JUDGMENT L. Narasimha Reddy, J. 1. Defendants 1 to 4 in O.S. No.51 of 1996 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Peddapuram, filed this appeal challenging the decree and judgment dated 21.11.2000 passed therein. The suit was filed by the 1st respondent herein against the appellants and the 2nd respondent (defendant No.5). 2. Since the 2nd respondent did not contest the suit, the 1st respondent herein referred to as the respondent. 3. The respondent filed the suit for the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 01.02.1995. He pleaded that the appellants are the owners of Acs.26-00 of land in different survey numbers of Talluru village of East Godavari District and they offered to sell the same for a sum of Rs.60,000/- per acre, aggregating to Rs.15,60,000/-. On the date of agreement, a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- is said to have been paid as an advance and that balance of sale consideration was agreed to be paid within 4 months. It was also his case that the appellants agreed to clear the loans due to Cooperative Society, Gandepalli (for short “the society”) and Samarlakota Sugar Factory (for short “the factory”) and to deliver the original title deeds, at the time of registration. 4. The respondent pleaded that though he was ready with the balance of sale consideration, the appellants did not come forward to execute the sale deed and register the document, and he addressed a letter dated 26.05.1995 calling upon them to perform their part of contract. It was stated that he got issued another notice dated 01.06.1995 to the appellants and that the latter in turn, gave a necessary reply dated 17.08.1995. It was also stated that through a notice dated 10.10.1995, the appellants got cancelled the agreement and a reply was given to that on 13.10.1995. According to him, the appellants addressed a letter dated 24.11.1995 stating that they are ready with the documents and the default was on the part of the respondent. He ultimately prayed for the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale and for delivery of the suit schedule property; or in the alternative for a decree for refund of Rs.1,00,000/- with interest at 18% per annum from 01.02.1995 till the date of payment. 5. The 5th defendant in the suit i.e., the 2nd respondent remained ex parte. He ultimately prayed for the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale and for delivery of the suit schedule property; or in the alternative for a decree for refund of Rs.1,00,000/- with interest at 18% per annum from 01.02.1995 till the date of payment. 5. The 5th defendant in the suit i.e., the 2nd respondent remained ex parte. The appellants contested the suit by filing a common written statement. They admitted execution of the agreement of sale and receipt of earnest money of Rs.1,00,000/-. It was, however, stated that though the balance of sale consideration was required to be paid within four months, the respondent did not come forward to pay that. It was stated that they did not receive the letter dated 26.05.1995. Another contention of the appellants was that they cleared the loan to the Society and the Factory long ago and since the respondent did not come forward to pay the balance sale consideration, they cancelled the agreement. According to them, there is steep increase in the prices of the land in the locality and that the respondent is not entitled to the relief of specific performance. 6. The trial Court passed the decree for specific performance of agreement of sale, directing the appellants to execute the sale deed by receiving the balance of sale consideration. Hence, this appeal. 7. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned senior counsel for the appellants, submits that the appellants have decided to sell their land to meet their immediate necessities and though four months period was stipulated for payment of balance of sale consideration, the respondent did not come forward at all. He contends that a meager amount, which is just about 6% of total consideration, was paid as advance and there is nothing on record to disclose that the respondent was possessed of the balance of the sale consideration. He submits that the trial Court has adopted a totally defective procedure in answering the issue straightaway and reducing the discussion in the judgment, only to the one of justifying the conclusions which were already arrived at. He submits that the trial Court ought to have, at the most, passed the decree for payment of the advance amount of Rs.1,00,000/-paid by the respondent. He placed reliance on certain precedents. 8. He submits that the trial Court ought to have, at the most, passed the decree for payment of the advance amount of Rs.1,00,000/-paid by the respondent. He placed reliance on certain precedents. 8. Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that his client was always ready and willing to pay the balance of sale consideration and it was the appellants, who did not come forward to comply with the conditions under the agreement. He contends that the appellants, in a way, have taken the plea that time is essence of the contract, and the contract became unenforceable on account of non-payment of balance sale consideration within time and that such a plea was rightly rejected by the trial Court in view of the settled principles of law that time can never be the essence of contract in relation to an agreement for purchase of an item of immovable property. He further submits that the respondent has demonstrated with cogent evidence, that he was possessed of adequate means to pay the balance of sale consideration. He further submits that in case the debts of the Society and the Factory were discharged earlier, there was no occasion for making mention thereof in the agreement. He too cited certain Judgments, in support of his contentions. 9. The respondent filed the suit for the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale or in the alternative, for refund of the advance, with interest. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: 1. Whether the time is the essence of the contract dt:01.02.95? 2. Whether the plaintiff performed his part of the contract and was ready to take a sale deed in his favour? 