JUDGMENT Mr. K. Kannan J. (Oral):- The second appeal is admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the instant case the alleged condition in sale is not repugnant to the absolute right of the plaintiff/appellant to hold the property as full owner ? 2. Whether in the event of any legal defect in the sale in favour of the plaintiff/appellant, the right of the appellant as lessee would stand revived ? 2. The second appeal is against the concurrent judgments of the trial Court and the Appellate Court dismissing the notice of cancellation of the sale approved in favour of the plaintiff. Both the Courts have held that the sales approved by the Municipal Committee contemplated the user of the property for establishing a petrol pump and admittedly, the plaintiff had not put the property to such a use. Consequently, there had been a breach of condition of the sale and the cancellation ordered was, therefore, perfectly justified. 3. The appellant contends that while the initial grant of lease in favour of the plaintiff was for the purpose of establishing a petrol pump and the lease period was for 20 years, the proposal for sale had been initiated at the request of the plaintiff for its inability to use of the property for the purpose for which it was leased and seeking for permission for sale so that the investment made by the plaintiff by levelling the property is put to a more viable use. The resolution by the Municipal Committee was passed initially on 05.01.1972 approving of a proposal for a transfer at Rs. 8 per square yard and since the resolution was passed subject to approval of the Deputy Commissioner, the matter was placed before the Deputy Commissioner who sanctioned the alienation of the property at Rs. 18/- per square yard on 07.06.1972 and that the price should be deposited within 15 days from the date when the order was issued. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff had also deposited the money within the time prescribed on 20.06.1972. 18/- per square yard on 07.06.1972 and that the price should be deposited within 15 days from the date when the order was issued. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff had also deposited the money within the time prescribed on 20.06.1972. The cause of action for the suit was a purported order of cancellation of sale made by the Administrator on 25.09.1979 on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish a petrol pump for which the lease was originally granted and that sale was also subsequently made only for the same purpose and that it was liable for cancellation when the condition had not been fulfilled. Both the Courts have admitted to such a cause. 4. The proposal for sale of the property has emanated after a request has come from the land owner through various representations. In the representation made by the plaintiff on 06.04.1969 after the grant of lease in his favour on 23.09.1968, the plaintiff has stated that “.....we are not able to utilize the land for setting up a petrol pump in the near future. It would take a considerable time before negotiations with the oil companies materialize. As already stated we have spent a large sum of Rs.15,000/- in getting the land filled up and levelled. The land is lying vacant and no benefit is accruing to us after spending such a huge amount. It would be proper to permit us to utilize the land for some other purpose. It is, therefore, requested that permission to set up some small scale industry or some other business may kindly be granted...” When the proposal was taken up for an agenda item and when it was considered appropriate to grant a sale, there was no reference anywhere that the sale shall always be only for user of the property for a particular purpose. The proposal and the resolution of the Committee is reproduced from Ex.P2:- Proposal Resolution of the Committee Application of Shri Tej Ram partner M/s Krishna Service Station Ballabgarh that the land which was on lease for 20 years from 1968 for installation of petrol pump, the same may be sold to us. We have spent Rs.15,000/- on development of the land. As per report of the Secretary, the land may be sold at Rs.8 per sq. yd. as assessed by the Tehsildar. This land is in depression. We have spent Rs.15,000/- on development of the land. As per report of the Secretary, the land may be sold at Rs.8 per sq. yd. as assessed by the Tehsildar. This land is in depression. As per report of the Secretary sale of land at Rs.8/- per square yard is accepted. Approval of the Deputy Commissioner may be taken. -sd- Administrator 5. The Deputy Commissioner who was undertaking the issue for sanction in his order dated 07.06.1962 also does not impose any condition about the manner of use. The order passed by the Deputy Commissioner is also reproduced as under:- “....Vide this notice you are hereby informed that vide Hasab Indent No.3108/L.C. Dated 5.6.1972, has proposed that the case for permanent alienation of land of the committee along the Hospital Road, details of which are described below at Rs.18/- per square yard vide its resolution No.5 dated 5.1.1972 be sent to the Deputy Commissioner for approval. The Deputy Commissioner Gurgaon has accorded approval for permanent alienation as proposed by the Committee. Therefore, you should deposit Rs.29,943/- within 15 days failing which the proposed approval shall be consigned as cancelled.” Each of the transactions which is relevant, namely, letter of request from the petitioner, the proposal placed before the Committee and the resolution passed by the Committee as well as the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner do not make any mention about the restriction on user of property only for setting up of a petrol pump. They bear out clearly, on the other hand, that the proposal for sale of the property had been made without any restriction on manner of user. The assumption that there was conditional sanction of sale as regards mode of user was clearly wrong and there is no basis for taking up such a ground for cancellation. The impugned order states that the Committee’s resolution had been recommended to be sold at “Rs.18 per square yard for installing a petrol pump.” This assumption was without any basis. 