ORDER Petitioner is the owner of Ambassador Car bearing Registration No.AP-5T-2196. On 17.1.2004, the said vehicle was seized on the allegation that it was carrying 39 bottles of Indian Made Foreign Liquor without paying the duty. Crime No. 133 of 2003-04 was registered on 17.1.2004 tinder Section 34(a) of Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 (for short, the 'Act'). On 3.3.2004, show-cause notice was issued caning for explanation of the petitioner as to why vehicle should not be confiscated for the offence committed by the petitioner. Petitioner has submitted his explanation. The defence taken by the petitioner was that he has no knowledge of transportation of non-duty paid liquor, by the accused, in his vehicle. Rejecting the contention of the petitioner, the Deputy Commissioner, Kakinada, passed orders on 1.4.2004 confiscating the said vehicle. 2. Aggrieved by the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, petitioner filed appeal before the Commissioner under Section 46-C of the Act, on 26.8.2004. The appeal was dismissed by the Commissioner by an order, dated 25.9.2006 on the ground that the appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 46-C of the Act. 3. Challenging the order of the Commissioner dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation and confiscation of the vehicle, the petitioner instituted this writ petition. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that for the genuine reasons the appeal could not be filed within the time prescribed under Section 46(C) of the Act and the appellate authority erred in not entertaining the appeal and dismissing the appeal on that ground is erroneous. He submits that the appellate authority has inherent powers to condone the delay and therefore, prays to direct the Commissioner to entertain the appeal and consider the appeal on merits. Learned Counsel submits that he had no knowledge of the transportation of contraband liquor and this constitutes a good ground to succeed in the appeal. 5. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Jyosna contends that Section 46(C) of the Act fixes time limit, within which the appeal should be filed and does not provide power to condone the delay in filing an appeal and, therefore, there was no error committed by the Commissioner in dismissing the appeal. 5. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Jyosna contends that Section 46(C) of the Act fixes time limit, within which the appeal should be filed and does not provide power to condone the delay in filing an appeal and, therefore, there was no error committed by the Commissioner in dismissing the appeal. In support of the said contention, the Assistant Government Pleader relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited and another, (2009) 5 SCC 791 . 6. The Assistant Government Pleader further contends that the only plea raised by the petitioner was that he had no knowledge that his vehicle was misused and non-duty paid liquor was transported and such contention has no merit in view of the mandate of Section 45 of the Act and the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Prohibition and Excise, A.P. and another v. Sharana Gouda, 2007 (2) ALD (Crl.) 563 (SC) = (2007) 6 SCC 42 . 7. The issue for consideration in this writ petition is whether the decision of the appellate authority in rejecting the appeal on the ground that appeal is not filed within the time prescribed under Section 46(C) of the Act, is valid. 8. Section 46(C) of the Act, reads as under: 46-C. Appeal. - Any person aggrieved by an order passed by Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise under Section 46 may, within sixty days from the date of passing such order, appeal to the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, who may after giving reasonable opportunity to the appellant pass such orders as he deems fit. Provision fixes 60 days time to prefer an appeal against the decision of the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, and has not vested power to the Commissioner to condone the delay if appeal is not filed within time fixed. Even if there are valid reasons for the delay in filing appeal, once time fixed is exhausted appeal is not maintainable. 9. The A.P. Excise Act is a self contained code. The Legislature has deliberately fixed time limit to file appeal against a decision of original authority. No provision is made to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Even if there are valid reasons for the delay in filing appeal, once time fixed is exhausted appeal is not maintainable. 9. The A.P. Excise Act is a self contained code. The Legislature has deliberately fixed time limit to file appeal against a decision of original authority. No provision is made to condone the delay in filing the appeal. When statute expressly fixed time and no power is vested in the Commissioner to condone the delay if appeal is not filed within time even for sufficient reasons, it cannot be said that Commissioner is vested with inherent power to condone the delay. A creator of the statute derives power from the statute and has to act within the four comers fixed by the statute. 10. The provision in Section 46-C is unambiguous. Therefore, literal rule of interpretation would apply where words of statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous. Literal interpretation has to be followed even if it results in hardship or inconvenience. Language employed in statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency. 11. Statute has not vested power in him to entertain an appeal if it is filed beyond time fixed in Section 46-C. Provisions of Limitation Act are not applicable to the appeals in Excise Act. On the issue of applicability of Limitation Act to such proceedings, apropos to consider few precedents. 12. Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, (2010) 9 SCC 183 , is case arising under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The application for leave to contest the application under Section 13-B of the 1949 Act has to be made within 15 days from the date of service of the summons. Whereas, the application to contest the application was made one day after the said period had expired. The issue for consideration was whether the Rent Controller was right in rejecting the application on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to condone the delay under the Act. It is held as under: "24. Section 13-B is a power given to a non-resident Indian owner of a building to obtain immediate possession of a residential building or scheduled building when required for his or her use or for the use of anyone ordinarily living with the dependant on him or her. It is held as under: "24. Section 13-B is a power given to a non-resident Indian owner of a building to obtain immediate possession of a residential building or scheduled building when required for his or her use or for the use of anyone ordinarily living with the dependant on him or her. The right has been limited to one application only during the lifetime of the owner. Section 18-A(2) of the aforesaid Act provides that after an application under Section 13-B is received, the Controller shall issue summons for service on the tenant in the form specified in Schedule II. The said form indicates that within 15 days of service of the summons the tenant is required to appear before the Controller and apply for leave to contest the same. There is no specific provision to vest the Rent Controller with authority to extend the time for making of such affidavit and the application. The Rent Controller being a creature of statute can only act in terms of the powers vested in him by statute and cannot, therefore, entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay since the statute does not vest him with such power. 