JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. This appeal under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent is at the instance of an unsuccessful applicant of a Special Civil Application and is directed against the judgment and order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 24/9/2013 by which His Lordship rejected the writ application. 2. It appears from the materials on record that the appellant herein was appointed on 16/11/1987 by the Sports Authority of Gujarat as a Coach. Between 1989 and 1994 the appellant worked at the Regional Coach Center under the Senior Coach as an Athletic Coach at Ahmedabad. Between 1994 and 1999 the appellant worked as an Athletic Coach under the Senior Coach at Nadiad Coaching Center of the respondent authorities. Between 1999 and 2002 the appellant worked as an Athletic Coach under the Senior Coach at District Patan. Between 2002 and June, 2011 he worked as a Coach at Khokhara Coaching Center. Between June, 2011 and till the date of his superannuation i.e. 24th September, 2013, he served as a Senior Coach at the Ahmedabad Coaching Center of the respondent authority. 3. It appears that since the appellant was to retire on 30/6/2014, the Administrative Officer, Sports Authority of Gujarat, Gandhinagar vide communication dated 12th June, 2013 informed to the Chief Coach and the Senior Coach respectively that the pension papers of the appellant be processed and forwarded to the concerned Department. Along with the name of the present appellant, in the said communication dated 12th June, 2013 there are names of other 8 employees also who are to retire in 2014. 4. It appears that thereafter all of a sudden the appellant received a communication dated 18th July, 2013 informing him that his Date of Birth recorded in the Service Book earlier being 17th May, 1955, he would retire in July, 2013 and not in July, 2014. 5. The appellant was taken by surprise by such a communication dated 18th July, 2013 and was left with no other option but to file a Writ Application being Special Civil Application No.11393/2013 wherein the appellant prayed for issue of a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the letter dated 18th July, 2013. The petitioner also prayed that the authorities be directed to maintain status quo as regards his service. 6. The petitioner also prayed that the authorities be directed to maintain status quo as regards his service. 6. The Writ application was taken up for hearing by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 31st July, 2013 and on that date Rule was issued and ad-interim relief in terms of Para-13(B) was granted in favour of the appellant. 7. Thereafter the matter was taken-up for further orders as regards interim relief on 5th August, 2013. On 5th August, 2013 the learned Single Judge passed a detailed order and came to the conclusion that the appellant herein was able to make-out a strong prima facie case in his favour to have an interim order in terms of Para-13(B) prayed for in the writ application till the final hearing of the main writ application. 8. Accordingly, the services of the appellant herein were protected and the appellant continued to serve as a Senior Coach with the Sports Authority of Gujarat at the Regional Coaching Center, Ahmedabad. 9. It appears from the materials on record that thereafter, other learned Single Judge of this Court took-up the main writ application for final hearing on 24th September, 2013 and vide order dated 24th September, 2013, rejected the writ application holding that the Date of Birth of the appellant is 17th July, 1955 and not 22nd June, 1956 as asserted by the appellant. 10. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant has come-up with the present appeal. 11. It appears that in the Service Book which, according to the appellant, is a Duplicate Service Book, as the Original Service Book got destroyed during the floods of the year 2004, the date of birth initially was stated to be 17th July, 1955 in figures. However, thereafter in the year 2009 having realised that there was a mistake in the Date of Birth, the same was corrected as 22/6/1956 after deleting the date 17/7/1955 written in figures. It also appears on perusal of the Service Book which is on record that in the words it has been stated as seventeenth July nineteen fifty six. Be that as it may, the fact is that such correction was endorsed by two superior Officers, namely, (1) Administrative Officer, Sports Authority of Gujarat, Gandhinagar and (2) Senior Coach, Regional Coaching Center, Ahmedabad. Be that as it may, the fact is that such correction was endorsed by two superior Officers, namely, (1) Administrative Officer, Sports Authority of Gujarat, Gandhinagar and (2) Senior Coach, Regional Coaching Center, Ahmedabad. Both these Officers have put their signatures with the stamp of their respective designation, stating that the date of birth of the appellant has been verified and accordingly corrected. Such correction was undertaken on 13/8/2009 as reflected from the date in the Service Book itself. 