ORDER : 1. Delay condoned. Leave granted. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court passed in Criminal Revision. The revision was preferred by the appellant against the order dated 25th January, 2012 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Saharanpur under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code summoning the appellant to face trial for an offence punishable under Sections 304 and 115 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. According to the appellant, he has been summoned to face trial only on an accusation made by respondent No.2 Shameem that he is guilty of the offence in view of dying declaration of the deceased Naseem where he stated as follows: "My wife Nasreen is talking with a boy Vikas s/o Ramesh of Chamar caste in mobile. When I snatched mobile from her, she throw kerosene oil lamp over me, lamp is lightening due to which my clothes catches fire. This incident had happened near about One' clock at night. My wife is in relation with him." 3. The appellant contended that though the police exonerated him during investigation, as there was no evidence showing his complicity in the commission of a crime. Nasreen against whom charge was levied, moved an application under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code which was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge who did not consider whether there exists a possibility that the accused so summoned, in all likelihood, would be convicted or not. According to the appellant, he could not have been so summoned since he was not present at the place of the incident nor was there any element of instigation carved out from the FIR. Against the initial order of Sessions Judge dated 15th October, 2011 the appellant moved the High Court in Criminal Revision. The High Court allowed the Criminal Revision and set aside the impugned order and directed the Sessions Judge to decide the application afresh under Section 319 in accordance with the directions of this Court in the cases of Mohd Shaft v. Mohd. Rafiq and Anr., (2007) 2 CCR 255 (SC) : (2007) 4 SLT 506 : (2007) 11 DLT (Cri.) 370 (SC) : 2007 (58) ACC 254 and Sarabjit Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Am., (2009) 3 CCR 143 (SC) : (2009) 5 SLT 42 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 141. Rafiq and Anr., (2007) 2 CCR 255 (SC) : (2007) 4 SLT 506 : (2007) 11 DLT (Cri.) 370 (SC) : 2007 (58) ACC 254 and Sarabjit Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Am., (2009) 3 CCR 143 (SC) : (2009) 5 SLT 42 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 141. However learned Additional Sessions Judge again brushed aside the appellant's submissions and summoned the appellant to face the trial for the offence under Sections 304 and 115 by a loconic order dated 25th January, 2012. The Second Revision before the Allahabad High Court was dismissed. Hence this appeal by special leave. Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as follows: "Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence. - (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under Sub-section (1), then - (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and witnesses re-heard; (b) subject to the provisions of Clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced." 4. The section undoubtedly empowers the Court, in the course of an inquiry or trial of an offence to proceed against a person for an offence from the evidence on record. The power can therefore be exercised from the evidence, it appears that the person has committed an offence. The High Court stated the term "evidence" used in Section 319 of the main evidence which is decided by cross-examination but however took the view that the deciding by cross-examination would arise only after the accused. The power can therefore be exercised from the evidence, it appears that the person has committed an offence. The High Court stated the term "evidence" used in Section 319 of the main evidence which is decided by cross-examination but however took the view that the deciding by cross-examination would arise only after the accused. We have no doubt that the evidence referred to in the section refers to evidence which is already brought on record and not the evidence already brought on record when the order under Section 319 is made and not evidence which is brought on record for the trial of the person added as an accused under Section 319. In Sarojben Ashwin Kumar Shah v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2011) 3 BC 543 (SC) : (2011) 3 CCR 273 (SC) : (2011) 6 SLT 119 : (2011) 3 DLT (Cri.) 615 (SC) : 2011 (74) ACC 951, this Court, inter alia, observed that the power to proceed against any person not being an accused before the Court must be exercised only during inquiry or trial sufficient evidence is adduced and not otherwise. The Court described the power as extraordinary power which should be used very sparingly and only fit evidence has come on record which sufficiently establishes that the other person has committed an offence. On mere doubt about the involvement of the other person on the basis of the evidence in Court would not be enough. Though this judgment was noticed by the High Court, it approved of the summoning of the appellant on the ground that merely because that the trial Court was satisfied that there exists "possibility" that the accused was summoned in all likelihood would be convicted as there was sufficient evidence. We have considered the material on record and find that it is difficult to uphold the order under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code since it does not appear from the evidence that the appellant has committed offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused. The evidence brought on record is the dying declaration of the husband Naseem reproduced above in which he stated that his wife threw kerosene oil lamp over him when he snatched the mobile from her. As a result fire broke out at about 1 O'clock in the night. The evidence brought on record is the dying declaration of the husband Naseem reproduced above in which he stated that his wife threw kerosene oil lamp over him when he snatched the mobile from her. As a result fire broke out at about 1 O'clock in the night. The appellant was not present at the time of the incident which took place in the house of the couple nor was he anywhere near it. There is no allegation that the appellant has instigated or inferenced his wife to throw the kerosene lamp over him or to attack oil lamp over Naseem or to attack him. It seems that the wife threw oil lamp over the husband when husband suddenly snatched mobile from her. In fact since the mobile appears to have been snatched from the wife there was no way the appellant could have communicated to the wife to attack the husband in any way. The appellant therefore could not have committed the offence under Sections 304 and 115 of the Indian Penal Code. In this view of the matter, we do not consider it appropriate that the appellant could face the trial for a charge under Section 304 read with Section 115 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court and of the trial Court dated 25th January, 2012 of Additional Sessions Judge Court No.9, Saharanpur in Sessions Trial No. 234 of 2011 are set aside. Appeal allowed.