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Andhra High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 792 (AP)

A. Mannan v. APSRTC rep. by its Managing Director

2013-09-20

K.G.SHANKAR

body2013
ORDER K.G. Shankar, J. 1. Both the writ petitions are disposed of through this common order. When the employee was removed from service by APSRTC after due enquiry, the employee raised I.D. No. 53 of 2002 before the Labour Court-Ill, Hyderabad. The labour Court passed an Award on 26-05-2004 finding the employee not guilty of the charge levelled against him and ordered reinstatement of the petitioner with continuity of service and back wages but without attendant benefits. Aggrieved by the Award of not granting attendant benefits, the employee preferred W.P. No. 13899 of 2004. Assailing the Award regarding reinstatement and back wages, the APSRTC preferred W.P. No. 106 of 2005. As both the writ petitions arise from the Award in I.D. No. 53 of 2002, both the writ petitions are disposed of through this common order. The parties are referred to as they are arrayed in W.P. No. 13899 of 2004. The petitioner joined the services of the respondents 1 & 2 as a Driver on 01-02-1985, On 24-02-2001, there was an altercation between the petitioner and a passenger by name N. Lingaiah while the petitioner was driving a bus leading to the petitioner slapping N. Lingaiah with a slipper, according to the allegations of the respondents 1 & 2. It would appear that N. Lingaiah lodged a police complaint against the petitioner. Consequently, a domestic enquiry was conducted regarding the alleged assault of the passenger while the petitioner was the driver of the bus. The petitioner was found guilty of the charge. The petitioner was removed from service through orders dated 07-05-2002. Questioning the same, the petitioner raised I.D. No. 53 of 2002 before the Labour Court-III (the 3rd respondent). As already pointed out that, the 3rd respondent ordered reinstatement with continuity of service, back Wages, but without attendant benefits. Hence, the two writ petitions. 2. Sri S.M. Subhan, learned counsel representing the petitioner submitted that the 3rd respondent considered that the charge has not been proved so much so the 3rd respondent ought to have ordered grant of attendant benefits also. He submitted that the petitioner be granted attendant benefits also apart from reinstatement, continuity of service and back wages. 3. 2. Sri S.M. Subhan, learned counsel representing the petitioner submitted that the 3rd respondent considered that the charge has not been proved so much so the 3rd respondent ought to have ordered grant of attendant benefits also. He submitted that the petitioner be granted attendant benefits also apart from reinstatement, continuity of service and back wages. 3. Sri H. Venugopal, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 1 & 2 on the other hand contended that the 3rd respondent has not properly reappreciated the evidence and that in fact the charge against the petitioner has been proved. He submitted that the order of reinstatement, continuity of service and back wages by the 3rd respondent is unjust and that the order of removal deserves to be upheld. 4. Before the Enquiry Officer, the main victim N. Lingaiah was examined. One G. Chinnamma and G. Chinna Chinnamma who were passengers in the bus at the time of the incident were also examined. The Conductor of the bus was also examined in the domestic enquiry. The learned Presiding Officer of the 3rd respondent reappreciated the evidence and held that the petitioner assaulting N. Lingaiah has not been made out. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 1 & 2 submitted that the scope of reappreciation of the evidence by the Tribunal is limited. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh v. Management of Usha Breco Limited and another 2008 (5) SCJ 439 : (2008) 5 SCC 554 : 2009 (2) ALT 23 .3 (DN SC). It was observed in that case: Indisputably, in the event, fresh evidence is adduced before the Labour Court by the management the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence. But, in a case where the materials brought on record by the enquiry officer fall for re-appreciation by the Labour Court, it should be slow to interfere therewith. It must come to a conclusion that the case was a "proper" one therefore. The Labour Court shall not interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer only because it is lawful to do so. It would not take recourse thereto only because another view is possible. Even assuming that, for all intent and purport, the Labour Court acts as an appellate authority over the judgment of the enquiry officer, it would exercise appropriate restraint. It would not take recourse thereto only because another view is possible. Even assuming that, for all intent and purport, the Labour Court acts as an appellate authority over the judgment of the enquiry officer, it would exercise