Scindia Devesthan Registered Charitable Trust v. Praveen Kumar Nigam
2013-07-05
G.D.Saxena, U.C.Maheshwari
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Maheshwari, J. -- 1. This order shall decide the following question of law referred by the Single Judge in above mentioned both the appeals by common order dated 22.3.2013. “Whether in each and every case a registered religious charitable public trust is obliged to prove that it’s income is being utilized in religious and charitable purpose of the Trust?” 2. The facts giving rise to this reference in short are that, the aforesaid both the appeals have been filed by the appellants under Order 43 rule 1 of CPC being aggrieved by the orders dated 10.7.2012 and 23.7.2012 passed by the Xth Additional District Judge, Gwalior and VIIth Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Regular Appeal No.16-A/12 and Civil Regular Appeal No.7-A/12 respectively whereby, by setting aside the judgment and decree of eviction passed by the trial Court in favour of the appellants, the cases by framing the additional issues on the question of section 3(2) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter in short ‘the Act’) have been remitted back with some direction to decide afresh. 3. The appellants being Public Trust after serving the quite notice for termination of tenancy filed the impugned suits for eviction against the respondents No.1 to 3 contending that the respondents were defaulter in paying the monthly rent and illegally encroached on some property of the appellants’ trust. It is also stated that, it being religious and charitable trust by virtue of notification of the State of Madhya Pradesh dated 7.9.1989 promulgated under the provision of section 3(2) of the Act, is exempted from the provisions of the Act. 4. In written statement of respondents-defendant had admitted the alleged tenancy the other averments relating to prayer of eviction were denied. 5. After framing the issues and holding the trial, both the suits of the appellant’s trust were decreed by the trial Court. But in appeal filed by the respondents-defendants, the appellate Court, after setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, by framing the additional issue on the question whether the income of the appellant’s/trust is utilized for the purpose and object of the trust, remitted back the matter to the trial Court with a direction to decide afresh after extending the opportunity of hearing to the parties on the aforesaid additional issue also. Accordingly, the appellants have come to this Court challenging the orders of the appellate Court.
Accordingly, the appellants have come to this Court challenging the orders of the appellate Court. 6. Initially these appeal were heard on merits by the Single Bench of this Court, but while deciding the same earlier judgments of the Single Bench regarding crucial controversy of exemption from the provision of the notification dated 7.9.1989, issued by the State under the provision of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act to the appellant came before such Bench, on which the above mentioned point was referred for consideration to resolve the anomaly of conflicting decision on such point. Pursuant to that, the Hon’ble Chief Justice has referred the matter to this Bench to decide the point referred. 7. Having heard the counsel of the parties present keeping in view their arguments at length, we have carefully gone through the records of the Courts below along with their respective judgments and order. 8. Before considering the matter to answer the point referred we would like to reproduce the provision of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act. The same is read as under : “Section 3. (1) .... .... (a) .... .... (b) .... .... (2) The Government may, by notification, exempted from all or any of the provisions of this Act any accommodation which is owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution or by any nursing or maternity home, the whole of the income derived from which is utilized for that institution or, nursing home or maternity home.” 9. By virtue of aforesaid provision, the State of M.P., has promulgated the notification dated 7.9.1989 and exempted some of the institution and the trusts from the provisions of the Act. The same is read as under : “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act (No. XLI of 1961), the State Government hereby exempts all the accommodations owned by -- (i) The Wakf, registered under the Wakf Act, 1954 (No.29 of 1950) or (ii) The public trust registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act 1951 (No. XXX of 1951) for an educational religious charitable purpose, from all the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 (No. XLI of 1961).” 10.
