court to resolve their disputes arising from agreement entered into between them and/or dispute arising on account of breach of agreement, while in the present case, in contrast petitioner proposes to construct on his own plot. Herein, the dispute between the parties is not pursuant to any agreement or breach of the agreement. Therefore, invoking or applying the principle laid down or course adopted by the Court in the cases of breach of agreement would not lead us to correct answer. The petitioner intends to carry out the construction on his own plot. Scope of right of the respondents, therefore, would be limited and to quite substantial extent, grievance of the respondents would be limited to breach of easementary right. The grievance as to the obstruction to easementary right is – as discussed above – is not possible to accept. Beside grievance as to violation of easementary right, grievance advanced on other points is also not possible to accept. It was also rightly pointed out that plan sanctioned and Raja Chhithi etc. are not challenged by the respondents. 24. The question referred to in opening part of the order i.e. consequence of deviation from NA permission, in view of above discussion, is answered against the respondents. It may also be added that, as stated above, absence of proper parties before the Court and proper challenge further weakens the case of the respondents. 25. 24. The question referred to in opening part of the order i.e. consequence of deviation from NA permission, in view of above discussion, is answered against the respondents. It may also be added that, as stated above, absence of proper parties before the Court and proper challenge further weakens the case of the respondents. 25. In view of the above, present petition requires to be allowed as the order of the first appellate court is illegal and bad. It is not merely erroneous. Hence, interference under Article 227 is called for. The finding of the first appellate court, as referred above, are erroneous. It may also be stated that the proper course for first appellate court was to desist from interfering with the view taken by the learned trial court. It was just, legal and proper view. The limitations of first appellate court in exercise of discretion by the learned trial court – either in granting or refusing the injunction – are fairly well known. Consistent to those principles, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the first appellate court ought not to have interfered with the order of the learned trial court. 26. In view of the above, the petition is allowed. The order dated 10.2.2012 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Sabarkantha, Camp at Modasa in CAFO No.69 of 2011 is hereby quashed and set aside. The injunction granted by the said court stands vacated. Rule is made absolute. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. FURTHER ORDER At this stage, learned advocate for the respondents prays to stay the operation of the order as the respondents want to approach the higher forum. Learned advocate for the respondents draws the attention of the Court that on account of Christmas Vacation, it would be difficult for the respondents to approach the higher forum within short time. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the petition, the stay was operative. Learned advocate for the petitioner seriously opposes this request. Request of learned advocate is accepted. The request being accepted, the operation of order is stayed for a period of six weeks from today with an understanding that respondents would not pray for further extension of time.