ORDER This criminal misc. petition has been filed under section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing of proceedings in view of the compromise between the accused petitioners and the complainants in criminal case No. 529/2010, State v. Manoj and others pending in the court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (S. D.) No. 9 Jaipur Metropolitan Jaipur for the offence under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B, I.P.C. 2. It may be mentioned that earlier Manoj Singh and Surendra Patrik (who are accused petitioners 3 and 2 in the present misc. petition) filed S. B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1645 of 2012 against the order dated 18-5-2011 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 9 Jaipur Metropolitan Jaipur in Criminal Case No. 529 of 2010 for the offence under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 381 and 120-B, I.P.C. whereby the court attested the compromise for offence under Sections 420 and 381 I.P.C. but declined to attest the compromise for the offence under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B, I.P.C. This Court vide order dated 19-5-2012 after hearing the counsel for the petitioners, public prosecutor and the counsel for the complainant rejected the criminal misc. petition, observing as under : “I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. I have also perused the order dated 18-5-2011 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 9 Jaipur Metropolitan Jaipur in criminal case No. 529 of 2010 for the offence under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 381 and 120-B, I.P.C. whereby the court attested the compromise for offence under sections 420 and 381, I.P.C. but declined to attest the compromise for the offence under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B, I.P.C. The order passed by the ACJM is just and proper. The criminal misc. petition is rejected. The stay application also stands rejected. However, the trial Court is directed to conclude the trial within a period of two months, if possible. 3. On 18th July, 2013, the accused petitioners Minakshi Patrick, Surendra Patrick, Manoj Singh Chauhan, Pramod Singh Chauhan and Victor Khan, accused petitioners, have filed this criminal misc. petition for quashing the criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise between the accused petitioners and the complainants, who have also been arrayed as non-petitioners 2 and 3. 4. This criminal misc. petition was listed before the Co-ordinate Bench of this court on 25-7-2013. petition for quashing the criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise between the accused petitioners and the complainants, who have also been arrayed as non-petitioners 2 and 3. 4. This criminal misc. petition was listed before the Co-ordinate Bench of this court on 25-7-2013. On 25-7-2013 following order was passed : “In view of the order dated 19th May, 2012 passed by Shri Mahesh Chandra Sharma, J. in S. B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1645/2012 between the same parties, list before Shri Mahesh Chandra Sharma, J.” 5. As per the orders of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, this case was listed before this Court on 30-7-2013, 6-8-2013, 14-8-2013, 22-8-2013, 30-8-2013, 2-9-2013, 30-9-2013, 3-10-2013, 21-10-2013, 11-11-2013 and on 13-11-2013. 6. Mr. Anurag Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners have argued that pending trial, the petitioners and the complainants resolved all their disputes and the entire amount was repaid to the respondent No. 2, de facto complainant and the partner of M/s. Dev Giri Exports. It is further argued that with the settlement between the parties now no dispute has remained to be resolved and the parties are maintaining cordial relations and they do not wish to contest the matter any further. The learned counsel appearing for the accused petitioners placed reliance on the Apex Court ruling in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012 Cri LJ 4934) (Three Judge Bench judgment). 7. Mr. Peeyush Kumar, Public Prosecutor appearing for the State and Anurag Kulshreshtha, learned counsel appearing for the complainants 2 and 3 do not dispute the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners and as per the ruling of the Apex Court cited by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the ruling cited by the counsel for the accused petitioners. The Apex Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012 Cri LJ 4934) (Three Judge Bench judgment) in paras Nos. 55 to 61 held as under : “55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. 55 to 61 held as under : “55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection. 56. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the Court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided. 57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. 58. 58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute ambicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed. 59. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed. 59. B. S. Joshi (2003) 4 SCC 675 : (2003 Cri LJ 2028), Nikhil Merchant (2008) 9 SCC 677 : ( AIR 2009 SC 428 ), Manoj Sharma (2008) 16 SCC 1 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1171) and Shiji (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012 Cri LJ 840) do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi (2003) 4 SCC 675 : (2003 Cri LJ 2028), Nikhil Merchant (2008) 9 SCC 677 : ( AIR 2009 SC 428 ), Manoj Sharma (2008) 16 SCC 1 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1171) and Shiji (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012 Cri LJ 840) this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment. 60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia (1990) 2 SCC 437 : (1990 Cri LJ 1599), Dharampal (1993) 1 SCC 435 : (1993 Cri LJ 1049), Arun Shankar Shukla (1999) 6 SCC 146 : (1999 Cri LJ 3964), Ishwar Singh (2008) 15 SCC 667 : ( AIR 2009 SC 675 ), Rumi Dhar (2009) 6 SCC 364 : ( AIR 2009 SC 2195 ) and Ashok Sadarangani (2012) 11 SCC 321 : (2012 Cri LJ 1850). The principle propounded in Simrikhia (1990) 2 SCC 437 : (1990 Cri LJ 1599) that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled. The principle propounded in Simrikhia (1990) 2 SCC 437 : (1990 Cri LJ 1599) that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal (1993) 1 SCC 435 : (1993 Cri LJ 1049) the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla (1999) 6 SCC 146 : (1999 Cri LJ 3964). In Ishwar Singh (2008) 15 SCC 667 : ( AIR 2009 SC 675 ) the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 307, I.P.C. and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under Section 307, I.P.C. was not compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar (2009) 6 SCC 364 although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for the commission of the offences under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471, I.P.C. along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani (2012) 11 SCC 321 : (2012 Cri LJ 1850) was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed the offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471, I.P.C. and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B. S. Joshi (2003) 4 SCC 675 : (2003 Cri LJ 2028), Nikhil Merchant (2008) 9 SCC 677 : ( AIR 2009 SC 428 ) and Manoj Sharma (2008) 16 SCC 1 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1171) and it was held that B. S. Joshi (2003) 4 SCC 675 and Nikhil Merchant (2008) 9 SCC 677 dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani (2012) 11 SCC 321 : (2012 Cri LJ 1850) was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani (2012) 11 SCC 321 : (2012 Cri LJ 1850) supports the view that the criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing. 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guidelines engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse or process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding. 62. In view of the above, it cannot be said that B. S. Joshi (2003) 4 SCC 675 : (2003 Cri LJ 2028), Nikhil Merchant (2008) 9 SCC 677 : ( AIR 2009 SC 428 ) and Manoj Sharma (2008) 16 SCC 1 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1171) were not correctly decided. We answer the reference accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the Benches concerned. 9. We answer the reference accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the Benches concerned. 9. It may be mentioned that the Apex Court has also considered the earlier Apex Court decision in Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v. State of Gujarat (2012) 12 SCC 401 : (2012 Cri LJ 3900) in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012 Cri LJ 4934), in para 45 as under : 45. In a very recent judgment decided by this Court in the month of July 2012 in Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v. State of Gujarat (2012) 12 SCC 401 : (2012 Cri LJ 3900), this Court was again concerned with the question of quashment of an FIR alleging the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B, I.P.C. The High Court refused to quash the criminal case under Section 482 of the Code. The question for consideration was that inasmuch as all those offences, except Section 420, I.P.C., were non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code, whether it would be possible to quash the FIR by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Bench elaborately considered the decision of this Court in Shiji and by invoking Article 142 of the Constitution quashed the criminal proceedings. It was held as under : (Jayrajsinh case (2012) 12 SCC 401 : (2012 Cri LJ 3900), SCC paras 13-15) “13. In the light of the principles mentioned above, inasmuch as Respondent 2 complainant has filed an affidavit highlighting the stand taken by the appellant (Accused 3) during the pendency of the appeal before this Court and the terms of settlement as stated in the said affidavit, by applying the same analogy and in order to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution, we accept the terms of settlement insofar as the appellant herein (Accused 3) is concerned. 