Coming to consider the point referred in the matter “whether in each and every case a registered religious and charitable public trust is obliged to prove that its income is being utilized in religious and charitable purposes of the trust is concerned, on such question various cases have been considered and decided by the Single Bench of this Court in which some conflicting views have been taken by the different Benches. So, this Court has to answer that out of the views of such various decided cases, which view is correct. 11. So far as the validity of the provision of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act is concerned, the same is not in res integra because after enactment of such provision the same was challenged to hold the ultra virus, but on consideration the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Kanhaiyalal Thakurdas v. Gulab Bai Digambar Jain, 1964 JLJ 628 = 1965 MPLJ 188 , has held such provision inter virus in following words : “8. There is no substance in the challenge to the vires of section 3(2) on the ground of abdication by the Legislature of its legislative function or of excessive delegation. The principle is now well established that the Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case; and that it must lay down the legislative policy and principle and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy before it delegates its subsidiary powers in that behalf. See Harishankar Bagla v. State of M.P. [(1955)1 SCH 380: AIR 1954 SC 465 ], and Vasanlal Maganbhai v. State of Bombay [ (1961)1 SCR 341 : AIR 1961 SC 4 ]. Now, section 3(2) does not give to the Government unfettered and un-canalized power to exempt from the operation of the Act accommodation belonging to any institution. The power of exemption can be exercised only in relation to that accommodation which is owned by any educational, or religions or charitable institution, or by any nursing or maternity home, and the whole of the income of which is utilized for that institution or nursing or maternity home. Thus, the Legislature, itself laid down the policy and principle of granting exemption to institutions of certain types.
Thus, the Legislature, itself laid down the policy and principle of granting exemption to institutions of certain types. The only discretion given to the Government in the matter of the exercise of power is in the selection of the institution satisfying the conditions mentioned in section 3(2) for the grant of exemption and in the selection of the accommodation belonging to the institution for being exempted from all or any of the provisions of the Act. The delegation of this power of selection does not involve any delegation of an essential legislative function or power. The question as to which institution fulfilling the conditions mentioned in section 3(2) is entitled to the benefit of the provision ande which accommodation belonging to it should be granted exemption, and whether the exemption should be from all or any of the provisions of the Act are all matters of detail. It was clearly impossible for the Legislature to visualize and contemplate the nature of each and every educational, religious or charitable institution or a nursing or maternity home and the nature of accommodation belonging to it and to make specific provisions covering all the contingencies in regard to the grant of exemption. In our opinion, section 3(2) enunciates with sufficient accuracy and clarity the legislative principle and policy in the matter of granting exemption and the delegation of power to the Government contained in that provision is intra vires.” 12. Subsequent to it, by virtue of the aforesaid provisions of section 3(2) of the Act, the State of Madhya Pradesh issued the aforesaid notification No.F.24-(4)-83-XXXII-I dated 7.9.1989, and exempted all the accommodations owned by the Wakf registered under the Wakf Act 1954 (No.29 of 1950) or the Public Trust registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act 1951 (No. XXX of 1951) for an educational religious charitable purposes from all the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 (No. XLI of 1961). Such notification was also challenged before this Court to hold the same ultra virus and unconstitutional by one Chintamani Agrawal, on consideration such notification was quashed by this Court in the matter of Chintamani Agrawal v. State of M.P., reported in 1994 MPLJ 597 , against which, the Special Leave Petition was filed by the State.
Such notification was also challenged before this Court to hold the same ultra virus and unconstitutional by one Chintamani Agrawal, on consideration such notification was quashed by this Court in the matter of Chintamani Agrawal v. State of M.P., reported in 1994 MPLJ 597 , against which, the Special Leave Petition was filed by the State. On consideration the Hon’ble apex Court vide judgment dated 19.10.1995 in Civil Appeal No.9909/1995 reported in 1999(2) JLJ 379 , by setting aside the judgment of the High Court had held such notification is valid in following verdict : “The State of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (the Act) exempted all buildings owned by the Madhya Pradesh Wakf Board (Board) from the operation of the Act. The notification dated September 7, 1989 granting exemption to the Board under the above mentioned provision of the Act was challenged before the High Court. The High Court quashed the notification on the short ground that there was no material before the State Government to reach the satisfaction that it was necessary to issue the impugned notification. 3. Learned counsel for the State of M.P. has invited our attention to the letter dated March 26, 1976, by the then Prime Minister of India addressed to the Chief Minister of the State of M.P., suggesting, for the reasons given in the said letter, to grant exemption of the provisions of the Act to other properties owned by the Wakf. Thereafter, the State of M.P. made inquiries from various other States in this respect. On receipt of the replies, the matter was considered and thereafter, the exemption notification was issued. We are satisfied that there was sufficient material before the State Government for issuing the impugned notification. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. We seek support from the judgment of this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu.” 13. Similarly the Division Bench of this Court also in the matter of Baburam v. State of M.P., reported in 1997(I) MPWN 3, has held such notification is valid. 14.
