JUDGMENT S.H. Vora, J. 1. By way of this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to challenge the detention order dated 4-10-2013 passed by the respondent No. 2 in purported exercise of powers under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (for short, the 'Act'), detaining the petitioner. The petitioner has been taken into custody. The detaining authority has supplied the grounds of detention also. The order of detention and the grounds state that the petitioner can make representation to the Secretary, Advisory Board, Additional Secretary, Food and Civil Supply, Gandhinagar and Additional Secretary for Consumers and Others and Public Distribution Department, New Delhi. 2. According to the petitioner, the petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation since many years and carried out transportation of various articles under the various schemes of the Government and presently, under the Door Step Delivery System, the petitioner is carrying on transport works at Navsari District and some parts of Valsid District. According to the petitioner, at no point of time, any irregularity or illegality was noticed against the petitioner. According to the petitioner, prior to the Door Step Delivery System, Fair Price Shop holders were to approach the Government godown for lifting the stock of essential articles, to hire vehicles for transportation and to bring the stock of essential Articles at their shops. Under the new scheme, the Government decided to give door step delivery to Fair Price Shop holders at their shops only so as to make the public distribution system strong. Under the said system, petitioner's tender was accepted after following the procedure prescribed by the Government and by order dated 30-3-2013, the petitioner has been awarded the transportation contract for the year 2013-14 for three Talukas, namely, Danta, Palanpur and Kankrej. According to the petitioner, the period of contract would expire on 31-3-2014. According to the petitioner, the petitioner has appointed one Mr. Memon Mohd. Idrish Hussain as his sub-contractor for Taluka Kankrej and for that, agreement dated 2-4-2013 has been executed between them. 3. The petitioner submits that since April, 2013, the sub-contractor of the petitioner was transporting stock of essential articles from the Government godown to the shops of Fair Price Shop holders. Memon Mohd. Idrish Hussain as his sub-contractor for Taluka Kankrej and for that, agreement dated 2-4-2013 has been executed between them. 3. The petitioner submits that since April, 2013, the sub-contractor of the petitioner was transporting stock of essential articles from the Government godown to the shops of Fair Price Shop holders. As a part of sub-contract duty, on 8-6-2013, at about 2-43 p.m., the sub-contractor of the petitioner for Taluka Kankrej, loaded the stock of essential articles for Fair Price Shop of Shri Shakti Swasahay Juth situated at village Padar in the trucks bearing R.T.O. registration Nos. GJ 8-Z-1080 and GJ 8-U-3887. In all, 281 bags were loaded from the godown and Godown Manager had obtained the signature on the delivery slip of the representative of sub-agent and the said trucks reached at the destination at 5-00 p.m. The delivery chalan bears signatures of the members of the Vigilance Committee with their mobile numbers and such delivery slips were deposited before the Godown Manager, Sihori on 9-6-2013 at about 10-30 a.m. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that the Supply Inspector carried out inspection at the Fair Price Shop of Shri Shakti Swasahay Juth and some irregularities were noticed. In pursuance thereof, the sub-contractor submitted his representation dated 18-7-2013 explaining that full and complete delivery of the stock in question was given to the said Fair Price Shop. At great shock and surprise, the petitioner was served with the order dated 5-8-2013 whereby the transport agreement remained with the petitioner for all the three Talukas was cancelled and also forfeited performance security deposit amount without prior notice upon the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the detaining authority has not taken into consideration the fact of cancellation of transport agreement and further, copy of such order has not been supplied with the grounds of detention. According to the petitioner, the said order was challenged before this Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 12913 of 2013 and by order dated 30-8-2013, this Court set aside the order dated 5-8-2013 passed by the respondent No. 2 and the matter was remanded with a direction to take decision afresh. It is also submitted by the petitioner that F.I.R. being II-C.R. No. 3134 of 2013 has been registered against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Secs. It is also submitted by the petitioner that F.I.R. being II-C.R. No. 3134 of 2013 has been registered against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Secs. 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act on 7-8-2013 with Thara Police Station and it is alleged against the petitioner that without obtaining prior permission, the petitioner had appointed sub-contractor. According to the petitioner, the said F.I.R. was challenged by way of filing quashing petition being Special Criminal Application No. 2464 of 2013 and vide order dated 26-8-2013, this Court stayed further proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. As the petitioner apprehended that the respondent No. 2 is likely to misuse its powers of preventive detention under the said Act, the petitioner made a detailed representation on 30-8-2013 and requested not to pass the order of detention against him. According to the petitioner, neither the representation dated 30-8-2013 nor the order passed by this Court staying further proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. were considered before passing of the order of detention. 5. While assailing the detention order, learned Advocate Mr. H.R. Prajapati for the petitioner submitted that the detaining authority placed reliance on the F.I.R. filed against the petitioner but the petitioner has not been supplied with the copy of the said F.I.R. According to him, non-supply of the copy of the F.I.R. would amount to non-communication of the grounds of detention, and therefore, continued detention of the petitioner becomes bad in law. It is also submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the detaining authority has not considered vital and important documents, more particularly, described in ground - I of the petition. Lastly, it is urged that when the transport agreement is cancelled by order dated 5-8-2013, there was no reason or ground on the part of the detaining authority to pass order of detention on 4-10-2013. In support of his factual submissions, learned Advocate Mr. Prajapati relied upon the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Union of India v. Ranu Bhandari, reported in 2008 (3) GLH 700 for the proposition of law that the documents in favour of and against the detenu must be provided to the detaining authority and omission thereof, is a sufficient ground for the detenue to question the detention order. The learned Advocate for the petitioner relied upon another decision of this Court rendered in the case of Sureshbhai Sankarbhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2006 (3) GLH 25 wherein, representation made to the detaining authority prior to the order of detention was passed pointing out factual and legal position and guidelines and requested the authority that before the order of detention is passed, the authority may consider such representation. In the said case, this Court has observed that the representation has great relevance on the decision making process of the detaining authority for passing the order and non-placement of the representation before the detaining authority would vitiate the detention order. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Government, reported in 2011 (5) SCC 244 to demonstrate that the competent authority has not considered the order passed by this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 2464 of 2013 whereby, further proceedings arising out of F.I.R. being II-C.R. No. 3134 of 2013 was stayed. In Para 25 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: "25. In this connection, it may be noted that there is nothing on the record to indicate whether the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the bail application of the accused was pending on the date when the detention order was passed on 8-4-2010. On the other hand, in Para 4 of the grounds of detention it is mentioned that "Thiru. Ramakrishnan is in remand in Crime No. 132 of 2010 and he has not moved any bail application so far". Thus, the detaining authority was not even aware whether a bail application of the accused was pending when he passed the detention order, rather the detaining authority passed the detention order under the impression that no bail application of the accused was pending but in similar cases bail had been granted by the Courts. We have already stated above that no details of the alleged similar cases have been given. Hence, the detention order in question cannot be sustained." 6. Per contra, learned A.G.P. Ms. We have already stated above that no details of the alleged similar cases have been given. Hence, the detention order in question cannot be sustained." 6. Per contra, learned A.G.P. Ms. Jirga Jhaveri while opposing the petition, referred to the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent No. 2 and submitted that the detaining authority has passed the order within four corners of legal provisions and after considering all the relevant materials and grounds in support of the order. It is contended by the learned A.G.P. that the proceedings' initiated under the Act is separate and distinct from the proceedings initiated under Secs. 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Therefore, non-reference of the outcome of the said F.I.R. has no bearing to the issue involved in the case, and therefore, there is no non-application of mind by the answering respondent No. 2. Lastly, it is urged that the respondent No. 2 has, after relying upon all the relevant materials and after subjectively satisfying itself, passed the order in question, and further, all the relevant materials which were taken into consideration, were supplied to the petitioner along with the grounds of detention. In support of her submissions, learned A.G.P. has placed reliance on the observations made in Paras 50 to 54 by the Hon'ble Apex Court in decision rendered in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, reported in 2008 (3) SCC 613 , for the proposition of law that the pending criminal prosecution against the detenu, detention order can be passed as such the order is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct. At the end, the learned A.G.P. also placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Alijan Mian v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, reported in AIR 1983 SC 1130 and, more particularly, Head-note B which reads as under: "B. Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 22 - Preventive detention - Pendency of criminal proceedings pertaining to same subject-matter - No bar. Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. In the circumstances, the pendency of a criminal prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention, nor is an order of preventive detention a bar to prosecution. It is for the detaining authority to have the subjective satisfaction whether in such a case there are sufficient materials to place the person under preventive detention in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order or the like in future. AIR 1979 SC 1945 , Rel. on. (Paras 10 and 11)" 7. In light of the factual and legal submissions, learned A.G.P. Ms. Jirga Jhaveri submitted to dismiss the petition. 8. I have examined the pleadings of the parties and heard submissions of the learned Advocates for both the sides on law and facts and also examined the detention order including the grounds stated in it as well as legal principles cited at bar. 9. There are several contentions raised by learned Advocate Mr. Prajapati for challenging the order of detention. However, the Court feels that the order of detention dated 4-10-2013 stands vitiated mainly on two counts. Firstly, the detaining authority, though placed reliance on the F.I.R. being II-C.R. No. 3134 of 2013, the petitioner has not been supplied with the copy of the said F.I.R. Not only that, the detaining authority was not aware of the fact that the said F.I.R. was under challenge by way of petition being Special Criminal Application No. 2464 of 2013 and vide order dated 26-8-2013, this Court stayed further proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. In light of the decision rendered in case of Rekha (supra), the detention order in question cannot be sustained. Secondly, the detaining authority failed to consider representation dated 30-8-2013 made by the petitioner to the competent authority. It is true that the petitioner has no right to make representation before the detention order is passed. But, once such representation is made to the authority and invited the attention to the grounds that in the facts and circumstances, the authority may not pass any detention order, then it is obligatory on the part of the competent authority to place the same before the detaining authority. But, once such representation is made to the authority and invited the attention to the grounds that in the facts and circumstances, the authority may not pass any detention order, then it is obligatory on the part of the competent authority to place the same before the detaining authority. It seems that the said representation has not been placed before the detaining authority, and therefore, also the order of detention cannot be sustained. 10. Last but not the least, the detaining authority failed to show as to how the petitioner would involve in the prejudicial activities after cancellation of his transport agreement dated 5-8-2013. The decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of Maharashtra (supra), though relied upon by learned A.G.P. Ms. Jhaveri, helps the petitioner. In Para 53 of the said judgment, while referring the decision rendered in the case of Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, 1975 (3) SCC 198 , it is reiterated that the order of detention is a precautionary measure and it is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. Considering the facts on record in their entirety, it is clear that transport agreement came to an end on 5-8-2013 then how the detaining authority can come to a conclusion that the petitioner would involve himself in a prejudicial activity under the Act after cancellation of the transport agreement? There is no material placed on record to indicate that the petitioner can involve himself in such a prejudicial activity after cancellation of the transport agreement. The combined effect of the findings recorded hereinabove is such that the petition is required to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order of detention dated 4-10-2013 passed by the respondent No. 2 is hereby quashed and set aside and the detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if the detenu is not required in connection with any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted. Petition allowed.