Judgment : Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J. The short question that has cropped up for consideration in this writ petition is whether the petitioner’s service during the period of probation was validly terminated. Underlying this lies a more fundamental question about the consequence when a probationer’s period of probation has expires but the same has not been extended. The petitioner was appointed in the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF, for short) and he joined the said post on May 19, 2001. It was mentioned in the letter of appointment that he was placed on probation for a period of two years in the first instance. As such the period of probation was supposed to expire on May 18, 2003. The petitioner received an order dated June 12, 2013 issued by the Deputy Inspector General, CISF, Durgapur to the effect that during the period of probation his service has not been found fit for further retention in service. Therefore, his services were terminated with immediate effect with one month’s salary in lieu one moth’s notice. He made an appeal against the said order of termination and the Inspector General by an order dated December 1, 2003 confirmed the said order as after the expiry of the period of probation he was deemed to be on probation under the CISF Rules. This time the petitioner made representation to the Director General, CISF praying for an order of his reinstatement in service. By a letter dated July 2, 2004 the Assistant Inspector General (L&R) CISF disposed of the petitioner’s representation. He was informed that his services were terminated for suppression of his involvement in a criminal case at the time of recruitment. He was further informed that there was no provision in the CISF Act and Rules for considering the appeal and revision by the Director General. This order has been challenged in the present petition. According to the petitioner the police officials had certified that there was nothing against him in the records at the time of his recruitment. Subsequently, however, he came to know of a criminal case where, according to the petitioner, he was falsely implicated because of his inability to gratify the concerned police officer. He has also taken a point that the service of a probationer can be terminated during the period of probation by giving one month’s notice. Subsequently, however, he came to know of a criminal case where, according to the petitioner, he was falsely implicated because of his inability to gratify the concerned police officer. He has also taken a point that the service of a probationer can be terminated during the period of probation by giving one month’s notice. But after the period of probation expires he cannot be terminated by issuing an order of termination simplicitor. Without extending the probation the authorities could not terminate his services. Therefore, he has prayed for a Mandamus directing the respondents to set aside the order of termination and reinstate him with all his arrears of salary. The respondents have contested this case by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. According to the respondents his probation was kept in abeyance as the police verification report through the District Magistrate or the Superintendent of Police of Dhanbad had not received by the respondents till then. This was received on June 6, 2003 from which it appeared that a police case under various provisions of Indian Penal Code was registered in the year 2001 against the petitioner at Dhanbad which the petitioner had suppressed in the Attestation Form at the time of appointment. In defence of their action the respondents have said that the termination order was passed on June 12, 2003 on the ground that he was not found fit for further retention in service on the implied ground of suppression of fact in the attestation form about the pendency of criminal case. There is no provision in the CISF Rules for entertaining any appeal against the termination order. The respondents’ further specific case is that in terms of the CISF Rules the petitioner was deemed to be on probation and as such the respondents have not done anything wrong in terminating his services during that period of probation. Thus the question boils down to whether the order of termination was issued during the period of probation of the petitioner. His assertion that his period of probation had expired on May 18, 2003 is not a tenable one. In terms of Rule 25 of the CISF Rules, 2001 every member of the force shall be on probation for a period specified in relevant column of the recruitment rules. His assertion that his period of probation had expired on May 18, 2003 is not a tenable one. In terms of Rule 25 of the CISF Rules, 2001 every member of the force shall be on probation for a period specified in relevant column of the recruitment rules. But in the absence of a specific order of confirmation or a declaration as to the completion of probation a member of the force shall be deemed to be on probation. There is still a second proviso to the said rule which provides that no member of the force shall ordinarily be kept on probation for more than twice the period prescribed in the respective recruitment rules and if during the period of probation the appointing authority is of the opinion that he is not fit for permanent appointment the appointing authority may discharge him or terminate the services after issuance of a notice of one month or after giving one month’s pay in lieu of such notice or revert him to the rank from which he was promoted or repatriate him to the parent department as the case may be. A bare reading of this provision makes it clear that in a case where there is no specific order of confirmation after the expiry of the period of probation, as in this case, a member of the force shall be deemed to be continuing on probation. Therefore, even after the expiry of the original period of probation on May 18, 2003 the petitioner was deemed to be continuing on probation. The rule itself lays down the upper limit of keeping an employee on probation, i.e., twice the period prescribed in the respective recruitment rules which means that in the present case the maximum period of probation would be four years. Therefore, I find no merit in the submission of the petitioner that his service could not be terminated after the original period of probation. In view of this very specific provision in the concerned rules there is no scope for presuming that the petitioner was deemed to have been confirmed in service. Therefore, I find no merit in the submission of the petitioner that his service could not be terminated after the original period of probation. In view of this very specific provision in the concerned rules there is no scope for presuming that the petitioner was deemed to have been confirmed in service. The next question that has cropped up for consideration was whether the petitioner’s service during the period of probation could be terminated on the ground of suppression of material facts at the time of recruitment and if so whether this cast any stigma upon the petitioner which calls for a regular enquiry giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. In