Judgment : Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J. Several questions, one connected with and dependent on the other, have cropped up for consideration in this writ petition: whether an Award passed by an industrial tribunal can be enforced by an employee who was no longer working in the company; whether an Award by an industrial tribunal may be enforced by way of a writ petition, whether a workman has a right to seek enforcement of the same at any point of time or conversely whether delay in lodging the claim can be set up by the employer as a factor disentitling the workman to seek any remedy out of the Award; whether a workman who had stopped coming to his place of work for a year can be said to have abandoned his service. These and other related issues are to be examined within the compass of the present case. The petitioner’s case in short is that the had been working as a casual canteen boy in the Airport Canteen Services Unit since 1988. In 1994 had typhoid and had to remain absent for a long time. In 1988 the employer in relation to the management of Air India referred a dispute to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal as regards the wages and other benefits of its employees. An Award was passed in 1995 in terms of the Joint Memorandum of Settlement. The petitioner made several representations to the authorities for regularization of his service. These, however, did not produce any result. Consequently he has filed this present writ petition inter alia seeking a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents either to regularize his services or appoint him to any suitable post in terms of the Award. The denial by the respondents of the case of the petitioner has led to the consideration of the issues as mentioned before. In their affidavit they have raised the question that a writ court cannot be the appropriate forum for enforcing a settlement and the petitioner has no legal right to be regularized. On the facts, the respondents have more specific allegations. The petitioner had been working as a casual canteen boy since 1988 on 'no work no pay' basis. He remained absent since March 10, 1994 without any intimation. He never informed anybody about his alleged sickness. On the facts, the respondents have more specific allegations. The petitioner had been working as a casual canteen boy since 1988 on 'no work no pay' basis. He remained absent since March 10, 1994 without any intimation. He never informed anybody about his alleged sickness. After about 7½ years by a letter, dated August 2, 2001 he sought re-employment as a casual worker. Refuting the allegation that any money is due to the petitioner the respondents have asserted that in fact some amount is due from the petitioner to the company. The Award that was passed by the Tribunal on June 27, 1995 provided that the canteen workers from serial numbers 1 to 26 would be regularized with effect from July 1, 1995 and the rest of the canteen workers who were engaged as casuals would be regularized in due course along with the other casuals of the company according to availability of vacancies. The name of the petitioner was at number 31 in the list. At the time of filing the dispute his name was included in the list of casual canteen worker. But at the time of passing of the Award he had already abandoned his casual job on his own. It has been categorically stated that the canteen workers from serial numbers 1 to 26 have been regularized, subject to their medical fitness. But the rest of the canteen workers are still working as casuals due to non-availability of vacancies. The facts thus are more or less admitted. At least there is no serious dispute about the basic factual context. The fact remains that the petitioner was working since 1988 as a casual canteen boy of the company. The petitioner does not dispute that since March, 1994 he kept himself absent without any intimation to the company. Thus when the Award was passed in June, 1995 the petitioner had left the job without any intimation for one year and three months. After about 7½ years the respondents first received his letter in November, 2001. His claim in the affidavit-in-reply that immediately after his recovery from ailment he contacted the respondents is a defence not worthy of much credence unless he claims that he suffered from typhoid for all those years. After about 7½ years the respondents first received his letter in November, 2001. His claim in the affidavit-in-reply that immediately after his recovery from ailment he contacted the respondents is a defence not worthy of much credence unless he claims that he suffered from typhoid for all those years. That apart there is no document from which it may appear that he had informed the respondents either before or after getting absent from his duties since March, 1994. The question is whether the petitioner in view of his long and silent absence could still claim benefit under the Award. The settlement in terms of which the Award was passed made two broad categories of the workmen as mentioned in the Memorandum of Settlement. Workmen from serial numbers 1 to 26 were to be regularized with effect from July 1, 1995. Those belonging to serial numbers 27 to 35 who were engaged as casuals were to be regularized in due course along with other casuals engaged by the company on the basis of their respective seniority and subject to availability of vacancies and fulfilling the recruitment procedure and eligibility criteria. This clause must be understood to be meant for those who were working in the company at that material point of time. The petitioner was no longer working in the company. He too had admitted this position and had described himself as an ex-casual canteen boy when he made an appeal to the manager of the company on October 3, 2002. As such the question of regularizing his services did not arise. In the case of G. T. Land and Others –Vs.- Chemicals and Fibres India Limited, reported in AIR 1979 SC 582 , the question that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court was about the true meaning of the expression abandonment of service. After considering the lexical and legal meanings of the expression the Supreme Court held that to constitute abandonment of service there must be total and complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same. The Supreme Court referred to the case of Buckingham Co. After considering the lexical and legal meanings of the expression the Supreme Court held that to constitute abandonment of service there must be total and complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same. The Supreme Court referred to the case of Buckingham Co. –Vs.- Venkatiah ( AIR 1964 SC 1272 ) where it had been held that under the common law an inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished the service was not easily drawn unless from the length of absence and surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect could be legitimately drawn and it could be assumed that the employee intended to abandon service. Applying these tests it can be held that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own. The length of absence was sufficient for drawing an inference adverse to the petitioner that he had intended to leave the organization. Again, the surrounding circumstances, such as that he had left without any intimation and then again surfaced after so many years without any intimation in between are clear indications of his intention to relinquish his job. Continuous absence for more than one year without any intimation may be taken as a proof of abandonment of service and the respondents cannot be blamed if they had treated the petitioner to have left the service. This takes us to the consideration of a more fundamental issue. Whether an Award can be enforced by a writ petition. The petitioner claims that he is entitled to reliefs in terms of the Award of the Tribunal. It has been found that he cannot take advantage of the Award. Even if he could, this is, however, not to be enforced by a writ court. In the case of K. M. Mukherjee –Vs.- Secretary and Treasurer, SBI and Others, reported in AIR 1968 Cal 59 , this court had held that - “An Award of an Industrial Tribunal is the decision of an industrial adjudication by a statutory tribunal and can have no more statutory force than the decree of a civil court. In the case of K. M. Mukherjee –Vs.- Secretary and Treasurer, SBI and Others, reported in AIR 1968 Cal 59 , this court had held that - “An Award of an Industrial Tribunal is the decision of an industrial adjudication by a statutory tribunal and can have no more statutory force than the decree of a civil court. Either may be executed or otherwise implemented in the manner laid down in the relevant haw, but it cannot be enforced by the prerogative writ of Mandamus, as an instrument having the force of law of itself.” In view of this settled principles of law the petitioner cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of the court to implement the Award passed by the Tribunal. The respondents have also raised their objection about the maintainability of the petition on the ground of delay. That indeed is also a factor disentitling the petitioner to the reliefs sought. The Award was passed in June, 1995. It was only in November, 2001 that the respondents heard anything from the petitioner and he filed this writ petition about three years thereafter. The petitioner has not explained this inordinate delay, except that from March, 1994 he was suffering from typhoid. Even from the period when he started making representation to the respondents there was a further delay of about three years. In the facts of the present case this by itself must be reckoned to be a very considerable delay. This unexplained delay for such a long period must be considered fatal to the writ petition. Thus I find no merit in the petition. The same is hereby dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.