B. Amit Sthalekar, J.;— The petitioner has come up with this writ petition challenging the order dated 30.4.2008 by which he has been dismissed from service and the order dated 22.4.2008 by which approval has been granted to the dismissal order. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner at the relevant point of time was working as Junior Branch Manager in Branch Mahobkhand, in the Hamirpur District Cooperative Bank Ltd., Mahoba. He was placed under suspension on 6.2.2006 and a chargesheet dated 20.4.2006 was issued wherein it was alleged that on 25.10.2005 he came to the Branch Office in a drunken state and misbehaved with the staff. Thereafter, an enquiry was held and on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer the petitioner was stated to have been exonerated of the above charge and reinstated in service by the resolution of the Committee of Management of the concerned bank dated 16.5.2006. Thereafter another chargesheet was issued to the petitioner on 17.7.2006 in which following charges were levelled against the petitioner:- @ Hindi @ The petitioner submitted his reply to the chargesheet, which has been filed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 17.7.2006 (pages 51 to 57 to the writ petition) holding the charges against the petitioner to be proved. The petitioner thereupon submitted his reply Annexure-8 to the writ petition on 6.9.2007 to the Enquiry report and, thereafter the impugned order dated 30.4.2008 of dismissal has been passed. I have heard Sri Gautam Baghel, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel for the respondent nos.1 to 5. Even in the revised list no one appeared for the respondent nos.6 and 7 although in the cause list the illness of Sri A.K.Lal is marked but there is no illness slip of Sri A.K.Lal on record. Therefore, the Court has proceeded to hear the matter in the absence of the respondents' counsel.Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that once the petitioner was exonerated of the charges in the first chargesheet, the second chargesheet has been issued by way of malafides. Therefore, the Court has proceeded to hear the matter in the absence of the respondents' counsel.Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that once the petitioner was exonerated of the charges in the first chargesheet, the second chargesheet has been issued by way of malafides. He further submitted that in respect of the charge relating to non-recovery of loan amount advanced to the persons mentioned in Charge-B the matter was referred to the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Chitrakoot Dham region, district Banda, who in his order dated 5.6.2012 filed as Annexure-3 to the supplementary affidavit dated October, 2012 has held that out of 17 persons to whom the loan was advanced, full recovery has been made from 10 persons and from the remaining 7 persons part recovery has been made and there is no such person from whom recovery has not been made. It has also been held by the said authority that the petitioner at the relevant point of time had been transferred out and, therefore, he could not have been held responsible for non- recovery of any amount during that period and, therefore, the charges against the petitioner regarding irregularities in the matter of advancement of loan and non-recovery thereof was not made out. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that even otherwise the matter related to non-recovery of loans and, therefore, only the penalty of recovery of the amount could have been imposed in view of the provisions of Rule 84 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the enquiry was held totally ex parte and the petitioner was not given reasonable or fair opportunity of defending himself, therefore, the impugned order of dismissal is liable to be set aside on that ground alone. From a perusal of documents filed along with writ petition it is seen that the petitioner appears to have been exonerated by a resolution of the Committee of Management of the Bank dated 16.5.2006 of the charge of misbehaviour in the office on duty hoursin drunken state. Nevertheless, that does not prevent the respondents from issuing a second chargesheet to the petitioner on charges relating to irregularities committed in the matter of advancement of loans. Therefore, I find no illegality so far as issue of second chargesheet is concerned. Nevertheless, that does not prevent the respondents from issuing a second chargesheet to the petitioner on charges relating to irregularities committed in the matter of advancement of loans. Therefore, I find no illegality so far as issue of second chargesheet is concerned. To the second chargehseet the petitioner was called upon to submit his reply and he submitted his reply dated Nil Annexure-6 to the writ petition. On a perusal of the reply it is seen that the petitioner has not denied any of the charges levelled against him but instead he has admitted the charges in respect of the irregularities. In addition to admitting the same he has stated that he would take care in future or try to remove the irregularities already committed. From a perusal of the enquiry report, it is seen that the charges against the petitioner have been held to be proved on the basis of the reply given by the petitioner. There is no allegation in the enquiry report that the petitioner is guilty of misappropriation of any of the funds. In paragraph no.23 of the counter affidavit there is an allegation that the petitioner has been found guilty of misappropriation of funds but it has been urged vehemently by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this was not even the charge in the chargesheet nor is there any finding to that effect in the enquiry report. It may be stated for purposes of record that whatever may be stated in the counter affidavit, ultimately what matters is what is alleged in the chargesheet and what are the findings in the enquiry report on the basis of which the charges are held to be proved. So far as the allegations made in Charge-B is concerned, the petitioner is alleged to have committed irregularities in the advancement of loan and that the loan amount could not be recovered and this matter was referred to Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Chitrakoot Dham Region, Banda, who by his order dated 5.6.2012 has exonerated the petitioner of the said charge. So far as the allegations made in Charge-B is concerned, the petitioner is alleged to have committed irregularities in the advancement of loan and that the loan amount could not be recovered and this matter was referred to Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Chitrakoot Dham Region, Banda, who by his order dated 5.6.2012 has