Judgment K.J. Thaker, J.—This is an appeal by the original accused-appellant, herein, assailing the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 3, Morbi, Dated : 21.11.2009, whereby, he was convicted for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months. The appellant was also convicted for the offence under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay fine of Rs. 250/- and in default to undergo further imprisonment for one month. 2. The brief facts of the case of the prosecution, as set out before the trial Court, reads as under; 3. A complaint came to be lodged by one Pragjibhai Laljibhai Koli on 07.06.2007, before PSI, Morbi Taluka, wherein, he stated that he is residing at the address mentioned in the complaint along with his wife and children, consisting the deceased Usha. It is stated in the complaint that about two months prior to the alleged offence, the appellant had come to their house and had asked to engage the deceased with him, but, since, the deceased and the other family members did not approve of him, they had refused to do so. At that time, the appellant had issued threat of dire consequences. The complainant, then, went on to narrate the alleged offence, stating that today, i.e. on the date of the alleged offence, he along with his wife and two sons had gone to Jagdish Pottery for work at about 08:00 a.m. and they came back home for having tea at about 09:00 a.m.. At that point of time, the appellant came there and told them, since, you have not acceded to my request and have not engaged Usha with me, today, I have come to finish her. After saying so, the appellant pulled out a knife from his trouser pocket and inflicted blows on the deceased and due to that the deceased fell down. On account of that the complainant and others raised alarm and the appellant run away. The deceased was, firstly, taken to the hospital at Morbi and from there to Hospital at Rajkot, where she was declared dead. 4. On account of that the complainant and others raised alarm and the appellant run away. The deceased was, firstly, taken to the hospital at Morbi and from there to Hospital at Rajkot, where she was declared dead. 4. On registration of the complaint, police carried out investigation into the alleged offence and on finding prima facie evidence against the accused, laid charge-sheet against him before the competent Court for trial. 5. In order to establish the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined the following witnesses; PROSECUTION NAME OF THE WITNESS EXHIBIT No. WITNESS NUMBER 1 Dr. Ramesh Hirjibhai Bhalala 5 2 Babubhai Arjanbhai 8 3 Prvainbhai Talsibhai 10 4 Deva Mohanbhai 11 5 Nodubha Surubha 13 6 Manhargiri Amargiri Gosai 14 7 Amrutbhai Becharbhai 16 8 Damjibhai Tribhovanbhai 18 9 Anwarbhai Musabhai 19 10 Safimiyan Jamalmiyan 21 11 Salim Valimahmed 22 12 Gafar Ibrahimbhai 24 13 Dr. Pareshbhai Nathubhai Gamara 25 14 Karsanbhai Bhavanbhai 31 15 Pragjibhai Laljibhai 32 16 Manishaben Ratibhai 34 17 Rukhiben Pragjibhai 35 18 Niteshbhai Pragjibhai 37 19 Rambhai Somabhai Vaghela 38 20 Rakeshkumar Prabhudas Parsandiya 39 6. Over and above the oral evidences, the prosecution also produced the following documentary evidences in support of its case; SR. PARTICULARS OF THE DOCUMENTS EXHIBIT No. No. 1 Case papers of the treatment of the deceased Ushaben 6 2 Injury certificate of the deceased 7 3 Inquest Panchnama 9 4 Discovery panchnama 12 5 Arrest Panchnama 15 6 Panchnama of place of offence 17 7 Panchnama of seizure of the clothes of the deceased after PM 20 8 Panchnama of seizure of the clothes of the accused 23 9 PM report 27 10 Complaint 40 11 Public Notification Prohibiting Carrying of Arms 44 12 Serological report 53 7. At the end of the trial, the statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. came to be recorded, and then, the trial Court passed the judgment and order, as referred to herein above. Hence, the present appeal. 8. Heard Mr. Pathak, learned Counsel for the appellant, and Ms. Shah, learned APP on behalf of the State, and perused the material on record with their assistance. 9. In order to establish that the death of the deceased was homicidal one, the prosecution examined the doctor, who had performed PM on the body of the deceased, as P.W. 13. 8. Heard Mr. Pathak, learned Counsel for the appellant, and Ms. Shah, learned APP on behalf of the State, and perused the material on record with their assistance. 9. In order to establish that the death of the deceased was homicidal one, the prosecution examined the doctor, who had performed PM on the body of the deceased, as P.W. 13. This witness in his examination-in-chief stated that at the time of PM, he had noticed following injuries on the body of the deceased; “1. Cut incised wound on the backside of the left hand elbow, which was extending towards wrist and was about 5 X 5 cms.. It was bone and muscle deep, the margins whereof were sharp; 2. One slight transverse stab wound on the front left side of the chest from midline, at nipple level, (which was extending from right to left and which was 5 cms. long and was about 2 cms. broad in the middle portion of the length and both the angles and margins of the same were sharp and it was cavity deep. On its dissection, the cut on the left border of the Sternum bone was found and its direction was towards downward left-side extending to its back; 3. One stab wound below the left coastal margin, 1.5 cms. towards left from midline and 8 cms. below nipple level and it was transverse and was extending from right to left and which was 4.5 X 1 cm. Cavity deep and its angles and margins were sharp.” 10. P.W. 13, in his cross-examination, denied the suggestion that the deceased had sustained no injury which could result into her death. 11. The evidence of P.W. 13 stands corroborated from the evidence of the doctor- P.W. 1, who had provided the primary treatment to the deceased at hospital at Morbi. Thus, the trial Court was justified in holding that the deceased died of a homicidal death. 12. Having held that the deceased died of homicidal death, the next aspect which comes up for our consideration is, as to whether the trial Court rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant, herein, was the author of the alleged offence. 13. In order to appreciate the aforesaid aspect, here, it would be relevant to refer to the evidence of the complainant-P.W.-15, who happened to be the father of the deceased. 13. In order to appreciate the aforesaid aspect, here, it would be relevant to refer to the evidence of the complainant-P.W.