JUDGMENT Hon’ble Aditya Nath Mittal, J.—Heard learned counsel for the applicants. Sri Anil Kumar has filed Percha for opposite party No. 2 and submitted that he is ready for argument and he do not want to file any counter-affidavit. 2. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed with the prayer to quash the impugned summoning order dated 7.4.2004 and impugned notice dated 3.1.2013 issued under Section 319 Cr.P.C. by Additional Sessions Judge, District Bareilly, in Sessions Trial No. 481 of 2003 under Sections 148 and 307 IPC. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that in the investigation the offence against applicants were not proved therefore, no charge-sheet was filed against them. Subsequently, upon the application of the prosecution which was submitted after recording the evidence of Abdul Majeed, the applicants have been summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for the offences punishable under Sections 148 and 307 IPC. Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that by the perusal of the cite plan, it do not reveal that the applicants were involved in the alleged attempt to murder. It has also been submitted that the medical report is also fabricated as the complainant had not received any injuries. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has submitted that the applicants are named in the FIR and specific role has also been assigned to them but the charge-sheet was filed against three persons namely Tasleem and others who had filed criminal revision No. 803 of 2004 which has been decided by this Court by order dated 4.1.2013. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant has drawn my attention towards Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, 2010(1) JIC 471 (SC), in which the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be rejected on the ground of alternative remedy of revision. 6. Learned counsel for the applicants has relied upon Smt. Zeenat Perveen and another v. State of U.P. and another, 2012(3) JIC 184 (All), in which it has been held that there is no compulsion to get part or full cross-examination of the witnesses before passing a summoning order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. A summoning order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was passed on 7.4.2004 and the proceedings of the case remained stayed due to interim order of this Court which has now been vacated. The said criminal revision No. 803 of 2004 was filed against order dated 27.11.2003 by which the charges against other accused persons were framed. 7. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , Hon’ble Apex Court has summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. 1. where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; 2. where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and acceptable in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; 3. where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly falls to prove the charge. 8. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognisable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1990(2) JIC 997 (SC) : 1992 (Supp.1) SCC 335. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of the rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: “1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognisable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognisable offence but constitute only a non-cognisable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 9. In M/s Eicher Tractor Limited and others v. Harihar Singh and another, 2009 (1) JIC 245 (SC), Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is an exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non protest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations accepted in toto. 10. It has further been held in the above noted case that the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. 10. It has further been held in the above noted case that the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true prospective without sufficient material. 11. In Harshendra Kumar D v. Rebatilata Koley and others, (2011) 3 SCC 351 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows : “It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents which are beyond suspicion or doubt placed by the accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if the accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial Court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage. 12. In the present case, in the FIR the present applicants were named and it was alleged that they alongwith their other companions armed with knife, country-made pistol and sticks entered into the Tal of the complainant. It was also mentioned in the FIR that Haneef the present applicant had attacked by knife with intention to cause death and Rasheed the present applicant had opened a fire which had hit the son of complainant-Manni and got injuries in the stomach. 13. As far as the order dated 7.4.2004 is concerned, that has been passed after taking into consideration the evidence of Abdul Majeed PW.1 and other papers available on record including the F.I.R. Learned Court below has come to the conclusion that Abdul Majeed has said in his statement that Mohd. 13. As far as the order dated 7.4.2004 is concerned, that has been passed after taking into consideration the evidence of Abdul Majeed PW.1 and other papers available on record including the F.I.R. Learned Court below has come to the conclusion that Abdul Majeed has said in his statement that Mohd. Haneef and Haseeb were also in the list of assailants and they were named in the FIR. Therefore, the applicants have been summoned exercising the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. 14. As far as the order dated 3.1.2013 is concerned, learned Court below has mentioned in its order that summons could not be issued against the present applicants because the proceedings were stayed by this Court in criminal revision No. 803 of 2004 and after the decision of the said revision, the summons have been issued against the applicants therefore, I do not find any error of law in the order dated 3.1.2013. As far as the order dated 7.4.2004 is concerned, the Court below has taken into consideration all the aspects of the matter and considering the fact that these applicants were named in FIR and the complainant has also stated in his statement on oath that applicants were assailants for the said offence therefore, it cannot be said that learned Court below has not applied its judicial mind. 15. For exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C., it should appear in the course of any inquiry into or trial of an offence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears ho have committed. It is settled law that for exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C., it is not legally required to evaluate the evidence as it is ordinarily done while rendering the final judgment and the Court has to see whether or not the evidence in record to the reason for the purposes of Section 319 Cr.P.C. I do not find any error of law in the impugned order and do not find any ground to exercise the inherent powers. The application is rejected. The application is rejected. If the applicants surrender before the trial Court within a period of 15 days from today, and move application for bail, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the bail application expeditiously and if possible the same day. ——————