We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. We seek support from the judgment of this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu.” 13. Similarly the Division Bench of this Court also in the matter of Baburam v. State of M.P., reported in 1997(I) MPWN 3, has held such notification is valid. 14. On subsequent occasion such question was again considered by the apex Court in the matter of Beti Bai and others v. Nathoram and others, reported in 1999(2) JLJ 380 = (1999)6 SCC 368 , in which after taking into consideration the aforesaid judgment of Chintamani’s case (supra), it was held as under : “8. It may be mentioned that similar notification issued in other States, by which Wakf and Trust properties were exempted, have already been upheld by this Court. As for example, the notification issued by the State Government of Tamil Nadu exempting Wakf and Trust properties, was upheld by this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettair v. State of Tamil Nadu. Even this decision was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges who disposed Mangilal case. 9. In view of the above, the appeal has no merit and is dismissed but without any order as to costs.” 15. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position we proceed to consider the rival judgments/orders passed by the different Single Bench of this Court. 16. In the matter of Boolchand v. Atal Ram Sindhi Dharamshala Trust, reported in 1998(I) MPWN 113, the appellate Court while hearing the first regular appeal remanded the matter after framing a fresh issue, requiring the Court below to give the finding if the whole of the income of the trust is being utilized for the purpose of the trust, in order to find out if the respondent No.1 was covered by the notification issued by the State Government exempting the public trust from the operation of the Act 1961 as per section 3 thereof, because it was contended that there was issue framed by the Court below on this point.
After passing the order of remand, the findings given by the trial Court to whom the case was remanded, should be routed through the first appellate Court which was also required to give its findings on the point and on consideration this Court has held as under : “The trial Court, after recording the evidence of the parties and hearing them, gave a finding that the whole of the income of the respondent No.1 was being utilized for fulfilling the object of the trust. The first appellate Court too has confirmed that finding.” 17. Pursuant to aforesaid cited case of Boolchand (supra), the respondents’ counsel has argued before us that in each and every case the plaintiff like appellants is bound to plead and prove that the entire income received by the public trust like appellants is spent and utilized for the object and activities of such trust/institution. It is apparent from the case cited that while deciding the same the case law of the apex Court in the matter of Chintamani Agrawal (supra), was not taken into consideration. 18. Subsequent to the aforesaid, both the judgments of the apex Court in the matter of Chintamani Agrawal (supra), and Betibai and others (supra), on arising the occasion such question, was again considered by the Single Bench of this Court in the matter of Reg. Vidhichand Dharamshala Trust through it’s President and Trustee Omprakash Garg v. Shyam Singh and others, reported in 2010(3) JLJ 394 = 2010(III) MPJR 142 , in which taking into consideration the aforesaid notification promulgated under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act so also case law in the matter Betibai and others (supra), it was held as under : “21. Validity of section 3(2) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and the notification dated 7.8.1989 exempting the application of the said Act has been upheld by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Betibai and others v. Nathooram and others [ 1999(2) JLJ 380 ]. In the case of Betibai (supra), it is observed that a landlord entitled to the benefit of the said exemption can straghtway file a suit for eviction after serving a quite notice. Thus, it is clear that a registered Public Trust would be able to avail the benefit of exemption so long as its income is utilized for the trust itself.
