JUDGMENT By the instant petition, the petitioners have prayed to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by seeking the following reliefs:- i. To issue writ of certiorari quashing order dated 02.04.2012 (Annexure P/5) passed by the respondent No. 2. ii. To issue writ of certiorari be issued quashing the impugned notification under section 4of the Act 1894 dated 12.07.2011 and under section 6, 9(3) of the Act 1984. iii. Summon the entire record pertaining to the land acquisition proceedings at Village Jamali Rajgarh and Ardla for the Construction of Talab. iv. To direct respondents to hear objections of the petitioners and other agriculturist in case No. L.A.C. No./61/A-82/10-11 L.A.C. No./63/A-82/10-11 whose land will be acquired. v. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper may kindly be granted. 2. One of the aforesaid reliefs is for the quashment of order dated 02.04.2012 (Annexure-P/5) whereby the respondent no. 2/Collector has rejected the representation of the petitioners after giving them opportunity as directed by this Court in W.P. No. 20685/2011. The entire endeavour has been made for the quashment of notification dated 12.07.2011 (Annexure-P/6) issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short "Act of 1894") because no inquiry was conducted as per requirement of provisions of Section 5A of the Act of 1894 and eventually the subsequent notification was passed under Section 6 of the said Act. The objections of petitioners have been rejected by the Collector on the ground that it was not necessary to conduct any inquiry under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 or to provide any opportunity to raise any objection and decide the same because the provision of Section 17 of the Act of 1894 has been invoked which clearly mentions that if the urgency clause is invoked it is not necessary to invoke any of the provisions under Section 5A of the Act of 1894. 3. According to learned counsel for the petitioners if the special power in case of urgency was to be invoked as envisaged under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 there should be a notification alongwith the notification under Section 4(1) of the said Act. 3. According to learned counsel for the petitioners if the special power in case of urgency was to be invoked as envisaged under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 there should be a notification alongwith the notification under Section 4(1) of the said Act. Having not done so at the time of issuance of notification which was published on 12.07.2011, the same could not have been given after more than 17 days on 29.07.2011 (Annexure-R/2) whereby the Commissioner Indore Division Indore directed the Collector Khandwa by giving his consent to proceed under Section 17 of the Act of 1894. Thus, the notification under section 4(1) (Annexure-P/6) and notification under Section 6 (Annexure-R/3) be quashed. Learned counsel submits that in the notification of Section 4, it is not at all mentioned that objections under section 5A of the Act are not required to be taken and heard. Hence, it has been put-forth by him that how the land owners would come to know that urgency clause is invoked. 4. By inviting my attention to the notification under section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 it has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that in the said notification, the names of land owners are not mentioned and similarly the survey numbers and khasra numbers are also not mentioned, therefore, the notification is bad in law. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on Single Bench decision of this Court in Raju Sharma v. State of M.P. & Ors. 2013(1) MPLJ 652 . He has also placed reliance upon the decisions of Supreme Court in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana and others 2012(1) SCC 792 and Darshan Lal Nagpal (dead) by LRs v. Government of NCT of Delhi and others 2012(2) SCC 327 , Radhy Shyam (dead) through LRs and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others 2011(5) SCC 553 and Surinder Singh Brar and others v. Union of India and others 2013(1) SCC 403 . Hence it has been prayed that this petition be allowed and by quashing the notification under Section 4(1) and section 6 of the Act of 1894 it may be held that entire proceedings to acquire the land in question is vitiated. 5. Hence it has been prayed that this petition be allowed and by quashing the notification under Section 4(1) and section 6 of the Act of 1894 it may be held that entire proceedings to acquire the land in question is vitiated. 5. On the other hand Shri Sanjay Dwivedi, learned Government Advocate has submitted that indeed the petitioners first approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 20685/2011 which was disposed of on 15.12.2011 and it was directed to the petitioners that on submitting representation to the Collector, Khandwa indicating therein their grievances, the same may be decided whether they were heard before issuance of notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. The Collector after hearing the petitioners has rejected their representation and hence the petitioners have come up in this petition. Learned Government Advocate further contended that there is no provision to issue a separate notification under Section 17(4). Indeed the urgency clause is to be notified in the notification under section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 itself and notification should be prior to issuance of notification under Section 6. Learned Government Advocate has submitted that the notification under Section 6 was already notified in the official gazette on 07.09.2011 i.e. before passing of order of this Court on 15.12.2011. In support of his contention, learned Government Advocate has placed reliance upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in Yogesh Neema and others v. State of M.P. and others 2008(2) MPHT 337 . Learned Government Advocate further submits that notification under Section 4(1) cannot be said to be bad in law merely because the names of land owners and survey numbers are not mentioned as it is not required to do so under Section 4(1) of the Act. Hence, it has been prayed that this petition be dismissed. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. Before dwelling upon the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties it would be apt to mention that award has already been passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and therefore this Court on 17.05.2012 has vacated the stay order which was granted earlier on 04.05.2012. 7. Before dwelling upon the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties it would be apt to mention that award has already been passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and therefore this Court on 17.05.2012 has vacated the stay order which was granted earlier on 04.05.2012. It would be further relevant to mention here that earlier on 06.05.2012 this petition was allowed but when a review petition was filed by the State of M.P. (R.P. No. 706/2012) the same was allowed on 22.11.2012 and hence this writ petition has been heard afresh. 8. The main contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that urgency clause as envisaged under section 17(1) and (4) of the Act of 1894 has not been invoked in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 and same has been invoked after more than 15 days and therefore the notification under Section 4(1) of the said Act is bad in law and eventually notification under Section 6 is also bad in law. Thus, I am required to see whether urgency clause has been invoked when the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 was notified. On bare perusal of the notification (Annexure-P/6) itself, this fact finds place that urgency clause under Section 17 has been invoked because dam is to be constructed for the approach and for the canal under the Scheme namely 'Ardala Irrigation Dam Scheme'. In the notification under Section 4(1) (Annexure-P/6 = Annexure-R/1) it has been mentioned that the provisions of section 5A of the Act of 1894 may not be invoked and therefore it should be inferred that the State Government has directed to invoke the provision of Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act of 1894 and hence the objections under Section 5A were not invited. In the order of Collector dated 02.04.2012 which has been passed in pursuant to the order of this Court in W.P. No. 20685/2011 dated 15.12.2011 it has been specifically mentioned that in order to irrigate 548 hectare un-irrigated land the Scheme namely 'Ardala Sinchai Talab Ke Doob Kshetra Bandh Speel Avam Approach Avam Nahar Nirman' was introduced by the State Government. Further because within the time limit the dam is to be constructed and canal is to be made so that unirrigated land may be developed and the inhabitants of the locality may be benefited by converting the un-irrigated land into irrigated land. Hence, in these facts and circumstances the objections under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 were not invited. In the order of Collector it has also been mentioned that after following the procedure prescribed under the law, a notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 has already been issued. Indeed the notification under section 6 has been brought on record as Annexure-R/3. Thereafter, the interested persons were directed to submit their claims under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 but no claim has been filed before the Land Acquisition Officer and therefore the objections of petitioners were rejected because looking to the urgency clause invoked hearing of objection under Section 5A was not required. 9. According to me, if the urgency clause is required to be invoked, there is no necessity to receive objection and to hear objections under Section 5A of Act of 1894 and indeed this is the intention of the legislature to give true meaning to Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act of 1894. 10. I do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that urgency clause envisaged under section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 has not been invoked at the time of issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 because in the said notification it is simply mentioned that in the opinion of the Collector, the provisions of Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act of 1894 are required to be invoked and therefore when Annexure-R/2 on 26.07.2011 was issued by the Commissioner Indore giving its consent to invoke urgency clause, issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 becomes otiose. 11. 11. This Court is of the view that because it has been specifically mentioned in the notification under Section 4(1)of the Act of 1894 that there is direction of the State Government not to invoke any provision under Section 5A of the Act of 1894, therefore, if it has been stated in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act by the Collector that in his opinion the provision of Section 17(1) and (4) would be applicable, the said notification ipso facto would not become bad in law. I may further add that the intention of the State Government not to invoke the provisions of Section 5(1) of the Act of 1894 impliedly means to invoke urgency clause because section 5A would not be applicable only when provisions of Section 17(1) and (4) are attracted. Undisputedly, in order to promote the happiness of the locality and the inhabitants of nearby villagers who are having un-irrigated land and to develop the agricultural lands of that vicinity, a dam as well as a canal is to be constructed to fulfill the object of the aforesaid Scheme of the State Government and therefore urgency clause is needed and in its true spirit it has also been mentioned in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894. Otherwise, in the notification it would not have been mentioned that according to the State Government there shall be no applicability of Section 5A of the Act. 12. The Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Krishan Lal Arneja and others (2004) 8 SCC 453 while interpreting sub-section (1) and (4) of Section 17 of the Act of 1894 and also by placing reliance upon its earlier decision has held that even if there is no statement about urgency in the notification under Section 4(1) r/w 17(1) of the Act of 1894 the Government could justify the urgency and the need to dispense with by invoking Section 17(4) by referring the surrounding circumstances, the nature of public purpose, the real urgency that the situation demands etc. From this angle I have gone