ORDER :- The present petition is preferred against the judgment and order dated 8-12-2012, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (Forest), Jammu, in a petition under Section 488, Cr. P.C. in case titled Rekha Arora v. Satish Kumar. By virtue of the judgment and order impugned, the Court below has rejected the prayer of the applicant-petitioner for interim maintenance on the ground that the petitioner had not made out a prima facie case as she had failed to establish that she was the legally wedded wife of the respondent herein. 2. The case set up by the petitioner in the Court below was that she had married the respondent who claimed himself to be a widower and whose children had been married and that he was living independently. It was stated that the petitioner and respondent got married in a simple marriage ceremony solemnized at the residence of the petitioner according to the Hindu rites and customs on 20-1-2008. 3. This fact was denied by the respondent. His specific stand was that he was never married the petitioner since he was already married with one Smt. Prem Rani, for the last more than 30 years and that the said marriage was still subsisting. It was stated that the petitioner was trying to blackmail the respondent and that she being a stranger, could not claim maintenance in terms of Section 488, Cr. P.C. 4. At this stage, it becomes necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of Section 488, Cr. P.C. which are reproduced below :- (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain. (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is by reason or any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or (d) ..........................................' 5. From a perusal of the aforementioned provisions of Section 488, Cr. P.C. it becomes clear that it is only a wife who can claim maintenance under the said Section. A wife would necessarily mean a legally wedded wife in accordance with the personal law of the parties or the law governing the marriage between the parties. 6. From a perusal of the aforementioned provisions of Section 488, Cr. P.C. it becomes clear that it is only a wife who can claim maintenance under the said Section. A wife would necessarily mean a legally wedded wife in accordance with the personal law of the parties or the law governing the marriage between the parties. 6. The intention of the legislation is clear that whereas, in sub-clause (b) of clause 1, legitimate or illegitimate children are included within the purview of the said Section, the same is not true in case of a wife who is not legally wedded. Before a woman can claim the status of a wife in terms of Section 488, Cr. P.C. it must be preceded by a valid marriage either according to the personal or civil law governing the parties. 7. This Court in the case reported as Titroo v. Morni, 1986 JKLR 1147 : (1987 Cri LJ 2069) has specifically held as under :- ' 6. In the instant case the parties being Hindus, the wife would claim maintenance only if she could prove the existence of a valid marriage which was not void under Ss. 5 and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act. A marriage between any two Hindus can be solemnized if neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage as is provided under S. 5(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Similarly, it is provided under S. 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act that any marriage solemnized after the commencement of the said Act shall be null and void if the same contravenes any one of the conditions specified in Cls. (i), (iv), (v) of S. 5 of the Act. Mst. Morni in para No. 2 of her petition herself stated that before her marriage, petitioner-husband was already married to one Mst. Nazku who according to her was a very clever women and was instrumental in getting her (the petitioner) ousted from the matrimonial house of her husband. On the basis of the allegations made by the respondent wife and in view of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act referred to hereinabove, her marriage with the petitioner husband was void ab initio and she could not be treated as ' wife' for the purposes of S. 488, Cr. On the basis of the allegations made by the respondent wife and in view of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act referred to hereinabove, her marriage with the petitioner husband was void ab initio and she could not be treated as ' wife' for the purposes of S. 488, Cr. P.C. Both the Courts below have completely ignored the mandatory provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Hindu Marriage Act while allowing the petition filed by the respondent.' 8. A reference has been made by Mrs. Rozina Afzal, counsel for the petitioner to a judgment of the Apex Court reported as Deoki Panjhiyara v. Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad, AIR 2013 SC 346 : (2013 Cri LJ 684) with a view to urge that the petitioner would have a right to claim maintenance till the marriage between the parties was held to be invalid by a competent Court and till such time that declaration was made, the petitioner would continue to be the wife of the respondent and entitled to claim all benefits. 9. Reliance placed upon the aforementioned judgment of the Apex Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner is totally misplaced as a reading of the judgment supra shows that in that case, a claim for maintenance was made by the wife which was denied by the husband on the ground that the marriage was void. The husband in that case had produced a marriage certificate of the wife- s earlier marriage which fact was denied by the wife. In the aforementioned case before the Apex Court, the marriage was not denied by the husband. The Court in those circumstances, held that determination of the validity of the marriage could have been gone into by a competent Court in appropriate proceedings and that mere production of a marriage certificate of the wife- s first marriage was not sufficient to render a complete and effective decision with regard to the marital status of the parties in a collateral proceedings for maintenance. It was in those circumstances held that until invalidation of the marriage between the appellant and respondent