12. It appears that the authorities came to the conclusion that such correction could not have been effected without prior permission of the Government. The State Government relied on a resolution issued by the General Administrative Department of the Government of Gujarat as regards instructions for correcting the Birth-date wherein it has been stated that the time limit for correcting Birth date after preparation of the Service Book of the employee concerned, would be 5 years from the date of completion of his Probation period or continuous service as a temporary employee which ever may be earlier and not thereafter. However, in the said Resolution it has been further clarified that if the Government is satisfied that there is a clerical mistake which needs to be corrected then in such circumstances, the Government may permit the necessary correction or change in the Birth-Date. The learned Single Judge, while rejecting the application, took into consideration the following aspects: (i) The Birth-date recorded in the Service Book in 1987 remained as it is for almost 22 years. The appellant must have had many occasions to see his own Service Book, but at no point of time thought fit to get the mistake rectified; (ii) The correction in the Birth-date affected in the year 2009 is contrary to the Resolution of the Government; (iii) If the appellant had documents to show that his correct Date of Birth is 22/6/1956 then there was no reason for him to keep quiet for a period of 22 years and since the correction in the Birth-date in the Duplicate Service Book of the appellant is without any sanction granted by the Government, then in such circumstances, the decision of the State Government to superannuate the appellant w.e.f. June, 2013 could not be faulted in any manner. 13. Mr. 13. Mr. Pujara, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted that the learned Single Judge committed an error in holding that the correct Date of Birth of the appellant is 17/7/1955 and not 22/6/1956. Mr.Pujara submitted that there is cogent materials on record to establish that the correct Date of Birth of the appellant is 22/6/1956 and the learned Single Judge ought to have taken into consideration such materials. 13.1 Mr. Pujara submitted that at the time of confirming the interim relief in favour of the appellant herein, the learned Single Judge had taken into consideration all such documents and it is only after being satisfied with such materials that the learned Single Judge thought fit to protect the service of the appellant. 13.2 Mr. Pujara submitted that there is no contemporaneous record available with the respondent authorities to even remotely suggest that the correct Date of Birth of the appellant is 17/7/1955. Mr.Pujara brought to our Notice that during the course of hearing of the main writ application, the respondents placed on record the Birth Certificate issued by the Sub- Registrar, Death & Birth, Nagarpalika, Dhrangadhra in which the Date of Birth is shown as 18/7/1955. At the same time along with the said Birth Certificate said to have been issued by the Nagarpalika, Dhrangadhra, the State Respondents also produced a Register of the Pay Center School No.2, Dhrangadhra in which the Date of Birth is shown to be 22/6/1953. 13.3 Mr. Pujara submitted that the very same Pay Center School No.2, Dhrangadhra has issued the School Leaving Certificate in which the birth date of the appellant is shown to be 22/6/1956. 13.4 Mr. Pujara submitted that there is nothing on record to show as to who had got the Birth-Date Register with the Nagarpalika, Dhrangadhra. In the absence of such evidence, the State Respondents could not have relied upon such a piece of evidence. 13.5 Mr. Pujara also submitted that in the Register of the Pay Center School No.2, Dhrangadhra, the Date of Birth of the appellants brother, named, Hiralal Ghaghar is shown to be 1/8/1955. This itself, according to Mr.Pujara, is suggestive of the fact that the documents are unreliable, because in a span of 14 days the two brothers could not have taken birth. 14. This itself, according to Mr.Pujara, is suggestive of the fact that the documents are unreliable, because in a span of 14 days the two brothers could not have taken birth. 14. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr.Pujara submitted that the Appeal deserves to be accepted and the same may be allowed by quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 15. On the other hand, Mr. Parth Bhatt, the learned AGP appearing for the State Respondents opposed this appeal and submitted that the learned Single Judge committed no error, not to speak of any error of law in rejecting the writ application, warranting any interference in this appeal. 15.1 Mr. Bhatt, the learned AGP submitted that assuming for the moment that the correct Date of Birth of the appellant is 22/6/1956 even then in such circumstances the correct procedure ought to have been followed for effecting the necessary correction. Without a valid sanction or permission from the State Government such corrections could not have been made in the alleged Duplicate Service Book of the appellant. 15.2 According to Mr. Bhatt, this is a case of fraud and the appellant should not be permitted to take the advantage of his own wrong. 15.3 In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Bhatt prays that there being no merit in this Appeal, the same deserves to be dismissed. 16. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration in this appeal is whether the learned Single Judge committed any error in passing the order impugned. 17. Bhatt prays that there being no merit in this Appeal, the same deserves to be dismissed. 16. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration in this appeal is whether the learned Single Judge committed any error in passing the order impugned. 