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2013 DIGILAW 76 (CAL)

Parimal Mondal v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

2013-02-07

JOYMALYA BAGCHI

body2013
JUDGMENT Joymalya Bagchi, J. The petitioner has challenged the Judgment and Order dated September 21, 2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Bankura acquitting the opposite party nos.2 to 5 herein from the charge of committing offence punishable under sections 498A and 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case is to the effect that the victim, Rina was married to opposite party no.2, Srimanta Gorai, on April 19, 2005 and within a couple of months of her marriage, i.e. on January 31, 2006, she died under unnatural circumstances at Amar Kanan Hospital; on February 24, 2006 PW 5, Parimal Mondal, brother of the victim, lodged the FIR. Charge sheet was filed against the opposite parties /accused persons under sections 498A and 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The case, being a session triable one, was committed to the court of Sessions, Bankura and was transferred to the court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Bankura. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges under section 498A and sections 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused persons. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In course of trial, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses. The defence, however, did not examine any witness. In conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Judge by Judgment and Order acquitted the opposite parties/ accused persons of the accusations leveled against them under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and sections 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned trial Judge appears to have acquitted the accused persons, inter alia, on the grounds that there was no explanation of delay of 24 days in lodging the FIR in the instant case; that the evidence of relation witnesses, viz. PW 5, PW 7, PW 8 and PW 15, were not supported by the independent witness, viz. PWs 1 to 4; the evidence of relation witnesses suffered from various inconsistencies and/or contradictions and that the cause of death had not been proved in the instant case by PW 13 (PM doctor) since viscera report had not been collected and exhibited. For proper analysis of the aforesaid reasons, a brief narration of the prosecution evidence may be essential. PWs 1 to 4; the evidence of relation witnesses suffered from various inconsistencies and/or contradictions and that the cause of death had not been proved in the instant case by PW 13 (PM doctor) since viscera report had not been collected and exhibited. For proper analysis of the aforesaid reasons, a brief narration of the prosecution evidence may be essential. P.W.s 1 to 4 are the co-villagers of the accused persons, who have been declared hostile and have stated that the victim died at her matrimonial home by consuming poison. Such fact had not been disputed by the accused persons during their examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. PW 5 is the brother of the victim and also the de facto complainant in the instant case. He has stated that at the time of marriage, Rs.1 lakh as dowry and gold ornament worth Rs.10,000/- were demanded. They paid Rs.70,000/-, but they could not pay Rs.30,000/-, which they assured to pay within three months of the marriage. Since they were unable to pay, the accused persons subjected the victim to torture and the victim had narrated such incidents of torture to him and her other relatives. P.W. 5 further stated that he had met the victim on Shraban Sankranti and during Durga puja and had seen marks of injuries of her person. He further stated that on 17th Magh 1412 (31.12.2006) he received information that the victim had been admitted to Amarkanan hospital. On rushing to the hospital, he found that the victim was lying dead and there were swelling injuries on the eyes and the head of the victim. He also found blood and froth coming out from the nostril of the victim. He stated that two or three days after the occurrence he reported the matter to the police station verbally and finally on 24.02.2006 he submitted written complaint. His evidence was corroborated by his mother, P.W. 7, who stated about the demands of ten vories of gold ornaments and a dowry of Rs. 1 lakh. His mother, P.W. 7, also stated that the victim narrated incidents of torture due to nonpayment of dowry demands. P.W. 8 (married sister) and her husband P.W. 15 also corroborated the demands of dowry and incidents of torture. 1 lakh. His mother, P.W. 7, also stated that the victim narrated incidents of torture due to nonpayment of dowry demands. P.W. 8 (married sister) and her husband P.W. 15 also corroborated the demands of dowry and incidents of torture. They stated that they visited the victim on 13th Magh, 1412, a couple of days prior to her death, whereupon the victim complained of suffering from illness as a result of beating by the accused persons. P.W. 9, an independent witness, has also corroborated the evidence of the relation witnesses relating to torture of the victim. P.W. 6 is the scribe of the first information report. P.W. 10 and 11 are the priest and the barber respectively, who were present during the marriage of the victim. P.W. 12 is the B.D.O. who held inquest over the body of the victim. P.W. 13 is the doctor who conducted the post mortem report and found the following injuries on the person of the victim: “1. One scalp haematoma 1”x½” on the frontal area from mid line to right side 2” above eyebrow. 