therein was made by a competent Court, it would only be correct to proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to be the wife of the respondent so as to entitle her to claim all benefits. It was in those circumstances held that until invalidation of the marriage between the appellant and respondent therein was made by a competent Court, it would only be correct to proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to be the wife of the respondent so as to entitle her to claim all benefits. This was in reference to the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and not under Section 488, Cr. P.C. 10. In Vimla (K.) v. Veeraswamy (K.), 1991 (2) SCC 375 : (1991 AIR SCW 754) a three Bench Judge of the Apex Court held that Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was meant to achieve a social purpose. The object whereof is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. While dealing with the meaning of the word ' wife' the Court held as under : ' ............The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. When an attempt is made by the husband to negative the claim of the neglected wife depicting her as a kept-mistress on the specious plea that he was already married, the Court would insist on strict proof of the earlier marriage. The term ' wife- in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal procedure includes a woman who has been divorced by a husband or who has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried. The woman not having legal status of a wife is thus brought within the inclusive definition of the term ' wife- consistent with the objective. However, under the law a second wife whose marriage is void on account of the survival of the first marriage is not a legally wedded wife and is, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under this provision.' 11. In Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 636 : (2005 Cri LJ 2141) the Apex Court while dealing with the plight of the unfortunate woman who unwittingly entered into wedlock with a married man held that there was no scope to include a woman not lawfully married within the expression of the term ' wife' . The Apex Court, however, held that this inadequacy in law could be amended only by the legislature. 12. The Apex Court, however, held that this inadequacy in law could be amended only by the legislature. 12. There is a slight difference between Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1973 as is applicable in the rest of the Country and Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1933 A.D. as is applicable in the State of J. & K. to the extent that whereas in the Central Code, the explanation brings within the definition of term ' wife' even a woman who has been divorced or has obtained a divorce from her husband, a divorced wife has not been brought within the purview of the term ' wife' in the State Code. 13. The other way by virtue of which a woman could claim maintenance from a man is under the provisions of Protection of Woman from Domestic Violence Act, 2010, (for short the Act of 2010). 14. The Apex Court in case titled D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, 2010 (10) SCC 469 : (2011 Cri LJ 320) while dealing with the phrase ' relationship in the nature of marriage- as occurring in the Act of 2005, in paragraph 31 held as under : ' 31. In our opinion a ' relationship in the nature of marriage- is akin to a common law marriage. Common law marriages require that although not being formally married : a. The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses; b. They must be of legal age to marry; c. They must be otherwise qualified to enter into legal marriage, including being unmarried; d. they must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time. In our opinion a ' relationship in the nature of marriage- under the Act of 2005 must also fulfill the above requirements, and in addition the parties must have lived together in a ' shared household' as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act of 2005. Merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a ' domestic relationship- .' 15. In paragraph 32, the Apex Court held as under : ' 32. In our opinion not all live in relationship will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of Act of 2005. Merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a ' domestic relationship- .' 15. In paragraph 32, the Apex Court held as under : ' 32. In our opinion not all live in relationship will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of Act of 2005. To get such benefit the conditions mentioned by us above must be satisfied, and this has to be proved by evidence. If a man has a ' keep' whom he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not, in our opinion, be a relationship in the nature of marriage.' 16. Although, there is only a slight difference in some respects between the Act of 2005 and the Act of 2010 yet, the essence remains the same. The aforementioned Acts, however, have the effect of benefiting those women who even though not legally married, according to the Personal or Civil law governing parties enjoyed a ' relationship in the nature of marriage- and held each other to be husband and wife by living together in a shared household as defined under the Act. 17. From the facts of the present case, it will be seen that the respondent has totally denied the factum of marriage with the petitioner. He has specifically asserted the subsistence of his earlier marriage with one Prem Rani. 18. The Court below has recorded a finding that the petitioner had failed to establish the factum of marriage with the respondent and had also not placed on record any document, photograph or any other proof which could prima facie establish that she was the legally wedded wife of the respondent and, thus, could not claim any maintenance in the absence of any such proof. 19. Be that as it may, I am of the opinion that the court below does not appear to have committed any perversity in passing the order impugned. 20. This petition is, accordingly, found to be without merit and is dismissed. 21. Record be returned to the Court below for proceeding further in the matter in accordance with the law. Petition dismissed.