JUDGMENT 1. - The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners against the order dated 5.3.2013 passed by learned Rent Tribunal, Churu, whereby in an eviction suit filed by the petitioner, Nain Sukh Das Lohiya Family Trust through its Trustee Ajay Kumar, the learned Rent Tribunal has allowed application of the rival family trust i.e. the respondent No. 2, M.N.K. Lohiya Trust through its Trustee, namely, Hukmi Chand Lohiya seeking its impleadment as party-defendant in the eviction application filed by the petitioners and that order is under challenge in the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. The learned trial Court below has observed in para 10 of the impugned order dated 5.3.2013 that the tenant/respondent No. 1, Ashok Kumar S/o Nand Lal Goynka was paying rent -to respondent No. 2 M.N.K. Lohiya Trust only and since the said Trust was also duly registered as a public trust by the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department, Bikaner and claimed that the disputed shop of which eviction was sought by the petitioner another Family Trust but suit shop was the property of the respondent No. 2 Trust, therefore, in the eviction application filed by the petitioner, Nain Sukh Das Lohiya Family Trust, the respondent No. 2 M.N.K. Lohiya Trust, was a necessary and proper party in the matter and deserved to be impleaded therein. 3. Challenging the said order, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Sandeep Shah, urged that in eviction matters, the question of title is not relevant and against the registration of respondent No. 2 M.N.K. Lohiya Trust, the petitioner has already initiated appropriate proceedings as the said Trust is not a valid one; and those proceedings are pending. The details of such proceedings are not available on record. He further submitted that in view of this impleadment of respondent No. 2 Trust in the eviction suit filed by the petitioners, will unnecessarily enlarge the scope of the eviction matter and question irrelevant to the eviction matters are likely to be taken up by the learned Rent Tribunal after such impleadment of respondent No. 2 Trust. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sandeep Shah and in view of reasons given in the impugned order this Court is satisfied that impleadment of the respondent No. 2 M.N.K. Lohiya Trust, in these circumstances, in the present eviction suit, cannot be validly assailed. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sandeep Shah and in view of reasons given in the impugned order this Court is satisfied that impleadment of the respondent No. 2 M.N.K. Lohiya Trust, in these circumstances, in the present eviction suit, cannot be validly assailed. The right of say in the present matter in view of reasons given in the impugned order that the tenant was paying rent 'to respondent No. 2 Trust itself and the said Trust being duly registered as a Public Trust, included the suit property also as its own property, its impleadment in the present suit cannot be said to be irrelevant or a case of miscarriage of justice, which deserves to be corrected in the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the scope of writ jurisdiction is narrow. 5. The Hon'ble. Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387 , has held as under: "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 the Constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or Tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) in order to ensure that law is followed by such Tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) it may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. (j) it may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo Motu. (1) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court tinder Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 6. In the case of Jai Singh & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr. reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 , in para 15 thereof, the Hon'ble Apex Court uses the words "the exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. it cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a Court or Tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. 7. Accordingly, the present writ petition filed by the petitioner/landlord-Trust is fond to devoid of any merit and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to cost. A copy of this order he sent to the concerned parties and the learned Rent Tribunal Churu, forthwith.Petition Dismissed. *******