appropriate restraint. It must bear in mind that the enquiry officer also acts as a quasi-judicial body. Before it, parties are not only entitled to examine their respective witnesses, they can cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the other side. They are free to adduce documentary evidence. The parties as also the enquiry officer can also summon witnesses to determine the truth. The enquiry officer can call for even other records. It must indisputably comply with the basic principles of natural justice. ... It is one thing to say that the finding of an enquiry officer is perverse or betrays the well-known doctrine of proportionality but it is another thing to say that only because two views are possible, the Labour Court shall interfere therewith. In other words, it is one thing to say that on the basis of the materials on record, the Labour Court comes to a conclusion that a verdict of guilt has been arrived at by the enquiry officer where the materials suggested otherwise but it is another thing to say that such a verdict was also a possible view. It is submitted by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents on the basis of this decision that the Tribunal overstepped itself in reappreciating the facts and did not assign proper reasons for finding the petitioner not guilty. 5. The charge as already pointed out is that while the petitioner was acting as driver of an RTC bus, he entered into scuffle with N. Lingaiah and slapped him with a slipper. The victim N. Lingaiah admittedly lodged a police complaint. In his evidence before the Enquiry Officer, N. Lingaiah stated that he entered into a compromise with the petitioner and had withdrawn the complaint against the petitioner. The learned Standing counsel for the respondents contended that the very lodging of the complaint has been admitted by N. Lingaiah and that N. Lingiah never stated before the Enquiry Officer that he was not beaten. He pointed out that Lingiah merely deposed that he entered into a compromise with the petitioner and consequently had withdrawn the compliant and that it clearly shows that the petitioner had assaulted N. Lingaiah. He pointed out that Lingiah merely deposed that he entered into a compromise with the petitioner and consequently had withdrawn the compliant and that it clearly shows that the petitioner had assaulted N. Lingaiah. 6. On the other hand, the evidence of N. Lingaiah is not positive before the Enquiry Officer that he was indeed beaten/assaulted by the petitioner and that he nevertheless had withdrawn the complaint on account of compromise between him and the petitioner. He merely admitted lodging a compliant albeit he never stated that he lodged a false complaint. He further stated that he had withdrawn the complaint owing to compromise. I consider that the Tribunal was justified in concluding that the evidence of N. Lingaiah did not prove that the petitioner assaulted N. Lingaiah. 7. Apart from N. Lingiah, G. Chinnamma deposed in the domestic enquiry that she witnessed the petitioner beating N. Lingiah. This evidence is against the evidence of the Conductor who categorically stated that the petitioner did not assault or beat N. Lingaiah or any one and that there was indeed an altercation between some of the passengers while the petitioner was driving the vehicle. Another witness G. Chinna Chinnamma also did not claim that the petitioner beat N. Lingaiah. Thus N. Lingaiah did not state that he was beaten by the petitioner. The Conductor stated that the petitioner did not beat Lingiah. G. Chinna Chinnamma did not state that the petitioner beat Lingiah. It is G. Chinnamma who alone stated that Lingaiah was beaten by the petitioner. Appreciating the evidence of G. Chinnamma in the context of overwhelming evidence against the evidence of G. Chinnamma, the 3rd respondent correctly considered that the evidence of G. Chinnamma cannot be given weight in concluding that the petitioner assaulted N. Lingiah. Thus the finding of the 3rd respondent does not appear to be perverse in any manner. At the same time, the contention of the learned Standing Counsel deserves to be taken note of that Lingiah did not state that he was not beaten by the petitioner. In that view of the situation, I consider that this is a case where perhaps the petitioner beat the passenger and that such a passenger has condoned the criminal activity of the petitioner. In that view of the situation, I consider that this is a case where perhaps the petitioner beat the passenger and that such a passenger has condoned the criminal activity of the petitioner. Consequently, the order of the 3rd respondent directing reinstatement of the petitioner with continuity of service and back wages and without the attendant benefits is eminently just and proper and does not deserve to be interfered with. I, therefore, see no merits in either of the writ petitions. Consequently, both the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.