Judgment :- U.V. Bakre, J. Heard Mr. Pangam, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. Costa, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. Admit. By consent, heard forthwith. 3. By this Letters Patent Appeal, the appellants have prayed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 15/4/2009 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 693/2008; order dated 4/9/2007 passed by the Administrative Tribunal in Eviction Appeal No. 61/2002 and order dated 4/3/2002 passed by the Additional Rent Controller in Eviction Case No. BLDG/162/ARC-I/85 (BLDG/24/ARC-II/95). 4. The Respondents had filed an application dated 31/10/1985, under Section 22(2) (a) and (g) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (the Act, for short), for eviction of the appellants from the suit premises on the ground of nonpayment of rents, which they claimed to be Rs. 300/- per month and denial of the title of the appellants. Suit premises are one of the shops situated at Bazar Cuncolim wherein business of bakery is carried out by the appellants. The appellants filed their written statement dated 2/5/1986, claiming that the rent was Rs. 100/-per month. On 7/2/1986, the appellants filed application under Section 32(3) of the Act, praying therein to determine the rents of the suit premises. On 18/3/1986, during the pendency of the said application under Section 32(3) of the Act, the respondents filed an application under section 32(4) of the Act for stopping further proceedings and putting the respondents in possession of the suit premises, on the ground that the appellants had not deposited any rent within the prescribed time limit, though they were bound to deposit at least the amount of rent which they had admitted to be due. 5. The appellants filed their reply to this application alleging that inquiry under section 32(3) is pending. The Additional Rent Controller vide judgment and order dated 28/8/1986 allowed the application of the respondents and directed stoppage of proceedings and eviction of appellants from the suit premises, on the ground that the appellants had not deposited the admitted rent and had even not explained as to why they could not deposit the same within the stipulated one month's time from the date on which notice was served on them about the proceedings. Against the said order, the appellants preferred Eviction Appeal no. Against the said order, the appellants preferred Eviction Appeal no. 65/1986 before the Administrative Tribunal, which, by judgment and order dated 25/6/1989 allowed the same and set aside the order dated 28/8/1986 of eviction. The Rent Controller was directed first to determine the rent under Section 32(3) of the Act and thereafter to decide the eviction application. The respondents preferred Writ Petition no. 398/1989 before this Court challenging the said order dated 25/6/1989 and the learned Single Judge of this Court, by judgment and order dated 30/11/1992, dismissed the petition and upheld the judgment and order dated 25/6/1989 passed by the Administrative Tribunal by which the eviction order was set aside. A direction was given to the Additional Rent controller to dispose of the application under Section 32(3) of the Act within four months and thereafter to decide the application under Section 32(4), after hearing the parties. Accordingly, by judgment and order dated 26/2/2001, the Rent Controller decided the dispute under Section 32(3) and determined the rent at Rs. 300/-per month. However, the appellants preferred Revision Application before the Administrative Tribunal challenging the said judgment and order dated 26/2/2001. Since there was delay of 3 days in filing the Revision Application, an application for condonation of delay was filed along with Revision Application. The respondents raised an objection that Revision was not maintainable. By order dated 18/8/2001, the Administrative Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation of delay. During the pendency of the said proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal, the appellants filed application dated 8/8/2001, praying that the arrears of rent as directed by judgment and order dated 26/2/2001 be permitted to be deposited in the Administrative Tribunal and, an amount of Rs. 42,000/- was deposited there, on 10/8/2001. In the meanwhile, the respondents filed another application, dated 8/5/2001, under Section 32(4) of the Act, before the Additional Rent Controller alleging that there were delayed payments in respect of rents of various months; no payments made in respect of the rents for certain months; and that after the order dated 26/2/2001, the deficiency of arrears of rent was not made good. The appellants filed reply dated 16/11/2001 to which was annexed a list showing the details of payments made by the appellants and mentioning the challan numbers. The appellants filed reply dated 16/11/2001 to which was annexed a list showing the details of payments made by the appellants and mentioning the challan numbers. It appears that the respondents filed their reply dated 26/11/2001 to the reply dated 16/11/2001, filed by the appellants, in which the respondents showed the defaults. By order dated 4/3/2002, the Rent Controller dealt with the application dated 8/5/2001 as well as previous application dated 18/3/1986 both filed under Section 32(4) of the Act, allowed them and ordered stoppage of proceedings and eviction under section 32(4) of the Act. Against this order, the appellants filed Eviction Appeal No. 61/2002 before the Administrative Tribunal, which was dismissed by judgment dated 4/9/2007. The appellants then filed Writ Petition no. 693/2009 before this Court, which came to be dismissed by order dated 15/4/2009. The appellants are aggrieved by the above three orders. 