JUDGMENT N. Kumar, J. 1. This appeal is by the wife, challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Mudhol, declaring that the marriage solemnized between her and the respondent on 21.04.2007 is a nullity. For the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their original rank before the trial Court. 2. The petitioner-husband filed a petition under Section 12(1)(d) of the Hindu Marriage Act, seeking for a decree of nullity of his marriage with respondent-wife Smt. Neelawwa, claiming that the marriage was solemnized on 21.04.2007 according to the rites and rituals of their community at Dhavaleshwar. After the marriage, the respondent came to his house for leading married life; and he was residing with his parents in the joint family. The respondent did not allow the marriage to consummate and started to drag on the days by giving one or the other reason, that she does not like him and her parents have forcibly married her to him. As such there was no co-habitation between them, they lived in his house only for 15 days. The respondent left the house without informing him or his parents and started residing in her parental house at Hunashyal Village, Gokak Taluk. He had been to the house of the respondent along with the elders of the village and tried to convince her to lead married life with him and the respondent assured that she would come back after a month, but did not. Again one more attempt was made to bring her back. At that stage, the parents of the respondent did not allow him to meet her. Again on 01.11.2007, when he went to respondent's parents house, he was shocked and surprised to know that the respondent had given birth to a male child on 24.10.2007 at Trupti Nursing Home at Mahalingpur. The respondent informed him that she was pregnant at the time of marriage and that her parents forcibly performed her marriage with him. On 02.04.2008, the respondent and her parents along with their relatives assaulted him and therefore, he filed a private complaint No. 44/2008 before the JMFC, Mudhol. The respondent, since was pregnant at the time of marriage by some other person, it is not possible for him to continue the marital relationship with the respondent and any such act would tarnish his image. The respondent, since was pregnant at the time of marriage by some other person, it is not possible for him to continue the marital relationship with the respondent and any such act would tarnish his image. As such he preferred the petition for declaring the marriage as nullity. 3. After service of notice, the respondent entered appearance, admitted the marriage but refuted all the allegations against her. It is her specific case that since the date of marriage till giving birth to a male child she and the petitioner led married life; there was good understanding between them. She gave birth to a male child in the said wedlock while in the house of the petitioner. After the delivery, she was sent to her parental house. Her family and the petitioner's family were not in good terms. Taking undue advantage of the strained relationship, the petitioner's family planned to take revenge against her family and filed this false petition. The petitioner has not made any provision for her maintenance. She and her parents, tried their level best to advise the petitioner to take her back with the child, but the petitioner and his parents flatly refused. On these contentions, she sought for dismissal of the petition. 4. Based on the pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following points for consideration:-- i) Whether the petitioner is entitled for the relief of decree of nullity of marriage as prayed? ii) What order? 5. The petitioner in order to substantiate his claim, examined himself as PW1 and a witness by name Shivappa as PW2, produced three documents, which are marked as Exs.P1 to P3. The respondent and her two witnesses by name Sripad and Chandrakant are examined as RW1 to RW3. 6. The trial Court on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record held that the minimum period of pregnancy required for a normal baby is 28 weeks i.e., seven complete months or 210 days; if the child is born before completion of 6 months, its survival would be difficult. The respondent, since gave birth to the child on 161st day of marriage, she was pregnant by some other person at the time of marriage and the respondent had no knowledge of the same and therefore he is entitled to a decree of nullity of marriage. Accordingly, it passed the impugned judgment and decree. The respondent, since gave birth to the child on 161st day of marriage, she was pregnant by some other person at the time of marriage and the respondent had no knowledge of the same and therefore he is entitled to a decree of nullity of marriage. Accordingly, it passed the impugned judgment and decree. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent-wife has preferred this appeal. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailing the impugned judgment and decree contends that no evidence is adduced by the petitioner to the effect that the child that is born is not hale and healthy. In the absence of any such evidence, the trial Court committed serious error in recording a finding that the child, born to the respondent is normal and a normal child could not be born on 161st day from the date of the marriage. The petitioner, who has come to the Court alleging that the respondent was pregnant through another person on the date of marriage should prove his case beyond reasonable doubt and the evidence adduced by the petitioner does not satisfy the said legal requirement; the trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and thereby recorded an erroneous finding, which requires to be set aside. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-husband supported the impugned judgment and decree. 9. The respondent-wife requested this Court to send the child to DNA test in order to verify whether the child is born to her through the petitioner, for which learned counsel appearing for both the parties had no objection. Therefore, by order dated 22.11.2012, this Court directed the trial Court to take the sample of the blood of the child and the petitioner, send the same for DNA test and to forward the DNA report after securing it, to this Court. The petitioner was directed to bear the expenditure of this exercise. Pursuant to the order, the trial Court has secured report of Forensic Expert after the DNA test and sent the same to this Court, in a sealed cover. We have opened the said sealed cover and looked into the report. 10. The petitioner was directed to bear the expenditure of this exercise. Pursuant to the order, the trial Court has secured report of Forensic Expert after the DNA test and sent the same to this Court, in a sealed cover. We have opened the said sealed cover and looked into the report. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Manilal Nanavati v. Sushila Mahendra Nanavati reported in 1964-LAWS (SC)-3-56 : ( AIR 1965 SC 364 ) wherein it is held as under: "(21) It follows that what the Court has to see in these proceedings is whether the petitioner has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was pregnant by some one else at the time of marriage. The petitioner has to establish such facts and circumstances which would lead the court either to believe that the respondent was pregnant at the time of marriage by someone else or to hold that a prudent man would, on those facts and circumstances, be completely satisfied that it was so. xxx xxx xxx (160) The notional period of pregnancy is calculated from the first day of the menstruation preceding the conception and it is on this account that 14 days are added to the period of pregnancy from the actual date of conception. On the basis of notional calculation, the fully mature child is born after 280 days. On the basis of the date of conception, the child is born (1) [1939] 2 All E.P. 59, between 265 and 270 days. The development of the foetus undoubtedly depends on its age as counted from the date of conception and it is for this reason that the books on Obstetrics mostly deal with the development of the foetus on the basis of, days or weeks after conception, for a period of about 2 months and thereafter they begin to note its development with respect, to the end of the 3rd and consecutive months. This must be due to the fact that by that time a difference of about a fortnight in the period of gestation does not bring about a substantial difference in the description of the development of the foetus. This must be due to the fact that by that time a difference of about a fortnight in the period of gestation does not bring about a substantial difference in the description of the development of the foetus. After all, the entire knowledge with respect to the development of the foetus with respect to the period of gestation is based on a consideration of a large number of cases and then arriving at some generalized conclusion about the development of the foetus corresponding to its age from the date of conception. It would not therefore be very correct to add 1 lunar month to the ascertained period of gestation in cases of a known date of conception merely on the ground that when books speak of a foetus of a certain number of months that foetus might be due to a conception taking place on any day of the lunar month corresponding to the menstruation prior to the conception and the miss-period after conception. 11. Therefore, in a petition filed under Section 12(1)(d) of the Act the Court has to determine whether the wife was, at the time of the marriage, pregnant by some person other than the petitioner. For the said purpose, date of the marriage and the date of the birth of the child are to be taken into consideration. In the normal course the period required for the birth of a fully matured child is 280 days. Even if a child is born in the 7th month, the minimum period required is 210 days. In this background the Court has to calculate the period between the conception and birth of the child. The notional period of pregnancy is calculated from the first day of the menstruation preceding the conception and it is on this account that 14 days are added to the period of pregnancy from the actual date of conception. On the basis of notional calculation, the fully matured child is born after 280 days. The development of the foetus undoubtedly depends on its age as counted from the date of conception and it is for this reason that the books on Obstetrics mostly deal with the development of the foetus on the basis of days or weeks after conception for a period of about 2 months and thereafter they begin to note its development with respect to the end of the 3rd and consecutive months. Even if a child is born after 7 months it can be only after 210 days from the 1st day of menstrual cycle preceding conception. In other words, no child can be born before 210 days from the 1st day of last menstrual cycle preceding the conception and under no circumstances, a child can be born on 160th day from the 1st day of last menstrual period preceding conception. 