2. One scalp haematoma 1”x½” on right parietal eminent.” He also deposed that the stomach contained 500 grams of violet colour solution with pungent smell which suggests intake of poison. The doctor stated that the injuries were caused within 48 hours prior to the death of the victim and that the injuries were caused by a hit/blow of hard and blunt substance and the same may be caused by two successive and separate trauma. P.W. 16 is the Investigating Officer of the instant case who conducted the investigation and submitted charge sheet in the said case. The learned trial Judge appears to have disbelieved the relation witnesses on the ground that independent witness namely P.W. 1 to 4 were declared hostile and have not supported the prosecution case of torture of the victim. It is a trite law that relations are the most natural witnesses in the matter of torture meted out to a housewife. There are many reasons as to why neighbours of the accused persons may not be willing to support the prosecution case against the said accused persons. However, mere lack of corroboration from such neighbours of the accused persons cannot be the ground to reject the evidence of relation witnesses if the same is otherwise reliable. There are many reasons as to why neighbours of the accused persons may not be willing to support the prosecution case against the said accused persons. However, mere lack of corroboration from such neighbours of the accused persons cannot be the ground to reject the evidence of relation witnesses if the same is otherwise reliable. In fact, in the instant case I find that the evidence of such relation witnesses had been corroborated by another independent witness namely P.W. 9 and the evidence of torture of the housewife as narrated by the relations was also corroborated by the medical evidence of P.W. 13. The learned trial Judge however held that the evidence of the relations namely P.W. 5 (brother), P.W. 7 (mother), P.W. 8 (married sister) and P.W. 15 (husband of P.W. 8) are inconsistent with one another. The theory of inconsistency was based on minor contradictions as to source from which the dowry money was procured and the fact that the families were on visiting terms during the matrimonial life of the couple. The learned trial Judge failed to consider that the evidence of the said witnesses were consistent to one another on material aspects on the demands of dowry and torture meted out to the victim due to non-payment of a part thereof. Such prosecution evidence was also unshaken in cross-examination and minor variations with regard to source from which dowry money was raised is clearly inconsequential to come to the conclusion that the prosecution case of demands of dowry and torture of the victim for non-payment of a part of such dowry has been proved beyond doubt. Mere inter se visits between the families also do not render allegations of torture and ill treatment unnatural. Learned Judge lost sight of the fact that the post mortem report disclosed injuries on the eyes and head of the victim and it is the version of the P.M. doctor (P.W. 13) that such injuries were caused due to two successive and separate trauma. It is highly improbable, if not impossible, that successive and separate trauma would be caused due to accidental fall. No explanation of such injury on the person of the victim which occurred within 48 hours prior to the death at her matrimonial home also have been offered by the accused persons. Such facts were certainly within their special knowledge. It is highly improbable, if not impossible, that successive and separate trauma would be caused due to accidental fall. No explanation of such injury on the person of the victim which occurred within 48 hours prior to the death at her matrimonial home also have been offered by the accused persons. Such facts were certainly within their special knowledge. Presence of such injury marks on the victim immediately prior to her unnatural death probabilises the version of P.W. 5, 7, 8, 9 and 15 that she was subjected to continuous torture and assault during her matrimonial life for and/or in connection with dowry demands. The learned trial Judge had completely lost sight of the aforesaid admissible pieces of evidence and had illegally come to a finding that the prosecution has failed to prove the torture meted out to the victim immediately prior to her death on account of demands of dowry. The learned trial Judge had disbelieved the prosecution case on the ground of delay in lodging of first information report. In the instant case the death occurred on 13.01.2006. The first information report was lodged on 24.04.2006. P.W. 5 has stated that two or three days after the incident he had gone to the police station and orally narrated the incident to the police