6. The learned Single Judge of this Court, in Writ Petition No. 693/2008 found that the default in payment of rent was not only one which could have been substantiated by documentary evidence, but there was admitted default in payment of rent ordered to be paid after the final order came to be passed on 26/2/2001, in as much as the appellants admittedly did not pay the arrears payable under the said order within 30 days. Therefore, it was held that the order dated 4/3/2002 passed by the Rent Controller, Margao-Goa cannot be challenged. The Writ Petition was dismissed. 7. Mr. Pangam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, submitted that initially the appellants had deposited arrears of rent, as per their case, at the rate of Rs.100/- per month from September, 1983 to November, 1992, on 17/11/1986. According to him, the application of the appellants under Section 32(3) of the Act was pending and hence till the decision on the same, the appellants could not deposit the rents. He relied upon “R. N. Lotlikar & another Vs. Kashinath Ghanashyam Sinai Kakodkar & Others” [1986 (3) Bom. C.R. 367] and contended that default prior to the order under section 32(3) could not have been looked into. According to him, the first order dated 28/8/1986, passed by the Rent Controller, was erroneous and was rightly set aside by the Administrative Tribunal by relying upon the case of “R. N. Lotlikar”(supra). C.R. 367] and contended that default prior to the order under section 32(3) could not have been looked into. According to him, the first order dated 28/8/1986, passed by the Rent Controller, was erroneous and was rightly set aside by the Administrative Tribunal by relying upon the case of “R. N. Lotlikar”(supra). He pointed out that the learned Single Judge of this court in Writ Petition No. 398/89 upheld the said order of the Administrative Tribunal and directed that the application under section 32(3) be decided first and then the one under Section 32(4). He submitted that it was on 26/2/2001 that the Additional Rent Controller held that the rent payable is Rs. 300/- per month. He submitted that only after the said order was passed under section 32(3) of the Act, the provisions of section 32(4) had come into play. He, however, submitted that against the said order dated 26/2/2001, the appellants filed Revision application before the Administrative Tribunal and on 8/8/2001, they filed application for deposit of rent before the Administrative Tribunal, which application was granted and, therefore, the appellants deposited further rents before the Administrative Tribunal. According to him, since the appellants were bonafidely prosecuting the Revision Application, challenging the order of determination of rent, the delay in depositing the arrears of rents should be held as bonafide and excused. He submitted that the respondents filed the second application under section 32(4) on 8/5/2001, wherein they, inter alia, alleged that the defaults were for particular eight months of the years 1993 to 1996 and accordingly a show cause notice dated 29/10/20001 was issued by the Rent Controller by mentioning the same months. Learned Counsel pointed out that in the Order dated 4/3/2002, the Rent Controller has held that the rents for several months from November 1993 to December 2000 were not deposited. According to the learned Counsel, this was beyond the show cause notice. He submitted that the appellants had produced challans along with their reply and had specificity stated that some challans were missing. He submitted that the appellants had filed application for inspection of the register of challans before the Rent Controller, which opportunity was not given to him. He further submitted that no inquiry, even for that matter a summary inquiry, was held and only on the ground of defaults for particular months, the eviction order came to be passed by the Rent Controller. He further submitted that no inquiry, even for that matter a summary inquiry, was held and only on the ground of defaults for particular months, the eviction order came to be passed by the Rent Controller. He pointed out that the Rent Controller has mentioned that some challans were not deposited in the present case and were concerned with another case. Mr. Pangam submitted that there was no other case between the parties and therefore, there was no reason for holding that the said challans pertained to some other case. Even otherwise, according to the learned counsel, the appellants were not put on notice and were not heard about the various defaults mentioned in the order and about challans being pertaining to some other case. 