Judgment : Manjula Chellur, C.J. 1. This writ petition is in the character of a Public Interest Litigation by the present Leader of Opposition in the Kerala Legislative Assembly. The petitioner has sought for the following reliefs: “I. Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the first respondent to hand over the investigation of Crime No.59/2011 of Kozhikode Town Police Station to the 2nd respondent CBI; II. Issue such other reliefs as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” An interim relief was also sought for when the writ petition came to be presented. 2. The averments in the writ petition and the reliefs sought for indicate, the petitioner seeks a direction for enquiry by the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI” for short) into Crime No.59 of 2011 registered on the file of Town Police Station, Kozhikode City for offences punishable under Sections 120B, 109, 193, 214, 465, 468 r/w Section 34 IPC. This crime came to be registered on the basis of a report submitted to the Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode city by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, City Branch dated 29.01.2011. The report of the Assistant Commissioner again relates back to a Press Report wherein one Rauf seems to have made serious allegations regarding successful attempts made by him to deviate the investigation in Crime No.282 of 1997 of Nadakkavu Police Station which is known as “Ice Cream Parlour case”. The report further indicates, attempts were made to subvert justice by successfully jettisoning the trial and the incidental proceedings before the trial Court as also this Court by influencing Judges, lawyers and other Constitutional functionaries, so on and so forth. 3. Ext.P2 is the FIR in Crime No.59/2011 based on Ext.P1 complaint. The accused No.1 is none other than one P.K. Kunhalikutty, a Minister in the present Cabinet and the second accused is none other than K.A. Rauf, Co-brother of accused No.1. The allegations made are very serious and damaging, so far as the two pillars of our democracy; i.e., the Legislature and the Judiciary. True or false, the accusations raise very serious concerns. If true, the very foundation of the judicial system is shaken and puts the entire legal fraternity in a very dark shade; darken than the darkest that befell the society. True or false, the accusations raise very serious concerns. If true, the very foundation of the judicial system is shaken and puts the entire legal fraternity in a very dark shade; darken than the darkest that befell the society. If false, by the sheer nature of allegations or accusations made, it puts the accuser in a very bad light and he owes an explanation to the society at large, apart from other legal proceedings. 4. Learned Senior advocate Mr. Shekhar Naphade appearing for the writ petitioner urged the following five aspects: (1) Unusual nature of the case which has been initiated based on the Press Report which relates to the disclosures of one K.A. Rauf a close relative of a prominent political personality; (2) that the persons named are very influential personalities closely linked with the administration of the State wielding political power as also having financial clout; (3) the investigating officer instead of conducting investigation took the responsibility of an adjudicator; (4) Several important and vital aspects were not investigated upon and finally (5) there is reasonable likelihood of bias. According to the learned Senior counsel Sri. Shekhar Naphade, the present investigation carried on would glaringly demonstrate such unwillingness and if not unwillingness, plain and simple inefficiency on the part of the investigating agency. The learned Senior Counsel would also place reliance on Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat and others [(2006) 3 SCC 374], Vikas Kumar Roorkewal v. State of Uttarakhand and Others [(2011) 2 SCC 178], Union of India & others v. Ramesh Gandhi [(2012) 1 SCC 476], Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others v. Union of India and others [(2012) 3 SCC 104], and Hema v. State, Thr. Inspector of Police [(2013) 1 Scale 242]. 5. As against this the learned Advocate General appearing for the State placing reliance on the investigating papers and the Report took us through the relevant dates to say that the so called disclosure was made by Mr. Rauf in a Press Conference on 28.01.2011 and immediately thereafter on 30.01.2011 Crime No.59/2011 was registered by the Town Police, Kozhikode for the above said offences against Sri. P.K. Kunhalikutty and Mr. Rauf. The Special Investigation Team was constituted on 03.02.2011 pertinently by the Government headed by the present petitioner himself. Rauf in a Press Conference on 28.01.2011 and immediately thereafter on 30.01.2011 Crime No.59/2011 was registered by the Town Police, Kozhikode for the above said offences against Sri. P.K. Kunhalikutty and Mr. Rauf. The Special Investigation Team was constituted on 03.02.2011 pertinently by the Government headed by the present petitioner himself. Emphasis was made by the learned Advocate General on the fact that the very same Special Investigation Team was continued by the present Government after it came into office. The present petition came to be filed on 28.08.2011 on the ground that the Special Investigation Team has not proceeded with the investigation an inch and on that reason, the petitioner sought investigation of the case by CBI. 6. At the initial stage a Division Bench of this Court by an interim order dated 27.09.2011 had called for a report and specifically noticed the progress made in the investigation and kept the matter pending so as to monitor the progress of the case. Another interim order dated 22.12.2011 indicates the status report being filed by the investigating agency and the same was scrutinized. At that stage the Division Bench of this Court had express satisfaction at the progress of the investigation. 7. According to the learned Advocate General, the claim of sluggish investigation which form the basis of the writ petition stands totally effaced or erased on the fact that the final report has been filed before the jurisdictional Magistrate court; the petitioner had also obtained copies of the Report and Case Diary, and are produced before this Court. The present attempt of the petitioner is to persuade this Court into usurping the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Court under Section 173(8) of ode of Criminal Procedure; which, again according to the learned Advocate General, is impermissible in the light of law laid down by this Court and also Hon’ble Supreme Court. He places reliance on the following decisions: India Carat (P) ltd. v. State of Karnataka [(1989) 2 SCC 132], Kunga Nima Lepcha v. State of Sikkim [(2010) 4 SCC 513], State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010 (1) KLT 723), Jakia Nasim Ahesan and Another v. State of Gujarat and Others [(2011) 12 SCC 302] and State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [AIR 2012 SC 364]. While referring to the judicial pronouncements in these decisions, learned Advocate General raised a note of caution to us from usurping the powers of the Magistrate’s Court under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. by entering into findings on the legality or sanctity of the final report now produced by the petitioner; especially in the absence of there being no pleadings by way of amendment or otherwise, to urge such relief. In other words, learned Advocate General’s contention is, that the basis of Public Interest Litigation being the lethargy in investigation, which alone constitute the pleading in the above writ petition, is no more available with the filing report and there cannot be any scope for expanding the ambit of the litigation. 8. Based on final report could we consider at this stage whether investigation is proper or not? Pleadings do not reflect such fact and further this Court is incompetent to go into the legality of the final report etc. is the contention put forth by learned Advocate General and additional respondents too. 9. Mr. Chandrasekhara Pillai, the learned counsel for the CBI would submit fairly that the Magistrate court though has ample power to order further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. but cannot order such enquiry to be conducted by the CBI. According to him, only this Court is competent to do so. He places reliance in State of West Bengal and others v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, W.B. [(2010) 3 SCC 571] and State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [AIR 2012 SC 364] to substantiate his contention. Both these citations are cited (supra) by the State also. 10. During the pendency of the above proceedings, impleading applications, in all four, came to be filed which are allowed. Out of these impleaded respondents; respondent Nos.6 & 7 who were examined earlier in criminal trial as P.Ws 8 and 9; support the statement of Rauf. These two respondents are alleged to be victims of sexual harassment in the earlier case. They are before this Court as additional respondents to contend that in the earlier case their deposition was an outcome of coercion and was secured by said Rauf on the strength of illegal gratification. Contending that alleged victims have no confidence in the investigation conducted by the State Police, Mr. A.C. Jojo learned counsel appearing for them supports the prayer of petitioner for a CBI enquiry. Contending that alleged victims have no confidence in the investigation conducted by the State Police, Mr. A.C. Jojo learned counsel appearing for them supports the prayer of petitioner for a CBI enquiry. Except saying that their deposition in the earlier case was tainted, they do not place on record any knowledge about the alleged influence exerted by Rauf on judicial officers and other authorities. It is pertinent to mention that these are persons who voluntarily and willingly contend that they have subverted the judicial system in the earlier legal proceedings. As a matter of fact, now they swear to an affidavit that Sri. P.K. Kunhalikutty had in fact perpetrated sexual harassment on them. Learned counsel Sri. Jojo places reliance on Rajender Singh Palthania v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2011 13 SCC 329]. 11. On the other hand other two additional respondents 4 and 5 refute the allegations made by Rauf and oppose the prayer of the petitioner. Learned counsel Sri. Sathyanatha Menon, represents additional 4th respondent who had approached this Court earlier in a Public Interest Litigation. According to Rauf it was dismissed on the influence exerted by him by way of illegal gratification to a judge of this Court. Rauf claims to have set up this additional respondent in the earlier Public Interest Litigation which was dismissed along with another Public Interest Litigation filed by one Ajitha, representing a non-governmental organization. According to Rauf, a writ appeal got filed at his instance and also a Special Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court were dismissed so as to scuttle the proper adjudication of an appeal filed by the aforementioned Ajitha against the common judgment. But additional respondent No.4 vehemently refutes such allegations and points out that he has been espousing the cause of the public in other cases also and condemns the allegations of Rauf as baseless and unsustainable. 12. Mr. Santhosh Mathew, learned counsel appearing for another additional respondent No.5 also opposes the prayer of the petitioner mainly pointing out the antecedents of Rauf and also the sanctity that can be attached to the disclosures made by such persons. He also submits that petitioner has made an application before Magistrate Court, which is seized of the final report, challenging and seeking rejection of the final report. In such circumstances, there is no justification asking for an enquiry by a special agency is the contention. 13. Sri. He also submits that petitioner has made an application before Magistrate Court, which is seized of the final report, challenging and seeking rejection of the final report. In such circumstances, there is no justification asking for an enquiry by a special agency is the contention. 13. Sri. N. Nandakumara Menon, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for a practicing advocate before this Court, who is brought on record as additional respondent No.3, confines his arguments to the damage caused to the judicial system by the reckless and baseless accusations of Rauf. He places reliance on judgment of this Court in W.P.(C) No.12285 of 2011 dated 12.04.2011 wherein yet another organization had sought similar relief i.e., an enquiry into the allegations made against two judges of this Court. The judgment of the Division Bench in the said petition categorically dismissed said accusations. Learned Senior counsel Mr. Menon places reliance on [(2010) 3 SCC 571] and [(2011) 12 SCC 302] (supra). 14. Learned counsel Mr. R. Satheesh appearing for the petitioner though admits in his reply address the powers and discretion vested with the Magistrate to order for further investigation under Section 173 Cr.P.C., categorically points out that such discretion does not extend to order an enquiry by the CBI. He further replies the argument advanced by the respondents so far as absence of pleadings, that the present petition being a Public Interest Litigation, there is no need of adhering to strict norms of adversarial litigation. While vehemently urging this Court to exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution so as to perform its solemn duty to see that justice is not subverted and ensure that person who attempts the same by whatever means, is properly dealt with places reliance on the judgments of the Apex court reported in State of Punjab v. CBI [(2011) 9 SCC 182], and R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court [(2009) 8 SCC 106]. According to Mr. Satheesh this Court alone is empowered to order investigation by the premier investigating agency of the country, i.e. CBI, and not the Magistrate court, and such enquiry by CBI perfectly would justify the facts and circumstances in the above case. 15. In order to appreciate the contentions raised, one has to understand the facts in the right perspective with reference to the law declared by the Apex Court and other Courts on the subject. 15. In order to appreciate the contentions raised, one has to understand the facts in the right perspective with reference to the law declared by the Apex Court and other Courts on the subject. The allegation made are serious in nature so also unusual. The fact that the important functionaries of the State and judiciary are alleged to have been involved itself is a great concern. Whether this alone can persuade us and justify an investigation by the CBI especially when the investigation by Special Team appointed by the State has reached the final stage, by submission of final report before the Magistrate Court? Before entering into arena of legality or sanctity of the investigation as discernible from the Case Diary and final report to appreciate the contention of alleged omission to enquire into the vital aspects, as also the reasonable likelihood of bias, we have to look into the background in which the present situation has arisen. 16. Crime No.282/97 eventually led to filing of charge sheet against 16 accused citing several witnesses but ultimately ended in an acquittal. The witnesses gave a complete go by to their earlier version, in the trial. Though the named Minister’s involvement was looked into at the earliest stage of investigation, ultimately he was not arrayed as accused in the proceedings. Though above crime led to different litigations like Public Interest Litigations, three in number, they came to be dismissed by a common judgment of this Court dated 30.07.1998. Appeals and Special Leave Petitions filed also ended in dismissal. So far as Public Interest Litigation is concerned, the subject matter was the involvement of the named Minister and the failure on the part of the investigating agency to arraign him as an accused. When the criminal trial ended in acquittal, there was an appeal at the instance of the State and so also Revision by one Ajitha who was examined as PW1, the defacto complainant in SC No.124 of 2002. Again by a common judgment in Crl.R.P. No.1000 of 2006 and Crl.R.P. No.2341 of 2006, these two petitions were dismissed on 16.11.2007. The allegation in the present petition is that these two judgments o this Court claim to have been obtained by Mr. Rauf influencing the judges with illegal gratification. Both these judgments were taken up to the Apex court but none of the judgments were reversed. 17. The allegation in the present petition is that these two judgments o this Court claim to have been obtained by Mr. Rauf influencing the judges with illegal gratification. Both these judgments were taken up to the Apex court but none of the judgments were reversed. 17. The claim of Rauf is, he was effectively engineering the entire trial, therefore, the witnesses spoke, under lure of money, against the case of the prosecution. It is specifically claimed that the above exercise was orchestrated only to protect his relative, the named Minister. Apparently and pertinently the said Minister was not arrayed as an accused in the criminal case. Then the question would be, why, as alleged, the said Minister or the said Rauf offered and gave huge sums of money to the witnesses when the name of the named Minister did not figure in as accused in the charge sheet. Probably it could be on account of apprehension that the witnesses may speak out against the named Minister when they depose on oath before the Court during the trial. Can this Court at this stage act on such probabilities alone? It is also apparent on record that the person who made the disclosure and the named Minister though were closely related fell out and have serious differences prior to making the above said disclosure. 18. According to the learned Senior counsel Sri. Sekhar Naphade appearing for the petitioner, the subject matter on hand is of unusual nature which has been initiated at the instance of one K.A. Rauf a close relative of a prominent political personality the named Minister who had been a Minister in successive governments and is still adorning such position. The above disclosures made by Rauf raise serious issues touching upon the sanctity of the very judicial system in so far as it discloses how the said person projected himself as having been instrumental in deviating and diverting justice delivery system by influencing the witnesses with illegal gratification and also the graphic details how even the judges of this Court, lawyers and other constitutional functionaries were influenced. According to him, the named persons enjoy high influence as they are closely linked with the administration of the State, therefore, they not only wield political power but also have financial clout. According to him, the named persons enjoy high influence as they are closely linked with the administration of the State, therefore, they not only wield political power but also have financial clout. Several portions of Case Diary and also the manner in which the final report has been arrived at was brought to our notice to contend that the investigating officer factually did the function of an adjudicator rather than conducting an investigation into the alleged disclosure. According to the learned counsel, this is evident by the manner in which the material was analysed while arriving at the findings. According to him, this would only indicate that he did the job of an Adjudicator usurping judicial powers traversing beyond the scope of powers as an investigating officer and took the responsibility of evaluating materials to come to a finding that named persons are not guilty. Several portions of the Case Diary was relied upon by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner to show that many vital aspects were not investigated, which any investigating officer would have normally investigated into. This is very clear from the unexplained wealth of witnesses and also the investments made by them which were not at all looked into is the contention. The investigating officer, placed reliance on the depositions of the witnesses in the earlier case relating to sexual harassment and the evidence given by them in the trial relating to Crime No.282 of 1997 to merely arrive at a finding that the present statements made by witnesses do not hold good and this is seriously criticized by the learned Senior Counsel. 19. The investigating officer, according to the petitioner, ought to have made investigation into the allegations of offences coming under the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act of 1956 or under Section 366 and 376 of the Penal Code. 20. Them coming to citations relied upon; in the case of Zahira Habibulla Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat and others [(2006) 3 SCC 374] their Lordships were analysing various aspects of the matter especially in respect of commission of perjury by the witnesses and the punishments to be imposed. Their Lordships while opining that if Courts act contrary to the role it is expected to play, it will be destruction of the fundamental edifice on which justice delivery systems stands. Their Lordships while opining that if Courts act contrary to the role it is expected to play, it will be destruction of the fundamental edifice on which justice delivery systems stands. This was a case in which the star witness approached the Supreme Court proclaiming that her deposition in the trial court was secured under duress. The Supreme Court ultimately directed retrial of the case outside the State of Gujarat on the basis of statements made by the said witness before the Supreme Court and also before the National Human Rights Commission (for short ‘NHRC’). Unfortunately, the said witness resiled from her statements made before the Apex Court and also NHRC. While considering the action to be taken against such persons, the Apex Court opined that the said witness, for disowning statement made before the Supreme Court and NHRC has committed an act nothing short of perjury. We are afraid, such a situation or stage has not yet reached in the present case. No doubt there are statements by witnesses as seen fro the material that in the earlier case they have not stated the true facts before the Court which conducted the trial. This was subject of investigation and final report. 21. The next case relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel is Vikas Kumar Roorkewal v. State of Uttarakhand and Others [(2011) 2 SCC 178]. In this case transfer of trial was sought on the ground of coercion and threat caused to the witnesses and doubtful sincerity of investigating and prosecuting agencies. Son of the deceased sought transfer of the case. learned Senior Counsel placed emphasis on the finding that in an application for transfer; the petitioner is not required to demonstrate that justice would inevitably fail and it is sufficient that circumstances are shown from which it can be inferred that there is an apprehension that it is reasonable in the circumstances alleged. 22. Union of India & Others v. Ramesh Gandhi [(2012) 1 SCC 476] was a case in which FIR was lodged against certain officials of Coal India Limited (‘CIL’ for short) with respect to the lifting of materials as per the two tenders issued by the CIL; which were in fact the subject matter of that writ petition and was consistently found in favour of the private Company which awarded the contract; upto the Supreme Court. In the said case, the private Company entered into a contract with CIL pursuant to two notices inviting tenders and subsequently the private Company sought variation of the original terms of the contract, which was ordered by the Coal Controller. The private company approached the High Court claiming implementation of the order of the Coal Controller and the only issue which came up for consideration was the requisite legal authority of the Coal Controller to order such variation. All the Courts affirmed existence of such authority including the Supreme Court while considering legality or validity of such exercise of authority but the relevant fact of breach of terms of contract was not at all considered. The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that fraud vitiates everything including judicial acts. It was opined that if an order has been obtained by practicing or playing fraud, the same is vitiated and cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. 23. Learned Senior Counsel relies on this case to urge the principle that; two public interest litigations seeking enquiry into the involvement of Sri. P.K. Kunhalikutty in the sex racket case had been dismissed by this Court and affirmed upto the Supreme Court as also the fact that the earlier crime registered as Crime No.282 of 1997 had ended in acquittal, again affirmed by the Supreme Court, does not militate against a fresh investigation on the basis of the facts disclosed by Sri. K.A. Rauf and supported by the witnesses who were examined in the trial conducted previously. We are of the opinion, the principle laid down in the above case of the Apex Court does not apply to the present situation. The Public Interest Litigations were affirmed, up to the Supreme Court, as well as the acquittal of the accused in the Sessions Case registered on the complaint of one Ajitha. Now the allegations are with respect to the means and ways the said Rauf had attempted to subvert the course of justice in the earlier proceedings as well as Public Interest Litigations. A suo motu complaint came to be registered, FIR has been lodged and investigation has been conducted. The final report is pending before the Courts seized of the matter. A suo motu complaint came to be registered, FIR has been lodged and investigation has been conducted. The final report is pending before the Courts seized of the matter. No one is challenging the FIR before us, but we are considering a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution wherein relief sought is for a CBI investigation with respect to the crime registered now, on the disclosures made by Mr. Rauf. Despite the earlier litigation ending in acquittal which has reached finality with the affirmation of the same up to Supreme Court, the allegations of subverting the entire justice delivery system in the judicial proceedings is the subject matter of investigation in the instant case. 24. Reliance is placed on Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India [(2012) 3 SCC 104] to contend that this Court is competent to order a fresh investigation into the matter even if the final report is filed before the Magistrate’s Court. According to the petitioner, the Magistrate’s Court before whom the final report is filed, is only empowered with the power to order further investigation, that too by the same agency, therefore, this court could alone order a fresh investigation by another agency if warranted by the very nature of the material placed before the Court. With reference to paragraph 22 of the said decision, learned counsel specifically contends that the ratio of judgments in Vineet Narain v. Union of India [(1998) 1 SCC 226], Union of India v. Sushil Kumar Modi [(1998) 8 SCC 661] and other judgments referred to in paragraph 21 would only indicate; the principle that once the trial court had taken cognizance of the offence, the presumption is that the trial is deemed to have commenced and the prayer for summoning any other person as an accused could be made only before the trial court was clearly distinguished. On perusal of the above said judgment, it is seen that it refers to two issues; one issue deals with appointing a group of independent persons to assit the Court in monitoring the investigation being carried on by the CBI, with which we are not concerned in the present situation; the other issue was in respect of an interlocutory application, wherein specific directions were sought for, for summoning a named minister of the Union Cabinet. In the above context, Their Lordships of the Apex Court distinguished the ratio of the judgments referred to in paragraph 21 of the judgment, especially based on the facts, though the CBI had filed a charge sheet as early as April, 2011 and also a supplementary charge sheet in August, 2011, the investigation into some of the aspects in the ill-famed ‘2G Spectrum Scam case’ was yet to be completed and the CBI as also the Enforcement Directorate had filed reports indicating the progress made in the investigation. Therefore, Their Lordships, while distinguishing the case before them on facts as the investigation had not been completed the judgments referred to in paragraph 21 were distinguished. It is pertinent to mention that ultimately the Apex Court declined the prayer for a direction to investigate the named minister by reason of the fact that similar application was pending before the trial Court. 25. Reference was made to the decision reported in Hema v. State, Thr. Inspector of Police (2013 (1) SCALE 242) to urge that investigation by CBI in spite of the fact that the State Crime Branch has registered the complaint was sustainable. The facts in the said case disclose that the CBI had taken over the investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946; which clearly confers power on any member of the CBI to exercise powers of the officer-in-charge of a police station of any area; in an order under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Special Act. We are of the opinion, the said case is not applicable to the facts of the present case as no such order is made. 26. State of Punjab v. CBI [(2011) 9 SCC 182] was again a case of sexual harassment, which was headlined as “Moga Sex Scandal”. In the said case, against two persons a case came to be registered for offences punishable under Sections 366 and 376 IPC and subsequently allegations came to be made by the victim against many others who were also implicated. One of them came out with a complaint of falsely being implicated by the investigating officer in connivance with another person who had ill will against him. On enquiry, it was ultimately found that the allegations against the accused persons were false. One of them came out with a complaint of falsely being implicated by the investigating officer in connivance with another person who had ill will against him. On enquiry, it was ultimately found that the allegations against the accused persons were false. Further, it also revealed that the Sub Inspector, who was the Station House Officer had been helping the victim and the other person, the latter of whom was found to be in connivance with the investigating officer who had also accepted illegal gratification. Subsequently, the victim was found with the Sub Inspector and that another person when arrest was made together from a place. This incident was popularly titled as “Moga Sex Scandal” and the High Court took suo motu notice of the news item and issued notices to the State as also the police to file status report of the investigation. Ultimately, when the truth was revealed that at the instance of the locally influential political persons and senior police officers, many innocent persons were implicated, eventually the investigation of the case came to be entrusted to CBI. The Supreme Court in Vineet Narain’s case (Supra) Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam)’s case (Supra) held that once investigation was over and charge-sheet is filed, the task of the monitoring court comes to an end. However, a distinction was noticed in the case of Nirmal Singh Kahion v. State of Punjab [(2009) 1 SCC 441] wherein the Supreme Court specifically took note of the fact that the State Police had investigated the allegations of irregularities in the selection of a large number of candidates to the post of Panchayat Secretaries and the charge sheet was filed against Nirmal Singh. In a public interest litigation under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court passed orders directing investigation by CBI. That was upheld on the basis of the following reasoning: “63. The High Court in this case was not monitoring any investigation. It only desired that the investigation should be carried out by an independent agency. Its anxiety, as is evident from the order dated 3.4.2002, was to see that the officers of the State do not get away. If that be so, the submission of Mr. The High Court in this case was not monitoring any investigation. It only desired that the investigation should be carried out by an independent agency. Its anxiety, as is evident from the order dated 3.4.2002, was to see that the officers of the State do not get away. If that be so, the submission of Mr. Rao that the monitoring of an investigation comes to an end after the charge-sheet is filed, as has been held by this Court in Vineet Narain and M.C. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) v. Union of India, loses all significance.” 27. It is pertinent to note in Nirmal Singh Kahoon’s case (Supra) that the High Court, while considering the public interest litigation, was not monitoring the case or the investigation. In the case of State of Punjab v. CBI (AIR 2011 SC 2962) the Apex Court considered that the High Court had suo motu issued notices on the basis of news that appeared in the news papers and had on facts found that the investigating officer will not be in a position to investigate the case fairly and truthfully, as senior functionaries of the State in the Police Department and political leaders were all named. In the present case also a political leader and members of judiciary have been named. But, we have to take note of the fact, the present claim of the witnesses is not that they spoke in favour of the named leader in the earlier case not by reason of fear or any coercion alone. It is their claim that they were offered illegal gratification which they willingly took and falsely deposed before the court in the earlier trial. 28. The learned Advocate General places reliance on India Carat (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [(1989) 2 SCC 132] to bring home the point that upon receipt of a police report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. the Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. only if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. It is not as if the Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. alone if the investigating officer gives an opinion that the investigation has brought out a case against the accused. It is not as if the Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. alone if the investigating officer gives an opinion that the investigation has brought out a case against the accused. The Magistrate is empowered to ignore such conclusion s arrived at by an investigating officer and Magistrate can independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the offence, if he so thinks fit. In the present case, the final report discloses that no offence appears to have been committed, therefore, the Magistrate, before whom the final report is pending, has option either to accept the report or drop the proceedings or by independent application of mind if finds that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further and take cognizance and issue process or yet again direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 Cr.P.C. 29. Kunga Nima Lepcha and others v. State of Sikkim and others [(2010) 4 SCC 513] was relied upon by the State. This was a case in which investigation was sought by way of public interest litigation, on allegations of corruption against the incumbent Chief Minister. The Apex Court held that the remedies available by way of writ jurisdiction, being of a extraordinary nature, they cannot be granted as a matter of course where statutory remedies are available. It was held in the said case that looking at the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the powers vested with the authorities, it confers on the Court of first instance to exercise certain degree of control over ongoing investigation and it was also held that it may not be advisable for the writ courts to interfere with criminal investigation. The petitioners therein were advised to rely on the statutory remedy and only on the exhaustion of such remedy, it was held that proceedings could be brought before a writ court. 30. State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010 (1) KLT 723) was a case wherein the issue whether a High Court could direct investigation of a cognizable offence by the CBI, without the consent of the State came up for consideration. 30. State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010 (1) KLT 723) was a case wherein the issue whether a High Court could direct investigation of a cognizable offence by the CBI, without the consent of the State came up for consideration. While holding that the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution of India are inherent in every citizen and cannot be extinguished by any constitutional or statutory provisions, it was held that no Act of Parliament can exclude or curtail powers of constitutional courts with regard to enforcement of fundamental rights. In the final analysis, the Apex Court held that a direction by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to the CBI to investigate cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of the State, without the consent of that State neither will impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution, nor violate the doctrine of separation of powers and such act shall be valid in law. However, a word of caution was given at paragraphs 46 and 47, which read as under: “46. Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary to emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by Arts.32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order, the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the exercise of these Constitutional powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said Articles requires great caution in its exercise. In so far as the question of issuing a direction to the C.B.I. to conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such power should be exercised but time and again it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police. This extra-ordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instill confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights. This extra-ordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instill confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights. Otherwise the C.B.I. would be flooded with a large number of cases and with limited resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate even serious cases and in the process lose its credibility and purpose with unsatisfactory investigations. 47. In Secretary, Minor Irrigation & Rural Engineering Services, U.P. & Ors. v. Sahngoo Ram Arya & Anr. ((2002) 5 SCC 521), this Court had said that an order directing an enquiry by the C.B.I should be passed only when the High Court, after considering the material on record, comes to a conclusion that such material does disclose a prima facie case calling for an investigation by the C.B.I or any other similar agency. We respectfully concur with these observations.” 31. Jakia Nasim Ahesan v. State of Gujarat [(2011) 12 SCC 302) was a case in which the wife of a victim sought additional investigation on the basis of additional material coming to light against persons in power for their connivance in communal riots. Relying upon Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court held that once the investigation has been completed by an agency, in terms of the orders passed by the Supreme Court from time to time, there is no course available in law, save and except to forward the final report under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Court empowered to take cognizance of the offence alleged. Even a Court monitoring the investigation, for the purposes of ensuring proper and honest performance of its duty by the investigating agency; should not be concerned with the merits of the accusations or the lack of it in the investigation. It was held to be an aspect falling for determination at the time of filing of the charge-sheet in the competent court according to the ordinary procedure prescribed by law. It was held to be an aspect falling for determination at the time of filing of the charge-sheet in the competent court according to the ordinary procedure prescribed by law. It was a case in which originally the wife of the victim filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court, seeking a direction to the Director General of Police for investigation by an independent agency. The High Court declined to exercise jurisdiction on the conclusion that a remedy was available under Section 190 read with Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court, on appeal, directed an investigation by a special investigating team with the assistance of a former DIG (CBI). The Supreme Court relied on a three-Judge-Bench decision of the Apex Court in Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) v. Union of India [(2007) 1 SCC 110] and held that having reached this stage where the process of monitoring of the case comes to an end, it would neither be desirable nor advisable to retain further seisin over the matter. 32. Reliance is placed on State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bullar (AIR 2012 SC 364). This is a case in which the High Court entertained an application for CBI enquiry in a criminal appeal which was already disposed of and the Supreme Court found that the impugned orders of the High Court transgresses judiciary’s discretion. In the course of judgment, the Court considered the question as to whether CBI enquiry can be directed. Placing reliance on Secretary, Minor Irrigation and Rural Engineering Services, U.P. v. Sahngoo Ram Arya (AIR 2002 SC 2225) the Apex Court found that no Court can merely proceed on the basis of “ifs and buts” to order an enquiry by the CBI. It was further held that it is not permissible for the Court to set the Criminal Law in motion on the basis of allegations made against a person in violation of principles of natural justice. When a person is adversely affected by an order against him it is only reasonable that he should be given an opportunity of being heard before such orders are passed and then he be impleaded as a respondent, being a necessary party. The Apex Court at paragraph 48 of Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar’s case (Supra) held so, which reads as under: “48. The Apex Court at paragraph 48 of Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar’s case (Supra) held so, which reads as under: “48. Thus, in view of the above, it is evident that a constitutional court can direct the CBI to investigate into the case provided the court after examining the allegations in the complaint reaches a conclusion that the complainant could make out prima facie, a case against the accused. However, the person against whom the investigation is sought, is to be impleaded as a party and must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. CBI cannot be directed to have a roving inquiry as to whether a person was involved in the alleged unlawful activities. The court can direct CBI investigation only in exceptional circumstances where the court is of the view that the accusation is against a person who by virtue of his post could influence the investigation and it may prejudice the cause of the complainant, and it is necessary so to do in order to do complete justice and make the investigation credible.” 33. It is very pertinent that one of he victims, a witness in the earlier prosecution, had resiled from his deposition and a public interest litigation was filed earlier before this Court, which was dismissed by another Division Bench in a decision reported in Edwin Tomson v. Kunhalikutty (2005 (2) KLT 380). A reading of the above judgment puts the facts of various litigations in a proper perspective. Crime No.282/1997 of Nadakavu Police Station, Kozhikode was registered on the basis of a complaint lodged by a women’s organisation called “Anweshi Women’s Counseling Centre”, represented by its President Ms. Ajitha. In the said complaint it was alleged that one Smt. Sreedevi was running a brothel under the guise of an ice cream parlour. She was the sole accused and was arrested at the initial stage. Later on, after investigation, 15 more persons were arrested and ultimately, the total number of accused went up to 16. Ms. Ajitha sought for further investigation at the stage when the investigating agency was to file charge-sheet. The objection of Ms. Ajitha was, one Mr. P.K. Kunhalikutty, first respondent therein, was attempted to be saved from being arrayed as an accused. Ms. Ajitha sought for further investigation at the stage when the investigating agency was to file charge-sheet. The objection of Ms. Ajitha was, one Mr. P.K. Kunhalikutty, first respondent therein, was attempted to be saved from being arrayed as an accused. The said Writ Petition came to be considered along with the other Writ Petition of the additional fourth respondent and the same were dismissed by judgment dated 30.7.1998 which we have referred to earlier and these judgments were alleged to be the judgments delivered under the influence of monetary gain. As stated above, the Writ Appeals were also dismissed and the matter was taken up to Apex Court. When the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, it directed respondents 1 to 3 therein, IG and DIG of Police, to file affidavits after making further investigation. The affidavits were also filed after the investigation. Meanwhile, charge-sheet came to be filed in Crime No.282/1997 against 16 accused and on a miscellaneous petition at the instance of Ms. Ajitha, Judicial Magistrate seized of the matter directed further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The police, after further investigation, reiterated that a case was made out only against the named 16 persons. In the result, the miscellaneous petition filed to seek rejection of the charge-sheet at the instance of Ms. Ajitha was dismissed by the Magistrate Court. Ms. Ajitha again came before this Court seeking a prayer to quash the charge-sheet and order further investigation. This also came to be dismissed. 34. The Special Leave Petitions, in which affidavits were filed by the Police Officers as stated above came up before the Supreme Court in the meanwhile and were directed to be listed after the disposal of the Criminal M.C. filed by Ms. Ajitha before the High Court. This Court confirmed the Magistrate’s view and the judgment was also carried upto the Apex Court. The Special Leave Petitions were heard together by the Apex Court and they were dismissed on 13.10.2003. 35. The provocation for the Writ Petition [Edwin Tomson’s case (Supra)] as found by the Division Bench was a statement given by Ms. Rejina, the victim and a witness on 28.10.2004 to the electronic media that the first respondent therein had sexually abused her. 35. The provocation for the Writ Petition [Edwin Tomson’s case (Supra)] as found by the Division Bench was a statement given by Ms. Rejina, the victim and a witness on 28.10.2004 to the electronic media that the first respondent therein had sexually abused her. The prayer there was that since the State Police Officers were under pressure to spare the first respondent therein from prosecution, investigation by CBI was necessary. The Division Bench of this Court, referring to the earlier judgments already referred to by us, held that each time a witness makes a statement that alone cannot give rise to a fresh cause of action. With these observations, earlier public interest litigation stood dismissed. Now, again, based on another disclosure by one Mr. Rauff, the present litigation is initiated. It is pertinent to note that the witness also have joined the band wagon resiling from earlier depositions made by them. 36. One has to analyse the facts placed before us with reference to the settled law analysed above in various judgments of the Apex Courts and other Courts. Admittedly, the petition is a public interest litigation. We do agree with the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner that while considering public interest litigation one need not adhere to strict compliance of norms applicable to adversarial litigation, but nevertheless one cannot ignore the fact that the prayer for investigation by a special agency like CBI (an independent agency) is to be considered primarily on the premise that a functionary of the State, a Minister, is involved and the police of the State would be helpless in booking a case against him or charge-sheeting him. Even if the technicalities of adversarial litigation is not applicable one cannot close ones eyes to the fact that no person can be condemned or prejudiced by judicial pronouncement in which he was not given an opportunity of being heard. The persuasive arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the CD and final report placed before us would convince the allegations made by them against several public persons. If we look into the CD and final report, then necessarily one has to look into the allegations made against public person as reflected in the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. The public persons against whom accusations made are about 22 in number. If we look into the CD and final report, then necessarily one has to look into the allegations made against public person as reflected in the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. The public persons against whom accusations made are about 22 in number. These 22 public persons are said to have been implicated by the revelations made by Mr. Rauf. Surprisingly, none of these persons are before us and it is not even reflected in the pleadings of the petitioner that these public figures are attempting to influence the investigation in the present case. The public interest litigation was filed on the sole ground of apprehension of special investigating team carrying on the investigation at a snail’s place dragging the investigation. 37. Rajender Singh Pathania and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others [(2011) 13 SCC 329] pertains to a case in which an incident of drunken brawl eventually persuaded the High Court to direct CBI enquiry and the matter ended in the High Court with the award of a total compensation of Rs.25,000/-. As a matter of fact, Honourable Judges of the Apex Court recorded their shock regarding the discretion exercised by the High Court in making the incident to be a serious one in which CBI investigation came to be ordered. In the same judgment, the Supreme Court categorically noticed that none of the individuals against whom allegations o malafides were made parties and heard. The Apex Court further opined that the judgment so passed by the High Court was one passed in flagrant violation of principles of natural justice. Several factors were noticed which should normally persuade the constitutional court to order CBI investigation. Paragraph 14 of the judgment reads as under: “14. This very Bench recently in Disha v. Gujarat while relying upon earlier judgments of this Court in Ashok Kumar Todi v. Kishwar Jahan and Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat, came to the conclusion that for directing the CBI to hold the investigation the court must be satisfied that the opposite parties are very powerful and influential persons or the State authorities like top police officials are involved and the investigation has not proceeded with in proper direction or it has been biased. In such an eventuality, in order to do complete justice a direction to the CBI to investigate the case can be issued.” 38. In such an eventuality, in order to do complete justice a direction to the CBI to investigate the case can be issued.” 38. By another decision of the Apex Court reported in (AIR 2012 SC 364), it is trite that merely because a person is influential or holds a post capable of influencing police officers, that alone cannot persuade a Court to order investigation by special agency like CBI. The petitioner in the present case also alleges that the investigation conducted would clearly indicate bias of the police and its unwillingness to investigate the case fruitfully and charge the accused. None of the persons against whom enquiry is initiated based on the accusations made by Mr. Rauf and the witnesses in the earlier case are impleaded in the present case. The final report is already before the Judicial Magistrate who has jurisdiction over the issue and who has to consider the final report and proceed further in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Section 173 Cr.P.C. 39. The exercise of the petitioner is to expand the scope of litigation by placing on record the CD and final report; then necessarily these 22 public persons ought to have been impleaded. As per the final report, all these 22 public persons were interrogated by special investigating them, rather the petitioner is not pointing out any lacuna in the investigation by making a statement that any of them were left out from interrogation. We have only looked at the specific references made by the learned Senior Counsel from the voluminous CD and final report. If we analyse the entire material brought on record in the CD and final report, we may pre-empt the Magistrate from considering the final report without any bias. If we do so, it would be nothing, but analysing the material that would come to the fore from the CD and final report. So far as non impleading of 22 public persons in the above proceedings in the light of specific allegations and accusations made against them, it is a serious lacuna and flaw in the present proceedings. 40. In order to appreciate the procedural aspect of the matter, as enumerated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is trite that the Magistrate considering a final report under Section 173 of the Code has ample authority to order further investigation. 40. In order to appreciate the procedural aspect of the matter, as enumerated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is trite that the Magistrate considering a final report under Section 173 of the Code has ample authority to order further investigation. This power conferred on the Magistrate has to be necessarily exercised by him after perusal of the contents of the CD and also the final report. Whether the investigator has merely putforth the facts or has rendered his opinion by applying his mind to the material collected by him, has to be decided by the Magistrate. This exercise does not hamper or prevent the Magistrate to restrict his power from ordering further investigation. This power conferred on the Magistrate is under a statute and this is not a right conferred either on the complainant nor on the accused, or third parties to seek further investigation. The right of the complainant or third parties is only to bring to the notice of the Magistrate the flaw or deficiencies, if any, in the investigation done and the Magistrate alone is authorised by virtue of powers conferred on him under the Code to order further investigation. The police have been specifically authorised to invoke such power under Section 173. It does not fetter the Magistrate from perusing into any material placed before him to order further investigation based on such material. 41. The rule of alternative remedy is a rule which Courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion when law provides an efficacious remedy. It is held that such course is appropriate before taking resort to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In several judgments of the Apex Court caution has been expressed on the application of the rule of alternative remedy. The alternative remedy cannot be said to be wholly inapplicable to arena of the public interest litigation where aggrieved persons themselves do not approach the Court. It is well settled that if a statutory remedy is available, the rule of alternative remedy may be applied. The Apex Court in (AIR 1996 SC 1209) was considering the scope of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when parties to the proceedings already were pursuing legal battle in a suit before the civil court. It is well settled that if a statutory remedy is available, the rule of alternative remedy may be applied. The Apex Court in (AIR 1996 SC 1209) was considering the scope of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when parties to the proceedings already were pursuing legal battle in a suit before the civil court. When a Writ Petition came up challenging interim and miscellaneous orders passed by the trial court, the High Court entertained the same. When the matter went up before the Apex Court, Their Lordships opined at paragraph 8 as under: “8. We are of the view that the High Court not only fell into patent error but also exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not confined to issuing the prerogative writs, there is a consensus of opinion that the High Court will not permit this extraordinary jurisdiction to be converted into a civil Court under the ordinary law. When a suit is pending between the two parties the interim and miscellaneous orders passed by the trial Court – against which the remedy of appeal or revision is available – cannot be challenged by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Where the civil Court has the jurisdiction to try a suit, the High Court cannot convert itself into an appellate or revisional Court and interfere with the interim/miscellaneous orders of the civil Court. The writ jurisdiction is meant for doing justice between the parties where it cannot be done in any other forum.” 42. Sri Ramdas Motor Transport Ltd. and others v. Tadi Adhinarayana Reddy and others [(1997) 5 SCC 446] was again a case where maintainability of Writ Petition came up for consideration. The Writ Petition was filed alleging oppression and mismanagement of affairs of a Company and sought for a direction for investigation into the affairs of the Company on the ground that the Company Law Board was not moving in the matter. Their Lordships held that the power to appoint an Inspector to investigate the affairs of a Company has to be exercised by the competent authority under Section 235 of the Companies Act after a preliminary scrutiny by the Registrar of the Company Law Board as the case may be. Their Lordships held that the power to appoint an Inspector to investigate the affairs of a Company has to be exercised by the competent authority under Section 235 of the Companies Act after a preliminary scrutiny by the Registrar of the Company Law Board as the case may be. The power of investigation being conferred on the Central Government on the faith that it will be exercised in a reasonable manner and Their Lordships opined that the first respondent therein without moving neither the Central Government nor the Company Law Board in accordance with the procedure contemplated ought not to have resorted to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court for a direction to have the affairs of the Company investigated by the CBI. Their Lordships said, when such alternative remedies are available, High Court should not readily entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 43. In the case of BALCO Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India (AIR 2002 SC 381) Their Lordships, while considering several aspects, also had an occasion to consider the rule of alternative remedy. It was a public interest litigation, which came up for consideration. Their Lordships opined invocation of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a public interest litigation has to be exercised with due care and caution, especially keeping in mind the circumstances in which such remedy was sought. It was elaborately dealt with. Their Lordships referred to paragraph 86 wherein observations were made to the majority decision of the Apex Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India (AIR 2000 SC 3751) at paragraph 763. Paragraphs 86 and 87 of the decision reported in BALCO Employees Union (Regd.)’s case (Supra) as under: “86. Lastly, we need only to refer to the following observations in the majority decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan case (supra) at page763. 232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the Court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The Court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the Court's jurisdiction. 233. At the same time, in exercise of its enormous power the Court should not be called upon to or undertake governmental duties or functions. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The Court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the Court's jurisdiction. 233. At the same time, in exercise of its enormous power the Court should not be called upon to or undertake governmental duties or functions. The Courts cannot run the Government nor can the administration indulge in abuse or non-use of power and get away with it. The essence of judicial review is a constitutional fundamental. The role of the higher judiciary under the Constitution casts on it a great obligation as the sentinel to defend the values of the Constitution and the rights of Indians. The Courts must, therefore, act within their judicially permissible limitations to uphold the rule of law and harness their power in public interest. It is precisely for this reason that it has been consistently held by this Court that in matters of policy the Court will not interfere. When there is a valid law requiring the Government to act in a particular manner the Court ought not to, without striking down the law, give any direction which is not in accordance with law. In other words, the Court itself is not above the law. 234. In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by the Government the Courts should not become an approval authority. Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and consideration. In a democracy welfare of the people at large and not merely of a small section of the society, has to be the concern of a responsible Government. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will not be in public interest to require the Court to go into and investigate those areas which are the function of the executive. For any project which is approved after due deliberation the Court should refrain from being asked to review the decision just because a petitioner is filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should not have been taken because an opposite view against the undertaking of the project, which view may have been considered by the Government, is possible. For any project which is approved after due deliberation the Court should refrain from being asked to review the decision just because a petitioner is filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should not have been taken because an opposite view against the undertaking of the project, which view may have been considered by the Government, is possible. When two or more option or views are possible and after considering them the Government takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the Court to go into the matter afresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.” 87. It will be seen that whenever the Court has interfered and given directions while entertaining PIL it has mainly been where there has been an element of violations of Article 21 or of human rights or where the litigation has been initiated for the benefit of the poor and the underprivileged who are unable to come to Court due to some disadvantage. In those eases also it is the legal rights which are secured by the Courts. We may, however, add that Public Interest Litigation was not meant to be a weapon to challenge the financial or economic decisions which are taken by the Government in exercise of their administrative power. No doubt a person personally aggrieved by any such decision, which he regards as illegal, can impugn the same in a Court of law, but, a Public Interest Litigation at the behest of a stranger ought not to be entertained. Such a litigation cannot per se be on behalf of the poor and the downtrodden, unless the Court is satisfied that there has been violation of Article 21 and the persons adversely affected are unable to approach the Court.” 44. The Supreme Court, in the case of Jakia Nasim Ahesan and Another v. State of Gujarat and others [(2011) 12 SCC 302], also deals with a situation where it directed that if the investigating agency finds lack of sufficient material or reasonable grounds to proceed against any person named in the complaint, then the Court of competent jurisdiction should issue notice to the complainant and make available to her/him copies of the statement of witnesses and other related documents, so also, the investigation report, and in such circumstances, Court has to afford an opportunity of hearing to the complainant as well. These observations came to be made in the context of the petitioner before the Supreme Court in that case, was the wife of one of the victims. Though we are not faced with such a situation, in the present case, it is not the victim or a person related to any of the victims who is before us, but the petitioner before us is a political figure of considerable significance in the State. True, he cannot be denied such opportunity especially since he is fighting a case in public interest. 45. The above cited decisions of the Supreme Court emphasises the outline of the jurisdiction of any High Court which is dealing with a matter in which final report has been filed by the investigating agency before the competent Magistrate of original jurisdiction as provided under the Criminal Procedure. This emphasis laid down by the Apex court in the above case cannot be ignored at all. The Bench relying on earlier decisions in an elaborate manner opined that it is the Magistrate and the Magistrate alone who can take proper decision in the matter one way or the other, once the final report is brought before him in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. It further laid down the principle that if the Magistrate passes a judicial order, the same may be the subject matter of appeal and judicial review. Even in the case of failure on the part of the prosecuting agency to approach the higher forum, it was held, that alone would not confer a jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to step in and bridge the gap. We have to take note of this emphasis made by the Apex Court in the said case and also the scope of further litigation after Magistrate records a finding on the final report. We are not curtailing anybody’s enthusiasm by dismissal of a public interest litigation. We are not closing the scope of a CBI enquiry either. The final report is pending consideration before the Magistrate who is competent to entertain and dispose of the same in accordance with the procedure under the Code. This may result in further investigation or acceptance of the final report. The aggrieved parties are always at liberty to assail the same in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the Code. The final report is pending consideration before the Magistrate who is competent to entertain and dispose of the same in accordance with the procedure under the Code. This may result in further investigation or acceptance of the final report. The aggrieved parties are always at liberty to assail the same in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the Code. Without giving an opportunity to the competent Magistrate, who is the statutory authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure to record his finding, will it be proper on the part of this Court to have a roving enquiry into the final report and the CD at this stage? The refusal to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in this public interest litigation will not foreclose further legal remedies available under the Code of Criminal Procedure. This has been emphasised and reiterated in many of the decisions referred to above while analysing the scope of further investigation or investigation by a different agency in the context of Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e. the inherent powers of the High Court. 46. The averments in the writ petition and the reliefs sought, if carefully gone through, clearly reiterate the position that the public interest litigation was filed only with the allegation of no progress in the investigation by the Special Investigating Team. We have already referred to various interim orders made by this Court at different point of time by successive Division Benches. This Court specifically on more than one occasion noticed the progress in the investigation as has been placed before it by “action taken reports” filed by the Special Investigating Team. The investigation is now concluded and final report is filed before the Magistrate. The persuasion of the petitioner before us is to look into the same and evaluate the material rather embark upon a process of sifting the grain from the chaff so as to find it to be insufficient and then order investigation by the CBI afresh. This is nothing short of scuttling the statutory procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The duty cast on the Magistrate is to look in to the material, i.e. the final report and proceed further as stated above to take recourse to several available options, if he or she deems it fit. This is nothing short of scuttling the statutory procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The duty cast on the Magistrate is to look in to the material, i.e. the final report and proceed further as stated above to take recourse to several available options, if he or she deems it fit. The order accepting the final report or even one directing further investigation again can be the subject matter of appeal and revision as provided under the Code. We will not be doing justice or exercising our discretion properly, if we act preempting such procedural seminal consideration by the jurisdictional Magistrate. If we therefore now, it is nothing but upsetting the hierarchy of judicial forums as prescribed under the Code. The relief sought in the writ petition for an enquiry by special agency like CBI on the ground of laxity in the investigation does not survive any more as the investigation is completed and the final report is filed. Now the prayer for CBI enquiry is on the ground of investigation made being grossly insufficient and according to us, such consideration is premature. 47. On earlier occasion a two judges Bench of Supreme Court has held that the provisions of Cr.P.C. i.e. 173(8) cannot limit or affect inherent powers of High Court to make order for fresh investigation or re-investigation as the case may be to give effect to any order of the Court or prevent abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice State of Punjab v. CBI [(2011) 9 SCC 182], it was under a different situation as the High Court in that case has arrived at such decision after being satisfied by giving opportunity of hearing to those who are attempted to be arrayed as accused Jakia Nasim Ahesan and another v. State of Gujarat and others [(2011) 12 SCC 302]. 48. In the case of Kunga Nima Lepcha’s case (Supra) the three judges Bench held that only after exhaustion of ordinary remedy that a proceeding can be brought before the Court of writ jurisdiction. 48. In the case of Kunga Nima Lepcha’s case (Supra) the three judges Bench held that only after exhaustion of ordinary remedy that a proceeding can be brought before the Court of writ jurisdiction. The prayer for transfer of trial referred to in Vikas Kumar Roorkewal v. State of Uttarakhand and others [(2011) 2 SCC 178) on a mere apprehension that justice would fail without it being so demonstrated also cannot be imported to the case of a fresh investigation especially when the investigation carried on by the special team has already culminated into a final report. We have to remind ourselves once again the caution expressed by the Constitution Bench in State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights [(2010) 3 SCC 571]. 49. In the case of Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali Alias Deepak and others [(2013) 5 SCC 762], the Supreme Court while considering the powers of Magistrate under Section 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure also had an occasion to say whether the Magistrate has the power to order fresh, denovo or re-investigation. The court found that the investigating agency has wide powers to conduct further investigation and even to file a supplementary report. The Magistrate has ample power to direct further investigation where the final report discloses the finding of the investigating agency that there was no case made out. However, the Magistrate has no power to order denovo of reinvestigation or fresh investigation, which power, according to the above judgment, is only vested with the High Courts having inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was also noticed that unless the higher court specifically directs that the report already filed or the investigation conducted so far would not form part of the record, such earlier report would be deemed to be part of the record which the Magistrate will not be competent to exclude from the records of the case. Therefore, when fresh investigation is to be ordered by the higher court, it has to specifically direct that the investigation or proceedings so conducted shall stand terminated and will not form part of the record for consideration by the court of competent jurisdiction. We are only reiterating the opinion of the Apex Court. Therefore, when fresh investigation is to be ordered by the higher court, it has to specifically direct that the investigation or proceedings so conducted shall stand terminated and will not form part of the record for consideration by the court of competent jurisdiction. We are only reiterating the opinion of the Apex Court. In this case if we were to consider the prayer for fresh investigation by CBI by looking into the CD and final report, we would be exercising jurisdiction at a premature stage. 50. We once again place on record our great and abiding concern on the impact this could have on the entire justice dispensation system. The disclosures true or false, the seriousness of the matter cannot be ignored at all. If it is true, it requires serious introspection and of course the guilty should be brought to book, equally if eventually the entire exercise reveals that the accusations or allegations are false, necessarily serious action has to be initiated against those who made such accusations or allegations. From examination of the facts of the present case with reference to earlier litigation so also legal position by dictum of the Apex Court, in nutshell; the following conclusions are arrived at: 1) The prayer for CBI enquiry was made on the ground of laxity in investigation carried on by Special Investigation Team. Such attack comes to an end with the filing of the final report. 2) We are of the opinion, necessarily we have to scan through the material available in the CD and final report if we were to consider ordering a fresh investigation and this is nothing but usurping the power of Magistrate conferred under the Code of Criminal Procedure. This results in pre-empting the competent Court to exercise its jurisdiction; which in any event Supreme Court has discouraged and the Courts monitoring investigation are cautioned against on more than one occasion. iii) None of he persons (22 in number) against whom accusations are made are made parties to the proceedings. No doubt, before the Magistrate, at the stage of consideration of final report, accused may not have right of audience but nevertheless a public interest litigation, seeking fresh investigation by CBI, without hearing the persons against whom accusations are levelled, cannot be proceeded with. No doubt, before the Magistrate, at the stage of consideration of final report, accused may not have right of audience but nevertheless a public interest litigation, seeking fresh investigation by CBI, without hearing the persons against whom accusations are levelled, cannot be proceeded with. Iv) We make it explicit that we are not in any manner giving our assent of approval to the final report, nor do we foreclose the prayer for fresh investigation by the CBI. However, the hierarchy of legal forums is competent to do so when the Magistrate lacks such competence. v) The final report is pending consideration before the Magistrate’s Court. Any aggrieved person having locus standi can always point out the lacuna in the investigation and seek appropriate remedy, including direction for further investigation, from the Magistrate’s Court, which is the competent authority under the Code. In the light of the above discussion aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion, above public interest litigation deserves to be dismissed and accordingly the same is dismissed, with the above observations.