17. The following facts are not in dispute : (i) The School Leaving Certificate issued by the Boys Middle School, Dhrangadhra dated 20th April, 1971 mentions the Date of Birth as 22/6/1956; (ii) In a duplicate school leaving certificate issued by Sir Ajitsingh Government High School in which the appellant studied for the 11 standard, the Date of Birth mentioned therein is 22/6/1956; (iii) Most importantly, the certificate issued on 1/6/1976 by the Gujarat Secondary School Certificate Examination Board, Baroda reveals the Date of Birth of the appellant as 22/6/1956; (iv) In the Driving License issued by the competent Licensing Authority of the Gujarat State, the Date of Birth of the appellant is shown as 22/6/1956; v) In the Birth-date Certificate dated 25/9/1989 issued by Sir Ajitsingh Government High School, the Date of Birth of the appellant is mentioned as 22/6/1956; (vi) In the Identity Card issued by the Sports Authority of Gujarat, the Date of Birth of the appellant is mentioned as 22/6/1956; (vii) In the provisional Seniority List prepared by the respondent authorities as on 1/1/2006 the appellant who is placed at Sr. No.43, the date of birth is shown as 22/6/1956; (viii) The correction which has been affected in the Service Book was in the year 2009 and not on the eve of the retirement of the appellant; (ix) The said correction has been endorsed by the two Superior Officers, namely, (1) Administrative Officer, Sports Authority of Gujarat, Gandhinagar and (2) Senior Coach, Regional Coaching Center, Ahmedabad. Both the Officers have put their signatures along with the Stamp of Designation with further endorsement that "The Birth date has been checked and verified on 13/8/2009." (x) The passport issued by the Ministry of External Affairs, Union of India, first in instance is dated 26/9/1997, and renewed on 9/9/2008 also mentions the birth date 22/6/1956. 18. Both the Officers have put their signatures along with the Stamp of Designation with further endorsement that "The Birth date has been checked and verified on 13/8/2009." (x) The passport issued by the Ministry of External Affairs, Union of India, first in instance is dated 26/9/1997, and renewed on 9/9/2008 also mentions the birth date 22/6/1956. 18. In view of the above materials on record, it is very difficult for us to accept the submissions canvassed on behalf of the State Respondents that the Date of Birth of the appellant is 17/7/1955. We fail to understand as to on what basis and on what materials, the State respondents are asserting that the correct Date of Birth of the appellant is 17/7/1955. We are saying so because, if the State respondents wants us to believe that the correct date of birth is 17/7/1955, then for that purpose there has to be some corroborative material in support of the same. Although at the last minute the respondents somehow have been able to procure a Birth Certificate purported to have been issued by the Nagarpalika, Dhrangadhra dated 17.8.2013, wherein the Date of Birth shown is 17/7/1955, but it is very difficult for us to accept such a document in absence of any evidence to show as to how such Birth date has come on record and who had got the Birth Registered. At the same time the respondents have also placed on record during the course of hearing of the main writ application, an extract of the General Register maintained by the Pay Center School No.2, Dhrangadhra to show that the correct date of birth of the appellant is 17/7/1955, but it is very difficult to even believe such a document, because in the very said register of the Pay Center School No.2, Dhrangadhra, the Date of Birth of the brother of the appellant, namely, Hiralal Ghaghar is shown to be 1/8/1955 which is just impossible. 19. We are of the opinion that the State Respondents are bound by their own records. It is not the case of the State Respondents that the documents which have been placed on record in support of the plea that the correct Date of Birth is 22/6/1956 are false or created at the last minute. If any fraud is alleged, it must be proved. It is not the case of the State Respondents that the documents which have been placed on record in support of the plea that the correct Date of Birth is 22/6/1956 are false or created at the last minute. If any fraud is alleged, it must be proved. Only because there appears to be some interpolation which has been duly endorsed by the two superior Officers way back in 2009, the same by itself would not lead to a conclusion that the appellant had supplied a wrong date of birth. Besides the above, it is also important to note that according to the provisions of Government Resolution dated 11/8/1989, the clause (1) thereof clearly stipulates that the Date of Birth mentioned in the S.S.C. Examination Certificate should be considered as a correct Date of Birth for the Government service. 20. It may not be out of place to state that vide communication dated 4/12/2012 the appellant was informed by the Secretary of the Sports Authority of Gujarat, Gandhinagar that the appellant will be required to undergo the process according to the Checklist provided in the Resolution of the Finance Department dated 27/1/1989 and the change of birth date should be made in consonance with Rule-40 of 2002 Rules within first 5 years of service and accordingly informed the appellant that he would have to undergo the procedure of obtaining a Duplicate Service Book. In that very same communication, the appellant was informed that he may send his S.S.C. Certificate for ascertaining the Birth Date. The genuineness of the S.S.C. Certificate is not at all in dispute and there is no reason why we should not believe the same. 21. Therefore, the only question we are left with to answer is about the correct procedure to be adopted for effecting the necessary correction as regards the Date of Birth in the Service Book. Technically speaking, the respondents may be right in submitting that the correct procedure has not been followed, but in our opinion the materials on record, the genuineness of which is not in dispute, indicates only one thing that the correct Date of Birth is 22/6/1956. We could have refused to entertain this appeal, had it been a case, where the appellant on his own had effected the correction on the premise that the correct date of birth is 22/6/1956. We could have refused to entertain this appeal, had it been a case, where the appellant on his own had effected the correction on the premise that the correct date of birth is 22/6/1956. That is not the case so far as this appeal is concerned. The correction has been affected by the two Superior Officers of the Government in the concerned Department, way back in the year 2009 and such correction is amply supported and corroborated by cogent and convincing materials on record. 22. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge ought to have accepted the plea of the appellant and should not have rejected the writ application solely on the ground that if such material was in existence, then why the appellant waited for 22 years to get the Birth date corrected in his Service Book. The defence of the appellant is that his original service book had got destroyed in the year 2004 during the floods and therefore, a duplicate service book had to be prepared in which the mistake crept in so far as the mentioning of the correct birth date is concerned which ultimately came to be rectified in the year 2009. Although a lot has been said about the defence of the appellant as regards destruction of the original service book in the year 2004 is concerned, but at the same time we believe that the materials on record, which indicate the correct Date of Birth to be 22/6/1956, also should not be ignored, and if we brush aside the said materials on the technical plea that the procedure has not been adopted, then we are of the opinion that we would be doing injustice to the appellant. 23. It is well-settled that the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. 24. The object underlying the prescription of a time limit for correction of the birth date after the service book of the concerned employee is prepared, is plain and clear. As explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Burn Standard Company Limited and ors. 24. The object underlying the prescription of a time limit for correction of the birth date after the service book of the concerned employee is prepared, is plain and clear. As explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Burn Standard Company Limited and ors. v. Dinabandhu Majumdar, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 172 : AIR 1995 SC 1499 , the first thing to consider is whether on the date of entry into the service, would the employee have been eligible for entry into service on the revised date of birth. Secondly, would the revision of his date of birth after a long lapse of time upset the promotional chances of others in the establishment, who may have joined service on the basis that the incumbent would retire on a given date opening up the promotional avenues for others. If that be so, and if permitting a change in the date of birth is likely to cause frustration down the line resulting in causing an adverse effect on the efficiency in functioning, the employer may refuse to permit correction in the date at a belated stage. As held by the Supreme Court in Burn Standard Company Limited (supra) that such sudden and belated change may upset the legitimate expectation of those who may have joined the service hopping that on the retirement of the senior on the due date, there would be an upward movement in the hierarchy. 25. In the present case, it appears from the materials on record that from the inception, the Department considered the birth-date of the appellant to be 22.6.1956, and this is precisely the reason why in the seniority list prepared as on 1st January, 2006, which is on record, the birth date of the petitioner is shown to be 22.7.1956. Therefore, the apprehension that if there is a change in the date of birth, it would upset the promotional chances of others in the establishment, is of no significance. 26. In the present case, the birth date has already been corrected in the year 2009 and the only dispute is as regards the correct procedure, which ought to have been adopted. 26. In the present case, the birth date has already been corrected in the year 2009 and the only dispute is as regards the correct procedure, which ought to have been adopted. According to the State Government, such correction could not have been effected by the two superior officers without the prior permission, but at the same time, the Government has accepted that the correction has been effected and there is no dispute as regards the identity of the two officers who have corrected the birth date. Once again, at the cost of repetition, we may state that if the correct birth date of the appellant is 17.5.1955, then how come in the seniority list maintained by the Department, the birth date is shown to be 22.6.1956? This is suggestive of the fact that from the very beginning, the authority concerned have accepted the birth date to be 22.6.1956. 27. Now, in such circumstances referred to above, whether it was permissible for the State Government to pass an order unilaterally superannuating the appellant, believing the date of birth of 17.5.1955? It is the State Government who is asserting that the correct date of birth is 17.5.1955, and therefore, the onus lies upon the State Government to establish by cogent evidence and an inquiry to establish the same. Indisputably, without conducting any inquiry in this regard, and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the appellant, the State Government straightway passed the impugned communication, retiring the appellant in July, 2013. 