3. Whether the defendants are entitled to get the contract of sale deed dt.1.2.95 cancelled and whether the earnest money can be forfeited? 4. Whether the performance of the contract at this stage would cause undue hardship and loss to the defendants? 10. On behalf of the respondent, the respondent deposed as P.W.1 and his son as P.W.2. He filed Exs.A-1 to A-12. On behalf of the appellants, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-3 were filed. Exs.X-1 and X-2 were also taken on record. 11. The suit was decreed granting the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale in the form of execution of sale deed. He filed Exs.A-1 to A-12. On behalf of the appellants, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-3 were filed. Exs.X-1 and X-2 were also taken on record. 11. The suit was decreed granting the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale in the form of execution of sale deed. In view of the extensive arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, we find that the following points arise for consideration; in this appeal. 1) Whether the respondent proved that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of consideration? 2) Whether the respondent made out a case for grant of the relief of specific performance? 3) Whether the procedure adopted by the trial Court in rendering the Judgment under appeal is proper? 4) Whether the relief granted by the trial Court to the respondent needs any modification? POINT No.1 : 12. Ex.A-1 is the agreement of sale, under which, the appellants agreed to sell an extent of Acs.26.00 of land in favor of the respondent. The consideration stipulated therein is Rs.60,000/- per acre aggregating to Rs.16,50,000/-, and out of it a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was paid as advance. There is stipulation in the agreement to the effect that the balance of sale consideration shall be paid within four months from the date of agreement, and that the appellants must take certain steps, such as handing over the documents and clearing of the debts. 13. There was a serious contest between the parties as to whether the time was essence of the contract under Ex.A-1. In fact, the trial Court has framed an issue on that. We agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that time cannot be said to be essence of the contract in the instant case. The reason is that in relation to the contracts for purchase of immovable property, time is not essence of contract. It is only in exceptional cases, where several other conditions providing for the penal consequences on account of failure of inference to the time, and the parties expressing their clear and unequivocal intention that time is the essence of contract that such an inference can be drawn. It is only in exceptional cases, where several other conditions providing for the penal consequences on account of failure of inference to the time, and the parties expressing their clear and unequivocal intention that time is the essence of contract that such an inference can be drawn. Time and again, the Supreme Court held that by and large, time cannot be treated as essence of contract and reference in regard, can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in SwarnamRamachandran (Smt) and another v. Aravacode Chakungal Jayapalan (2004)8 Supreme Court Cases 689). 14. Readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff, is one of the most important ingredients in a suit for specific performance. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act mandates that the relief can not be granted in the absence of such a plea in the plaint. That apart the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 makes a plea in relation thereto, compulsory, in the relevant Forms appended to it. It is true that the readiness and willingness need not be, to the extent of holding the balance of sale consideration in hand or in bank account, from the date of agreement till the date of filing of the suit. All the same, nature and the extent of the readiness, which is pleaded by a plaintiff, would have its own relevance, for the Court, in forming an opinion about granting or denying the discretionary relief under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. 15. As against the total consideration of Rs.15,60,000/-, the respondent paid a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-. More than 90% of the sale consideration remained unpaid and he had four months time to pay that. Notwithstanding the fact that time is not the essence of the contract, the respondent was under the obligation to show to the Court or to the appellants that he was possessed of adequate means to pay the balance of sale consideration, by the time he required the appellants to execute the sale deed. 16. One of the facts pleaded by the respondent is that he addressed a letter dated 26.05.1995 calling upon the appellants to execute the sale deed. However, he was not able to substantiate his plea. The earliest notice received by the appellants from the respondent was the one dated 01.06.1995, marked as Ex.A-3. 16. One of the facts pleaded by the respondent is that he addressed a letter dated 26.05.1995 calling upon the appellants to execute the sale deed. However, he was not able to substantiate his plea. The earliest notice received by the appellants from the respondent was the one dated 01.06.1995, marked as Ex.A-3. After stating that an agreement was entered into and mentioning the conditions incorporated therein, the respondent required the appellants to do the following : “Hence, this notice is issued to you calling upon you to produce the original title deeds, after dischrigng the debts and execute a registered sale deed in favour of my client within one week from the date of receipt of this notice. Else my client will be constrained to take such action as advised.” 