U.C. Dhyani, J. – An application under section 12 (1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), was filed by the applicant lady (respondent herein) before learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Roorkee. Respondents in the proceedings under section 12(1) of the Act were - her husband, mother-in-law, father-in-law and other family members including the revisionist, who is her brother-in-law. The respondents in the application under section 12(1) of the Act appeared before learned ACJM, Roorkee, Harid-war. Thereafter, application under section 12(1) of the Act was fixed for the evidence of the applicant. Nine opportunities were already given to the appli­cant when the application was listed for hearing on 18.8.2012. 2. When the case was called out on 18.8.2012, the applicant was not present. The application for exemption from personal attendance and adjournment was moved on her behalf. Respondents No. 1 & 4 appeared before learned Magistrate on 18.8.2012. Application for exemption fronx^personal appearance of the respondent No. 2 & 3 was also moved. Paper No. Kha-2 was the appli­cation of the applicant for exempting her personal attendance and for adjournment. It was written in the said application that she was unwell and therefore, was unable to appear in the Court. A request was therefore, made to exempt her personal appearance and also adjourn the hearing of the case. Such an application bearing the seal and signatures of her Counsel Mr. Shri Kant Dheeman, Advocate is annexed with this Criminal Revision. An endorsement was made by the respondent No. 1 on the same. Such endorsement reads as under: ".............last nine times applicant is seeking exemption for evidence. Last two times, last opportunity has been given to the applicant. Once last opportunity has expired, so no ap­plication is maintainable for exemption to place the evidence. In view of the aforesaid, misconceived applica­tion is strongly opposed." 3. The said objection on behalf of tho respondent No. 1 was mentioned by learned ACJM, in his order dated 18.8.2012. Learned Trial Court men­tioned in his order that the application (under section 12(1) of the Act) was pending for applicant's evidence since 7.4.2012. Instead of adducing the evi­dence, applicant moved applications for exempting her personal appearance. Applicant was also granted last oppor­tunity to adduce the evidence on the last two dates, but the applicant failed to adduce her evidence. Learned Trial Court men­tioned in his order that the application (under section 12(1) of the Act) was pending for applicant's evidence since 7.4.2012. Instead of adducing the evi­dence, applicant moved applications for exempting her personal appearance. Applicant was also granted last oppor­tunity to adduce the evidence on the last two dates, but the applicant failed to adduce her evidence. On 18.8.2012, the application for adjournment was moved by the applicant, whereas the respon­dents were appearing in the Court con­tinuously (as per the order). 4. The application of the applicant for exemption and adjournment was allowed in the interest of justice grant­ing last opportunity to adduce the evi­dence on the next day, following which, it was directed, the opportunity to the applicant to adduce the evidence will be closed. 25.8.2012 was fixed as the next date for evidence. 5. Order dated 18.8.2012 was as­sailed by one of the respondents before learned Sessions Judge, Haridwar, un­der section 29 of the Act. Criminal Ap­peal was dismissed by learned 2nd Addi­tional Sessions Judge, Haridwar vide order dated 1.3.2013. Feeling aggrieved against the same, present Criminal Re­vision was preferred by the revisionist. 6. The first question which arises for consideration is whether it is incum­bent upon the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint (summons case) for non-appearance of the complainant on any date? section 256 Cr.P.C. provides the answer as follows: -- "256. Non-appearance or death of complainant. -- (1) If the summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, not­withstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to ad­journ the hearing of the case to some other day. Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the offi­cer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of opinion that the per­sonal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dis­pense with his attendance and proceed with the case." [Emphasis supplied] 7. It follows that it is not necessary for the Magistrate to dismiss the com­plaint (summons case), if the complain­ant does not appear on any date of hear­ing. It is well within the domain of learned Magistrate to dismiss the com­plaint and acquit the accused, if the complainant does not appear. It follows that it is not necessary for the Magistrate to dismiss the com­plaint (summons case), if the complain­ant does not appear on any date of hear­ing. It is well within the domain of learned Magistrate to dismiss the com­plaint and acquit the accused, if the complainant does not appear. But, he is not bound to pass such an order in view of the phraseology "unless for some rea­sons if he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day" used in sub-section (1) of section 256 Cr.P.C J 8. It, therefore, follows that the Magistrate shall (dismiss the complaint and) acquit the accused, unless for some reasons he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day. The (dismissal of the complaint and) acquittal of the accused is, there­fore, the rule and adjournment is the exception, well founded on judicial norms. In other words, the Magistrate should dismiss the complaint and acquit the accused unless for some reasons he thinks that the adjournment of the case is proper. 9. The aforesaid question (posed in para No. 6 above) is replied accordingly. Coming back to the facts of this case, although the complainant did not appear in person on 18,8.2012, but she moved an application for exempting her personal attendance through her Coun­sel and for adjournment, which is evi­dent from her application dated 18.8.2012. It, therefore, cannot be said that the complainant did not appear on 18.8.2012. She appeared through her Counsel on the said date and moved an application for adjournment, which was allowed by the Trial Court in the inter­est of justice. Even if she was not pre­sent before the Trial Court on the date of hearing, still it was within the domain of the Magistrate to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day, for some reasons which he would have thought proper. 