28. It is a settled law that although the impugned communication is administrative in character, but even an administrative order, which involves civil consequences, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice, after informing the appellant of the case of the State Government, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the appellant of being heard, and meeting with or explaining the evidence. No such steps were admittedly taken and straightway the impugned communication was served upon the appellant. 29. In this connection, we may profitably refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC 1269 . In the said case, Dr. Binapani Dei was appointed as an Assistant Surgeon in the Orissa Medical Service. 29. In this connection, we may profitably refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC 1269 . In the said case, Dr. Binapani Dei was appointed as an Assistant Surgeon in the Orissa Medical Service. At the time of her appointment by the Orissa Government, she had declared that her date of birth was April 10, 1910. Dr. Binapani Dei claimed that her assertion as regards the date of birth was supported by documentary evidence tendered by her father, which was verified and accepted and the birth date was recorded in the Civil list and in the history of service of Gazetted Officers of the Government of Orissa, maintained by the Accountant General of the State. In the normal course, Dr. Binapani Dei would have attained superannuation on April 10, 1965, after completing the age of 55 years. But, in consequence of a Notification of the State of Orissa, the age of superannuation was raised from 55 to 58 years in respect of all the Government servants, who were to retire after December 1, 1962. 29.1 Few anonymous letters were addressed to the Accountant General, alleging that Dr. Binapani Dei had misstated her age when she was admitted to the service of the State. After an enquiry, Dr. Binapani was required to show cause why her date of birth should not be accepted as 4.4.1907. It was submitted by Dr. Binapani that her date of birth was correctly recorded and certain school records relied upon by the State was erased, altered or overwritten. Vide letter dated June 27, 1963, the Government of Orissa determined the date of birth of Dr. Binapani as 16.4.1907 and declared that she should be deemed to have retired on 16.4.1962, subject, however, to the extension of service granted from April 16, 1962 till the afternoon of July 15, 1963. 29.2 Thereafter, Dr. Binapani filed a writ-application in the High Court of Orissa for a declaration that the order of retirement passed by the State Government was contrary to law and against the constitution, and principles of natural justice. 29.2 Thereafter, Dr. Binapani filed a writ-application in the High Court of Orissa for a declaration that the order of retirement passed by the State Government was contrary to law and against the constitution, and principles of natural justice. It was argued before the High Court of Orissa that the order made by the State amounted to an order of compulsory retirement, contrary to the rules governing her service and was violative of the principles of natural justice. 29.3 The High Court held that the order declaring the first respondent to be superannuated on April 16, 1962 on the premise that her date of birth was April 16, 1907, amounted to compulsory retirement before she attained the age of superannuation and was contrary to the rules governing her service conditions and amounted to 'removal' within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution, and since Dr. Binapani was not given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against her, the order was held to be invalid. 29.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied, the State of Orissa came before the Supreme Court with certificate granted by the High Court. 29.5 Before the Supreme Court, mainly two contentions were canvassed:- (l) that the petition raised disputed questions of fact and the High Court should not have decided those questions in a writ petition: and (2) that the order refixing the age of the first respondent was an administrative order and the High Court had no power to sit in appeal over the decision of the State authorities refixing the age of the first respondent. 29.6 The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal filed by the State of Orissa, made the following observations, which, in our opinion, are very much relevant for the present case. "9. The first respondent held office in the Medical Department of the Orissa Government. She, as holder of that office had a right to continue in service according to the rules framed under Article 309 and she could not be removed from office before superannuation except "for good and sufficient reasons". The State was undoubtedly not precluded merely because of the acceptance of the date of birth of the first respondent in the service register, from holding an enquiry if there existed sufficient grounds for holding such enquiry and for refixing her date of birth. The State was undoubtedly not precluded merely because of the acceptance of the date of birth of the first respondent in the service register, from holding an enquiry if there existed sufficient grounds for holding such enquiry and for refixing her date of birth. But the decision of the State could be based upon the result of an enquiry in manner consonant with the basic concept of justice. An order by the State to the prejudice of a person in derogation of his vested rights may be made only in accordance with the basic rules of justice and fair play. The deciding authority, it is true, is not in the position of a Judge called upon to decide an action between contesting parties, and strict compliance with the forms of judicial procedure may not be insisted upon. He is, however, under a duty to give the person against whom an enquiry is held an opportunity to set up his version or defence and an opportunity to correct or to controvert any evidence in the possession of the authority which is sought to be relied upon to his prejudice. For that purpose the person against whom an enquiry is held must be informed of the case he is called upon to meet, and the evidence in support thereof. The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed: it need not be shown to be super-added. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act Judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case. 10. The State has undoubtedly authority to compulsorily retire a public servant who is superannuated. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case. 10. The State has undoubtedly authority to compulsorily retire a public servant who is superannuated. But when that person disputes the claim he must be informed of the case of the State and the evidence in support thereof and he must have a fair opportunity of meeting that case before a decision adverse to him is taken. 11. In this background, the facts of the case may be reviewed. In 1957 anonymous letters were received by the Director of Health Services that the first respondent had misstated her age, but no steps were taken immediately to hold an enquiry. In 1961 some investigation was undertaken through the Vigilance Department. The Secretary to the Government in the Health Department on August 23, 1961 informed the first respondent that the Government of Orissa had information that when she was admitted into Class X in the Ravenshaw Girls' School, her date of birth was 15 years, and when she was admitted into the First Year Class on July 9, 1924 her age was 17 years and 2 months, and she was required to show cause why May 9, 1907, should not be accepted as her date of birth on the basis of the entry in the Admission Register of the First Year Class. The first respondent submitted her explanation stating that she did not recollect if she had ever attended the Ravenshaw Girls' School. After some correspondence the Admission Register was examined by the first respondent in the presence of the Director of Health Services and the officers of the Vigilance Department, and thereafter on March 19, 1962, she wrote a letter pointing out the irregularities in the entries relating to age in Ravenshaw Girls' School Admission Register. The Additional Director of Family Planning Dr. S. Mitra was then asked to make a report. In his report Dr. S. Mitra largely relied upon a letter written by the Principal, Lady Hardinge Medical College, Delhi, that the birth date of the first respondent was April 4, 1908. In the course of the enquiry before Dr. The Additional Director of Family Planning Dr. S. Mitra was then asked to make a report. In his report Dr. S. Mitra largely relied upon a letter written by the Principal, Lady Hardinge Medical College, Delhi, that the birth date of the first respondent was April 4, 1908. In the course of the enquiry before Dr. S. Mitra the letter was shown to the first respondent but she declined "to make any comments thereon." Thereafter on September 28, 1962 there was a notice from the Secretary in the Department of Health stating that according to the School Admission Register her date of birth was August 22, 1906, and according to the First Year Class Admission Register it was April 1907, and it was intended to treat the latter date as the date of her birth, and the first respondent was called upon to show cause why that date should not be accepted. The report which Dr. S. Mitra had submitted to the State was not disclosed to the first respondent. It may be recalled that there were four different dates before the State authorities: (1) the entry in the Ravenshaw Girls' School Admission Register showing the date of birth as August 22, 1906, (2) the entry in the Admission Register of the First Year Class showing the date of birth as some date in April, 1907, (3) the report of the Principal, Lady Hardinge Medical College, Delhi, showing the date of birth as April 4, 1908, as recorded in the Medical College Admission Register, and (4) the first respondent's statement supported by her father's statement at the time when she joined the service in 1938 giving her date of birth as April 10, 1910. If an enquiry was intended to be made, the State authorities should have placed all the materials before the first respondent and called upon her to explain the discrepancies and to give her explanation in respect of those discrepancies and to tender evidence about her date of birth. 12. It is true that some preliminary enquiry was made by Dr. S. Mitra. But the report of that Enquiry Officer was never disclosed to the first respondent. 12. It is true that some preliminary enquiry was made by Dr. S. Mitra. But the report of that Enquiry Officer was never disclosed to the first respondent. Thereafter the first respondent was required to show cause why April 16, 1907, should not be accepted as the date of birth and without recording any evidence the order was passed.We think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences, as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. No such steps were admittedly taken, the High Court was, in our judgment, right in setting side the order of the State. 