17. In the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph in Ex.A-3, it was mentioned that the respondent is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 18. From a perusal of the paragraph extracted herein, it is evident that it is not a case where the respondent offered to pay the amount and required the appellants to execute the sale deed. Certain conditions were imposed. In response to this, the appellants gave a reply on 17.08.1995 marked as Ex.A-4. Thereunder, the appellants requested the respondent to furnish a copy of the agreement reserving a right to give a detailed reply. On 10.10.1995, a reply/Ex.A-5 was given stating that the respondent was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract, and accordingly, the agreement is cancelled. Under Ex.A-6 dated 13.10.1995, the respondent informed the appellants that he is ready with the balance of sale consideration and if the appellants discharged the debts and delivered the sale deeds (link documents) as per the agreement, he will get the sale deed engrossed on stamp papers, to obtain income tax clearance certificate. He has also insisted that it is the obligation of the appellants to discharge the debts and that they have no right to cancel the agreement. 19. The consistent case of the appellants was that the respondent did not possess adequate means to pay balance of sale consideration. It is, also, their case that the debts to the Society and the Factory were discharged longback. 20. 19. The consistent case of the appellants was that the respondent did not possess adequate means to pay balance of sale consideration. It is, also, their case that the debts to the Society and the Factory were discharged longback. 20. In his chief-examination, the respondent, as P.W.1, stated that he deposited the money in VetlapalemBranch of State Bank of India in the name of himself and his sons and that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In the cross-examination, however, he admitted that by the time he filed the suit, he did not have the entire money with him. He, however, stated that many persons promised to lend him, the amount. He has also stated that he does not know how much money is deposited in each account. A suggestion was made to him that the bank officials colluded with him and gave a statement. Though he mentioned names of some persons, who are said to have promised to lend the amount, he did not examine any one of them. The only other witness, whom he examined, was his son. He admitted that the deposits were made in the banks just before filing of the suit. Ex.A-8 is a certificate dated 16.10.1998 issued by the Andhra Bank, Peddapuram branch, stating that the respondent made certain deposits. However, the earliest of the deposit was on 06.10.1995 being Rs.2,00,000/- and most of the subsequent deposits were made in July and August 1996, just before the suit was filed. 21. In case what remained unpaid under the agreement was a small amount or small fraction of the total consideration, it may not be necessary to scrutinize the financial condition of the respondent. When the balance of sale consideration is almost 95% of the total consideration, the scrutiny is certainly essential. There is nothing on record to disclose that either by the time the respondent got issued Ex.A-3 or he filed the suit, he was possessed of adequate means. Though there are certain precedents to the effect that the readiness and willingness must be continuous in nature, it is essential that atleast when the money became payable under the agreement or when the plaintiff called upon the defendants to execute the sale deed, he must show to the satisfaction of the Court that he was possessed of the requisite amount. That, however, it is totally lacking in the present case. It has already been mentioned that no proof is placed before the Court to show that the respondent had the balance of consideration with him, when he required the appellants to execute the sale deed. 22. The tone and tenor of the notice got issued by the respondent needs to be taken in to account. His emphasis was mostly on requiring the appellants to handover the original link documents and to clear the debts. The very fact that the respondent insisted to clear off the debts discloses that he was of the view that certain amount remained unpaid by the appellants to the Society and the Factory. Any prudent person would have either discharged that amount by himself or would have withheld that portion of the amount from the sale consideration, so that it can be discharged as and when time arises. In their reply, the appellants categorically stated that they have already discharged the debts. Atleast then, the respondent should have offered to pay the balance of sale consideration. His failure to do so will certainly leads to a conclusion that he was only trying to throw the blame on the appellants to cover up his inability to pay the balance of sale consideration. Further, nothing emanated from him within the time stipulated for payment i.e., four months. He made a vain attempt to impress upon the Court that a notice was issued within the time, but he failed to prove it. 23. By referring to the Judgment of the Privy Council in ArdeshirMama v. Flora Sassoon (A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council 208.), the Supreme Court, in JugrajSingh andanother v. Labh Singh and others (A.I.R. 1995 S.C. (945)1), held that the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance must be at all stages from the date of agreement till the date of filing of the suit. Even if such a stringent requirement is not insisted, the respondent failed to prove that atleast when he got issued Ex.A-3, he possessed the requisite amount. 24. Even if such a stringent requirement is not insisted, the respondent failed to prove that atleast when he got issued Ex.A-3, he possessed the requisite amount. 24. A Division Bench of this Court in SardarAmarjeet Singh v. Nandu Bai and others ( 1998(5) ALD 697 (DB), held that mere averment in a plaint or a pre-suit notice that the plaintiff is, at all material times, ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, is not sufficient and that it should be supported by satisfactory evidence. Reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R.Rajan Mohan Rao ( 1995(5) SCC 115 ) and to other judgments. If we analyze the case on hand, with the principles enunciated by the Courts, the answer to the first point would, invariably, be against the respondent. It is answered accordingly. POINT No. 2: 25. Assuming that the answer to the first point is in the affirmative, it needs to be seen as to whether the respondent is entitled to the relief of specific performance. The property involved is a fairly large extent of land, of substantial value. As against the total consideration of Rs.15,60,000/-, just a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was paid. The respondent was harping on the fact that the appellants cannot execute sale deed unless the debts are cleared by them to the Society and the Factory. There is a clear inconsistency in this regard. Ex.A-2 connotes his stand that he is not prepared to pay the balance of sale consideration, unless the conditions insisted upon by him are complied with. If what was pleaded by him in the notices was true, his prayer ought to have been to insist upon the appellants to clear the debts and to pave the way for execution of the sale deed. This is not having been done, the occasion for the Court to formulate its discretion contemplated under Section 20 of the Act did not arise. 