25. In such case, neither the Rent Controller nor the High Court had committed any error of law in rejecting the petitioner's application for seeking leave to contest the suit, since the same had been filed beyond the period prescribed in the form in Schedule II of the Act referred to in Section 18-A(2) thereof". 13. In Chhathu Ram and others v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar, Patna and others, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 582, the application filed by an assessee under Section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 before the Tribunal were dismissed as barred by limitation. On a challenge, the Patna High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the Tribunal had no power to condone delay in filing an application under Section 66(1) of the Act. On appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "The Tribunal is not a Court and, therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the proceedings before' the Tribunal. The dismissal of the applications under Section 66(1) was, therefore, proper. On appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "The Tribunal is not a Court and, therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the proceedings before' the Tribunal. The dismissal of the applications under Section 66(1) was, therefore, proper. The provision contained in sub-section (3) of Section 66 does not also empower the High Court to condone the delay in filing the application under sub-section (1)". 14. In Prakash H. Jain v. Marie Fernandes (Ms.), (2003) 8 SCC 431 , on the issue of whether an authority constituted under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 has power to condone the delay if an application/affidavit with grounds of defence and leave to contest not having been filed within the time fixed, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "There is no such thing as any inherent power of Court to condone delay in filing proceedings before a Court/authority concerned, unless the law warrants and permits it, since it has a tendency to alter the rights accrued to one or the other party under the statute concerned." 15. In Fairgrowth Investments Limited v. Custodian, (2004) 11 SCC 472 , Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting provisions of Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 held that "If the power to condone delay were implicit in every statutory provision providing for a period of limitation in respect of proceedings before Courts, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be, rendered redundant. 16. It is further held that "It is not for the Courts to determine whether the period of 30 days is too short to take into account the various misfortunes that may be faced by notified persons who wish to file objections under Section 4(2) of the Act nor can the section be held to be directory because of such alleged inadequacy of time." 17. Similar provisions of Central Excise Act, 1944, have fallen for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise's case (supra), Section 35(H) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, provides an appeal to the High Court. Such an appeal should be preferred within 180 days from the date of communication of the decision or order under appeal. No power is vested in the High Court to condone the delay if such appeal was not made within the time prescribed. Such an appeal should be preferred within 180 days from the date of communication of the decision or order under appeal. No power is vested in the High Court to condone the delay if such appeal was not made within the time prescribed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court pleased to hold that; "In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified on holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days." The Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold further as under: "It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court." 18. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court." 18. In view of the proposition of law as aforesaid and on a strict construction of provisions in Section 46-C of the A.P. Excise Act, I am of the considered opinion that appeal against decision of Deputy Commissioner under Section 46-C of the Act is not maintainable if it is not filed within 60 days and Commissioner has no power to entertain all appeal filed after the time stipulated even if there is justified reasons for not filing appeal in time. 19. There is no merit in the contention of the petitioner that appeal can be entertained even if it is filed beyond 60 days prescribed under Section 46-C of the Act and that this Court can confer power on the Commissioner to entertain the appeal though it was filed beyond the time stipulated in Section 46-C of the Act. It would amount to enlarging the time to entertain the appeal. No inherent power can be traced to him. This Court cannot enlarge time for filing of appeal, which is not provided in the statute. 20. In the case on hand, petitioner has not even filed an application for condonation of delay, leaving aside the inference of inherent power to condone the delay in filing appeal. Thus, the order of Commissioner of Excise impugned herein rejecting the appeal on the ground that appeal was not filed within the time stipulated in Section 46-C of the Act cannot be said as erroneous warranting interference by this Court. 21. For one other reason the relief claimed by petitioner cannot be granted. The only defence taken by the petitioner against confiscation of his vehicle is that he had no knowledge that in his vehicle non-duty paid liquor was carried attracting penal provision of Section 34(a) of Act. 22. 21. For one other reason the relief claimed by petitioner cannot be granted. The only defence taken by the petitioner against confiscation of his vehicle is that he had no knowledge that in his vehicle non-duty paid liquor was carried attracting penal provision of Section 34(a) of Act. 22. Interpreting the provisions of Section 45 of the Act, on power to confiscate the vehicle carrying contraband liquor, in Sharana Gouda's case (supra), rejecting the defence taken therein that the owner of the vehicle had no knowledge that his vehicle was misused for carrying contraband liquor, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that knowledge of transportation of contraband liquor to the owner, of the vehicle is not material. Once it is proved that vehicle is involved in transportation of contraband liquor, it is liable for confiscation. In view of the same, even on merits the petitioner has no case for consideration. 23. Having regard to the facts of this case, the writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this petition shall stand dismissed.