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Allahabad High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 792 (ALL)

Jai Pal v. Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda and Another

2013-03-12

TARUN AGARWALA

body2013
Tarun Agarwala, J.— Heard Sri Bhoopendra Nath Singh, the learned counsel assisted by Sri D.P. Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Manisha Ambwani, the learned counsel holding brief of Sri Vipin Sinha, the learned counsel for the respondents. The petitioner workman whose reference was answered in negative by the labour court, has filed the present writ petition. The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition is, that the petitioner contended that he was engaged as a peon on daily rate basis on 12th January, 1995 and worked continuously without any break in service till 1st November, 1996, and that his services were arbitrarily terminated on 2nd November, 1996. The petitioner contended that he had worked for more than 240 days in a calender year and that his services were arbitrarily terminated without complying with the provisions of 6- N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The respondents, in the written statement, denied the stand of the petitioner and contended that he was never an employee of the Bank and that for exigency of services, the workman was engaged on a daily rate basis for a period of one week in April 1995, for which he was paid the wages through a voucher. The workman filed an application before the labour court seeking direction to the employers to produce certain documents, namely, payment vouchers for the period in question to prove that the petitioner had worked for the period in question. In response to the said application, the employer produced the voucher for April, 1995 indicating that he had worked for this period and denied that workman had worked for any other period. At a later stage, the employer submitted that vouchers for the remaining period was not traceable . The labour court, by an order dated 12th June, 2003, rejected the the application of the petitioner for the production of the documents by the respondent Bank. This order has become final. The labour court, while rejecting the application, allowed the workman to produce secondary evidence, and in response thereof, the workman petitioner filed photo stat copies of the payment vouchers indicating that he had received payment from the bank for the period in question. On the strength of these documents, the petitioner tried to justify that he had worked for more than 240 days in a calender year. On the strength of these documents, the petitioner tried to justify that he had worked for more than 240 days in a calender year. The labour court, after considering the material evidence on record rejected the claim of the workman holding that no evidence was filed by the workman to prove that he had worked for more than 240 days in a calender year. The labour court also rejected the photo stat copies holding that it cannot be treated as evidence. The labour court came to the conclusion that the workman had worked only for a limited period and that he had not worked for more than 240 days in a calender year, and accordingly, declined to grant the relief to the petitioner. The workman, being aggrieved by the said award, has filed the present writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the best evidence was with the employers, namely, the payment vouchers and that payment vouchers for the period April, 1995 was produced and that the vouchers for the remaining period had not been produced. Consequently an adverse inference ought to have been drawn against the employers. The learned counsel further submitted that photo stat copies should have been accepted as secondary evidence in the absence of the original payment vouchers not being produced by the employers. The learned counsel contended that in the light of these facts, especially when the labour court at one stage had directed the employers to produce the payment registers, the labour court has committed an error in holding that the photo stat copies could not be treated as secondary evidence and that the labour court further committed an error in holding that the workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed a reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the Devinder Singh Vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur 2011 (3) ESC 514 and Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation 2010 (3) SCC 192 wherein the Supreme Court held that the termination of the service without providing compensation as provided under Section 25 F of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act warrants quashing of the order of the termination and awarding of the reinstatement in service as well as wages. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation 2010 (3) SCC 192 wherein the Supreme Court held that the termination of the service without providing compensation as provided under Section 25 F of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act warrants quashing of the order of the termination and awarding of the reinstatement in service as well as wages. The learned counsel also placed a reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in R.M. Yellatti Vs. Assistant Executive Engineer 2006 (108) FLR 213, wherein the Supreme Court held that the Evidence Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and that the burden of proof upon the workman to prove that had worked worked for 240 days in a calender year was discharged the moment the workman appeared in the witness box. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the Court finds that the petitioner's application for production of documents was rejected by the labour court. This order has not been brought on record nor has been challenged by the petitioner. Consequently, the earlier interlocutory orders of the labour court directing the petitioner to produce the registers are of no use whatsoever. Whatever documents that has been produced by the employers were duly considered by the labour court. The Court finds that the labour court allowed the workman to file secondary evidence. In the instant case photo stat copies of the payment register ought to have been taken as secondary evidence, but the Court finds from a perusal of the counter affidavit that the photo stat copies of the payment vouchers indicated a lot of cuttings and overwriting by changing the name of the worker, and consequently, the genuineness of the photo stat copies becomes doubtful. The labour court accordingly rejected the phot stat copies as secondary evidence. This being a finding of fact, which is not perverse, and consequently, the Court is not inclined to interfere in this finding. In the light of the fact that no evidence of any nature was brought before the labour court to prove that the workman had worked for more than 240 days in a calender year, the initial burden, which was upon the petitioner himself was not discharged and, consequently, the onus could not shift upon the employers. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner consequently has no application to the present facts and circumstances of the case. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner consequently has no application to the present facts and circumstances of the case. The labour court has given a finding that the workman could not prove that he had worked for more than 240 days. Consequently, t`he principle of "last come first to go" becomes wholly redundant. In the light of the aforesaid, the Court does not find any error in the impugned award. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. _____________