JUDGMENT By Court: Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the State. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the Judgment dated 21st December 1999 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Palamau, in Criminal Appeal No. 71 of 1997, whereby, the Appellate Court below has upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioner for the offence under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code. It may be stated that the petitioner was found guilty and convicted for the offence under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 25 (1-B)(a)/26 of the Arms Act, by the Judgment dated 26.4.1997 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Palamau at Daltonganj, in G.R Case No. 1749 of 1991/T.R No. 180 of 1997, and upon hearing on the point of sentence, the petitioner was sentenced to undergo R.I for two years for the offence under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code and R.I for one year for the offence under Sections 25 (1-B)(a)/26 of the Arms Act, and both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. In the appeal, the conviction and sentence of the petitioner for the offences under the Arms Act were set aside, but his conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code were upheld by the learned Appellate Court below. 3. The record shows that the petitioner had been made accused in Sadar P.S. Case No. 539 of 1991 for the offence under Sections 394/ 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 25(a)/26/35 of the Arms Act on the allegation that on 30.10.1991, the petitioner along-with the other co-accused persons had committed robbery in a hotel room and when the accused persons were fleeing away, the petitioner was apprehended and he was produced before the police along-with the fire arm, at the place of occurrence itself. The other co-accused persons managed to flee away, who were named by the petitioner. On the basis of the information given by the informant, Kanhai Prasad Mathur, the F.I.R was lodged and the investigation was taken up. After investigation, the police submitted the charge-sheet against the petitioner and the other co-accused persons and after taking cognizance, the petitioner was put to trial along with the co-accused persons. 4. On the basis of the information given by the informant, Kanhai Prasad Mathur, the F.I.R was lodged and the investigation was taken up. After investigation, the police submitted the charge-sheet against the petitioner and the other co-accused persons and after taking cognizance, the petitioner was put to trial along with the co-accused persons. 4. In course of trial, the prosecution examined five witnesses including the informant, who was examined as P.W.4, and he has fully supported the prosecution case in his evidence. The informant also claimed to identify the accused persons who were on representation on the date of his examination. The other witnesses examining in this case are P.W.2, Surya Narayan Das and P.W.3, Surendra Prasad Singh who are the I.O and the other police officer. The Fardbeyan was proved by the P.W.2 Surya Narayan Das, who had recorded the same at the place of occurrence. P.W.1 and P.W.5 are the formal witnesses, who proved the formal FIR and the report of the Sergeant Major regarding the fire-arm. 5. On the basis of the evidence on record, the Trial Court found the petitioner guilty for the offence under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code and 25 (1-B)(a), 26 of the Arms Act and accordingly, convicted him for the same and upon hearing on the point of sentence, the petitioner was sentenced to undergo R.I for two years for the offence under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code and he was also sentenced to undergo R.I for one year for the offence under the Arms Act, and both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 6. In the appeal filed against the said Judgment, the Appellate Court below has set aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner for the offences under the Arms Act, but has confirmed the conviction and sentence of the petitioner for the offence under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned Judgments passed by the Courts below are absolutely illegal, inasmuch as, only one material witness was examined in the Court below. The other witnesses are the police officials and the formal witnesses. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned Judgments passed by the Courts below are absolutely illegal, inasmuch as, only one material witness was examined in the Court below. The other witnesses are the police officials and the formal witnesses. Learned counsel accordingly, submitted that in absence of other material witnesses, the prosecution has failed to establish the charge against the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubts and it is a fit case, in which, the petitioner ought to have been given at least the benefit of doubt. Learned counsel for the petitioner has lastly submitted that in any case, the petitioner has remained in custody for about one year, and he may be sentenced only for the period undergone. 8. Leaned counsel for the State, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer and has submitted that the witnesses examined by the prosecution have fully supported the prosecution case. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the State that the informant has also fully supported the prosecution case and has deposed that the petitioner was apprehended and produced before the police at the place of occurrence itself. It has also been submitted that it has come in the evidence that another material witness had died, due to which he could not be examined by the prosecution. Learned counsel accordingly, submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned Judgments passed by the Courts below, worth interference in the revisional jurisdiction. 9. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record, I find that the Judgments of the Courts below are based on the evidence on record which has been discussed in detail by the Trial Court. The witness examined by the prosecution have proved the fact that the petitioner has committed robbery and he was apprehended at the spot and produced before the police. The Trial Court has sentenced the petitioner to undergo R.I. for two years, for his conviction for the offence under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code, which in the facts and circumstances of this case was just and proper. Accordingly, I do not find any illegality in the impugned Judgments passed by the Courts below. 10. The Trial Court has sentenced the petitioner to undergo R.I. for two years, for his conviction for the offence under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code, which in the facts and circumstances of this case was just and proper. Accordingly, I do not find any illegality in the impugned Judgments passed by the Courts below. 10. However, the fact remains that the petitioner was sentenced by the Trial Court on 26.4.1997 itself and during the course of trial, the petitioner has undergone the sentence for a little above one year. In view of the passage of time, I am of the considered view that it would not be proper to send the petitioner to jail again after the lapse of more than 15 years. In my considered view, the ends of justice would be met if the petitioner is only sentenced fine for the remaining period of sentence. Accordingly, it is directed that if the petitioner pays the fine of Rs.15,000/-(Rs. Fifteen thousand only), he shall be discharged from the liabilities of his bail bonds. 11. The petitioner is directed to deposit the amount of fine in the Court below within a period of two months from today, failing which, the Court below shall issue process against the petitioner for his production in the Court below, and if he fails to deposit the amount of fine, he shall have to undergo the remaining part of the sentence imposed by the Trial Court below. 12. With this modification and sentence, this revision application stands dismissed. Let this order be communicated to the Court concerned forthwith, along with the Lower Court Records.