12. It is in this background, we have to appreciate the evidence on record. The evidence of the respondent is that she led marital life with the petitioner from the date of their marriage till she gave birth to a male child, that too while she was in the house of the petitioner and only after the delivery, she was sent to her parental house. In the cross-examination, respondent admits that on 21.04.2007 the engagement ceremony took place and on the very same day the marriage was also performed. Three days after the marriage she went to the house of the petitioner to lead marital life. She gave birth to a male child in the 7th month i.e., on 24.10.2007 at about 12.45 p.m. The parents of the petitioner, admitted her to the hospital for delivery. It is after the birth of the child, she went to her parents' house. She admits that 15 days after the marriage she menstruated. 13. RW2-Sripad has deposed that on the date of marriage itself, the respondent was sent to the petitioner's house; 15 days thereafter, she returned to the parents house, stayed there for two days and went back to the petitioner's house. However, 2 or 3 months later the respondent returned to her parents house and gave birth to a child 9 months thereafter. But according to RW3-Chandrakant the respondent delivered the child after seven months. 14. From the above, it is clear that before the marriage there was no physical relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. The respondent-wife could conceive only after 15 days from 21-04-2007 being the date of marriage. Because, she menstruated 15 days after the marriage which would be 06-05-2007. From this day, a minimum of 10 days is required to conceive and that takes us roughly to 15-05-2007. The respondent delivered the male child on 24-10-2007 which is 172nd day from the 1st day of menstrual cycle preceding conception. 15. Because, she menstruated 15 days after the marriage which would be 06-05-2007. From this day, a minimum of 10 days is required to conceive and that takes us roughly to 15-05-2007. The respondent delivered the male child on 24-10-2007 which is 172nd day from the 1st day of menstrual cycle preceding conception. 15. Even if the case of the respondent-wife that the child was born after 7 months is to be accepted, it should be after 210 days from the 1st day of menstrual period preceding conception i.e., 06-05-2007. No evidence is adduced by the respondent to show that the child was born after seven months. On the contrary, her witness RW-2 says that the child was born after 9 months. The parents of the respondent have not stepped into the witness box to speak about this fact. Nor is the doctor who attended to the respondent at the time of delivery or before, examined to prove this fact. If a child is born immediately after 7 months, it would not be a normal delivery and the child would require extra attention. In the instant case the delivery took place in a Nursing Home. RW1's evidence is silent as to the number of days she stayed in the Nursing Home before and after the delivery and no evidence is adduced by her to show that such extra medical attention/treatment was given to the child. 16. The petitioner-husband in his evidence has stated that after the marriage, the respondent did not allow him to have intercourse stating that she was not interested in marrying him and the marriage took place because of her parents' compulsion. There was no cohabitation during 15 days after the marriage. He was cross-examined at length and except the suggestion denying his assertion there is absolutely no cross-examination touching this aspect. In fact the petitioner's two witnesses have supported his case fully. 17. It is based on this evidence, the trial Court has rightly held that the petitioner was pregnant on the date of marriage through some other person other than the petitioner and is justified in granting decree of nullity of the marriage. 18. In fact the petitioner's two witnesses have supported his case fully. 17. It is based on this evidence, the trial Court has rightly held that the petitioner was pregnant on the date of marriage through some other person other than the petitioner and is justified in granting decree of nullity of the marriage. 