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants further submitted that in the impugned order, the Rent Controller has held that there is default in payment of rents and has passed the eviction order, but there is no finding given by him as to why the appellants should be thrown out without further hearing being given to the appellants to show cause to the contrary. He submitted that it is not a must that the Rent Controller should evict merely on the ground of non-payment of rent. He submitted that there were various other factors which had to be considered. According to him, even the Administrative Tribunal and the learned Single Judge of this Court have not considered this aspect of the matter. He has relied upon: (i) “Roque Antonio Judas Tadeu Caetano Ribeiro Vs. Angelo Cassiano Neves E Souza & 4 ors.” [1989 (2) Goa Law Times (313)] (ii) “ShriMariano Silveria Vs. Antonio Silveira and others” [1995 (1) Bom. C. R. 487]. 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf for the appellants further submitted that arguments before the Administrative Tribunal concluded on 7/7/2005, but the judgment was passed on 4/9/1997 and this delay of more than two years vitiates the judgment. In this regard, he has relied upon the judgment dated 13/6/2012 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 191/2012 (Shri Jitendra Deshprabhu and Ors. Vs. Shri Vasudeo Deshprabhu and Ors.) The learned counsel, therefore, urged that the impugned judgments and orders which have not considered all the above factors are liable to be quashed and set aside. 10. In this regard, he has relied upon the judgment dated 13/6/2012 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 191/2012 (Shri Jitendra Deshprabhu and Ors. Vs. Shri Vasudeo Deshprabhu and Ors.) The learned counsel, therefore, urged that the impugned judgments and orders which have not considered all the above factors are liable to be quashed and set aside. 10. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, at the outset, invited our attention to the reply dated 26/11/2001 filed by the respondents in the Court of the Rent Controller in answer to the application dated 16/11/2001 filed by the appellants and submitted that the chart of deposits made by the appellants reveals that there are gross defaults, which cannot be termed as bonafide. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that initially when the Rent Controller had ordered eviction, the Administrative Tribunal had remanded the matter to the Rent Controller for deciding the application under section 32(3) of the Act and the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 398/89 had ordered that so long as the application under section 32(3) of the Act is decided, the appellants are protected. According to the learned counsel, the appellants were protected only with regard to the balance amount by taking rent as Rs. 300/- per month and not with regard to admitted rents at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month. He contended that therefore, the appellants were supposed to deposit at least the rents admitted within the prescribed time even if the application under section 32(3) of the Act was pending. He pointed out that the appellants had deposited the said admitted rents, for the months from September 1983 to November 1986, only on 17/11/86, which is much after the prescribed time. He submitted that on 26/2/2001, the rent was fixed at Rs. 300/- per month and the Rent Controller had specifically directed to deposit the rent within 30 days. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the appellants have failed and neglected to deposit the arrears within 30 days. He submitted that there is no discrepancy in the show cause notice and that in the order dated 4/3/2002, two notices have been taken into account and both the applications dated 18/3/1986 and 8/5/2001 were decided in one and the same order. He submitted that there is no discrepancy in the show cause notice and that in the order dated 4/3/2002, two notices have been taken into account and both the applications dated 18/3/1986 and 8/5/2001 were decided in one and the same order. He further submitted that the chart which was filed in the reply dated 26/11/2001 was verified by the Rent Controller vis-a-vis his records and had confirmed that there were defaults. He urged that as per the order dated 26/2/2001, the balance of the rents calculated at the rate of Rs.300/- per month by deducting the rent deposited at the rate of Rs.100/- per month had to be deposited in March 2001, but the appellants continued to deposit rents at the rate of Rs.100./- per month and only in August 2001, the arrears from September 1983 to February 2001 were paid. He, therefore, submitted that the defaults were writ large, without sufficient cause. He submitted that the Rent Controller had exercised his discretion and he was justified by the material on record. He further submitted that even the Administrative Tribunal has exercised its discretion judiciously. 