JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard learned Standing Counsel for applicants-appellants and Sri Anil sharma, Advocate for respondent. 2. This is a second appeal instituted by State of U.P. through District Magistrate, Bijnor and another and has been filed beyond period of limitation by one year and 322 days, i.e., almost two years. The appeal is accompanied with this application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1963”) seeking condonation of delay. The affidavit accompanying this application gives nothing but a superficial eye wash explanation having several wide gaps in the prospective of period. In brief, the chronological events given in affidavit to explain delay, read as under: 3. In the aforesaid narration, after sending opinion by DGC on 10.3.2011, there is no explanation for a period of about one and half years and more inasmuch as the applicants applied for fresh certified copy of judgment on 1.10.2012 but what happened to earlier certified copy of judgment and what proceedings were taken, the affidavit is totally silent except of stating that earlier certified copy lost somewhere but no inquiry, no investigation and no action against anybody stated to have been taken by applicants. It is also not clear at what stage and from when the certified copy was misplaced or lost. The explanation is extremely sketchy and in a usual casual, careless and negligence manner. 4. It is true that when State is a party, and file appeal with some delay, it may deserve some leverage for official hierarchical steps for permission etc. but a wholly unexplained, reckless and negligent approach of delay running in almost one and half years and more cannot be overlooked particularly when it is not the case of applicants that they have taken any action against erring individual. 5. The expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. 5. The expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC 107 , the Court said, that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 6. In the matters where action is brought by Government, no person is individually affected and in ultimate analysis it is the public interest which suffers. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional and do not share the characteristic of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation though is equal and apply at par to both private individual and Government but where the Government makes out a case of sufferings to public interest owing to acts of fraud and bad faith on the part of its officials and agents, and also, the intention of Government not to allow such officers of doubtful integrity to go scot free, the Court should also come forward to do justice in the interest of public at large, but, a mere eye wash kind of explanation, without any honest intention of State authorities to proceed against tainted officers, or, those who have acted in a bad faith, or, those who have worked negligently, the explanation that delay must be condoned in public interest would be superficial and lacking bona fide, hence difficult to be accepted by Court. 7. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 , in para 8 of the judgment, the Court said: “8. . . . . . . . 7. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 , in para 8 of the judgment, the Court said: “8. . . . . . . . Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes ‘sufficient cause’ for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be some what unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have ‘a little play at the joints’. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning-of course, within a reasonable limits-is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law-officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of these cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government.” 8. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 , the Court said: “Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” 9. The Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy rights of parties. They virtually take away the remedy. They are meant with the objective that parties should not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over their rights. They must seek remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The statute relating to limitation determines a life span for such legal remedy for redress of the legal injury, one has suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. They must seek remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The statute relating to limitation determines a life span for such legal remedy for redress of the legal injury, one has suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time, newer causes would come up, necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The statute providing limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). It is for this reason that when an action becomes barred by time, the Court should be slow to ignore delay for the reason that once limitation expires, other party matures his rights on the subject with attainment of finality. Though it cannot be doubted that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing the suiter from putting forth his cause but simultaneously the party on the other hand is also entitled to sit and feel carefree after a particular length of time, getting relieved from persistent and continued litigation. 10. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. No person gains from deliberate delaying a matter by not resorting to take appropriate legal remedy within time but then the words “sufficient cause” show that delay, if any, occurred, should not be deliberate, negligent and due to casual approach of concerned litigant, but, it should be bona fide, and, for the reasons beyond his control, and, in any case should not lack bona fide. If the explanation does not smack of lack of bona fide, the Court should show due consideration to the suiter, but, when there is apparent casual approach on the part of suiter, the approach of Court is also bound to change. Lapse on the part of litigant in approaching Court within time is understandable but a total inaction for long period of delay without any explanation whatsoever and that too in absence of showing any sincere attempt on the part of suiter, would add to his negligence, and would be relevant factor going against him. 11. Lapse on the part of litigant in approaching Court within time is understandable but a total inaction for long period of delay without any explanation whatsoever and that too in absence of showing any sincere attempt on the part of suiter, would add to his negligence, and would be relevant factor going against him. 11. I need not to burden this judgment with a catena of decisions explaining and laying down as to what should be the approach of Court on construing “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of Act, 1963 and it would be suffice to refer a very few of them besides those already referred. 12. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 , a three Judge Bench of the Court said, that, unless want of bona fide of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. 13. The Privy Council in Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94, observed that true guide for a Court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This principle still holds good inasmuch as the aforesaid decision of Privy Council as repeatedly been referred to, and, recently in State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others, AIR 2005 SC 2191 . 14. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, JT 2001(5) SC 608, the Court said that under Section 5 of Act, 1963 it should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. In the former case consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard and the basic guiding factor is advancement of substantial justice. 15. In the present case admittedly the certified copy of judgment of Courts below alongwith opinion of DGC was remitted to appellants on 10.3.2011. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard and the basic guiding factor is advancement of substantial justice. 15. In the present case admittedly the certified copy of judgment of Courts below alongwith opinion of DGC was remitted to appellants on 10.3.2011. The entire explanation is completely silent as to when this letter was received by District Magistrate in his office, whether it was actually received or not, if not, what happened, in what manner this opinion and certified copy were sent by DGC and at what level the aforesaid documents were found detected as misplaced. Nothing has been said except of one line statement that aforesaid documents got misplaced and thereafter the appellants applied for a fresh certified copy on 1.12.2012, i.e., almost after one and half years. No inquiry, no investigation, no action against anyone found blameworthy by appellants, has neither been stated in the affidavit filed alongwith this application nor there is any whisper to deal on this aspect of the matter. Moreover when appeal was already delayed so much, still more than three months were taken by law department in clearing the matter to file appeal and for this aspect also there is no explanation except of just two letters, one by District Magistrate seeking permission of Government and second is Government’s letter granting permission but why it took three months, in respect thereto, there is a complete silence. 16. In a matter like present one where plaintiff-respondent suit has been decreed by Trial Court and concurring with the findings therewith the Lower Appellate Court has also dismissed defendants’ appeal, still the applicants-defendants could proceed with a matter with such unexplained long delay showing lack of bona fide on their part. In my view, the kind of explanation rendered herein does not satisfy the observations of Apex Court that if delay has occurred for reasons which does not smack of mala fide, the Court should be reluctant to refuse condonation. On the contrary, I find that here is a case which shows a complete careless and reckless long delay on the part of applicants which has remain virtually unexplained at all. Therefore, I do not find any reason to exercise my judicial discretion exercising judiciously so as to justify condonation of delay in the present case. 17. The application is accordingly rejected. ——————