14. In view of the same, we quash and set aside the impugned FIR No. 45 of 2011 registered with Sanand Police Station, Ahmedabad for offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B, I.P.C. insofar as the appellant (Accused 3) is concerned. 15. The appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above. 14. In view of the same, we quash and set aside the impugned FIR No. 45 of 2011 registered with Sanand Police Station, Ahmedabad for offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B, I.P.C. insofar as the appellant (Accused 3) is concerned. 15. The appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above. It may be mentioned that the Apex Court quashed and set aside the impugned FIR No. 45 of 2011 registered with Sanand Police Station, Ahmedabad for offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B, I.P.C. against the accused respondent No. 3 in the above case of Jayrajsingh Digvijaysinh Raja (supra). 10. It may further be mentioned that the complainants Surya Prakash Gupta and Yogesh Kumar Sharma have filed reply to the criminal misc. petition stating that the answering respondents have settled their dispute with the accused petitioners by the settlement and resultantly, answering respondents do not want to pursue the matter against the accused petitioners registered in FIR No. 192/2010, PS Sodala, Jaipur. 11. On May 7, 2011, the complainants namely Surya Prakash Gupta and Yogesh Sharma and the accused persons Manoj Chauhan and Surendra Patrick filed application under section 320(2), Cr. P.C. before the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) and Judicial Magistrate No. 9 Jaipur, through advocate. The application reads as under : ***************** 12. The compromise entered between the parties dated 7-5-2011 enclosed with the above application, reads as under : ***************** 13. The parties further submitted application on 17-5-2013 before the trial Court. The application reads as under : ***************** 14. From the applications and the compromise entered between the parties, it is clear that the complainants are not interested in pursuing their complaint against the accused persons. 15. The trial Court vide order dated allowed the application of the parties for compromise to the extent of offence under Sections 420 and 381, I.P.C. and did not permit the parties for offence under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B, I.P.C. 16. Again accused Quiter Khan and the complainants filed application for compromise on 1-6-2013 submitted before the trial Court. The trial Court vide order dated 1-6-2013 rejected the application of the parties as the offence under Sections 467, 471 and 120-B is not compoundable. 17. Again accused Quiter Khan and the complainants filed application for compromise on 1-6-2013 submitted before the trial Court. The trial Court vide order dated 1-6-2013 rejected the application of the parties as the offence under Sections 467, 471 and 120-B is not compoundable. 17. I have gone through the applications and the compromise petitions filed by the parties from time to time and the orders passed by the trial Court and have also gone through the judgments of the Apex Court. As per the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012 Cri LJ 4934) (Three Judge Bench) and the view taken by the Apex Court in Jayarajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v. State of Gujarat (2012) 12 SCC 401 : (2012 Cri LJ 3900) (Two Judge Bench), which too relate to offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B, I.P.C. and the Apex Court quash and set aside the FIR No. 45 of 2011 registered with Sanad Police Station, Ahmedabad for offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B, I.P.C. insofar as the accused is concerned. Two Judge Bench decision Jayarajsingh Digvijaysingh Rana v. State of Gujarat (2012) 12 SCC 401 : (2012 Cri LJ 3900) which too relate to offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B, I.P.C. has also been approved by the Apex Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012 Cri LJ 4934) (Three Judge Bench). After going through the contents of the compromise and the amicable settlement of the parties, in my view the application and the compromise entered between the parties for quashing and setting aside the criminal proceedings deserve to be allowed as after the matter is compromised between the parties, the continuance of the criminal proceedings could turn out to be an exercise in futility without anything positive being ultimately achieved. 18. For the reasons mentioned above, the criminal proceedings pending against the accused petitioners for the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B, I.P.C. in criminal case No. 529/2010 pending before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate No. 9, Jaipur Metropolitan are quashed and set aside in view of the compromise filed by the complainants and the accused petitioners before the trial Court. Order accordingly.