18. This Court at the request of the respondent has obtained the DNA report, which reads as under: "Observation: (i) The genetic profile generated for Exhibit-S(1) (Source: Ravi alias Mallappa Ambi) had one of the alleles similar to that of the genetic profile of Exhibit-M(1) (Source: Neelavati Ambi) (ii) The non maternal alleles in the genetic profile of Exhibit- S(1) (Source: Ravi alias Mallappa Ambi) do not match with one of the alleles in the genetic profile of Exhibit - F(1) (Source: Maruti Ambi) at the following loci D21S11, D7S820, CSF1PO, D13S317, D19S433, vWA, D18S51, D5S818 and FGA. Conclusion: Based on the above observation it can be concluded that: Maruti Ambi is not the biological father of Ravi alias Mallappa Ambi" The DNA report is also consistent with the aforesaid finding recorded by the trial Court. 19. A marriage under the Hindu Law is not purely a Contract. A reading of Sections 5 and 7 make it clear that a Hindu marriage has both religious as well as secular attributes. Therefore, the marriage has to be treated both as a sacrament and a contract. It is sacrament because certain customary rights and ceremonies as described in Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act have to be performed for the completion of marriage. It is a contract, as Section 5 deals with the capacity of the spouse to enter into an alliance for a marriage. 20. Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 dealing with voidable marriages reads as under: "12. Voidable marriages.--(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely:-- (a) to (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner. Voidable marriages.--(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely:-- (a) to (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no petition for annulling a marriage-- (b) on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-section (1) shall be entertained unless the court is satisfied-- (i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged; (ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnized after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage; and (iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the said ground." 21. Section 12(1)(d) of the Act, therefore, provides that any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on the ground that the respondent was pregnant at the time of marriage by some person other than the petitioner. Section 12(2)(b) of the Act makes it clear that if a decree for nullity is to be passed on the aforesaid ground, the petitioner further has to prove that he was, at the time of marriage, ignorant of the fact alleged and that the marital intercourse, has not taken place with the consent of the petitioner. 22. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to a decree of nullity merely on the ground that the respondent was at the time of marriage pregnant by some person other man the petitioner. To grant a decree of nullity of marriage under this provision, the following conditions must exist: i) The wife, at the time of marriage should be pregnant by some person other than the petitioner; ii) The petitioner was, at the time of the marriage ignorant of the said pregnancy; iii) He should not have marital intercourse with consent, after the discovery of the existence of the said ground i.e., pregnancy. 23. 23. In a matrimonial dispute, the burden of proof is not like in a criminal case. The petitioner who is seeking the relief of decree of nullity, is not liable to prove the ground under Section 12(1)(d) of the Hindu Marriage Act beyond reasonable doubt. But at the same time, the proof that is required to declare a marriage as nullity, has to be something more than the preponderance of probabilities required under the Civil Law. The reason is that the result of a finding under Section 12(1)(d) would have the effect of (a) bastardizing the child or declaring it as an illegitimate child; (b) it would have the effect of casting aspersions on the wife's chastity, integrity and status; (c) it would have the effect of declaring the marriage solemnized as nullity. 24. Therefore, the proof that is required in a civil case in order to succeed on the ground that the respondent was at the time of marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner is something more than the probability of the case and something less than the proof beyond reasonable doubt. However the petitioner has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was pregnant by some one else at the time of the marriage. When the respondent specifically denies that she became pregnancy before the marriage, the question of the petitioner being aware of the respondent's pregnant on the date of the marriage would not arise. It is not the case of the respondent that she was pregnant on the date of marriage and knowing this fully well, the petitioner had marital intercourse with her or he did not object to the pregnancy, acquiesced with the same and had marital intercourse with her. In the instant case, all the conditions under Section 12(1)(d) of the Act are satisfied; the medical evidence coupled with the admitted evidence on record clearly establishes that the respondent was pregnant at the time of marriage by some person other than the petitioner. Therefore, the order passed by the trial Judge is based on the legal evidence and is in accordance with law. No case for interference is made out. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed