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2013 DIGILAW 749 (RAJ)

Satayaveer Jhakhar v. Taj Mohammed Rathore

2013-04-10

ALOK SHARMA

body2013
Hon'ble SHARMA, J.—This criminal misc. petitioner under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed against the order dated 21.03.2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Anoopgarh, District Sri Ganganagar in Criminal Revision No.28/2004, titled Taj Mohd. & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., by which the revising Court set aside the order of cognizance dated 05.01.2005, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Gharsana in Criminal Case No. 11/2004. The learned Judicial Magistrate, Gharsana had taken cognizance against the respondents-accused (hereinafter 'the accused') for the offences under Sections 167, 201, 204, 420, 466, 471 and 120-B IPC and summoned the accused by bailable warrants. 2. The facts of the case are that the petitioner complainant (hereinafter 'the complainant') filed a complaint under Section 167, 201, 204, 466 and 471 IPC against the accused, alleging that the accused No.1 Taj Mohd. Rathore acting as Tehsildar had issued a notice under Section 22(3) of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act to one Rawata Ram, Executive Engineer, in case No.138/2003 in his Court. The complainant stated that the noticee Rawata Ram had appointed him as his Advocate whereupon he filed his Vaklatnama in the proceedings before the Tehsildar on behalf of Rawata Ram and submitted reply to the notice. According to complainant, the accused No.1 thereupon drew an order-sheet in his own hand on 09.10.2003 recording the fact of the reply filed while making certain observations against Rawata am. The matter was put up on 17.10.2003. It was stated that a certified copy of order-sheet dated 09.10.2003 was applied for, whereupon the concerning Clerk accused No.2 told the complainant that it would take 2 to 4 days in supplying the certified copy of the order dated 09.10.2003. Thereupon the Junior Advocate, assisting the complainant noted the order-sheet of 09.10.2003 in his own hand awaiting the certified copy of the order in issue. It was stated that however the certified copy of order-sheet dated 09.10.2003, when received indicated that it was different from the order-sheet dated 09.10.2003 which had been drawn on the said date and had been noted for personal use by the complainant's Junior Advocate in his own hand-writing. This alteration of the order-sheet dated 09.10.2003 according to the complainant entailed commission of offences under Sections 167, 201, 204, 466 and 471 IPC. This alteration of the order-sheet dated 09.10.2003 according to the complainant entailed commission of offences under Sections 167, 201, 204, 466 and 471 IPC. In support of complaint, the complainant got examined four prosecution witnesses under Section 200 Cr.P.C. After considering the statements of the complainant and witnesses, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Gharsana vide order dated 5.1.2004 took cognizance of the offences alleged and issued process against the accused Nos. 1 and 2 summoning them. The accused thereupon filed a revision petition before the Addl. Sessions Judge, Anoopgarh against the order of cognizance dated 05.01.2004. On consideration of the matter, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Anoopgarh vide order dated 21.3.2005 allowed the revision petition against the order of cognizance dated 5.1.2004 on the ground of no sanction, as warranted under Section 197 Cr.P.C. having been obtained for the prosecution of the accused, who were both Government servants. 3. Mr. N.L. Joshi, appearing for the complainant, submits that the order dated 21.3.2005 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Anoopgarh is completely misdirected in holding that sanction for prosecution under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was required against the accused, albeit Government servants, in spite of their having committed offences under Sections 167, 201, 204, 420, 466, 471 and 120-B IPC, which could not even remotely be said to be acts in the discharge of their official duties, or even in the purported dischage thereof. It has been submitted that the collusive destruction of the original order-sheet by the two accused drawn in a proceeding under the Rajasthan Colonization Act by the Tehsildar and fabrication of a new order-sheet with an intent to cause injury to Rawata Ram - the noticee in the proceeding under the Rajasthan Colonisation Act could not in any event tantamount to an act in respect whereof the accused could be said to be entitled to the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. It has been submitted hat for the benefit/protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C., there has to be a reasonable nexus between the official duties of Government servants and their act/s constituting the offences alleged. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. S.S. Dhillon, appearing for the accused, on the other hand, has submitted that the nature of offences alleged is not relevant for the determination of question as to whether an accused Government servant would be entitled to protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. He submits that what is relevant is the act of the accused and its nexus with their official duties. It is submitted that Section 197 Cr.P.C. has been enacted by the Legislature keeping in mind the vulnerability of Government servants to false allegations while discharging official duties and the need to protect them. Counsel submits that even through the allegations in the complaint are absurd, wholly false and unsustainable, he does not presently seek to address the merits of the complaint as it is beyond the issue in the petition, but confines his submissions to the right of accused as government servants to be protected under Section 197 Cr.P.C. and not to be proceeded against for the alleged offences without the requisite sanction having been granted by the competent authority. Counsel submits that not only are the acts attributed to the accused clearly in the course of discharge of the official duty (drawing order-sheets by accused No.1 in the course of adjudication of a notice under the Rajasthan Colonization Act for which the Tehsildar was authorized) but also it could not be conceivably argued that the drawing of the order-sheet dated 09.10.2003 - one way of the other - was at least not in the purported discharge of the official duty of the Tehsildar. It has been submitted that the language of Section 197 Cr.P.C. is preemptive in nature and not to be easily circumvented without a clear case being made out. Counsel submitted that the words "purporting to act" in Section 197 Cr.P.C. entail a liberal and expansive interpretation and would cover all manner of acts and resultant offence/s alleged against a Government servant while discharging the job assigned because the word purport" as defined in Concise Oxford Dictionary Eleventh Edition connotes a false claim. Counsel submitted that the words "purporting to act" in Section 197 Cr.P.C. entail a liberal and expansive interpretation and would cover all manner of acts and resultant offence/s alleged against a Government servant while discharging the job assigned because the word purport" as defined in Concise Oxford Dictionary Eleventh Edition connotes a false claim. It is submitted that hence "purporting to act" should be interpreted to mean "falsely claiming to act" and hence where a Government servant even falsely seeks protection on the ground that the act complained of was in the discharge of his official duties, the jurisdiction of the criminal courts to take cognizance in the first instance would be barred till the grant of sanction for prosecution by the State Government. It is submitted that this interpretation would entail only a temporary relief for a Government servant concerned as on consideration of the matter by the Government, sanction for prosecution could be granted where it was found that there was no linkage between the act of the Government servant and his official duties. Counsel submits that contrarily if Section 197 Cr.P.C. were to be narrowly construed and the protection limited to acts plainly indisputably and unquestionably in the discharge of official duty, the words "purporting to act in the discharge of official duty" would be rendered otiose and the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. a mere chimera. It is submitted that such a limited construction of the protection envisaged by the Parliament for Government servant would defeat the object and purpose of Section 197 Cr.P.C. In support of the submissions, counsel for the accused has relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Sheetla Sahai & Ors. ( (2009) 8 SCC 617 ), B. Saha & Ors. vs. M.S. Kochar ( (1979) 4 SCC 177 ), Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli & Anr. vs. The State of Bombay ( AIR 1955 SC 287 ). 5. On specifics of the case, it is submitted that the offences alleged in the complaint are founded on the act of the accused in allegedly altering the order-sheet dated 09.10.2003. vs. M.S. Kochar ( (1979) 4 SCC 177 ), Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli & Anr. vs. The State of Bombay ( AIR 1955 SC 287 ). 5. On specifics of the case, it is submitted that the offences alleged in the complaint are founded on the act of the accused in allegedly altering the order-sheet dated 09.10.2003. It is submitted that one way or the other drawing the order-sheets even two times over in the proceeding under the Rajasthan Colonization Act was palpably an act in the discharge of official duty and would in all events be an act covered within the words "purporting to act in the discharge of official duty". It is submitted that even assuming the allegation in the complaint to be true, the order-sheet dated 09.10.2003 could not have been altered in the event the accused No.1 was not acting as Tehsildar having jurisdiction to issue notices for unauthorized supply of irrigation facility on Government land encroached by one Bhajan Lal Bishnoi colluding with Rawata Ram, Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department, Gharsana with the intent to perpetuating the encroachment. Counsel submits that thus in the facts of the case, the accused were entitled to protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. and the revising Court vide order dated 21.03.2005 has correctly set aside the order dated 05.01.2004 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Gharsana taking cognizance against the accused in spite of the statutory interdict. 6. Heard. Considered the submissions and perused the writ petition. 7. The words "purporting to act" in Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. are of fundamental importance in construing the said Section. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya Rifles vs. CBI & Anr. ( (2012) 6 SCC 228 ) has referred to the meaning of the word "purport" which reads as under : Purport: Purport means to present, especially deliberately, the appea-rance of being; profess or claim, often falsely. It means to convey, imply, signify or profess outwardly, often falsely. In other words it means to claim (to be a certain thing, etc.) by manner or appearance; intent to show; to mean; to intend. Purport also means 'alleged'. It means to convey, imply, signify or profess outwardly, often falsely. In other words it means to claim (to be a certain thing, etc.) by manner or appearance; intent to show; to mean; to intend. Purport also means 'alleged'. The definition of words "Purporting" and "Purported to be done" have also been set out as under : 'Purporting' – When power is given to do something 'purporting' to have a certain effect, it will seem to prevent objections being urged against the validity of the act which might otherwise be raised. Thus when validity is given to anything 'purporting' to be done in pursuance of a power, a thing done under it may have validity though done at a time when the power would not be really exercisable. (Dicker vs. Angerstein) 'Purporting to be done' – There must be something in the nature of the act that attaches it to his official character. Even if the ct is not justified or authorised by law, he will still be purporting to act in the execution of his duty if he acts on a mistaken view of it. So it means that some-thing is deficient or amiss : everything is not as it is intended to be" The referring to a Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Azimunnissa and Ors. vs. The Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Properties, District Deoria and Ors. ( AIR 1961 SC 365 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court extracted para 20 thereof as under: The word 'purport' has many shades of meaning. It means fictitious, what appears on the face of the instrument; the apparent and not the legal import and therefore any act which purports to be done in exercise of a power is to be deemed to be done within that power notwithstanding that the power is not exercisable .....Purporting is therefore indicative of what appears on the face of it or is apparent even though in law it may not be so." 8. A reference to Dicker vs. Angerstein (1874 D. 110), referred to by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya Rifles (supra) in detail would be beneficial. 9. Dicker vs. Angerstein (1874 D. 110) considered the important of the words "purporting to act". The facts of the case related to a mortgage deed. A reference to Dicker vs. Angerstein (1874 D. 110), referred to by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya Rifles (supra) in detail would be beneficial. 9. Dicker vs. Angerstein (1874 D. 110) considered the important of the words "purporting to act". The facts of the case related to a mortgage deed. A condition in the mortgage deed provided that where the mortgagee "purported to act" in terms of his power to sell the mortgaged property even an otherwise invalid sale (sale subsequent to the discharge of mortgage debt) would be saved. This is what exactly happened. It was claimed by the plaintiff that the sale of the mortgaged property after discharge of the mortgaged debt was invalid. Jessel, M.R. having regard to the conditions of the mortgage-deed safeguarding the interest of the bona fide purchaser even in the event of the mortgagee "purporting to act" in the exercise of his power to sell, dismissed the action against the purchaser. It was held that the mortgage deed saved a sale executed by the mortgagee "purporting to act" under the mortgage deed in issue and the sale even if at all in valid in law and equity could not be set aside. The ration thus propounded was that where not only the valid exercise of power but also the purported exercise of power is protected, action by the holder of power even if otherwise invalid, is deemed to be valid and within the scope of power conferred. 10. The words "purported to be done" also find mention in Article 361(1) of the Constitution of India. For facility of reference, Article 361(1) of the Constitution of India is reproduced hereinunder: 361. Protection of President and Governors and Rajpramukhs.- (1) The President, or the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, shall not be answerable to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties : Provided that the conduct of the President may be brought under review by any court, tribunal or body appointed or designated by either House of Parliament for the investigation of a charge under Article 61. Provided further that nothing in this clause shall be construed as restricting the right of any person to bring appropriate proceedings against the Government of India or the Government of a State. 11. In the case of Biman Chandra Bose vs. Dr. H.C. Mukherjee, Governor, West Bengal & Ors. (AIR 1952 Calcutta 799), it has been held that the words "purporting to be done" in Article 361 of the Constitution of India are of very wide important and application and even though the act allegedly done in the exercise of the said power may be outside or in contravention of the Constitution, it comes within the protection of the Article if the Act is professed to be done in pursuance of the Constitution. 12. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition, defines the word "purporting" in the context of a criminal offence (Section 16 of the Forgery Act, 1861) to take within its sweep even a pretense. The said dictionary also defines the word "purported" as implying something deficient or amiss and states that "the thing that is purported to be is not an intended to be". Corpus Juris Secundum equates purporting within "claiming" "having an appearance - even specious" and "professing outwardly the character of an act". Black's law dictionary edited by Bryan A. Garner (7th Edition) defines the word "purport" as to profess or claim falsely. 13. In the case of Sheetla Sahai (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court noting the language of Section 197 Cr.P.C. as also the object and purpose of the Section has held that too narrow a construction of the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. would render the protection intended by the legislature of the public servant otiose and redundant and therefore a broader construction in law is required of the said provision. It has been held that the nature of the offence alleged is not relevant while considering the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. - what is relevant is whether the offence/s alleged contained an element necessarily dependent on the offender being a public servant or whether the offence alleged was intertwined with the official duties of the Government servant in the dock. It has been held that even where the offence alleged had something to do with or as related in some manner with the discharge of official duties, no cognizance in respect thereof was permissible without the previous sanction of the competent authority. 14. It has been held that even where the offence alleged had something to do with or as related in some manner with the discharge of official duties, no cognizance in respect thereof was permissible without the previous sanction of the competent authority. 14. In Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli (supra), a three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that "if Section 197 Cr.P.C. is construed too narrowly it can never be applied for, of course, it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The Section has content and its language must be given meaning. ............... We have therefore first to concentrate on the word "offence" .... in Section 197 Cr.P.C." the Hon'ble Apex Court then went on to observe that an offence is usually composed of several elements and a series of acts must be provide before commission of an offence can be established. Referring to the facts of the case before it, which inter alia pertained to an alleged offence under Section 409 IPC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where entrustment to a Government servant was in his official capacity, unauthorized conversion by him, albeit no part of the government servant's duty, would be so inextricably linked to the entrustment to the Government servant in his official capacity that such a Government servant could not be prosecuted for an offence of criminal breach of trust resulting from unauthorized conversion without the requisite sanction of the competent authority. For facility of reference para 19 of the report is reproduced hereinbelow: Now an offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be provide before it can be established. In the present case, the elements alleged against the second accused are, first, that there was an "entrustment" and/or "dominion"; second, that the entrustment and/or dominion was "in his capacity as a public servant"; third, that there was a "disposal"; and fourth, that the disposal was "dishonest". In the present case, the elements alleged against the second accused are, first, that there was an "entrustment" and/or "dominion"; second, that the entrustment and/or dominion was "in his capacity as a public servant"; third, that there was a "disposal"; and fourth, that the disposal was "dishonest". Now it is evident that the entrustment and/or dominion here were in an official capacity, and it is equally evident that there could in this case be no disposal lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity. Therefore, the act complained of, namely the disposal, could not have been done in any other way. If it was innocent, it was an official act; if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event the act was official because the second accused could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act, namely officially permitting their disposal; and that he did. He actually permitted their release and purported to do it in an official capacity, and apart from the fact that he did not pretend to act privately, there was no other way in which he could have done it. Therefore, whatever the intention or motive behind the act may have been, the physical part of it remained unaltered, so if it was official in the one case it was equally official in the other, and the only difference would lie in the intention with which it was done: in the one event, it would be done in the discharge of an official duty and in the other, in the purported discharge of it. 15 . The ration of the judgment in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli (supra) case is thus that where an act alleged against a public servant is inextricably intertwined with his other official duties (but which in isolation even may constitute an offence not being a part of a Government servant's official duties) the Government servant cannot be subject to any prosecution for such an alleged offence (based on such concomitant act) without the previous sanction of the competent authority. 16. 16. In the case of Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari ( AIR 1956 SC 44 ), dealing with the requirement of sanction of the competent authority before taking cognizance against a Government servant in view of Section 197 Cr.P.C., a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the legal enunciation of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that where from the allegations in the complaint there was something attaching the allegations to the official character of the accused, sanction of the appointing authority would be required before taking cognizance on such complaint. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that public servants have to be protected from harassment in the discharge of public duties. In para 17, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted with approval Hori Ram Singh vs. The Crown (1939 FCR 159) which inter alia held that for the protection of Government servants from frivolous criminal complaints, it was not necessary to hold that the act constituting the offence was inseparably connected with the official duty so as to form part of the same transaction but that the protection would be available merely if "something in the nature of the act complained" "attaches to the official character of the person doing it." 17. In the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao ( AIR 1989 SC 2292 ), the Apex Court has held that once it was established that an act was done by a Government servant in the discharge of his official duty or even in purported (falsely claimed as the word is defined) discharge of official duty, the safety of Section 197 Cr.P.C. should enure to the Government servants' benefit. In the said case the act of obtaining of documents by the accused Captain Buddhikota Subba Rao for alleged espionage in violation of the Official Secrets Act 1923 and Atomic Energy Act, 1962 while in employment of the Government was taken as an act in the discharge of official duty to entail the necessity of previous sanction of the competent authority before the Court could take cognizance of even the serious offences alleged. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that mere allegations of espionage - assuming them to be true - could not deprive a public servant of the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. as the unauthorized availing of document in issue at the foundation of the alleged offences could only have been obtained while discharging official duty. 18. In General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya Rifles (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : "The law on the issue of sanction can be summarized to the effect that the question of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duty. In order that the public servant may not be unnecessarily harassed on a complaint of an unscrupulous person, it is obligatory on the part of the executive authority to protect him. However, there must be a discernible connection between the act complained of and the powers and duties of the public servant. The act complained of may fall within the description of the action purported to have been done in performing the official duty. Therefore, if the alleged act or omission of the public servant can be shown to have a reasonable connection interrelationship or is inseparably connected with discharge of his duty, he becomes entitled for protection of sanction." 19. The substance of the various authorities of the Apex Court cited on the issue of grant of sanction prior to taking cognizance on a complaint in which a Government servant is an accused resulting in his being summoned would to my mind be as under : (i) Section 197 Cr.P.C. has been enacted by the Parliament for the prevention of harassment without good cause of servants Government while discharging official duties - and is a provision in public interest of good, decisive and firm administration in as large a democracy as ours with competing interests vigorously jostling for space which at times also entails resort to criminal process against Government servants. The importance of Section 197 Cr.P.C. for good governance cannot be discounted. The importance of Section 197 Cr.P.C. for good governance cannot be discounted. The said provision of law has to be pro-actively addressed in public interest and government servants assured of protection against harassment against vexatious and frivolous prosecution to be able to be perform and discharge their onerous duties of public office and justify the great financial cost for their upkeep through their salaries - perks and perquisite; monies for which are generated on the sweat and enterprise of the people at large. (ii) The protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. has to be broadly and expansively construed leaving out only cases of cynical and absurd invocation of the said sanction such as where the offence alleged has no manner of connection and relation even remotely with the discharge of duties of public offices and could have been committed even without access to public office. The act alleged and attributed to the Government servant