11. Insofar as the alleged delay of two years caused by the Administrative tribunal in passing the judgment, is concerned, learned Senior Counsel submitted that though this ground of delay was raised in the Writ Petition, however, the same was not pressed for before the learned Single Judge and therefore, the appellants cannot now take the said ground and cannot rely upon the subsequent judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 191/2012. He also submitted that even otherwise, the requirement that the judgment should be passed expeditiously applies when oral arguments are heard as it is difficult to remember the submissions after passage of time. He pointed out that in the present case, both the parties had filed written arguments before the Administrative Tribunal and hence no prejudice was caused to either of the parties. 12. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondents has relied upon the following judgments: (I) “Atma Ram Vs. Shakuntala Rani” [ (2005) 7 S.C.C 211 ] (II) “MaragathammalVs. Kamalammal [ (2006) 8 S.C.C 152 ] 16 (III) “SarlaGoel and others Vs. Kishan Chand” [ (2009) 7 S.C.C. 658 ]. (IV) “ShantiPrasad Jain (Dead) Through LRS. Vs. Prakash Narain Mathur [(2009) 11 S.C.C 663]. 13. Shakuntala Rani” [ (2005) 7 S.C.C 211 ] (II) “MaragathammalVs. Kamalammal [ (2006) 8 S.C.C 152 ] 16 (III) “SarlaGoel and others Vs. Kishan Chand” [ (2009) 7 S.C.C. 658 ]. (IV) “ShantiPrasad Jain (Dead) Through LRS. Vs. Prakash Narain Mathur [(2009) 11 S.C.C 663]. 13. We have carefully gone through the entire material on record and have also considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We have also gone through the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the parties. 14. In the case of “R. N. Lotlikar” (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court, in the facts and circumstances of that case, in paragraph 9, inter alia, has observed as follows: “It is clear from the above observation of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that it is only after the fixation of the reasonable provisional rent that obligation to deposit or pay the rent arises. In the Act, sub-section (3) of Section 32 provides that where there is any dispute as to the amount of rent to be paid or deposited under sub-section (1), the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority, as the case may be, shall, on application made either by the tenant or by the landlord, and after making such inquiry as he deems necessary determine summarily the rent to be so paid or deposited. The mandate of subsection (3) is that when a dispute is raised as to the quantum of the rent, the controller, or the appellate or revisional authority, as the case may be, to determine summarily the rent to be so paid or deposited. In other words, unless and until the rent is summarily determined, the tenant will not be in a position to pay or deposit the rent. In the present case, admittedly, the very application under section 32(3) of the Act was not considered and therefore, it is clear that occasion had not arisen at all for the petitioners to deposit the rents due.” 15. In the present case, admittedly, the very application under section 32(3) of the Act was not considered and therefore, it is clear that occasion had not arisen at all for the petitioners to deposit the rents due.” 15. In Writ Petition No. 398/89, filed by the respondents against the order dated 25/6/1989, passed by the Administrative Tribunal, the learned Single Judge of this Court has observed that there is some merit in the contention that mandate must be read in Section 32(1) that the tenant cannot remain content without depositing the admitted amount of rent until the entire matter is disposed of under sub-section (3) of section 32. It was pointed out to the learned Single Judge that the law is silent on the requirement of the payment or deposit by a tenant of admitted rents unless the dispute is resolved under sub-section (3) of section 32. The learned Single judge has observed that the matter also needs to be examined from another angle, namely whether the Controller, in such circumstances, is required to make an order directing a tenant to deposit the rent admitted even during the pendency of the application under Section 32(3). The learned Single Judge has observed that the in the case of “R. N. Lotlikar”(supra), the learned Single Judge had finally disposed of the matter on facts and circumstances of that case and had not gone into the question as was raised by the learned Counsel in Writ Petition No. 398/89. It has been held that ratio of the judgment in “R. N. Lotlikar”(supra) is that inquiry under Section 32(3) of the Act must be concluded before application under Section 32(4) of the act is required to be decided. In the Writ Petition No. 398/89, it was informed that during the pendency of the Eviction Appeal proceedings before the Tribunal, the first respondent(appellants) had deposited the arrears of rent as per the calculations from September 1983 and further challans were shown whereupon rents were being deposited before the Court of the Controller in treasury, the last of such challans being dated 6th November, 1992. The learned Single judge held that the facts as above stated by the first respondent(appellants) taken together with the deposit made during the pendency of the appeal proceedings will, also bail out the first respondent(appellants) until the inquiry under section 32(3) is concluded by the Additional Rent Controller. 