through the order of Collector dated 02.04.2012 in which it has been clearly embodied that in order to develop the un-irrigated land and to develop the locality a dam and canal are required to be constructed. Indeed this stand has also been taken in the return by the respondents. From this angle I have gone through the order of Collector dated 02.04.2012 in which it has been clearly embodied that in order to develop the un-irrigated land and to develop the locality a dam and canal are required to be constructed. Indeed this stand has also been taken in the return by the respondents. In another decision First Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and another (2002) 4 SCC 160 it has been held by the Supreme Court as under:- “The question of urgency of an acquisition under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily it is not open to the Court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. In this view of the matter when the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant considerations into account and is satisfied that there exits emergency for invoking powers under Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act, and issues notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with by the Court unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the Appropriate Authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the Appropriate Authority malafide.” I have already held hereinabove that the Government has taken a decision by taking all relevant consideration into account and thereafter it was satisfied that their exists emergency for invoking the power under section 17(1) and (4) of the Act of 1894 and thereby in the notification under Section 4(1) it has been mentioned that there shall be no applicability of Section 5A of the Act of 1894. The action of the appropriate authority appears to be quite bona fide and nothing has been brought on record in order to infer that it is mala fide. 13. The Chief Justice Shri A.K. Patnaik (as His Lordship then was) in Yogesh Neema (supra) by placing reliance on the decisions of Supreme Court Krishan Lal Arneja and Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli (supra) held that for construction of canal to benefit several hectares of land so that the inhabitants would be benefited, the urgency clause which was projected was bona fide. The Chief Justice Shri A.K. Patnaik (as His Lordship then was) in Yogesh Neema (supra) by placing reliance on the decisions of Supreme Court Krishan Lal Arneja and Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli (supra) held that for construction of canal to benefit several hectares of land so that the inhabitants would be benefited, the urgency clause which was projected was bona fide. If para 9 of the said decision is taken in to consideration it would reveal that notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 of that case was published earlier and the request was made to the Commissioner, Indore Division, Indore to accord its permission to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act of 1894. The Commissioner thereafter accorded its consent on 15.11.2007. In the said decision, the Collector requested to Commissioner to give its consent to invoke Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act and in the present also, exactly the similar situation is there. The Division Bench of this Court upheld the decision of learned Writ Court dismissing the writ petition. To me, the Division Bench decision of this Court in Yogesh Neema (supra) is squarely applicable in the case at hand. 14. The decisions of Surinder Singh Brar and Raghbir Singh Sehrawat (supra) and so also Single Bench decision of this Court in Raju Sharma (supra) are not applicable in the present case because in these cases the urgency clause was not invoked. The decision of Darshan Lal Nagpal (supra) is not applicable in the present case because time lag of five years between proposal for acquisition of land for establishment of electricity substation and issue of notification invoking urgency provisions and therefore it was held that in those facts and circumstances the urgency clause could not have been invoked. In the decision of Radhy Shyam (supra) urgency clause was invoked to develop the industrial development in the district through Development Authority (Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority) and in the facts and circumstances of that case it was held that invoking of provisions under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 was not required. Further there was a long time gap of one year and three months between receipt of land acquisition proposal from Development Authority and issuance of notification. Further there was a long time gap of one year and three months between receipt of land acquisition proposal from Development Authority and issuance of notification. However, in the present case the procedure of acquisition has already been completed and Land Acquisition Officer has also passed the award. Thus, all the decisions placed reliance by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 15. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that the description of survey numbers and the names of land owners are not mentioned in the notification under Section 4(1) and therefore said notification is bad in law is concerned, suffice it to say that nowhere in Section 4(1) looking to its language it was mandatory on the part of the appropriate Government to state the names of land owners and khasra numbers etc. in this regard I may profitably place reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in Union of India v. K. Balaji Jay Rama Rao and others, (2007) 15 SCC 791. That apart, there is no pleading to that effect of the petitioners and for the first time this point is raised at the time of hearing. 16. For the reasons stated hereinabove, I do not find any merit in this petition. The same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. This Court is not aware as to whether the petitioners have filed any application praying to refer the matter to the Civil Court. However, if the petitioners are not satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded to them by the Land Acquisition Officer, they may assail the order of Award in the Civil Court by following procedure prescribed under the law.