Mohd. Aleemuddin v. State of A. P. rep. by Special P. P. ACB
2013-09-18
R.KANTHA RAO
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : 1. This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.92 of 2011 on the file of the II Additional Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad. 2. I have heard Sri T.Mahender Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri R.Ramachandra Reddy, the learned Standing Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor for A.C.B. Cases for the respondent/State. 3. The accused is the petitioner. He was charge sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w 13 (1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 4. The short facts leading to filing of the charge sheet are that the petitioner while he was working as Deputy Tahsildar in the office of the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Unit, Yellampally, Ramagundam mandal, Karimnagar District, demanded an amount of Rs.20,000/- as bribe for doing official favour viz. handing over of the cheque for an amount of Rs.8,55,626/- which was the compensation amount of the sub-merged lands of an extent of Ac.05-23 guntas belonging to the father of the de facto complainant. It is said that after bargaining, the petitioner reduced the amount to Rs.10,000/- and the de facto complainant who was not willing to pay the bribe, approached the ACB and lodged a report with them. On the strength of the said report, a trap was laid. In the course of the said trap, the petitioner allegedly received the amount of Rs.10,000/- from the de facto complainant. After investigation, the charge sheet was laid against the petitioner alleging commission of offences under Sections 13 (2), 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 5. One of the crucial aspects in this case is that the de facto complainant who is the important witness in the case stated before the Magistrate that while his statement was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. during the course of investigation he stated that the petitioner refused to hand over the cheque on the ground that there was a dispute with regard to the compensation between his father K.Ranga Rao and Katta Anjaiah and paid the awarded amount to the awardee Katta Anjaiah as per the direction of the Special Deputy Collector and therefore, the de facto complainant developed grouse against the petitioner, approached the ACB and got him involved in the false trap after lodging the written report against him with the ACB.
He also specially stated in the 164 Cr.P.C. statement that the petitioner, in fact, did not receive the bribe amount from him, but, he forcibly thrusted the amount in to his shirt pocket, he refused to receive, returned the money back to him. This apart, basing on the representation made by the petitioner to the government requesting to reinstate him into service, as he was falsely involved in a trap case by the de facto complainant, whereupon the sanctioning authority perused the entire material and took into consideration the statement made by the de facto complainant under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate, passed an order that prima facie it seems to be a case of foisted trap and the request of the petitioner herein was cogent and logical and accordingly ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner vide Memo No.50925/VIG.VI(2)/07-2, dated 01.07.2008. Subsequently, the government after careful consideration of the aforesaid material decided to order departmental enquiry against the petitioner instead of granting sanction to prosecute the petitioner in a criminal court and accordingly issued the Memo No.50925/VIG.VI(2)/07-2, dated 13.09.2010. 6. Sri T.Mahender Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that initially the government having come to a conclusion that it is a case of foisted trap, ordered only departmental enquiry instead of prosecution of the petitioner in a criminal court, gravely erred in cancelling the earlier order issued in memo No. 50925/VIG.VI (2)/07-2, dated 20.04.2011 accorded sanction for prosecuting the petitioner under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The sanctioning authority according to the learned counsel cannot review its own order on the basis of the same material and therefore, on the basis of the said sanction order, the prosecution is bad in law. On the aforesaid two grounds, the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to quash the charge sheet against the petitioner. 7. On the other hand, Sri R.Ramachandra Reddy, the learned Standing Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor for A.C.B. Cases filed counter-affidavit contending inter alia that this Court while exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is not supposed to indulge in appreciation of evidence.
7. On the other hand, Sri R.Ramachandra Reddy, the learned Standing Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor for A.C.B. Cases filed counter-affidavit contending inter alia that this Court while exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is not supposed to indulge in appreciation of evidence. According to the learned Special Public Prosecutor the earlier order passed by the sanctioning authority was only directing departmental enquiry instead of prosecution of the petitioner and thereafter basing on the letter addressed by the Director General , ACB, A.P. Hyderabad reconsidered the final report submitted by the A.C.B. against the petitioner and issued the sanction order for prosecution and therefore, the validity of the sanction cannot be questioned. 8. As regards the statement made by the de facto complainant under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate totally contradicting the version of the prosecution and specially stating that the petitioner did not demand and receive any bribe from him, but, he thrusted the amount into his pocket as he refused to issue the cheque for an amount of Rs.8,56,626/- relating to his father, I would like to state that the statement given by the witness before the Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence. It would be known only in the course of trial as to which stand the de facto complainant would confine i.e. whether he speaks in accordance with the prosecution story or follows his version in the 164 Cr.P.C. statement. Therefore, on the mere ground that the de facto complainant gives a totally inconsistent version to the prosecution story in his 164 Cr.P.C. statement, the charge sheet cannot be quashed. 9. The crucial question, however, would be as to whether the sanctioning authority can review or revise its own order on the basis of the same material. There need not be any doubt as to the fact that the subsequent order passed by the government to prosecute the petitioner is basing on the same very material which it considered to pass an order directing only departmental enquiry and not to prosecute the petitioner for a criminal offence before the Court. 10.
There need not be any doubt as to the fact that the subsequent order passed by the government to prosecute the petitioner is basing on the same very material which it considered to pass an order directing only departmental enquiry and not to prosecute the petitioner for a criminal offence before the Court. 10. According to the learned Standing Counsel for A.C.B. cases, the earlier order passed by the sanctioning authority is without application of mind and subsequently pursuant to the letter addressed by the Director General, A.C.B., the Principal Secretary to the Government, the sanctioning authority reconsidered the final report submitted by the A.C.B. dated 07.02.2008 and issued sanction order to prosecute the petitioner. Admittedly, in this case the letter addressed by the Director General, A.C.B. also reveals that the request was made in the said letter to reconsider the final report filed by the A.C.B. against the petitioner and the sanctioning authority passed the subsequent order basing on the same material which it earlier considered. 11. Learned Standing Counsel for A.C.B. relied on some judgments to persuade this Court that if the earlier order passed by the competent authority refusing or according sanction is the result of non-application of mind, the competent authority can subsequently review or revive its own order. They are: (i) K. SRINIVASULU v. THE GOVERNEMNT OF A.P. REP. BY ITS PRL.SECRETARY, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS ((2010)2 ALT (Cri) 147) ii) JAGJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB ((1996) 0 Crl.L.J. 2962) wherein the learned single Judge of this Court and the learned single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed the government orders issued by the competent authority declining to order sanction for prosecution on the ground that the said orders were passed without application of mind and directed the competent authority to examine the request of the prosecution for sanction afresh in accordance with the observations made in the writ petitions. The above said two decisions are not applicable to the facts of the present case since in this case, the earlier order cannot be said to be the result of non-application of mind.
The above said two decisions are not applicable to the facts of the present case since in this case, the earlier order cannot be said to be the result of non-application of mind. The learned Standing Counsel for A.C.B. further relied on STATE OF M.P. v. AWADH KISHORE GUPTA AND OTHERS ( AIR 2004 SC 517 ) wherein the Supreme Court held as follows: “The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.” 12. This Court is also of the opinion that the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have to be exercised cautiously and sparingly and this Court is not supposed to quash the F.I.R./charge sheet on the premise that there is no likelihood of the case being ended in conviction. At the same time, this Court is also not expected to act mechanically without considering the fact that the trial would only be futile exercise and also the fact that the trial, if at all takes place, it would be absolutely an abuse of process of law and would result in miscarriage of justice. 13. Now I would like to refer to some judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner.
13. Now I would like to refer to some judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. They are: i) ASHOK KUMAR ASWAL v. UOI AND OTHERS (II (2013) CCR 72) wherein the learned single Judge of Delhi High Court took the view that the sanctioning authority has absolute discretion to grant or withhold sanction, it must apply its independent mind to the material before it, mind of sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor there any external force to take a decision one way or the other and if discretion of not granting sanction is taken away, sanction becomes mechanical act and nullity. ii) B. SHIVARUDRASWAMY v. STATEOF KARNATAKA (LAWS (KAR)-2008-2-73) wherein the learned single Judge of Karnataka High Court held that no fresh material was placed before the sanctioning authority for reconsideration, the material being the same, there could not have been a fresh order reviewing the earlier order refusing to accord sanction. iii) STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER v. MOHAMMED IQBAL BHATTI (2010 CRL.L.J. 1436) wherein the Supreme Court held as follows: “Although the State in the matter of grant or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory jurisdiction, the same, however, would not mean that power once exercised cannot be exercised once again. For exercising its jurisdiction at a subsequent stage, express power of review in the State may not be necessary as even such a power is administrative in character. It is, however, beyond any cavil that while passing an order for grant of sanction, serious application of mind on the part of the concerned authority is imperative. The legality and/or validity of the order granting sanction would be subject to review by the criminal courts. An order refusing to grant sanction may attract judicial review by the Superior Courts. Validity of an order of sanction would depend upon application of mind on the part of the authority concerned and the material placed before it. All such material facts and material evidences must be considered by it. The sanctioning authority must apply its mind on such material facts and evidences collected during the investigation. Even such application of mind does not appear from the order of sanction, extrinsic evidences may be placed before the court in that behalf.
All such material facts and material evidences must be considered by it. The sanctioning authority must apply its mind on such material facts and evidences collected during the investigation. Even such application of mind does not appear from the order of sanction, extrinsic evidences may be placed before the court in that behalf. While granting sanction, the authority cannot take into consideration an irrelevant fact nor can it pass an order on extraneous consideration not germane for passing a statutory order. It is also well settled that the Superior Courts cannot direct the sanctioning authority either to grant sanction or not to do so. The source of power of an authority passing an order of sanction must also be considered. The Vigilance Department did not contend that the Hon'ble Minister did not have any jurisdiction. It accepted the said order. It was not challenged. Only when a new government came in, a request was made for reconsideration of the earlier order, as would be evident from the memo of the Secretary of the Department. It was, therefore, not a case where fresh materials were placed before the sanctioning authority. No case, therefore, was made out that the sanctioning authority had failed to take into consideration a relevant fact or took into consideration an irrelevant fact. If the clarification sought for by the Hon'ble Minister had been supplied, as has been contended before us, the same should have formed a ground for reconsideration of the order. It is stated before us that the Government sent nine letters for obtaining the clarifications which were not replied to.” i) MANSUKHLAL VITHALDAS CHAUHAN v. STATE OF GUJARAT ( AIR 1997 SC 3400 )wherein the Supreme Court held that ‘the mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration.
Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be had for the reason that the discretion of the authority "not to sanction" was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution.’ 14. The facts of the present case have to be examined in the light of the principles laid down by the High Court and the Supreme Court concerning the subject matter. There is no dispute about the fact that this Court taking into probabilities into consideration and indulging in exercise of appreciation of evidence shall not quash the F.I.R./charge sheet in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In his 164 Cr.P.C. statement, the de facto complainant totally departed from the prosecution story and gave an inconsistent version to the effect that the petitioner never demanded any bribe, but he thrusted the amount into his pocket having developed the grouse for refusal by the petitioner to issue the cheque in the name of his father and hand over to him. No doubt, this would be a serious lacuna in the prosecution case in the event if the trial takes place. But, it is premature to visualize as to how the prosecution would be able to explain the situation before the trial Court. Therefore, the 164 Cr.P.C. statement not being a substantive piece of evidence, cannot totally deprive to prosecution from establishing its case by explaining away the circumstances under which the de facto complainant gave the statement before the magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Similarly, the petitioner also could be able to show before the trial Court that what all the de facto complainant stated before the learned magistrate is only true and that his written report and his statement allegedly recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is not at all correct and genuine. Therefore, this is a matter which has to be left to the decision of the trial Court. 15.
Therefore, this is a matter which has to be left to the decision of the trial Court. 15. But, the arguments which can be advanced on the validity of the sanction will be the same before this Court and also before the trial Court, if at all, the trial takes place. Therefore, this issue assumes greater importance in this case. At the cost of repetition, I would like to state that the earlier order passed by the competent authority only directing departmental enquiry and not to initiate any criminal prosecution against the petitioner and the subsequent order passed by the competent authority according sanction to prosecute the petitioner are on the very same material. Moreover, in the earlier order, the sanctioning authority having considered the entire material placed before it in the form of final report filed by the A.C.B. specifically mentioned that it seems to be a case of foisted trap. Only after the letter dated 29.10.2010 addressed by the Director General, A.C.B. to reconsider the final report of A.C.B. dated 07.02.2008 passed the second order directing the sanction to prosecute the petitioner. Absolutely no fresh material was placed before the sanctioning authority and no special reasons were assigned for according sanction to prosecute the petitioner in the second order. It would clearly appear to me that the sanctioning authority while passing second order was unable to apply its independent mind on account of the request made by the Director General, A.C.B. to reconsider the final report and has not exercised its discretion properly while according sanction contrary to its earlier order. The sanction order, therefore, seems to have been passed mechanically without application of mind. Further, as per the judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the sanctioning authority cannot revise or review its own order on the same material. In the present case, the sanctioning authority reviewed its own order on the same material. It also has not assigned any cogent reasons as to why it took a different stand having earlier been thoroughly convinced that the case seems to be a case of foisted trap and that the petitioner in his explanation gave cogent and convincing reasons.
In the present case, the sanctioning authority reviewed its own order on the same material. It also has not assigned any cogent reasons as to why it took a different stand having earlier been thoroughly convinced that the case seems to be a case of foisted trap and that the petitioner in his explanation gave cogent and convincing reasons. This Court while acting under Section 482 Cr.P.C. if reaches the absolute certainty that the trial would only be a futile exercise, for the sanction being void, making the accused to undergo ordeal of trial would be an abuse of process of law and it would result in miscarriage of justice. 16. For the reasons aforementioned, the proceedings in C.C.No.92 of 2011 on the file of the II Additional Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad are hereby quashed and the criminal petition is allowed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, filed in this criminal petition shall stand closed.