6. The impugned order states that the Committee’s resolution had been recommended to be sold at “Rs.18 per square yard for installing a petrol pump.” This assumption was without any basis. 6. The restrictions that could be imposed by a land owner at the time of grant of lease are not unusual and a land owner is always entitled to dictate as to how a property shall be used by a lessee since a right of resumption and re-entry into the property after the tenure of the lease period must secure to the landlord the property free of any obstruction. It is, therefore, a usual practice to even stipulate the type of user of the property. Many of the rent control legislations which govern the conditions for imposition of lease also permit the user of the property to be restricted either for residential or non-residential purpose. A change of user of the property is also afforded as one of the grounds of eviction in many of the State legislations. All these are only to point out that the restriction that may be imposed in grant of lease have to be seen completely in a different context from how the Transfer of Property Act itself states that there could be no such restriction of alienation of property. Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act reads thus:- “11. Restriction repugnant to interest created.- Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction. Where any such direction has been made in respect of one piece of immoveable property for the purpose of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property, nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any right which the transferor may have to enforce such direction or any remedy which he may have in respect of a breach thereof.” 7. A restriction of user of the property shall always be strictly construed. Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act extracted above deals with effect of restriction made which is repugnant to transfer of interest in immovable property. A restriction of user of the property shall always be strictly construed. Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act extracted above deals with effect of restriction made which is repugnant to transfer of interest in immovable property. Government grants are different and it shall be permissible for a Government to impose restriction regarding the inalienability of the property for a particular period or restriction on user of property for a particular use for a particular period. First of all, the sale which is made is not a Government grant to which the provisions of Government Grant Act apply and therefore, a fortiorari Section 11 would not definitely come into play. This is taking a worst case scenario that the sale had been made subject to a condition. If there were to be such a condition even such a condition would be invalid. In this case there is no such condition and therefore, the sale which was made could not have been assailed in the manner in which it was sought to be done through the impugned order. 8. I have also examined the legal basis for sale. The alienation is made under the Punjab Municipal General Rules dealing with the Management of Municipal Properties and of State Properties Under the Control of Municipal Committee. The relevant Rules are reproduced as under:- “(1) Any Municipal Committee proposing to alienate permanently or for a term exceeding ten years any land or other immoveable property of which it is the owner shall apply to the Deputy Commissioner for sanction. (2) An application under rule (1) shall be accompanied by a plan of the proposals to be alienated together with a statement in the form appended to these rules. (3) The Deputy Commissioner shall record an order on the application- (i) Sanctioning it (subject to such conditions, if any, as he thinks fit), or (ii) Refusing to sanction it, provided that no sale by auction shall be valid, until it has been confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner. (4) When the Deputy Commissioner has accorded sanction to a sale by auction, the statement aforesaid shall in due course be re-submitted to him with the details regarding the auction which are shown in the form printed on the reverse of the statement and the Deputy Commissioner shall thereon either confirm the sale or refuse to confirm it. (4) When the Deputy Commissioner has accorded sanction to a sale by auction, the statement aforesaid shall in due course be re-submitted to him with the details regarding the auction which are shown in the form printed on the reverse of the statement and the Deputy Commissioner shall thereon either confirm the sale or refuse to confirm it. If the Deputy Commissioner refuses to confirm the sale, the same shall be void. (5) Any orders passed by Deputy Commissioner under Rules 3 and 4 shall subject to the provisions of Section 237 of the Municipal Act be final.” Even the Rules do not prescribe any imposition of condition at the time of grant of sale of the property. It is, therefore, even doubtful whether the Deputy Commissioner could have imposed any restriction on user of the property at the time when he was according a sanction of outright sale of the property. 9. The sale effected was not attached with any condition as wrongly included by two Courts below. The cancellation of sale which was purported to be done was clearly untenable. The substantial question of law as regards the issue of whether there could have been any imposition of restriction would require to be answered in favour of the plaintiff to hold that the sale in favour of the plaintiff was without any condition and there was no scope for cancellation of such a sale. Other substantial question of law as regards the scope of revival of leasehold interest which has been raised does not arise and I, therefore, do not answer it as unnecessary. 10. The judgments of the Courts below are set aside and the appeal is allowed with costs. The lawyer’s fee in appeal is determined at Rs. 20,000/-. ---------0.B.S.0------------ ------------------