16. The learned Single judge held that the facts as above stated by the first respondent(appellants) taken together with the deposit made during the pendency of the appeal proceedings will, also bail out the first respondent(appellants) until the inquiry under section 32(3) is concluded by the Additional Rent Controller. 16. We do not feel it necessary to go into the said controversy regarding the legal position insofar as the alleged defaults prior to the decision on the application under section 32(4) of the Act, as in our view, the consideration of default after the judgment and order dated 26/2/2001, by which the Additional Rent Controller held that the quantum of rent payable by the respondent Rosario is Rs. 300/- and directed to deposit all the dues within 30 days from the date of the order, is sufficient for disposal of this LPA. 17. Section 32(4) of the Act provides that if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority, as the case may be, shall unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. In the case of “RoqueAntonio Ribeiro” (supra), a Division bench of this Court has held that it is not mandatory for the Rent Controller to make an order stopping the proceedings under section 32(4), but the power is directory and at his judicial discretion, keeping in mind that the Act is a beneficial legislation. It is further held that that though the word “shall” is used in Section 32(4) in the context of tenant's right to show case to the contrary, it must be read as “may” and as vesting discretion in the authorities to make order of stopping the proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession only after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances. It has been observed that some of the factors which the Rent Controller should bear in mind while exercising his discretionary power would be whether the default is willful or unintentional, whether it is for a short period or long period, whether it is stray or persistent, whether payment was made at the first opportunity or after contest, whether the default is bonafide or to harass the landlord. It is held that the circumstances of the case must be considered. In the case of “Shri Mariano Silveria” (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that powers under Section 32(4) are exercisable in case of habitual defaulters and not in cases of inadvertent mistakes. It has been observed that the discretionary power under Section 32(4) is to be held as exercisable only in relation to cantankerous or contumacious defaulters and/or in case of a congenital and compulsive litigant who inspite of being given an opportunity to behave is resisting the payment of rents due only to harass the landlord. 18. As has been rightly held by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated 15/4/2009 in Writ Petition no. 693/2008, there is an admitted default in payment of rent ordered to be paid after the said final order came to be passed on 26/2/2001 by the Additional Rent Controller. The appellants had deposited the arrears of rent of Rs. 3900/-, for the months of September 1983 to November 1986 on 17/11/1986, at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month and thereafter they continued to deposit the rent at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month. According to them, they were paying at that rate because that was the rent fixed. They filed application under section 32(3) of the Act, for determination of quantum of rent since the respondents had claimed the rent at the rate of Rs. 300/-per month. Since the respondents had filed an application under Section 32(4) of the Act on 18/3/86, for eviction of the appellants, on the ground non-payment of rents, which was decided by order dated 28/8/1986 and there were further challenges to the orders, the appellants had a fair idea of the consequences of non-payment of rents, within prescribed time. As per the order dated 26/2/2001, passed by the Rent controller under Section 32(3) of the Act, the appellants had to deposit all the dues within 30 days from the date of that order. The appellants, admittedly did not comply with that order. 19. It is true that the appellants had filed an Eviction Revision Application along with an application for condonation of delay against the said judgment and order dated 26/2/2001 passed by the Additional Rent Controller. The said application for condonation of delay was registered as Misc. Application No. 194/Condone/2001/ER. The appellants, admittedly did not comply with that order. 