the petition he has asserted that had there been an enquiry he would have been able to show that at the time of recruitment no criminal case was pending before any court of law and after his recruitment his name was maliciously inserted by one police officer as he had failed to please him. This assertion, however, does not appear to be correct in view of the statements made by the respondents. The petitioner filled up the Attestation Form on April 25, 2001 and as per the police verification report received by the respondents a criminal case bearing no. 70 of 2001 dated March 10, 2001 was registered against him. This belies the petitioner’s contention that at the time of his appointment there was nothing against him in the police records. The law is now very well settled that a probationer has no substantive right to the post and he cannot complain if his service is terminated before confirmation. This is done as a protection on the part of the employer against selecting a wrong employee and then being required to continue with him for the rest of the service period. The Supreme Court had said that they are ‘taken on trial’ and that is why there is a period of probation which after successful completion is followed by confirmation. If during the period of probation the appointee is not found fit for permanent retention the employer is within his power to terminate the service of the probationer. The right of the appointee after the period of probation when he has not received any order either of termination or of confirmation was the subject-matter of some dispute. If during the period of probation the appointee is not found fit for permanent retention the employer is within his power to terminate the service of the probationer. The right of the appointee after the period of probation when he has not received any order either of termination or of confirmation was the subject-matter of some dispute. However, the rules in the present case says that after the expiry of the probationer period the employee will be deemed to be continuing on probation and there is no question of any implied confirmation in such cases. In support of his contention the petitioner has referred to the case of Commissioner of Police and Others –Vs.- Sandip Kumar, reported in 2011(3) SLR 680 for a proposition that minor indiscretions committed by young people should be condoned. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the criminal case pending against the respondent in that appeal was under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court had said that after all he was not involved in serious offences like murder, decoity or rape etc. Therefore, a lenient view should be taken. The facts are, however, not the similar in this case. Quite serious charges against the petitioner under various sections were pending. As such that case has no application to the facts of the present case. The next question urged by the petitioner was that the allegation of suppression of material should have been proved by a disciplinary proceeding and he ought not to have been terminated without providing an opportunity of hearing. It may be mentioned that a similar question cropped up in the case of Union of India and Others –Vs.- Sukhen Chandra Das, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 125 where also the respondent was enrolled as a constable in the CRPF. On the basis of a report from the District Magistrate about the pendency of a criminal case against the employee his service was terminated on the ground that this was not disclosed in the verification roll. After completing the stages of statutory appeal the employee filed a writ petition. On the basis of a report from the District Magistrate about the pendency of a criminal case against the employee his service was terminated on the ground that this was not disclosed in the verification roll. After completing the stages of statutory appeal the employee filed a writ petition. When the matter reached the Supreme Court on an independent scrutiny of the relevant documents on record the court was of the view that the order of termination was innocuous on its face and proposed to be an order of discharge in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment of a temporary government servant. Such termination is neither punitive nor stigmatic in nature nor it is in any case actuated with any motive. The language of the order clearly and plainly showed that it was termination simplicitor based upon the relevant rules during the period when the employee was a temporary employee of CRPF and it does not cast any stigma on the conduct of the respondent. The basis of this judgement was a finding that at the time of enrolment it was obligatory upon a candidate to fill up the verification roll and it was specifically mentioned that if any false information was furnished or there had been any suppression of factual information in the verification roll and if that come to the notice during the service of a person his service would be liable to be automatically terminated. The Supreme Court had further observed that the candidate had to give the information as to whether he had been arrested, prosecuted etc. or convicted by any court of law. In the present case as well the petitioner had to fill up the Attestation Form at the time of his recruitment which has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-7. In the said Attestation Form it was specifically mentioned that furnishing false information or suppression of factual information in the said form would be a disqualification and was likely to render the candidate unfit for employment under the government. It was further instructed that if false information had been furnished or if there was any suppression of factual information in the Attestation Form and if it came to the notice at any time during the service of a person the service was liable to be terminated. It was further instructed that if false information had been furnished or if there was any suppression of factual information in the Attestation Form and if it came to the notice at any time during the service of a person the service was liable to be terminated. It further appears that in the said attestation form there were specific column asking the petitioner to give an answer whether he was ever arrested or prosecuted or whether he was kept under detention. The petitioner, it appears from the Attestation Form annexed thereto, had not filled it up. And this form was filled up on April 25, 2001, i.e., after the police case against him had started on March 10, 2001. So there has been a suppression of fact and the authorities had taken a decision to terminate the service of the petitioner treating that because of such suppression he was fit for retention in the service. The observation made by the Supreme Court that it contains no stigma has settled the issue entitling the employer to terminate the service of a probationer. In such view of it I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed. The writ petition is disposed of. Interim order, if any, shall stand vacated. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all requisite formalities.