should, to warrant denial of Section 197 Cr.P.C. protection, not be an incident of holding of office and where the Government servant cannot even purportedly and conceivably be held to be acting in the discharge of his official duties. (iii) This does not however mean a general amnesty for Government servants irrespective of the offence alleged. Section 197 Cr.P.C. is only a procedural to strain out frivolous and vexatious prosecution and not a complete insulation from prosecution. Investigation can be commenced and on findings based thereon sanction for prosecution can be sought and obtained. A complaint eschewing the investigating agencies by seeking to pursue the alleged offence/s as a criminal compliant before the competent Court should be required seek sanction from the Government. To my mind, refusal of sanction in an appropriate case can be subject to judicial review and hence scrutiny of superior courts. This would balance the protection of Government servants from frivolous and vexatious prosecution with the need of vindication of justice and punishment for offences committed even beyond the penumbra of public duties. (iv) No cognizance without previous sanction can be taken by a Court against a Government servant where from a bare reading of the complaint a connection between the act and offence alleged and office held by the government servant is apparent. (iv) No cognizance without previous sanction can be taken by a Court against a Government servant where from a bare reading of the complaint a connection between the act and offence alleged and office held by the government servant is apparent. Act/s alleged but apparently done by a Government servant on the foundation of office held should caution the magisterial court to actively engage the complainant and his witnesses to determine the question of the court's jurisdiction to take cognizance without previous sanction as at the stage of cognizance as at that stage proceedings are ex-parte against the accused. 20. In the context of the legal position as culled out from my reading of the cited judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, a bare look at the allegations in the complaint as laid by the complainant before the Magistrate in the present case shows that the substratum of the case against the accused was that they individually and in concert with each other replaced the other-sheet earlier drawn on 09.10.2003 in proceedings before the accused No.1 under the Rajasthan Colonization Act with a fabricated order-sheet of ever date to allegedly cause Rawata Ram a noticee in proceedings under the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, unfair loss (potentially of his job with the Government) - his having been accused of facilitating and perpetuating encroachment over sawai chak land by one Bhajan Lal Bishnoi by unauthorisedly ensuring irrigation facility over the encroached land. The allegation for whatever its worth was thus of first destroying the purported original order-sheet also of the said date. On these allegations in the complaint cognizance for offences under Sections 167, 201, 204, 420, 466, 471, 120B IPC was taken by the Magistrate and the accused summoned. 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has applied the prohibition of Section 197 Cr.P.C. with vigor and emphasis and even in case of allegation of espionage under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 and violation of Atomic Energy Act, 1962 in Captain Buddhikota Subba Rao (supra) as also in a case of alleged criminal conspiracy under Section 123B IPC relating to unauthorizedly facilitating sale of electricity at the instance of the Energy Minister, Government of Kerala in the case of R. Balakrishna Pillai vs. State of Kerala & Anr. ( (1996) 1 SCC 478 ) resulting in an alleged benefit of Rs.19,58,630.40/- for private industry. Further in Sankaran Moitra vs. Sadhna Das & Anr. ( (1996) 1 SCC 478 ) resulting in an alleged benefit of Rs.19,58,630.40/- for private industry. Further in Sankaran Moitra vs. Sadhna Das & Anr. ( (2006) 4 SCC 584 ), in a case of alleged murder resulting from innumerable injuries on the body of the deceased attributed to a police office, the Hon'ble Court by a majority of 2 to 1 set aside a criminal prosecution against a police officer inter alia for an offence under Section 302 IPC holding that where death of a person occurred in an action by the police in the performance of official duties, Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. could not be bypassed on the reasoning that killing a person could never be done or be a part of performance of official duty. For facility of reference, para 25 of the report is reproduced hereunder: The High Court has stated that killing of a person by use of excessive force could never be performance of duty. It may be correct so far as it goes. But the question is whether that act was done in the performance of duty or in purported performance of duty. If it was done in performance of duty or purported performance of duty Sec. 197(1) of the Code cannot be by-passed by reasoning that killing a man could never be done in an official capacity and consequently Section 197(1) of the code could not be attracted. Such a reasoning would be against the ratio of the decisions of this Court referred to earlier. The other reason given by the High Court that if the High Court were to interfere on the ground of want of sanction, people will lose faith in the judicial process, cannot also be a ground to dispense with a statutory requirement or protection. Public trust in the institution can be maintained by entertaining causes coming within its jurisdiction, by performing the duties entrusted to it diligently, in accordance with law and the established procedure and without delay. Dispensing with of jurisdictional or statutory requirements which may ultimately affect the adjudication itself, will itself result in people losing faith in the system. So, the reason in that behalf given by the High Court cannot be sufficient to enable it to get over the jurisdictional requirement of a sanction under Sec. 