exonerated the petitioner of the said charge. It may be pointed out thatthis was only one of the charges and even if the petitioner has been exonerated of this charge it does not mean that he stands exonerated of the other charges and its sub charges in the chargesheet and the Competent Authority can proceed to impose penalty against the petitioner in respect of departmental irregularities committed by him in respect of the other charges and its sub charges. The Supreme Court in the case reported in (1996) 3 SCC 750 State of U.P. and others vs. Nand Kishore Shukla and Another has held that if even one of the charges is proved and is sufficient for imposition of penalty, the Court would be loath to interfere with the order of the Disciplinary Authority. "7.It is settled law that the court is not a court of appeal to go into the question of imposition of the punishment. It is for the disciplinary authority to consider what would be the nature of the punishment to be imposed on a Government servant based upon the proved misconduct against the Government servant. Its proportionality also cannot be gone into by the Court. The only question is whether the disciplinary authority would have passed such an order. It is settled law that even one of the charges, if held proved and sufficient for imposition of penalty by the disciplinary authority or by the appellate authority, the Court would be loath to interfere with that part of the order. The order of removal does not cast stigma on the respondent to disable him from seeking any appointment elsewhere. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was wholly wrong in setting aside the order. After the enquiry report was submitted, the petitioner was also issued a show cause notice, on 24.8.2008 to submit his reply to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the petitioner has submitted his reply on 6.9.2007 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition). Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was wholly wrong in setting aside the order. After the enquiry report was submitted, the petitioner was also issued a show cause notice, on 24.8.2008 to submit his reply to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the petitioner has submitted his reply on 6.9.2007 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition). This reply has been duly considered by the Disciplinary Authority General Manager/Secretary, District Cooperative Bank Ltd., Mahoba who after considering the same had passed the impugned order of dismissal. The order of dismissal, thereafter, has been approved by the U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board, Lucknow, respondent no.3. The findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority are wellconsidered and based upon findings of fact recorded by the Enquiry Officer and therefore, it is not for this Court to interfere with those findings. A Writ Court can only exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and can only interfere in the matters relating to disciplinary proceedings if there is any procedural lapse or infraction of any Rules or principles of natural justice and it is not for the Writ Court to sit as a Court of Appeal over the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority. The charges have been admitted by the petitioner. The Supreme Court in the case reported in (2005) 5 SCC 337 , Vivekanand Sethi vs Chairman, J.& K. Bank Ltd. and others had held that where the facts are admitted, holding of enquiry would be an empty formality. Para 22 of the judgement reads as follows:- "22. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an empty formality. Even the principle of estoppel will apply. [See Gurjeewan Garewal (Dr.) vs. Dr.Sumitra Dash.] The principles of natural justice are required to be complied with having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. (See State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh and Karnataka SRTC v. S.G. Kotturappa.) In (2008) 5 SCC 569 , Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and others vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu the Supreme Court has again held as follows:- 16. Indisputably, the respondent was a habitual absentee. (See State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh and Karnataka SRTC v. S.G. Kotturappa.) In (2008) 5 SCC 569 , Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and others vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu the Supreme Court has again held as follows:- 16. Indisputably, the respondent was a habitual absentee. He in his explanation, in answer to the charge sheet pleaded guilty admitting the charges. In terms of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, charges having been admitted were not required to be proved. It was on that premise that the enquiry proceeding was closed. Before the enquiry officer, he did not submit the explanation of his mother being ill. He, despite opportunities granted to report to duty, did not do it. He failed to explain even his prior conduct. 17. In Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad & Ors. v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (Dead) through LRs & Ors. 2005 (11) SCC 314 , this Court noticing Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, held :(SCC p.380 para 214) "214. In terms of the aforementioned provision, things admitted need not be proved. In view of the admission of Respondent 1 alone, the issue as regards allotment of 6475 shares should have been answered in favour of the appellants. The company petitioner at a much later stage could not be permitted to take a stand which was contrary to or inconsistent with the original pleadings nor could she be permitted to resile from her admissions contained therein." 