officer and later on lodged the written complaint on 24.04.2006. No question had been put to P.W. 16 (I.O.) to improbabilise the explanation of P.W. 5 that he went to the police station two or three days after the incident and orally narrated the same to the police station. Hence, such explanation of P.W. 5 remained uncontroverted and uncontested. Remissness on the part of the police to reduce such oral communication into writing and commence a criminal case thereon cannot be a ground to throw out the prosecution case on the ground of delay of lodging F.I.R. Furthermore, in the facts and circumstances of this case wherein a pregnant housewife had died within 7 months of her marriage at her matrimonial home under unnatural circumstances, a delay of 24 days cannot be said to be fatal and the learned Judge acted illegally in not taking into consideration the explanation given by the prosecution witnesses for such delay. Another irrelevant circumstance which weighed heavily with the learned trial Judge in acquitting the accused persons, was that in the absence of the viscera report it cannot be said that the victim died due to poisoning. It appears that even the hostile witnesses P.W. 1 to 4 have deposed that the victim had consumed poison. The accused persons in their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. have also stated that the victim had consumed poison. The evidence of P.M doctor (P.W. 13) is that 500 grams of violet coloured solution with pungent smell was found in the stomach of the victim which suggested intake of poison. Such materials on record clearly give rise to an irresistible conclusion that the victim had suffered an unnatural death by consuming violet coloured deleterious solution with pungent smell. From the aforesaid facts “unnatural death” of the victim is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Exact cause of death is not a matter of enquiry in a charge for commission of offence punishable under Section 304 B of the Indian Penal Code. It is nobody’s case that the victim died a natural or accidental death. The learned trial Judge therefore clearly misdirected himself in law in acquitting the accused persons from the aforesaid charge on the ground that the exact cause of death had not been proved due to non-production of the viscera report in the instant case. I am of the considered opinion that from the circumstantial facts proved in the instant case it is clear that the victim died due to consuming the violet coloured solution with pungent smell and such death was clearly an unnatural one. No doubt, in a criminal trial, the prosecution has a duty to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some inevitable flaws because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. Vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other that truth. Vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other that truth. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. (See: Gurbachan Singh Vs. Satpal Singh & Ors. reported in (1990) 1 SCC 445 ; Sucha Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2003) 7 SCC 643 ) The learned trial Judge failed to appreciate such settled principle of law and misdirected himself in coming to the conclusion that the cause of death of the victim in the instant case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. That apart, the learned trial Judge has also not considered the impact of the statutory presumptions available in law under Section 113 B of the Indian Evidence Act. The prosecution evidence had established that the pregnant housewife was subjected to continuous torture by the accused persons at her matrimonial home due to nonfulfillment of demands of dowry. Last of such torture was meted out on 3rd Magh, 1412 B.S., a couple of days prior to her death, and is corroborated by the marks of injury noted by the P.M. doctor on the body of the victim. In the backdrop of such evidence, the learned trial Judge ought to have considered the impact of the aforesaid statutory presumption and the shift of the onus of proof upon the accused persons. He had completely failed to apply his mind with regard thereto. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal suffers from patent illegalities and is clearly a miscarriage of justice. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal is accordingly set aside. The matter is remanded to the trial Court for retrial from the stage of arguments under Section 234 Cr.P.C. The respondents are directed to appear before the trial Court within a fortnight from date. The said proceeding shall be concluded within three months from the date of communication of this order. Lower court record be sent down to the trial Court within seven days from date. The said proceeding shall be concluded within three months from the date of communication of this order. Lower court record be sent down to the trial Court within seven days from date. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual undertaking Joymalya Bagchi, J. The petitioner has challenged the Judgment and Order dated September 21, 2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Bankura acquitting the opposite party nos.2 to 5 herein from the charge of committing offence punishable under sections 498A and 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case is to the effect that the victim, Rina was married to opposite party no.2, Srimanta Gorai, on April 19, 2005 and within a couple of months of her marriage, i.e. on January 31, 2006, she died under unnatural circumstances at Amar Kanan Hospital; on February 24, 2006 PW 5, Parimal Mondal, brother of the victim, lodged the FIR. Charge sheet was filed against the opposite parties /accused persons under sections 498A and 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The case, being a session triable one, was committed to the court of Sessions, Bankura and was transferred to the court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Bankura. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges under section 498A and sections 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused persons. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In course of trial, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses. The defence, however, did not examine any witness. In conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Judge by Judgment and Order acquitted the opposite parties/ accused persons of the accusations leveled against them under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and sections 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned trial Judge appears to have acquitted the accused persons, inter alia, on the grounds that there was no explanation of delay of 24 days in lodging the FIR in the instant case; that the evidence of relation witnesses, viz. PW 5, PW 7, PW 8 and PW 15, were not supported by the independent witness, viz. The learned trial Judge appears to have acquitted the accused persons, inter alia, on the grounds that there was no explanation of delay of 24 days in lodging the FIR in the instant case; that the evidence of relation witnesses, viz. PW 5, PW 7, PW 8 and PW 15, were not supported by the independent witness, viz. PWs 1 to 4; the evidence of relation witnesses suffered from various inconsistencies and/or contradictions and that the cause of death had not been proved in the instant case by PW 13 (PM doctor) since viscera report had not been collected and exhibited. For proper analysis of the aforesaid reasons, a brief narration of the prosecution evidence may be essential. P.W.s 1 to 4 are the co-villagers of the accused persons, who have been declared hostile and have stated that the victim died at her matrimonial home by consuming poison. Such fact had not been disputed by the accused persons during their examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. PW 5 is the brother of the victim and also the de facto complainant in the instant case. He has stated that at the time of marriage, Rs.1 lakh as dowry and gold ornament worth Rs.10,000/- were demanded. They paid Rs.70,000/-, but they could not pay Rs.30,000/-, which they assured to pay within three months of the marriage. Since they were unable to pay, the accused persons subjected the victim to torture and the victim had narrated such incidents of torture to him and her other relatives. P.W. 5 further stated that he had met the victim on Shraban Sankranti and during Durga puja and had seen marks of injuries of her person. He further stated that on 17th Magh 1412 (31.12.2006) he received information that the victim had been admitted to Amarkanan hospital. On rushing to the hospital, he found that the victim was lying dead and there were swelling injuries on the eyes and the head of the victim. He also found blood and froth coming out from the nostril of the victim. He stated that two or three days after the occurrence he reported the matter to the police station verbally and finally on 24.02.2006 he submitted written complaint. His evidence was corroborated by his mother, P.W. 7, who stated about the demands of ten vories of gold ornaments and a dowry of Rs. 1 lakh. He stated that two or three days after the occurrence he reported the matter to the police station verbally and finally on 24.02.2006 he submitted written complaint. His evidence was corroborated by his mother, P.W. 7, who stated about the demands of ten vories of gold ornaments and a dowry of Rs. 1 lakh. His mother, P.W. 7, also stated that the victim narrated incidents of torture due to nonpayment of dowry demands. P.W. 8 (married sister) and her husband P.W. 15 also corroborated the demands of dowry and incidents of torture. They stated that they visited the victim on 13th Magh, 1412, a couple of days prior to her death, whereupon the victim complained of suffering from illness as a result of beating by the accused persons. P.W. 9, an independent witness, has also corroborated the evidence of the relation witnesses relating to torture of the victim. P.W. 6 is the scribe of the first information report. P.W. 10 and 11 are the priest and the barber respectively, who were present during the marriage of the victim. P.W. 12 is the B.D.O. who held inquest over the body of the victim. P.W. 13 is the doctor who conducted the post mortem report and found the following injuries on the person of the victim: “1. One scalp haematoma 1”x½” on the frontal area from mid line to right side 2” above eyebrow. 2. One scalp haematoma 1”x½” on right parietal eminent.” He also deposed that the stomach contained 500 grams of violet colour solution with pungent smell which suggests intake of poison. The doctor stated that the injuries were caused within 48 hours prior to the death of the victim and that the injuries were caused by a hit/blow of hard and blunt substance and the same may be caused by two successive and separate trauma. P.W. 16 is the Investigating Officer of the instant case who conducted the investigation and submitted charge sheet in the said case. The learned trial Judge appears to have disbelieved the relation witnesses on the ground that independent witness namely P.W. 1 to 4 were declared hostile and have not supported the prosecution case of torture of the victim. It is a trite law that relations are the most natural witnesses in the matter of torture meted out to a housewife. The learned trial Judge appears to have disbelieved the relation witnesses on the ground that independent witness namely P.W. 1 to 4 were declared hostile and have not supported the prosecution case of torture of the victim. It is a trite law that relations are the most natural witnesses in the matter of torture meted out to a housewife. There are many reasons as to why neighbours of the accused persons may not be willing to support the prosecution case against the said accused persons. However, mere lack of corroboration from such neighbours of the accused persons cannot be the ground to reject the evidence of relation witnesses if the same is otherwise reliable. In fact, in the instant case I find that the evidence of such relation witnesses had been corroborated by another independent witness namely P.W. 9 and the evidence of torture of the housewife as narrated by the relations was also corroborated by the medical evidence of P.W. 13. The learned trial Judge however held that the evidence of the relations namely P.W. 5 (brother), P.W. 7 (mother), P.W. 8 (married sister) and P.W. 15 (husband of P.W. 8) are inconsistent with one another. The theory of inconsistency was based on minor contradictions as to source from which the dowry money was procured and the fact that the families were on visiting terms during the matrimonial life of the couple. The learned trial Judge failed to consider that the evidence of the said witnesses were consistent to one another on material aspects on the demands of dowry and torture meted out to the victim due to non-payment of a part thereof. Such prosecution evidence was also unshaken in cross-examination and minor variations with regard to source from which dowry money was raised is clearly inconsequential to come to the conclusion that the prosecution case of demands of dowry and torture of the victim for non-payment of a part of such dowry has been proved beyond doubt. Mere inter se visits between the families also do not render allegations of torture and ill treatment unnatural. Learned Judge lost sight of the fact that the post mortem report disclosed injuries on the eyes and head of the victim and it is the version of the P.M. doctor (P.W. 13) that such injuries were caused due to two successive and separate trauma. Learned Judge lost sight of the fact that the post mortem report disclosed injuries on the eyes and head of the victim and it is the version of the P.M. doctor (P.W. 13) that such injuries were caused due to two successive and separate trauma. It is highly improbable, if not impossible, that successive and separate trauma would be caused due to accidental fall. No explanation of such injury on the person of the victim which occurred within 48 hours prior to the death at her matrimonial home also have been offered by the accused persons. Such facts were certainly within their special knowledge. Presence of such injury marks on the victim immediately prior to her unnatural death probabilises the version of P.W. 5, 7, 8, 9 and 15 that she was subjected to continuous torture and assault during her matrimonial life for and/or in connection with dowry demands. The learned trial Judge had completely lost sight of the aforesaid admissible pieces of evidence and had illegally come to a finding that the prosecution has failed to prove the torture meted out to the victim immediately prior to her death on account of demands of dowry. The learned trial Judge had disbelieved the prosecution case on the ground of delay in lodging of first information report. In the instant case the death occurred on 13.01.2006. The first information report was lodged on 24.04.2006. P.W. 5 has stated that two or three days after the incident he had gone to the police station and orally narrated the incident to the police officer and later on lodged the written complaint on 24.04.2006. No question had been put to P.W. 16 (I.O.) to improbabilise the explanation of P.W. 5 that he went to the police station two or three days after the incident and orally narrated the same to the police station. Hence, such explanation of P.W. 5 remained uncontroverted and uncontested. No question had been put to P.W. 16 (I.O.) to improbabilise the explanation of P.W. 5 that he went to the police station two or three days after