-15, who happened to be the father of the deceased. In his examination-in-chief, P.W. 15 recited the facts given by him in his complaint before the police, stating as to how, on the date of the alleged offence, he along with other family members was having morning tea, at which point of time, the appellant came there and inflicted blows on the deceased. P.W. 15, then, stated that the reason for the alleged offence was refusal on their part to engage the deceased with the appellant. This witness, then, identified the clothes of the deceased and muddamal knife before the Court. In his cross-examination, P.W. 13 denied the suggestions that the deceased had sustained injury from the nail used for hanging clothes and that he was not present at home at the time of offence. He, further, clarified the said aspect, stating that though he had gone for work in the morning, he had come back home to have his morning tea. 14. The evidence of P.W. 15 gets support from the evidence of P.W. 17, who happened to be the mother of the deceased, and P.W. 18, who happened to be the brother of the deceased, who were also present at the place of offence, at the time of its commission. 15. The complainant-P.W.-15, P.W. 17, P.W. 18 and the appellant are the residents of the same locality and they happen to knew each other even prior to the alleged offence. The alleged offence took place during the broad day light, and hence, the question of misidentification does not arise. All the aforesaid witnesses identified the appellant, as the accused, as well as the muddamal knife, as the wepon used by him in committing the offence, before the Court. 16. Insofar as the evidence of P.W. Nos. 2 to 12, 14 and 16 are concerned, they did not support the case of the prosecution and were declared hostile, and hence, we do not propose to discuss the same in detail. 17. The case of the prosecution also gets support from the documentary evidence in the form of panchnama of place of offence, FIR, PM report etc.. 2 to 12, 14 and 16 are concerned, they did not support the case of the prosecution and were declared hostile, and hence, we do not propose to discuss the same in detail. 17. The case of the prosecution also gets support from the documentary evidence in the form of panchnama of place of offence, FIR, PM report etc.. The report of FSL indicated that the presence of human blood of group ‘AB’ was found on muddamal article ‘E-2’, i.e. the trouser of the appellant, and muddamal article ‘F’, i.e. the knife used in committing the alleged offence. This piece of evidence leaves no manner of doubt in our mind about the involvement of the appellant in the alleged offence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the trial Court committed no error in holding the appellant guilty for the act of causing death of the deceased. Now, what we have to examine is as to whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC. In that regard, it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of Section 299 read with Sections 300 and 304 of the Indian Penal Code, which read as under; “299. Culpable homicide:—Who ever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. XXX XXX XXX 300. Culpable homicide:—Who ever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. XXX XXX XXX 300. Murder:—Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— 2ndly—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— 3rdly—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or— 4thly—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. XXX XXX XXX 304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder:—Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for life],or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, Or With imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.” 18. In the light of the above provisions, here, it would not be out of place to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of “Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs. State of Maharashtra”, 2013 (6) Scale 778. In that case, while the original accused Nos. In the light of the above provisions, here, it would not be out of place to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of “Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs. State of Maharashtra”, 2013 (6) Scale 778. In that case, while the original accused Nos. 1 to 3 were passing through the filed of the deceased, wherein the crop of sugarcane was taken by the deceased, the dog of the deceased started barking at them and being aggrieved thereby original Accused No. 1 hit the dog with an iron pipe and when the deceased objected to the same, there was exchange of hot words, which resulted into a scuffle, during which original Accused Nos. 2 and 3 delivered kick and fist blows to the deceased, whereas, Accused No. 1 inflicted blow of iron pipe on the head of the deceased, on account of which the deceased expired, subsequently. The trial Court as well as the High Court held the Accused No. 1 guilty for the offence of murder and convicted him under Section 302. Being aggrieved there by the Accused No. 1 approached the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Apex Court, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case that there was a sudden quarrel, modified the conviction of the Accused No. 1 from Section 302 to Section 304 (II) of the Indian Penal Code. 19. In the case on hand also, it is borne out from the FIR of the alleged offence that before about two months prior to the alleged offence, a quarrel had taken place between the family of the deceased on one hand and the appellant on the other hand, over the issue of engagement of the deceased with the appellant and even on the date of the alleged offence also the appellant had gone to the house of the deceased for that reason only and pursuant to the further refusal to his request, the alleged offence took place. Thus, we are of the opinion that the trial Court committed an error in recording conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and keeping in mind the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment, the ends of justice would met, if, the conviction of the appellant is substituted from Section 302 to Section 304 (Part I) of the IPC. Moreover, keeping in mind the economical condition of the accused and in view of the fact that even before this Court, he is being represented by an Advocate appointed through HCLS, though, we maintain the fine imposed under the aforesaid section, we reduce the default sentence from six months to three months. 20. So far as the conviction of the appellant under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act is concerned, the public notification was duly proved by the prosecution, and hence, same requires no interference. 21. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and order of the trial Court, Dated : 21.11.2009, recording conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is modified and the same is SUBSTITUTED with SECTION 304 (PART I) of the IPC and the appellant is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for TEN YEARS. Moreover, the amount of fine under the aforesaid Section is, though, maintained, the default sentence is reduced to THREE MONTHS. Rest of the judgment and order of the trial Court stands CONFIRMED. The appellant shall be granted all the benefits, i.e. remission etc., as available to him under the law. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned jail authority, forthwith.