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Dispensing with of jurisdictional or statutory requirements which may ultimately affect the adjudication itself, will itself result in people losing faith in the system. So, the reason in that behalf given by the High Court cannot be sufficient to enable it to get over the jurisdictional requirement of a sanction under Sec. 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are therefore satisfied that the High Court was in error in holding that sanction under Sec. 197(1) was not needed in this case. We hold that such sanction was necessary and for want of sanction the prosecution must be quashed at this stage. It is not for us now to answer the submission of learned counsel for the complainant that this is an eminently fit case for grant of such sanction. 22. In my considered opinion, the allegations of destruction and subsequent forging - replacing of the earlier order-sheet 9.10.2003 in the present case were clearly actions and alleged offence/s in regard whereto no cognizance could have been taken by the Magistrate without the previous sanction of the competent authority in view of the specific and mandatory bar of Section 197 Cr.P.C. The acts as alleged qua the accused may or may not be true but without doubt related to the office held by the accused No.1. Accused No.2 is only alleged to be a conspirator with accused No.1 and swims or sinks with him. The alleged fabrication of the subsequent order sheet of 9.10.2003 after the alleged destruction of the earlier drawn order-sheet also of 9.10.2003 partakes character of an official act or at lest a purported official act as the two acts aforesaid were inextricably intertwined - the second not being possible without the first. The subsequent order-sheet of 9.10.2003 was not capable of being drawn first without the destruction of the earlier one allegedly differently drawn. The subsequent order-sheet of 9.10.2003 was not capable of being drawn first without the destruction of the earlier one allegedly differently drawn. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli (Supra) dealing with intertwined acts constituting an offence one of which was attributed to a holder of public office as unauthorized held that in a case of criminal breach of trust under Sec. 409 IPC, the entrustment admittedly being in the discharge of official duty, subsequent unauthorized conversion of property entrusted, even contrarily to law, would be inextricably relate to the earlier entrustment in the discharge of official duty and hence prior to prosecution of the accused for unlawful conversion and consequent offence under Section 409 IPC prior sanction of the competent authority would be necessary. On analogy of reasoning, in the instant case, the earlier order-sheet having been indisputably drawn on 9.10.2003 in the discharge of official duty by accused No.1, even as per the complainant's allegation, its subsequent alleged destruction was related thereto as was the alleged forgery and fabrication or the order-sheet of even date. All the aforesaid acts, the official and the allegedly unauthorized act were inextricably intertwined, one not possible without the other. To my mind, even otherwise from the facts on record, it is apparent that the allegation against the accused have "something to do with" and are "related in same manner" with the discharge of official duties by the accused and in the enunciation of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court prior sanction for the prosecution by the competent authority was required before the order of cognizance passed on 5.1.2004 on a complaint arraying the Government servants in issue as accused. Further in my considered opinion, the actions attributed to the accused were any event of the matter in the purported discharge of their duties as the words "purporting to act" and variants thereof have been construed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to include acts which can be said to be related in some manner with the official duties of the Government servant. 23. Yet the Magistrate in the order of cognizance passed on 5.1.2004 overlooked the prohibition of Section 197 Cr.P.C. and summoned the accused in an act wholly without jurisdiction. 23. Yet the Magistrate in the order of cognizance passed on 5.1.2004 overlooked the prohibition of Section 197 Cr.P.C. and summoned the accused in an act wholly without jurisdiction. The revising Court by its impugned order dated 21.3.2005 has for reason stated earlier in this judgment rightly granted to the respondents-accused the benefit of Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. 24. This criminal misc. petition is thus without force, devoid of merit wholly misdirected and hence liable to be dismissed.