19. A subsequent explanation before another authority, which had not been pleaded in the departmental proceedings, cannot by itself be a ground to hold that the principles of natural justice had not been complied with in the disciplinary proceedings." In (2006) 2 SCC 269 , L.K.Verma vs. HMT LTD. and Another the Supreme Court has held that things admitted need not be proved. Para 15 thereof reads as follows:- "15.The Labour Commissioner, in our considered opinion, misdirected himself in passing the said order. Whereas, on the one hand, he noticed that the Appellant, herein had stated that during the preliminary enquiry he made those utterances owing to tension in his mind, he opined that no evidence had been produced against him for which he has been dismissed from service. It is now well-settled that things admitted need not be proved. Whereas, on the one hand, he noticed that the Appellant, herein had stated that during the preliminary enquiry he made those utterances owing to tension in his mind, he opined that no evidence had been produced against him for which he has been dismissed from service. It is now well-settled that things admitted need not be proved. [See Vice-Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Another v. Girdharilal Yadav,] The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in terms of Regulation 84-D only a penalty of recovery could have been imposed and major penalty of removal or dismissal could not have been imposed. The submission is rejected being fallacious and wholly misconceived. The petitioner was issued a chargesheet. The charges amounted to gross misconduct and Enquiry Officer was appointed. The petitioner was required to submit his reply to the chargesheet. In his reply, he has admitted the charges and has also stated that in those cases where there are irregularities he will try to rectify the same in future and the Enquiry Officer has submitted his enquiry report on the basis of the reply of the petitioner and in thecircumstances it cannot be said that Disciplinary Authority was not competent to pass the order of dismissal from service and only an order of minor penalty of recovery would have been passed. The Supreme Court in 2005 7 SCC 435 State Bank of India and another vs. Bela Bagchi and others while referring to misconduct by Bank Officer has held as follows:- "A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in the case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charge against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance." Regulation 84 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulation 1975 reads as follows:- "84. Penalties.-(i) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in any other regulation, an employee who commits a breach of duty enjoined upon him or has been convicted for criminal offence or an offence under section 103 of the Act or does anything prohibited by these regulations shall be liable to be punished by any one of the following penalties:- (a) Censure, (b) Withholding of increment. (c) Fine on an employee of Category IV (peon, chaukidar, etc.) (d) Recovery from pay or security deposit to compensate in whole or in part for any pecuniary loss caused to the cooperative society by the employee's conduct. (e) Reduction in rank or grades held substantively by theemployee, (f) Removal from service, or (g) Dismissal from service. (ii) Copy of order of the punishment shall invariably be given to the employee concerned and entry to this effect shall be made in the service record of the employee. (iii) No penalty except censure shall be imposed unless a show cause notice has been given to the employee and he has either failed to reply within the specified time or his reply has been found to be unsatisfactory by the punishing authority. (iv) (a) The charge-sheeted employee shall be awarded punishment by the appropriate authority according to the seriousness of the offence. Provided that no penalty under sub-clause (e), (f) or (g) of clause (I) shall be imposed without recourse to disciplinary proceedings. (b) No employee shall be removed or dismissed by an authority other than by which he was appointed unless the appointing authority has made prior delegation of such authority to such other person or authority in writing. (v) The appointing authority or person authorised by him while passing orders for stoppage of increment shall state the period for which it is topped and whether it shall have effect of postponing future increments or promotion. (v) The appointing authority or person authorised by him while passing orders for stoppage of increment shall state the period for which it is topped and whether it shall have effect of postponing future increments or promotion. It is nowhere extracted that the power of the Disciplinary Authority is only to impose a penalty of recovery as contemplated under Regulation 84(i) (d). Rather Regulation 84-(i) provides for penalties marked as (a to g) and further the proviso to clause -iv (a) of Regulation 84 mentions that no penalty under sub clause (e), (f) or (g) of clause (i) shall be imposed without recourse to disciplinary proceedings. In the present case a chargesheet has been issued to the petitioner and the petitioner has admitted his guilt which fact has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner but rather he has very fairly admitted it in the course of his submissions and insuch circumstances in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court referred to above it would not be necessary to hold a full fledged enquiry, once guilt has been admitted by the petitioner. In AIR 1972 SC 32 , Channabasappa Basappa Happali vs. The State of Mysore, the Supreme Court has held that where the delinquent employee admits all the relevant facts on which the decision could be given against him it could not be said that the enquiry was in breach of principles of natural justice. Para-5 of the judgement reads as follows-: "5. It was contended on the basis of the ruling reported in R v. Durham Quarter Sessions Ex-parte Virgo (1952 (2) QBD 1) that on the facts admitted in the present case, a plea of guilty ought not to be entered upon the record and a plea of not guilty entered instead. Under the English law, a plea of guilty has to be unequivocal and the Court must ask the person and if' the plea of guilty is qualified the Court must not enter a plea of guilty but one of not guilty. The police constable here was not on his trial for a criminal offence. It was a departmental enquiry, on facts of which due notice was given to him. He admitted the facts. In fact his counsel argued before us that he admitted the facts but not his guilt. The police constable here was not on his trial for a criminal offence. It was a departmental enquiry, on facts of which due notice was given to him. He admitted the facts. In fact his counsel argued before us that he admitted the facts but not his guilt. We do not see any distinction between Admission of facts and admission of guilt. When he admitted the facts, he was guilty. The facts speak for themselves. It was a clear case of indiscipline and nothing less. If a police officer remains absent without leave and also resorts to fast as a demonstration against the action of the superior officer the indiscipline is fully established. The learned Single Judge in the High Court was right when he laid down that the plea amounted to a plea of guilty on the facts on which the petitioner was charged and we are in full agreement with the observations of the learned, Single Judge." Thus in the facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Supreme Court I do not find any merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________