30. Dr. Binapani Dei (supra) was later on followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Sarjoo Prasad v. The General Manager and anr., reported in AIR 1981 SC 1481 . The Supreme Court made the following observations, which are as under:- "Heard counsel for the parties. The short point in this appeal is whether it was open to the respondent to change or alter the birth-date of the appellant, being 25th July, 1927, once accepted by the respondent in 1951, without giving an opportunity to him to sustain the birth date of appellant has been made without giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. Appellant claimed that his date of birth is July 25th, 1927 and this birth-date is entered in his High School Certificate and this birth date was accepted by the respondent in 1951. In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 . this Court held that the date of birth without notice and without giving opportunity to the appellant cannot be altered to the disadvantage and prejudice of an employee because an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made in conformity with the rule of natural justice which at its lowest minimum requires notice and opportunity to he person affected thereby. That admittedly having not been done, on the short ground, we allow this appeal and set aside the order retiring the appellant from service as well as the order correcting the birth date. 2. The appellant under the orders of this Court continues to be in service and will continue to be in service. It will however be open to the respondent if it so desires and considers it necessary to hold the enquiry about the correct birth date afresh after giving notice and opportunity of hearing and producing evidence on either side in this case." 31. We may also quote with profit a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti Prokash Mitter v. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.K. Bose, Chief Justice of the High Court, Calcutta and anr., reported in AIR 1965 SC 961 . In that case, the short question before the Supreme Court was whether the order passed by the President of India on May 15, 1961, approving the action which was proposed to be taken against the appellant, amounted to a decision on the question about the appellant's age as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court, under Article 217(3) of the Constitution. In the note placed before the President along with it's accompaniments, it was proposed that the appellant should be informed that his correct date of birth had been determined to be 27.12.1901, and so, he should demit his office of puisne Judge of the Calcutta High Court on December 26, 1961, on which date he would attain the age of 60. A writ petition was filed by the appellant in the Calcutta High Court, praying for a writ in the nature of mandamus against the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, requiring him to recall the order passed by him, by which he had decided that the appellant had retired from his post as a Judge with effect from December 27, 1961. The writ-petition was dismissed in limine. 31.1 The appellant challenged the correctness of the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge by preferring an appeal under the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent Bench of three learned Judges heard the appeal and delivered three concurring judgments. The writ-petition was dismissed in limine. 31.1 The appellant challenged the correctness of the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge by preferring an appeal under the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent Bench of three learned Judges heard the appeal and delivered three concurring judgments. They were however, unanimous in holding that the learned Single Judge was in error in refusing to issue a Rule Nisi, and accordingly, directed that a Rule Nisi in terms of prayer 1 of the petition be issued. 31.2 Against such order, the Chief Justice of the High Court came in appeal before the Supreme Court by Special Leave. Vide the judgment dated 14th October, 1963, the Supreme Court held that the Special Bench was right in directing that Rule Nisi ought to have been issued on the writ petition filed by the appellant, and accordingly, dismissed the appeal. 31.3 The writ proceedings went back to the Calcutta High Court for disposal on merits in accordance with law. A Special Bench consisting of five learned Judges of the High Court heard the matter. All the learned Judges constituting the Bench delivered separate judgments. The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court. 31.4 The reason why we are relying on this decision of the Supreme Court is for a limited purpose. In the said decision of the Supreme Court, much emphasis was laid on the birth-date of the appellant, which was mentioned in the matriculation certificate. In the present case also, we have led much emphasis on the fact that the certificate issued by the Gujarat Secondary School Certificate Examination Board mentions the date of birth as 22.7.1956. We quote the relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in this regard, as under:- "7. ..... ..... The appellant who was enrolled as a Barrister of the Calcutta High Court on May 5, 1931, was appointed as Additional judge of the said High Court on February 11, 1949. In January, 1950, he became a permanent Judge of the said High Court. At the time of his appointment, the appellant had given the date of his birth as December 27, 1904. It appears that some time in 1959, the attention of the Home Minister of the Government of India was drawn to an extract from the Bihar and Orissa Gazette of June 26, 1918 containing the results of the Matriculation Examination held by the Patna University in April, 1918. It appears that some time in 1959, the attention of the Home Minister of the Government of India was drawn to an extract from the Bihar and Orissa Gazette of June 26, 1918 containing the results of the Matriculation Examination held by the Patna University in April, 1918. The relevant information contained in the said extract showed the age of the appellant at the date of the examination as 16 years and 3 months. This would indicate that the appellant was born on December 27, 1901. 