U.C. Dhyani, J. – Since the above applications under section 482 Cr.P.C. arise out of the same impugned order, therefore, they are being taken up to­gether and decided by this common judgment and order. 2. The accused-applicants (Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu), by means of Application under section 482 Cr.P.C. bearing No. 526/2010, seek to quash the summoning order dated 28.5.2010 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar in Criminal Complaint Case No. 5742 of 2009 titled as Dhani Ram v. Rakesh and others under sections 323 & 504 IPC. The applicants also seek to quash the proceedings of the aforemen­tioned criminal complaint case pending before the said Court. 3. A criminal complaint was filed by the complainant (Dhani Ram) against 6 accused persons in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar. After recording of statement of Dhani Ram (complainant) under section 200 Cr.P.C. and statements of the witnesses, namely, Ashok Kumar, Deshraj, Smt. Suresho, Suresh, Noorhasan, Vinod Kumar, Vinay Kumar, Randhir Singh, Ramesh Chandra and Bhoora under section 202 Cr.P.C. and after having found a prima facie case against the ac­cused (Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu), the cognizance was taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, vide order dated 28.5.2010 and accused-applicants (Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu) were summoned to face the trial. Learned Magistrate, however, did not summon other accused persons, namely, S.O. Rakesh Gusai, S.I. Pradeep Kumar, Con­stable Ashwani Kumar and Constable Lal Singh, by holding that the sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. was required for the purpose of instituting a criminal complaint case against them. 4. Aggrieved against the summon­ing order, application No. 526/2010 under section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed by the accused- applicants (Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu). Another application under section 482 Cr.P.C. bearing No. 676/2010 was filed by the complainant (Dhani Ram) for non-summoning of S.O. Rakesh Gusai, S.I. Pradeep Kumar, Constable Ashwani Kumar and Consta­ble Lal Singh. 5. Complainant (Dhani Ram) al­leged in his complaint that on 13.9.2009 when he was sitting in his office along-with his companions, then accused persons, namely, Rakesh Gusai, Pradeep Kumar, Ashwani Kumar, Lal Singh, Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu came to his office between 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM. Complainant was the chairman of a society having it's head office in village Ikadkala, District Haridwar. He was a social worker. On the relevant date, ac­cused persons used casteist remarks against him. Complainant was the chairman of a society having it's head office in village Ikadkala, District Haridwar. He was a social worker. On the relevant date, ac­cused persons used casteist remarks against him. They hurled abuses at him and assaulted him. Witnesses, namely, Ashok Kumar, Deshraj, Smt. Suresho, Suresh, Noorhasan, Vinod Kumar, Vinay Kumar, Randhir Singh, Ramesh Chandra and Bhoora intervened and saved the complainant from the clutches of accused persons. The grievance of the accused persons was as to why the complainant raised voice against their misdeeds. The complainant made an attempt to lodge FIR against the accused persons, but to no avail. He sent a regis­tered letter to the S.S.P., Haridwar on 14.10.2009, but no heed was paid to the request of complainant. The complain­ant, therefore, had no other option, but to file a criminal complaint before the Magistrate concerned. It is alleged that the accused persons lodged two FIRs, which were registered as case crime Nos. 181/2009 and 189/2009, against the complainant (Dhani Ram). When the complainant entered into the witness box, he supported the prosecution story. Witnesses, namely, Ashok Kumar, Deshraj, Smt. Suresho, Suresh, Noor­hasan, Vinod Kumar, Vinay Kumar, Randhir Singh, Ramesh Chandra and Bhoora also supported the statement of the complainant. 6. One of the contentions of learned Counsel for the accused-applicants (Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu) is that the complaint filed by the complainant against them was a counterblast to the FIRs lodged by them. The foundation of criminal offences punishable under sec­tions 323 and 504 IPC is laid against the accused-applicants (Dhramendra and Adarsh @ Sonu). It could not be believed, at this stage, that the complaint filed by the complainant was only a counterblast to the FIRs lodged by the accused per­sons against the complainant. Having found a prima facie case against the ac­cused persons (Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu), learned Judicial Magistrate committed no illegality in passing the impugned order. 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another, (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986. has laid down certain principles in respect of exercise of jurisdiction un­der section 482 of Cr.P.C. One of the principle is that the Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontro-verted allegations as made from the re­cord of the case and the documents sub­mitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. has laid down certain principles in respect of exercise of jurisdiction un­der section 482 of Cr.P.C. One of the principle is that the Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontro-verted allegations as made from the re­cord of the case and the documents sub­mitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improb­able that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic-ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may in­terfere. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the Courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two in­gredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substan­tial compliance with the requirements of the offence. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous exami­nation of the evidence is needed for con­sidering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate Courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to inter­fere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. Another very significant cau­tion that the Courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evi­dence and materials on record to deter­mine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is con­cerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will con­stitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of Court leading to injustice. 8. When factual foundation of any offence is laid against the accused-applicants, then this Court should not intervene in exercise of it's inherent ju­risdiction. It is a well settled law that the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. should be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section. In the instant case, the accused-applicants (viz. It is a well settled law that the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. should be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section. In the instant case, the accused-applicants (viz. Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu) are unable to pass those tests and it is not a fit case where such jurisdiction should be exercised. 9. As a consequence thereof, ap­plication under section 482 Cr.P.C. bear­ing No. 526/2010 filed by accused-applicants (Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu) is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. It is, however, pro­vided that if the applicants (Dharmen­dra and Adarsh @ Sonu) surrender be­fore the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ha-ridwar and seek bail, their bail application) in the criminal complaint case No. 5742/2009 shall be decided by the Magistrate concerned on the same day. 10. The same allegations, which were levelled against Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu, were also levelled against S.O. Rakesh Gusai, S.I. Pradeep Kumar, Constable Ashwani Kumar and Constable Lal Singh, inasmuch as, all the accused persons came together in the office of complainant, used casteist remarks, hurled abuses and assaulted the complainant, as was said by the complainant in his statement under sec­tion 200 Cr.P.C., which was duly sup­ported by the witnesses, namely, Ashok Kumar, Deshraj, Smt. Suresho, Suresh, Noorhasan, Vinod Kum.c?r, Vinay Kumar, Randhir Singh, Ramesh Chandra and Bhoora in their statements under section 202 Cr.P.C. 11. Whereas accused Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu were summoned by the Trial Court, other accused persons were not summoned because, in the opinion of the Magistrate, the requisite sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. was not obtained for instituting a complaint against S.O. Rakesh Gusai, S.I. Pradeep Kumar, Constable Ashwani Kumar and Constable Lal Singh. The sole questior, which arises for consideration of this Court is whether learned Magistrate was justified in holding that sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. was required for institution of criminal complaint case against such public servants or not? One has to keep in mind that the accused persons allegedly used casteist remarks, hurled abuses and assaulted the com­plainant with fists and sticks. 12. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in K Kalimuthu v. State by DSP, 2005 (29) AIC 70 (SC) = 2005 (52) ACC 793 (SC) = (2005) 4 SCC 512 . One has to keep in mind that the accused persons allegedly used casteist remarks, hurled abuses and assaulted the com­plainant with fists and sticks. 12. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in K Kalimuthu v. State by DSP, 2005 (29) AIC 70 (SC) = 2005 (52) ACC 793 (SC) = (2005) 4 SCC 512 . that the protection under section 197 Cr.P.C. is available to a public servant, only when the alleged act done by him is reasonably connected with the dis­charge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. Even if, a public servant acts in excess of his official duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the pro­tection. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment: - "The protection given under section 197 is to protect responsible public servants against the institu­tion of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate pro­tection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for any­thing done by them in the discharge of their official duties without rea­sonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Govern­ment, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is rea­sonably connected with the dis­charge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objec­tionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from the protec­tion. The question is not as to the na­ture of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an ele­ment necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. The question is not as to the na­ture of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an ele­ment necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before section 197 can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was ac­cused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dere­liction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant con­cerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protec­tion of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable con­nection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty, if the answer to his question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the pub­lic servant while- acting in the dis­charge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of sec­tion 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case." 13. In Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar and others, 2006 (38) AIC 13 (SC) = 2006 (54) ACC 536 (SC) = (2006) 1 SCC 557 . Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: - "12. It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty; that is under the colour of of­fice. Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: - "12. It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty; that is under the colour of of­fice. Official duty, therefore, implies 1 that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The sec­tion has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its appli­cability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its offi­cial nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to in­dulge in criminal activities. To that extent the section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protec­tion to a public servant without sanc­tion shall stand frustrated. For in­stance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecu­tion of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty and without any justification therefor then the bar under section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Mata-jog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR (1956) SC 44. thus: "The offence alleged to have been commit­ted (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty ... thus: "The offence alleged to have been commit­ted (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty ... there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a rea­sonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." 14. Merely because the accused persons, namely, S.O. Rakesh Gusai, S.I. Pradeep Kumar, Constable Ashwani Kumar and Constable Lal Singh were the public servants, the prosecution sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. was not required for alleged misdeeds (offences) committed by them. It is no­where alleged that they (police person­nel) went to the office of complainant in discharge of their official duties. Had they went there in discharge of their official duties and would have acted in excess of their official duties, then they were entitled to protection under section 197 Cr.P.C., but in the instant case, they did not go to the complainant's office in connection with their official duties. Complainant was also medically exam­ined in Government Hospital, Haridwar on the date of incident. The offences alleged against the accused, namely, S.O. Rakesh Gusai, S.I. Pradeep Kumar, Constable Ashwani Kumar and Consta­ble Lal Singh, were_not reasonably con­nected with the discharge of their offi­cial duties. It is being reproduced at the cost of repetition that if in doing their official duties, they acted in excess of their official duties and there was rea­sonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duties, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the pro­tection, but as said earlier, in the instant case, there was nothing on record to show/that the accused persons (police personnel) committed alleged offences in discharge of their official duties, even though they acted in excess. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of section 197 Cr.P.C. does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case. 15. The same offences, which were alleged against Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu, were also alleged against the police personnel, namely, S.O. Rakesh Gusai, S.I. Pradeep Kumar, Constable Ashwani Kumar and Consta­ble Lal Singh. The foundation of criminal offences punishable under sections 323 and 504 IPC is laid against them. 15. The same offences, which were alleged against Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu, were also alleged against the police personnel, namely, S.O. Rakesh Gusai, S.I. Pradeep Kumar, Constable Ashwani Kumar and Consta­ble Lal Singh. The foundation of criminal offences punishable under sections 323 and 504 IPC is laid against them. The Honljle Supreme Court in Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, 2013 (123) AIC 220 (SC) = 2013 (81) ACC 387 (SC) = (2013) 3 SCC 330 . held as follows: "21. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or other­wise of allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the de­fences raised on behalf of the accused is. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so, because it would result in giving fi­nality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, with­out allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed, by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position, that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s) levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations lev­elled, trial must be held." 16. Once the ingredients of offence complained of against the accused per­sons were satisfied and the provisions of section 197 Cr.P.C. were not attracted, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that learned Magistrate committed a manifest error in holding that the criminal complaint could only be instituted only when the sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. was obtained. The impugned order of the Magistrate dated 28.5.2010 is required to be interfered to this extent only. 17. Application under section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by Dhani Ram is allowed. The impugned order of the Magistrate dated 28.5.2010 is required to be interfered to this extent only. 17. Application under section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by Dhani Ram is allowed. Part of the order dated 28.5.2010 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Harid-war in Criminal Complaint Case No. 5742 of 2009, whereby the complaint pertaining to the accused police person­nel (viz, S.O. Rakesh Gusai, S.I. Pradeep Kumar, Constable Ashwani Kumar and Constable Lal Singh) were dismissed, is set aside. 18. The said accused also ought to have been summoned by the Magistrate, like co-accused Dharmendra and Adarsh @ Sonu. 19. The matter is remitted back to the Trial Court with the direction to pass appropriate order in view of above observations made by-this Court, in ac­cordance with law. 20. The complainant (Dhani Ram) is directed to appear before the Magistrate concerned on 4.1.2014. Ordered Accordingly. ____________