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2013 DIGILAW 772 (PNJ)

Nirmal Singh v. Secretary Department of Cooperation, Punjab

2013-07-01

Mahesh Grover

body2013
JUDGMENT Mr. Mahesh Grover, J.:- The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that the premature retirement resolution accepted by the respondent/Cooperative Society on 7.8.2009 and the subsequent order dated 13.11.2009 passed by the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Moga in appeal and the revisional order dated 11.5.2010 be declared as null and void and contrary to the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 and the rules framed thereunder. 2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner was working as a Salesman with the respondent/Society and on 7.8.2009 he submitted an application for premature retirement (which according to the petitioner was obtained forcibly and under coercion). 3. The application for retirement was accepted the very same day by passing a resolution. 4. The petitioner made a grievance of the acceptance of the said application by alleging that the same was procured by the respondents under the threat of elimination of the petitioner and he filed an appeal which was rejected and similarly, the revision preferred by the petitioner against the appellate order was also rejected. 5. The petitioner thus contends that since the resolution was accepted on the very same day, this would lead to an inference that the resignation was procured under some coercion and that is the reason that the respondents without following the process under Rule 80 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), accepted it with undue haste. He further contends that all this was done to accommodate persons of the respondent’s choice. 6. The respondents have justified the acceptance of the resignation by stating that the petitioner himself had submitted an application for seeking premature retirement on the ground of his failing health which was accepted by the Managing Committee and duly approved by the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies in accordance with the provisions of the rules. It has further been stated by the learned counsel for the respondents that the plea of coercion etc. is an afterthought and was never raised by the petitioner even though the Deputy Registrar granted the approval more than a month after the passing of the resolution by the Managing Committee. They have denied that action is mala fide by saying that post itself was abolished and none appointed. 7. is an afterthought and was never raised by the petitioner even though the Deputy Registrar granted the approval more than a month after the passing of the resolution by the Managing Committee. They have denied that action is mala fide by saying that post itself was abolished and none appointed. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 8. One of the foremost things that would weigh against the petitioner is his muted silence to the plea of coercion for over a month when the proceedings remained pending awaiting approval of the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies. In this interregnum, which was crucial to the cause of the petitioner, he never raised any plea that the premature retirement had been obtained from him under some threat or coercion. Similarly, he never made an attempt to withdraw the said application or apprise the authorities under the Cooperative Societies Act or anyone else for that matter. 9. When this conduct of the petitioner is evaluated against the plea of physical elimination which he has pleaded in appeal and the subsequent proceedings including the present petition, then it does not stand to reason as to why the petitioner would remain silent for over a month when the proceedings were awaiting approval. Besides, these are questions of fact which have to be established on the basis of the evidence and cannot be appreciated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Inferences as the one that the petitioner wants the Court to derive cannot be based on mere incidental conduct of the Managing Committee which accepted the plea of voluntary retirement on the very same day more particularly when no malice has been done. The fact that post was abolished would show that there was no ulterior motive of accommodating any one else in place of the petitioner. 10. Rule 16 which has been referred to by the petitioner in his submissions to plead violation thereof also does not come to his assistance as that rule merely prescribes a period of one month required to submit a resignation with a counter-obligation on the employer to condone this period of notice if it falls short of the prescribed period. 10. Rule 16 which has been referred to by the petitioner in his submissions to plead violation thereof also does not come to his assistance as that rule merely prescribes a period of one month required to submit a resignation with a counter-obligation on the employer to condone this period of notice if it falls short of the prescribed period. By no stretch of imagination can this rule be construed to be bestowing any assistance to the petitioner even if the most benevolent interpretation is placed on it. The plea that rule 80(1)(a) was not followed is also of no assistance to the petitioner as the petitioner made no overt effort prior to the acceptance of his plea of premature retirement. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the petition and the same is therefore, dismissed. --------0.B.S.0------------ ——————————