Thus, it is clear that a registered Public Trust would be able to avail the benefit of exemption so long as its income is utilized for the trust itself. In a suit for eviction, if it is established that the entire income of the trust is not utilized for the trust itself, the plaintiff would no more be entitled to seek benefit of exemption. This may be proved by the defendants by producing reliable evidence in due manner. It is a trite law that a case is to be decided on the basis of the evidence recorded in it, as held by the apex Court in the case of Mitthulal and another v. State of M.P. [1975 JLJ 432]. It is equally clear that utilization of income of the trust for any purpose other than that of Trust must be with the express or implied consent of the trust or atleast within the knowledge of the trust with no objection. In such a situation, the benefit of exemption may be denied to the trust. Thus, it is clearly observed that if the defendant succeeds in establishing by cogent evidence that the utilization of the entire income of the trust has not been made for the purpose other than that of the trust, a suit for eviction by trust under the shelter of exemption of section 3 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 read with the aforesaid notification is liable to be dismissed in the absence of existence of any of the grounds enumerated under sub-section (1) of section 12 of the said Act.” 19. On the other hand in the matter of Dayaram s/o Moolchandra Sindhi v. Shri Charbhujanath Mandir Panch Maheshwariyan Mandsaur, in Second Appeal No.274/08 vide judgment of the Indore Bench of this Court dated 20.8.2010 [ 2012(III) MPWN 5 ], taking into consideration the various case laws including the case laws of the apex Court in the matter of Betibai and others (supra), and of this Court in the matter of Babu v. State (supra), it was held as under : “13.
So far as the contention of the appellant that for claiming exemption from the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act landlord Trust is required to prove that the whole of the income derived from which is being utilized for that institution is concerned, in view of the aforesaid notification and also in view of the aforesaid position of law, it is not necessary for this Court to examine whether the whole income of the trust is being utilized for that purpose or not. First because it is the job of Registrar, Public Trust and not the Court and secondly for application of section 3(2) of the Act also it is not necessary for religious or charitable institution. Whether the income of the institution is being utilized for that institution or not, is required to be examined in the matter where exemption is being claimed by any Nursing Home or Maternity Home and not for religious or charitable institution.” 20. Again such question was answered by this Court in the matter of Shrimal and others v. Shri Achal Gachh Kachhi Visa Oswal Jain Shwetambar Dharmik Parmarthik Nyas and others, reported in 2011(I) MPWN 107 = 2011(1) MPLJ 468 , in which it was held as under : “9. In the present case, no specific plea was raised by the respondent trust that the income of the trust is not being utilized for carrying on the activities of the trust. Exh.P-4 is the balance-sheet for the year 2004-05, from perusal of the balance-sheet it is evident that the respondent/trust is having different accounts from where the trust activities are being carried out. There is nothing on record on the basis of which it can be said that the income of the trust is being utilized for carrying out the trust activities. Apart from this when the notification has been issued by the State Government whereby all the trusts have been exempted and the validity of the notification has been upheld by the Hon’ble apex Court, therefore, it is not necessary for this Court to examine that income of the trust is being utilized for the welfare of the trust. Otherwise also for this purpose Registrar of Public Trust is the competent authority.” 21.
Otherwise also for this purpose Registrar of Public Trust is the competent authority.” 21. Again such question was considered and answered by the Single Bench of this Court in the matter of Kewalchand v. Aachalgachha Kachhi Bisa Oswal Jain Swetamber Dharamik Evam Parmarthik Nyas, reported in 2010(1) MPLJ 158 , in which it was held as under : “6. Now the crucial question in the case may be looked into that whether under section 3(2) of the Act, the plaintiff trust was exempted from all the provisions of the Act. The State Government issued a notification dated 7.9.1989 by which all the accommodation owned by Wakf registered under Wakf Act, 1954 and the public trust registered under the M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951 were exempted from all the provisions of the Act. The notification was challenged before this Court and ultimately the matter travelled upto apex Court in State of M.P. and others v. Chintamani Agrawal and others [ 1999(2) JLJ 379 ]. The apex Court held that notification dated 7.9.1989 was valid. A Division Bench of this Court in Baburam v. State of M.P. [1997(I) MPWN 3], considered this aspect and held that such notification exempting the public trust from all the provisions of the Act was valid.” 22. In the matter of Shri Bhagwatacharya Narayan Dharmarth Trust, Balaji Mandir and others v. Jai Prakash s/o Mithalala Shah, reported in 2011(1) MPACJ 156, it was held as under : “6. From perusal of record, it is evident that the appellant/Shri Bhagwatacharya Narayan Dharmarth Trust Balaji Mandir is a public trust having a Narsingh Temple at Alirajpur. The trust is registered under the provisions of Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. In exercise of powers conferred by section 3(2) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, State Government issued notification dated 7.9.1989 whereby accommodations owned by public trust registered under M.P. Public Trust Act 1951 were exempted from all the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. This notification was challenged before this Court and this Court in the matter of Chintamani Chandramohan Agrawal, reported in 1994 MPLJ 597 , held that notification dated 7.9.1989 granting exemption under section 3(1) of the Act is constitutionally illegal and void being violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India.
This notification was challenged before this Court and this Court in the matter of Chintamani Chandramohan Agrawal, reported in 1994 MPLJ 597 , held that notification dated 7.9.1989 granting exemption under section 3(1) of the Act is constitutionally illegal and void being violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India. Ultimately the matter travelled up Hon’ble apex Court in the matter of State of M.P. v. Chintamani Agrawal [ 1999(2) JLJ 379 ], wherein it was held that the notification dated 7.9.1989 was valid. In the matter of Baburam v. State of M.P. [1997(I) MPWN 3], Division Bench of this Court also held that notification exempting the public trust from all the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act was valid. This position of law is further affirmed bythis Court in the matter of Kewalchand v. Aachalgachha Kachhi Bisa Oswal Jain Swetambar Dharmik Evam Parmarthik Nyas [ 2010(1) MPLJ 158 ], wherein this Court held that accommodation owned by public trust is exempted from all the provisions of the Act. 7. .... .... 8. .... .... 9. .... Since the appellant is a registered charitable trust, therefore, in view of the notification dated 7.9.1989 it was not necessary for the appellant to make out a case either under section 12 or 20 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act and the appellant was entitled to terminate the tenancy of the respondent under section 106 of Transfer of Property Act.” 23. Keeping in view all the aforesaid decided cases of the Single Bench of this Court, in the light of the principle laid down by the apex Court in the above mentioned cases Chintamani Agrawal (supra), and Betibai and others (supra), the question referred is examined.
Keeping in view all the aforesaid decided cases of the Single Bench of this Court, in the light of the principle laid down by the apex Court in the above mentioned cases Chintamani Agrawal (supra), and Betibai and others (supra), the question referred is examined. It is undisputed position that under the provision of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, by issuing the above mentioned notification dated 7.9.1989 by the State of M.P., all the public trust have been exempted from the provision of the Act and pursuant to that, such public trust/institutions are not under obligation to plead and prove any of the grounds of the eviction enumerated either under section 12 or section 20 of the Act in it’s eviction suits, as such in view of the aforesaid notification of exemption, such public trust has a right to terminate the tenancy of the premises in accordance with the provision of section 106 of the Transfer of the Property Act and file the suit of eviction directly and the Court is obliged to decide such case in accordance with the scheme of section 106 of the Transfer of the Property Act. 24. Mere perusal of the language of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, it is apparent that it gives the right to the State Government to issue the notification exempting any educational religious and charitable institution or nursing or maternity home, the whole of the income derived from which is utilized for that institution or nursing home or maternity home, from all or any of the provision of the Act. So, the requisite satisfaction in this regard, whether the income of the public trust is being utilized by it for the object of trust, is required to be examined by the State before issuing the notification and once the notification was issued by the State and all the public trusts and other stated institutions have been exampted by the State from the provisions of the Act, then any of such public trust is not under obligation or bound to plead and prove that the income received by the trust is utilized for fulfilling the object and purpose of such trust.
In such premises, the Court entertaining such civil suit or it’s appellate authority could neither direct nor expect from such plaintiff/public trust to plead and/or prove the income received by such trust is being utilized for the object and purpose of such trust. 25. For the sake of arguments, if the contention of the respondent is accepted then each case the question about the income of trust is being spent or utilized by the trust in fulfilling the object and purpose of the trust, is required to be considered and adjudicated and issuance of notification by the State would have no meaning. The language of the section is very clear which provides that the State Government by notification may exempt from all or any of the provisions of this Act, any accommodation which is owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution or by nursing or maternity home, the whose of the income derived from which it utilized for that institution or nursing home. Meaning thereby, the aforesaid satisfaction is to be recorded by the State Government and only thereafter the notification may be issued. For issuance of notification, the aforesaid requirement is sine qua non. Once the State Government has issued a notification, it can be presumed that the aforesaid notification was issued after due satisfaction by the State Government in this regard and each case the landlord is not required to plead or prove such a factum. Otherwise, it will encourage unnecessary litigation and the entire purpose of issuance of notification would frustrate. 26. Apart the aforesaid, while considering the validity of the aforesaid notification dated 7.9.1989 by the apex Court in the above cited cases Chintamani Agrawal (supra), and Betibai and others (supra), all probable questions were taken into consideration and the aforesaid notification was held to be valid and constitutional. When the apex Court after considering the matter has upheld the notification valid, then the propriety of law does not permit any subordinate Court or to this Court to give any further interpretaion to the language or the decision of the apex Court. The law laid down by the apex Court being law of land, is binding against each of the citizen, the subordinate Courts and this Court.
The law laid down by the apex Court being law of land, is binding against each of the citizen, the subordinate Courts and this Court. In such premises, either this Court or any other subordinate Court did not have any authority to give any further interpretation or to extend the scope of the decision of the apex Court by giving any further or additional findings. 27. In such premises, on examining the case of Boolchand’s (supra), it is apparent that such case was decided without taking into consideration the law laid down by the apex Court in the matter of Chintamani Agrawal’s case (supra), as stated earlier. So, such law laid down by the Single Judge of this Court could not be said to be a good law. 28. Apart this, in the case of Regd. Vidhichand Dharamshala Trust (supra), the Single Judge by giving some further and additional interpretation to the decision of the apex Court announced in the matter of Betibai and others (supra), contrary to it’s principle and spirit has stated that “thus, it is clear that a registered public trust would be able to avail the benefit of exemption so long as it’s income it utilized for the trust itself. In a suit for eviction if it is established that the entire income of the trust is not utilized for the trust itself, the plaintiff would no more be entitled to seek the benefit of exemption”. The aforesaid later part of this cited case of Regd. Vidhichand (supra), being contrary to the law laid down by the apex Court could not be said to be a correct view. In such premises, the law laid down by the single Judge in the matter of Boolchand (supra), and in the matter of Regd. Vidhichand (supra), being not correct, is hereby overruled. 29.
Vidhichand (supra), being contrary to the law laid down by the apex Court could not be said to be a correct view. In such premises, the law laid down by the single Judge in the matter of Boolchand (supra), and in the matter of Regd. Vidhichand (supra), being not correct, is hereby overruled. 29. In view of the aforesaid elaborate discussions the law laid down by the Single Benches of this Court, in the matter of Dayaram s/o Moolchand Sindhi (supra), of Shrimal and others (supra), of Kewalchand (supra), and of Shri Bhagwatacharya and others (supra), holding that subsequent to notification dated 7.9.1989 issued under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, such public trust is not under obligation to plead and prove that its entire income received is utilized for the object and purpose of such public trust/institution, are hereby held to be correct law on the question referred. 30. Apart the aforesaid, on arising the occasion while considering the identical question to some extent a Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Bipin Bhai Shankar Bhai Patel v. Murti Deo Radha Madhavlaji Geda, reported in 1999(1) MPLJ 133 , has held as under : “10. True, the validity of the notification was not considered in relation to the exemption to all the accommodations owned by public trust but when once the notification having come up for consideration before the Supreme Court of which validity has been upheld as a whole, in the opinion of this Court, its applicability on the accommodation in question owned by respondent public trust cannot be attacked, as constitutional validity of the notification on the accommodation owned by public trust is not under challenge in this appeal, as is evident from the substantial question of law framed.
Even assuming for the sake of arguments that the constitutional validity of the notification is under challenge by which exemption from application granted to accommodations owned by public trusts, it may be noticed that this Court has already considered the question in case of Baburam (supra), wherein similar contention was raised, the Court upheld the validity of the notification in relation to accommodation owned by public trust registered under the MPPT Act and observed thus : “In our opinion, the contention has no merit as it is well settled when the Supreme Court considers the vires of a statutory provision or of a notification and upholds the constitutional validity of the said notification as a whole then it cannot be contended that before the Supreme Court a part of the notification was not under consideration. Finality in litigation and public policy both require that a litigant should not be permitted to challenge validity of the provisions of the Act or notification at different times on different grounds. Once notification has been considered by the Supreme Court and the validity of the same was upheld it must be presumed that all grounds which could validity be raised were raised and considered by the Court and the decision would be binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. See Anil Kumar Neotia and others v. Union of India and others [ AIR 1988 SC 1353 ], and Kesho Ram and Co. and others etc. v. Union of India and others [ (1989)3 SCC 151 ].” 11. Besides, view taken by this Court it may also be stated that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all notwithstanding the fact that it is against or in favour of the party and it is binding on even those who were not parties before the Court. It is also well settled that once an authority of law is laid down it is no longer open to recanvass the same on new grounds or reasons that may be put forth in its support. Every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo a binding precedent. It does not lose its authority merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned. It is a law what has been declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and is binding.
Every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo a binding precedent. It does not lose its authority merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned. It is a law what has been declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and is binding. It can only be substituted or clarified or reconsidered by the Supreme Court and not by this Court on the doctrine of per incuriam and sub-silentio which are in the nature of exceptions to the rule of precedent in relation to law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution. As the Supreme Court has declared the notification constitutionally valid now its validity cannot be challenged. To say so, besides the decisions relied in Baburam’s case (supra), we rely on the decisions in Shenoy and Co. Bangalore and others v. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore and others [ AIR 1985 SC 621 ], and D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. [ (1993)3 SCC 259 ]. 12. As a result of aforesaid discussion we hold that the notification issued under section 3(2) of the Act in question by the State Government exempting the applicability of the provisions to the accommodations owned by the public trust registered under MPPT Act, applies to the accommodation owned by the respondent public trust registered under MPPT Act of which the appellant is a tenant.” 31. In the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench it was held, that “finality in litigation and public policy both require that a litigant should not be permitted to challenge validity of the provisions of the Act or notification at different times on different grounds. Once the notification has been considered by the Supreme Court and the validity of the same was upheld it must be presumed that all grounds which could validly be raised were raised and considered by the Court and the decision would be binding under Article 141 of the Constitution”. It was further held that the law laid down by the apex Court is binding on all notwithstanding the fact that it is against or in favour of the party and it is binding on even those who were not parties before the Court.
It was further held that the law laid down by the apex Court is binding on all notwithstanding the fact that it is against or in favour of the party and it is binding on even those who were not parties before the Court. It is also held that once an authority of law is laid down it is no longer open to recanvass the same on new grounds or reasons tht may be put forth in its support. Every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo a binding precedent. It does not lose its authority merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned. It was held that the law which has been declared by the apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution is binding. It can only be substituted or clarified or reconsidered by the Supreme Court and not by this Court on the doctrine of per incuriam and sub-silentio which are in the nature of exceptions to the rule of precedent in relation to law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution.Thus, in such premises also, by giving any further interpretation to the above mentioned decisions of the Supreme Court the public trust could not be directed to prove in each case that it’s received income is being utilized for the object and purpose of the trust. 32. In view of the aforesaid discussions our answer on the question referred is : “that in each and every case a registered religious and charitable public trust is not obliged to prove that it’s income is being utilized in religious and charitable purpose of the trust”. Accordingly after such answer of the question referred, the Registry is directed to place this matter before the Single Bench for further hearing and adjudications of these appeals on merits. 33. Copy of this order are be placed in both the appeals separately. .............