19. It is true that the appellants had filed an Eviction Revision Application along with an application for condonation of delay against the said judgment and order dated 26/2/2001 passed by the Additional Rent Controller. The said application for condonation of delay was registered as Misc. Application No. 194/Condone/2001/ER. The said Revision Application and the application for condonation of delay were filed about 93 days after the order dated 26/2/2001. In the order dated 16/8/2001, passed by the Administrative Tribunal, in said Misc. Application No. 194/CONDONE/2001/ER, it has been specifically stated that the Roznama of 26/2/2001 in the records and Proceedings of the Additional Rent Controller clearly show that both parties were present in the Lower Court on that date when the impugned order was pronounced in the open Court. It is not that the appellants did not know about the provision of Section 45(2) of the Act, which inter alia provides for an appeal against an order, other than interim order, passed by the Controller. The appellants had earlier filed Eviction Appeal under No. 65/86, against the order dated 28/8/1986, passed by the Rent controller under Section 32(4) of the Act. The Administrative Tribunal, in the said order has held that the order dated 26/2/2001, passed by the Additional Rent Controller was not falling within the category of “interim order” and therefore under Section 45(2) of the Act, only an appeal lies against it. But the appeal, if permissible, as held by the Tribunal, had to be filed within 30 days. It has been further observed by the Administrative Tribunal that the application for certified copy of the order dated 26/2/2001 was filed only on 7/5/2001, which was much beyond the period of limitation of 30 days, as 28/3/2001 would be the last date for filing appeal. Admittedly, the said order dated 16/8/2001 has not been challenged. As per that order, there was no cause, much less a sufficient cause, shown for the delay. As already stated above, by the said order dated 26/2/2001, passed by the additional Rent controller, the appellants were required to deposit all the dues within 30 days, from the date of that order. The appellants did not deposit the balance arrears of rent, calculated at the rate of Rs. As already stated above, by the said order dated 26/2/2001, passed by the additional Rent controller, the appellants were required to deposit all the dues within 30 days, from the date of that order. The appellants did not deposit the balance arrears of rent, calculated at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month, from September 1983 within 30 days from the date of order i.e. from 26/2/2001. The appellants also did not deposit the said balance of arrears of rent on the date of filing of application for condonation of delay i.e. on 3/7/2001, along with the same, but what they did was to file an application dated 8/8/2001 to deposit the rent before the Administrative Tribunal alleging that the rent for the period from September, 1983 to February 2001 was deposited before the Additional Rent Controller at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month and that rent for the period of March 2001 to June 2001 was also deposited there. The appellants alleged that they desire to deposit difference of rent arrears at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month for the period from September 1983 to February 2001 pursuant to the impugned order dated 26/2/2001, without, however, explaining as to why they had not deposited the same before the Rent Controller within 30 days of the order dated 26/2/2001. According to the appellants, the arrears of rent were accordingly deposited before the Administrative Tribunal. The said arrears were deposited on 10/8/2001. The appellants neither deposited the said admitted balance of arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month from September 1983 within 30 days of the order, nor did they challenge that order within 30 days, to show their bonafides. The contention that the appellants were bonafidely prosecuting their Revision Application challenging the order dated 26/2/2001 and hence had not deposited the said arrears within the stipulated time does not appear to be sound, either legally or otherwise. The appellants did not wait for depositing the said arrears till the disposal of the application for condonation of delay, which application was dismissed on 16/8/2001. Before that on 8/5/2011, they filed application for deposit of said arrears in the Court of the Administrative Tribunal and deposited the same on 10/8/2001. They therefore knew that the order dated 26/2/2001, which was not stayed, had to be complied with, within 30 days thereof. Before that on 8/5/2011, they filed application for deposit of said arrears in the Court of the Administrative Tribunal and deposited the same on 10/8/2001. They therefore knew that the order dated 26/2/2001, which was not stayed, had to be complied with, within 30 days thereof. Thus, mere filing of the Revision Application along with application for condonation of delay cannot be a sufficient cause for not complying with the order dated 26/2/2001. Non-compliance of the order of the Competent Authority, in the facts and circumstances above, show the cantankerous and contumacious nature of the appellants, in resisting/delaying payment of the rents due, only to harass the landlord. 