11. Learned Additional Chief Judi­cial Magistrate, Roorkee passed the im­pugned order in the presence of learned Counsel for the complainant and also in the presence of respondents No. 1 and 4. There is, therefore, no illegality in the said order on this count. i 12. 11. Learned Additional Chief Judi­cial Magistrate, Roorkee passed the im­pugned order in the presence of learned Counsel for the complainant and also in the presence of respondents No. 1 and 4. There is, therefore, no illegality in the said order on this count. i 12. Learned Counsel for the te\ i-sionist further submitted that the evi­dence was not led by the applicant on 9 previous occasions and, therefore, learned Magistrate ought to have dis­missed the application, which was filed under section 12(1) of the Act. This Court has already observed above that even if the applicant was not personally present in the Court and if learned Magistrate thought it proper, he could have adjourned hearing of the case citing rea­sons. The order-sheet of most of the dates indicate that she moved applica­tion for personal exemption and ad­journment, though, it is correct that she was not present in person on those dates. It will be worthwhile to mention here that the number of opportunities to be granted to the applicant for adducing evidence is nowhere prescribed in the Act. The same depends upon the judi­cial discretion of the Magistrate, which judicial discretion should be based on 'reason' and well founded judicial norms. 13. Learned Counsel for the revi­sionist next argued that once 'last op­portunity' was given by learned Magis­trate to the applicant to adduce evi­dence, it was not within his jurisdiction to extend such time further. It was writ­ten by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Roorkee on 18.8.2012 that the complainant was being given 'last opportunity' to adduce the evidence on last two dates, but she failed to adduce the evidence. The question, therefore, is whether learned Magistrate committed illegality on this count? 14. The Code of Criminal Proce­dure, 1973 or the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, nowhere provides for the 'last opportunity' to the applicant to adduce evidence. These words are commonly used by the Trial Courts to exert pressure upon the complainant/applicant to adduce evidence, so that the hearing may be concluded at an early date. Whenever the Magistrate employs such words it is in the form of 'warning' to the complainant/applicant to adduce evidence or else, her or his case may be dismissed or his or her evidence may be closed. If learned Magistrate has used such words, he is riot 'estopped' from enlarging such time in the interest of justice. Whenever the Magistrate employs such words it is in the form of 'warning' to the complainant/applicant to adduce evidence or else, her or his case may be dismissed or his or her evidence may be closed. If learned Magistrate has used such words, he is riot 'estopped' from enlarging such time in the interest of justice. There is no estoppel against law or statute. It, therefore, cannot be said that the Court was 'estopped' from giving further time to the applicant to ad­duce evidence. Since it has, on the last occasion, directed that this will be the last opportunity to the complainant to adduce evidence, the same will not 'estop' the Magistrate from enlarging further time. It will be useful to reproduce section 28 of the Act in this context as follows: "28.Procedure. -- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under sections 12,18,19,20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under sec­tion 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of!974). (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the Court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section 12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23." 15. The aforesaid section provides that proceedings under the Act relating to application and orders for reliefs and offence of breach of protection order or interim protection order by the respondent shall be governed by Cr.P.C. Subsection (2) envisages that the Court may lay down it's own procedure for dis­posal of applications for any relief or for ex-parte order. 16. Needless to say that laying down it's own procedure must be founded on judicial norms, and not otherwise. Such order must be reasonable order and not arbitrary one, based on the whims, caprices and fancy of the Presiding Officer. Reasonableness is the antithesis of arbitrariness and Courts of Law are expected to pass orders based on reasons. 17. The reply, therefore, to the third contention of learned Counsel for the revisionist is that the Trial Court was not 'estopped' from enlarging time for adducing evidence. It could have granted further opportunity to the ap­plicant to adduce evidence. 18. Learned Counsel for the revi­sionist further argued that the order dated 18.8.2012 amounts to 'recall' of it's previous order by the Trial Court. It could have granted further opportunity to the ap­plicant to adduce evidence. 18. Learned Counsel for the revi­sionist further argued that the order dated 18.8.2012 amounts to 'recall' of it's previous order by the Trial Court. This Court is unable to subscribe to such con­tention of learned Counsel for the revi­sionist, in as much as, the orders dated 23.6.2012 and 7.7.2012 were not in the form of 'final orders', the Trial Court nowhere said that the applicant's evidence was closed. Had learned Magistrate passed an order to this effect, it was, perhaps, not possible for him to recall such an order. In the instant case, no order was recalled by learned Magistrate, only time to adduce evidence was further enlarged. There was, therefore, no illegality in the order passed by the Magistrate on this count also. 19. Even if Lower Appellate Court did not consider some of the grounds taken in the appeal, yet, broadly speaking, the same also does not suffer from any illegality. 20. There is no illegality or infirmity in the orders of two Courts below. No interference is called for.' Criminal revision filed against the impugned judg­ment and order is, therefore, dismissed. 21. Before parting with, this Court would like to bring the provision of sub­section (5) of section 12 of the Act to the notice of learned Additional Chief Judi­cial Magistrate, Roorkee. The same is being reproduced herein below: "12.Application to Magistrate. -- (1) ............ (2) ............ (3) ............ (4) ............ (5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing." 22. Reminding learned Magistrate of the intention of Legislature, it is expected that he shall make an endeavour to dispose of such application at an early date. 23. Let a copy of this judgment alongwith Lower Court record be sent to the Court below _____________.