the incident and orally narrated the same to the police station. Hence, such explanation of P.W. 5 remained uncontroverted and uncontested. Remissness on the part of the police to reduce such oral communication into writing and commence a criminal case thereon cannot be a ground to throw out the prosecution case on the ground of delay of lodging F.I.R. Furthermore, in the facts and circumstances of this case wherein a pregnant housewife had died within 7 months of her marriage at her matrimonial home under unnatural circumstances, a delay of 24 days cannot be said to be fatal and the learned Judge acted illegally in not taking into consideration the explanation given by the prosecution witnesses for such delay. Another irrelevant circumstance which weighed heavily with the learned trial Judge in acquitting the accused persons, was that in the absence of the viscera report it cannot be said that the victim died due to poisoning. It appears that even the hostile witnesses P.W. 1 to 4 have deposed that the victim had consumed poison. The accused persons in their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. have also stated that the victim had consumed poison. The evidence of P.M doctor (P.W. 13) is that 500 grams of violet coloured solution with pungent smell was found in the stomach of the victim which suggested intake of poison. Such materials on record clearly give rise to an irresistible conclusion that the victim had suffered an unnatural death by consuming violet coloured deleterious solution with pungent smell. From the aforesaid facts “unnatural death” of the victim is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Exact cause of death is not a matter of enquiry in a charge for commission of offence punishable under Section 304 B of the Indian Penal Code. It is nobody’s case that the victim died a natural or accidental death. The learned trial Judge therefore clearly misdirected himself in law in acquitting the accused persons from the aforesaid charge on the ground that the exact cause of death had not been proved due to non-production of the viscera report in the instant case. It is nobody’s case that the victim died a natural or accidental death. The learned trial Judge therefore clearly misdirected himself in law in acquitting the accused persons from the aforesaid charge on the ground that the exact cause of death had not been proved due to non-production of the viscera report in the instant case. I am of the considered opinion that from the circumstantial facts proved in the instant case it is clear that the victim died due to consuming the violet coloured solution with pungent smell and such death was clearly an unnatural one. No doubt, in a criminal trial, the prosecution has a duty to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some inevitable flaws because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. Vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other that truth. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. (See: Gurbachan Singh Vs. Satpal Singh & Ors. reported in (1990) 1 SCC 445 ; Sucha Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2003) 7 SCC 643 ) The learned trial Judge failed to appreciate such settled principle of law and misdirected himself in coming to the conclusion that the cause of death of the victim in the instant case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. That apart, the learned trial Judge has also not considered the impact of the statutory presumptions available in law under Section 113 B of the Indian Evidence Act. The prosecution evidence had established that the pregnant housewife was subjected to continuous torture by the accused persons at her matrimonial home due to nonfulfillment of demands of dowry. That apart, the learned trial Judge has also not considered the impact of the statutory presumptions available in law under Section 113 B of the Indian Evidence Act. The prosecution evidence had established that the pregnant housewife was subjected to continuous torture by the accused persons at her matrimonial home due to nonfulfillment of demands of dowry. Last of such torture was meted out on 3rd Magh, 1412 B.S., a couple of days prior to her death, and is corroborated by the marks of injury noted by the P.M. doctor on the body of the victim. In the backdrop of such evidence, the learned trial Judge ought to have considered the impact of the aforesaid statutory presumption and the shift of the onus of proof upon the accused persons. He had completely failed to apply his mind with regard thereto. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal suffers from patent illegalities and is clearly a miscarriage of justice. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal is accordingly set aside. The matter is remanded to the trial Court for retrial from the stage of arguments under Section 234 Cr.P.C. The respondents are directed to appear before the trial Court within a fortnight from date. The said proceeding shall be concluded within three months from the date of communication of this order. Lower court record be sent down to the trial Court within seven days from date. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual undertaking.