26. It is not without reason that the relief of specific performance is made discretionary; albeit the same is circumscribed by several conditions. It has already been mentioned in the discussion under point No.1 that the respondent failed to prove that he possessed the requisite means to pay the balance of sale consideration. The property involved is vast in extent and is in a prime locality. It has already been mentioned in the discussion under point No.1 that the respondent failed to prove that he possessed the requisite means to pay the balance of sale consideration. The property involved is vast in extent and is in a prime locality. Mere payment of Rs.1,00,000/- does not clothe the respondent with the right vis-a-vis the property at his whims. The acute needs of the necessity of the appellants is evident from the fact that they thought of parting with their valuable property; and the time for payment of the entire consideration was stipulated as four months. Things would have been different, had the respondent paid any considerable amount before expiry of four months or immediately thereafter. He did not even offer to make any payment and was insisting on fulfillment of conditions, which, in fact, did not arise at all. The result is that it is not a fit case where the Court can exercise its discretion to grant the relief of specific performance. This is particularly so, in view of the fact that the Courts have taken judicial notice of the steep increase in the value of the immovable properties, that too, which are surrounding the towns and cities. Therefore, we hold that the respondent did not make out a case for grant of specific relief. POINT No. 3: 27. This is in relation to the procedure adopted by the trial Court. It, no dubt, has framed the issues and conducted trial. However, surprisingly at the threshold of the judgment itself, against the each issue, it recorded its findings. The discussion was relegated to the one of sustaining the findings that are already recorded. After the findings were recorded against each issue, the learned trial Judge commenced the discussion with the heading “reasons for findings”. 28. The writing of judgment is an activity, which, almost every person entrusted with the function of adjudication is acquainted. It starts with the taking note of the contention of the respective parties, followed by the identification of the issues or points reflecting the area of controversy. Then comes the discussion on the relevant issues or points with reference to the pleadings, evidence, arguments, applicable provisions of law and precedents, if cited. It is the result of such discussion that would give rise to findings. If the conclusion is arrived at, at the threshold itself, the discussion becomes perfunctory. Then comes the discussion on the relevant issues or points with reference to the pleadings, evidence, arguments, applicable provisions of law and precedents, if cited. It is the result of such discussion that would give rise to findings. If the conclusion is arrived at, at the threshold itself, the discussion becomes perfunctory. Though the question as to whether conclusion should follow reasons or the vice versa may appear to be one of semantics. However, the subtle distinction needs to be keep in mind. While it is the prerogative of an administrator, to take a decision first and supplements with reasons as and when demanded, the basic tenets of a Court is to undertake the process of reasoning and then come to a conclusion or to record a finding. The change of roles would certainly render the very process redundant. Though the Judgment of the trial Court cannot be set aside, on this ground, the procedure adopted by it cannot be countenanced. POINT NO.4 : 29. It is not in dispute that the respondent paid a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as an advance. Obviously, being conscious of the fact that there is every likelihood of the relief of specific performance being denied to him, he prayed for the relief of refund of the advance paid by him with interest, at 18% per annum. Though the appellants pleaded that the agreement is cancelled and the advance is forfeited, we find it difficult to consider that they have the right to forfeit the advance. Further, they stood to benefit on account of the steep increase in the value of the property. The rate of interest claimed by the respondent may appear to be higher. However, if one takes into account, the fact that the appellants had the benefit of that amount, without any corresponding loss, the rate of interest is reasonable. Hence, we are of the view that the alternative relief of a decree for refund of the amount of Rs.1,00,000/-with interest at 18% per annum. from the date of agreement till the date of payment can be granted. 30. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed setting aside the decree passed by the trial Court but granting the alternative relief of refund of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) with interest at 18% per annum from 01.02.1995 till the date of realization. There shall be no order as to costs. 30. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed setting aside the decree passed by the trial Court but granting the alternative relief of refund of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) with interest at 18% per annum from 01.02.1995 till the date of realization. There shall be no order as to costs. The Miscellaneous Applications filed in these appeals shall stand disposed of.