15. Thereupon, Chief Justice Lahiri of the Calcutta High Court intimated to the appellant on September 21, 1959, that he had been asked by the Chief Minister, West Bengal, to inform him that the Home Minister, Government of India, had considered the explanation given by him about his age and had decided, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India, that the age stated in his Matriculation certificate would be treated as final and he will have to retire on the basis of the age as recorded therein. It appears that the Home Minister, Government of India, had written to the Chief Minister, West Bengal, on September 14, 1959, intimating to him that he had consulted the Chief Justice of India in regard to the question of the appellant's age and that he entirely agreed with the advice given by the Chief Justice of India; and so, he suggested that the appellant should be informed accordingly through the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court. That is how the appellant came to know about this decision through his Chief Justice. 19. Accordingly, the appellant met the Chief Justice of India on July 31, 1961. It appears that when the appellant met Chief Justice Sinha, the latter advised him to retire on December 26, 1961 on the basis of the date of birth disclosed by his Matriculation Certificate. The appellant was told that that was in consonance with the policy adopted by the Government of India in recent cases. It appears that when the appellant met Chief Justice Sinha, the latter advised him to retire on December 26, 1961 on the basis of the date of birth disclosed by his Matriculation Certificate. The appellant was told that that was in consonance with the policy adopted by the Government of India in recent cases. The Chief Justice assured the appellant that it was not the intention of the Government of India to do anything to cast aspersions on the veracity of a Judge of a High Court, and he indicated that without going into the correctness of the age given by the appellant, it was desirable that he should retire on the basis that the Matriculation Certificate correctly represented his age. "I am glad" said Chief Justice Sinha, "that you have taken my assurance in the spirit in which it was given, namely, to save you and to save the Government from any embarrassment in connection with such a controversy. This is the substance of the letter which Chief Justice Sinha wrote to the appellant on August 22, 1961. This letter also indicates that Chief Justice Sinha assured the appellant that no aspersion was intended to be cast on the veracity of his statement as to his age presumably because the appellant had indicated to him that he would be willing to retire in case it was made clear that no aspersion was cast on his veracity. As Chief Justice Sinha explained in a note made by him on a later occasion, the background of his letter clearly suggests that the conversation between the Chief Justice and the appellant was of an informal character and the Chief Justice was naturally willing to assure the appellant that if he quits office on the 26th December, 1961, it would save embarrassment both to the appellant and the Government. This approach again was flexible, fair and sympathetic to the appellant. As we have already seen, in due course before the 26th December, 1961 arrived respondent No. 1 passed an order directing the office to treat the appellant as having retired on December 26, 1961; and that has given rise to the present controversy." 32. This approach again was flexible, fair and sympathetic to the appellant. As we have already seen, in due course before the 26th December, 1961 arrived respondent No. 1 passed an order directing the office to treat the appellant as having retired on December 26, 1961; and that has given rise to the present controversy." 32. Thus, applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the afore noted decisions, we are far more convinced that the action of the State Government in issuing the impugned communication retiring the appellant with effect from 18th July, 2013, could be termed as violative of the principles of natural justice and such action deserves to be set aside. 33. In our view, the impugned communication is nothing short of passing an order of compulsory retirement without giving opportunity to the appellant because even an administrative order which involves civil consequence must be made in conformity with the rule of natural justice. 34. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there is merit in this Appeal and the same deserves to be allowed. 35. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 24th September, 2013 is hereby set aside. The communication dated 18th July, 2013 is also hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to permit the appellant to resume his duties as a Senior Coach at the Regional Coaching Center, Ahmedabad, the place where the appellant served last before the impugned communication dated 18th July, 2013 was served on him. The appellant shall be treated to be in continuous service, and since we have held that the communication dated 18th July, 2013, impugned to be illegal and the consequential action of the authority in retiring the appellant before the actual date of superannuation as violative of the principles of natural justice, the appellant shall be entitled to the salary for the period between 24th September, 2013 till the date of this judgment. 36. It will, however, be open to the respondent, if it so desires and considers it necessary, to hold an inquiry about the correct birth-date, after giving notice and opportunity of hearing, and producing evidence on either side in this case and take an appropriate decision. Appeal allowed.