20. Insofar as the said admitted default in payment of rent ordered to be paid after the final order dated 26/2/2001, the question of prejudice being caused to the appellants by not permitting them to peruse the register of challans does not arise. Besides the above, in view of the said admitted default, by way of delay, the question of holding any inquiry, fulfledged by taking evidence or otherwise a summary inquiry, also does not arise. 21. Another contention of the appellants is that the show cause notice dated 29/10/2001 issued by the Rent Controller, only spoke about the non-payment of arrears of rent of the suit premises for eight particular months whereas the ultimate judgment dated 4/3/2002 passed by the Rent Controller has considered various other aspects beyond the scope of the said Show cause notice. First of all, such a point was neither raised before the Administrative Tribunal, in Eviction Appeal No. 61/2002, nor before the learned Single Judge, in the Writ petition No. 693/2008. It is for the first time in this LPA that the appellants have raised such a contention. Indisputably, the show cause notice dated 29/10/2001 pertained to the application dated 8/5/2001. In paragraph 3 of the said application, filed by the respondents under section 32(4) of the Act, the respondents had taken this ground of non-payment of the arrears. The respondents had specifically stated that upon the completion of inquiry under section 32(3) and upon the Court of Rent Controller holding that the rent was Rs. 300/-per month, the appellants ought to have made good the deficiency of Rs. The respondents had specifically stated that upon the completion of inquiry under section 32(3) and upon the Court of Rent Controller holding that the rent was Rs. 300/-per month, the appellants ought to have made good the deficiency of Rs. 200/-per month for the period till the date of order under Section 32(3) by depositing the rent immediately after the date of order or at least within 30 days from the date of the order. In reply, the appellants alleged that they had deposited the rents up to date. The judgment and order dated 4/3/2002 pertains to two applications under Section 32(4) of the Act namely the one dated 18/3/1986 and the other dated 8/5/2001. The application dated 18/3/1986 is regarding the nonpayment of the admitted rents, within the stipulated time. Copies of both the said application were furnished to the appellants. What is more relevant is the application under section 32(4) of the Act and not the show cause notice. The appellants had prior knowledge of the case of the respondents, as stated in the applications under Section 32(4) of the Act. No prejudice can be said to have been caused to the appellants. There is, therefore, no force in the above contention of the appellants. 22. The Additional Rent Controller, in the impugned order dated 4/3/2002, has held that the payments of arrears of rent, after the order deciding the application under Section 32(3) passed on 26/2/2001, were to be deposited by 28/3/2001 but inspite of the directive of the Court to do so, the appellants neglected to comply with the same. The Additional Rent controller has observed that the appellants in their reply to show cause notice have not shown cause as to why the respondents should not be put in possession of the suit premises. Discretion was with the Rent Controller while deciding application under Section 32(4) of the Act. It is seen that the Additional Rent Controller has exercised his discretion in a proper manner, in accordance with settled principles of law. Similarly, the Administrative Tribunal also cannot be said to have exercised it's discretion arbitrarily or capriciously. Discretion was with the Rent Controller while deciding application under Section 32(4) of the Act. It is seen that the Additional Rent Controller has exercised his discretion in a proper manner, in accordance with settled principles of law. Similarly, the Administrative Tribunal also cannot be said to have exercised it's discretion arbitrarily or capriciously. In the circumstances above, no fault can be found with the impugned order dated 15/4/2009 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 693/2008 or with the order dated 4/9/2007 passed by the Administrative Tribunal in Eviction Appeal No. 61/2002 or with the order dated 4/3/2002 passed by the Additional Rent Controller in Eviction Case No. BLDG/162/ARC-I/85. 23. Insofar as the contention of the appellants on the ground of inordinate delay in passing the judgment dated 4/9/2007 committed by the Administrative Tribunal, is concerned, though the same was raised in the Writ Petition No. 693/2008, however, it was not pressed for before the learned Single Judge of this Court. Hence, we are not inclined to consider the same in this L.P.A. 24. In view of the discussion above, we do not feel it necessary to refer to ratio of the Judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 25. The Letters Patent Appeal is devoid of merit and is therefore, rejected. Interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are left to bear their own costs.